Zinzendorf thought this too bold a step, without consulting the Emperor:
to which Gallas replied, that his design was only to engage the Queen to
go on with the war; that Zinzendorf knew how earnestly the English and
Dutch had pressed to have these troops from Hungary, and therefore they
ought to be promised, in order to quiet those two nations, after which
several ways might be found to elude that promise; and, in the mean
time, the great point would be gained of bringing the English to declare
for continuing the war: that the Emperor might afterwards excuse
himself, by the apprehension of a war in Hungary, or of that between the
Turks and Muscovites: that if these excuses should be at an end, a
detachment of one or two regiments might be sent, and the rest deferred,
by pretending want of money; by which the Queen would probably be
brought to maintain some part of those troops, and perhaps the whole
body. He added, that this way of management was very common among the
allies; and gave for an example, the forces which the Dutch had promised
for the service of Spain, but were never sent; with several other
instances of the same kind, which he said might be produced.

Her Majesty, who had long suspected that Count Gallas was engaged in
these and the like practices, having at last received authentic proofs
of this whole intrigue, from original letters, and the voluntary
confession of those who were principally concerned in carrying it on,
thought it necessary to show her resentment, by refusing the count any
more access to her person or her court.

Although the Queen, as it hath been already observed, was resolved to
open the conferences upon the general preliminaries, yet she thought it
would very much forward the peace to know what were the utmost
concessions which France would make to the several allies, but
especially to the States General and the Duke of Savoy: therefore, while
Her Majesty was pressing the former to agree to a general treaty, the
AbbГ© Gaultier was sent to France with a memorial, to desire that the
Most Christian King would explain himself upon those preliminaries,
particularly with relation to Savoy and Holland, whose satisfaction the
Queen had most at heart, as well from her friendship to both these
powers, as because, if she might engage to them that their just
pretensions would be allowed, few difficulties would remain, of any
moment, to retard the general peace.

The French answer to this memorial contained several schemes and
proposals for the satisfaction of each ally, coming up very near to what
Her Majesty and her ministers thought reasonable. The greatest
difficulties seemed to be about the Elector of Bavaria, for whose
interests France appeared to be as much concerned, as the Queen was for
those of the Duke of Savoy: however, those were judged not very hard to
be surmounted.

The States having at length agreed to a general treaty, the following
particulars were concerted between Her Majesty and that republic:

"That the congress should be held at Utrecht.

"That the opening of the congress should be upon the twelfth of January,
N.S. one thousand seven hundred and eleven-twelve.

"That, for avoiding all inconveniences of ceremony, the ministers of the
Queen and States, during the treaty, should only have the characters of
plenipotentiaries, and not take that of ambassadors, till the day on
which the peace should be signed.

"Lastly, The Queen and States insisted, that the ministers of the Duke
of Anjou, and the late Electors of Bavaria and Cologne, should not
appear at the congress, until the points relating to their masters were
adjusted; and were firmly resolved not to send their passports for the
ministers of France, till the Most Christian King declared, that the
absence of the forementioned ministers should not delay the progress of
the negotiation."

Pursuant to the three former articles, Her Majesty wrote circular
letters to all the allies engaged with her in the present war: and
France had notice, that as soon as the King declared his compliance with
the last article, the blank passports should be filled up with the names
of the MarГ©chal d'Uxelles,[9] the AbbГ© de Polignac, and Mons. Mesnager,
who were appointed plenipotentiaries for that crown.

[Footnote 9: In his "Letter to Sir William Windham," Bolingbroke thus
refers to M. d'Uxelles: "The minister who had the principal direction of
foreign affairs I lived in friendship with, and I must own to his
honour, that he never encouraged a design which he knew that his court
had no intention of supporting" (p. 141). This was written of the time
when Bolingbroke was in Paris, an adherent of the Pretender. [T.S.]]

From what I have hitherto deduced, the reader sees the plan which the
Queen thought the most effectual for advancing a peace. As the
conferences were to begin upon the general preliminaries, the Queen was
to be empowered by France to offer separately to the allies what might
be reasonable for each to accept; and her own interests being previously
settled, she was to act as a general mediator: a figure that became her
best, from the part she had in the war, and more useful to the great end
at which she aimed, of giving a safe and honourable peace to Europe.

Besides, it was absolutely necessary, for the interests of Britain, that
the Queen should be at the head of the negotiation, without which Her
Majesty could find no expedient to redress the injuries her kingdoms
were sure to suffer by the Barrier Treaty. In order to settle this point
with the States, the ministers here had a conference with Mons. Buys, a
few days before the Parliament met. He was told, how necessary it was,
by previous concert between the Emperor, the Queen, and the States, to
prevent any difference which might arise in the course of the treaty at
Utrecht: That, under pretence of a barrier for the States General, as
their security against France, infinite prejudice might arise to the
trade of Britain in the Spanish Netherlands; for, by the fifteenth
article of the Barrier Treaty, in consequence of what was stipulated by
that of Minister, the Queen was brought to engage that commerce shall
not be rendered more easy, in point of duties, by the sea-ports of
Flanders, than it is by the river Scheldt, and by the canals on the side
of the Seven Provinces, which, as things now stood, was very unjust;
for, while the towns in Flanders were in the hands of France or Spain,
the Dutch and we traded to them upon equal foot; but now, since by the
Barrier Treaty those towns were to be possessed by the States, that
republic might lay what duties they pleased upon British goods, after
passing by Ostend, and make their own custom-free, which would utterly
ruin our whole trade with Flanders.

Upon this, the lords told Mons. Buys very frankly, "That if the States
expected the Queen should support their barrier, as well as their
demands from France and the house of Austria upon that head, they ought
to agree, that the subjects of Britain should trade as freely to all the
countries and places, which, by virtue of any former or future treaty,
were to become the barrier of the States, as they did in the time of the
late King Charles the Second of Spain; or as the subjects of the States
General themselves shall do: and that it was hoped, their High
Mightinesses would never scruple to rectify a mistake so injurious to
that nation, without whose blood and treasure they would have had no
barrier at all." Mons. Buys had nothing to answer against these
objections, but said, he had already wrote to his masters for further
instructions.

Greater difficulties occurred about settling what should be the barrier
to the States after a peace: the envoy insisting to have all the towns
that were named in the Treaty of Barrier and Succession; and the Queen's
ministers excepting those towns, which, if they continued in the hands
of the Dutch, would render the trade of Britain to Flanders precarious.
At length it was agreed in general, that the States ought to have what
is really essential to the security of their barrier against France; and
that some amicable expedient should be found, for removing the fears
both of Britain and Holland upon this point.

But at the same time Mons. Buys was told, "That although the Queen would
certainly insist to obtain all those points from France, in behalf of
her allies the States, yet she hoped his masters were too reasonable to
break off the treaty, rather than not obtain the very utmost of their
demands, which could not be settled here, unless he were fully
instructed to speak and conclude upon that subject: That Her Majesty
thought the best way of securing the common interest, and preventing the
division of the allies, by the artifices of France, in the course of a
long negotiation, would be to concert between the Queen's ministers and
those of the States, with a due regard to the other confederates, such a
plan as might amount to a safe and honourable peace." After which the
AbbГ© Polignac, who of the French plenipotentiaries was most in the
secret of his court, might be told, "That it was in vain to amuse each
other any longer; that on such terms the peace would be immediately
concluded; and that the conferences must cease, if those conditions were
not, without delay, and with expedition, granted."

A treaty between Her Majesty and the States, to subsist after a peace,
was now signed, Mons. Buys having received full powers to that purpose.
His masters were desirous to have a private article added, _sub spe
rati_, concerning those terms of peace; without the granting of which,
we should stipulate not to agree with the enemy. But neither the
character of Buys, nor the manner in which he was empowered to treat,
would allow the Queen to enter into such an engagement. The congress
likewise approaching, there was not time to settle a point of so great
importance. Neither, lastly, would Her Majesty be tied down by Holland,
without previous satisfaction upon several articles in the Barrier
Treaty, so inconsistent with her engagements to other powers in the
alliance, and so injurious to her own kingdoms.

The lord privy seal, and the Earl of Stafford, having, about the time
the Parliament met, been appointed Her Majesty's plenipotentiaries for
treating a general peace, I shall here break off the account of any
further progress made in that great affair, until I resume it in the
last book of this History.


*****       *****       *****       *****       *****




THE HISTORY OF THE FOUR LAST

YEARS OF THE QUEEN.

BOOK III.


The House of Commons seemed resolved, from the beginning of the session,
to inquire strictly not only into all abuses relating to the accounts of
the army, but likewise into the several treaties between us and our
allies, upon what articles and conditions they were first agreed to, and
how these had been since observed. In the first week of their sitting,
they sent an address to the Queen, to desire that the treaty, whereby
Her Majesty was obliged to furnish forty thousand men, to act in
conjunction with the forces of her allies in the Low Countries, might be
laid before the House. To which the secretary of state brought an
answer, "That search had been made, but no footsteps could be found of
any treaty or convention for that purpose." It was this unaccountable
neglect in the former ministry, which first gave a pretence to the
allies for lessening their quotas, so much to the disadvantage of Her
Majesty, her kingdoms, and the common cause, in the course of the war.
It had been stipulated by the Grand Alliance, between the Emperor,
Britain, and the States, that those three powers should assist each
other with their whole force, and that the several proportions should be
specified in a particular convention. But if any such convention were
made, it was never ratified; only the parties agreed, by common consent,
to take each a certain share of the burthen upon themselves, which the
late King William communicated to the House of Commons by his secretary
of state; and which afterwards the other two powers, observing the
mighty zeal in our ministry for prolonging the war, eluded as they
pleased.

The commissioners for stating the public accounts of the kingdom, had,
in executing their office the preceding summer, discovered several
practices relating to the affairs of the army, which they drew up in a
report, and delivered to the House.

The Commons began their examination of the report with a member of their
own, Mr. Robert Walpole, already mentioned; who, during his being
secretary at war, had received five hundred guineas, and taken a note
for five hundred pounds more, on account of two contracts for forage of
the queen's troops quartered in Scotland. He endeavoured to excuse the
first contract; but had nothing to say about the second. The first
appeared so plain and so scandalous to the Commons, that they voted the
author of it guilty of a high breach of trust, and notorious corruption,
committed him prisoner to the Tower, where he continued to the end of
the session, and expelled him the House.[1] He was a person much
caressed by the opposers of the Queen and ministry, having been first
drawn into their party by his indifference to any principles, and
afterwards kept steady by the loss of his place. His bold, forward
countenance, altogether a stranger to that infirmity which makes men
bashful, joined to a readiness of speaking in public, hath justly
entitled him, among those of his faction, to be a sort of leader of the
second form. The reader must excuse me for being so particular about
one, who is otherwise altogether obscure.[2]

[Footnote 1: See "Part Hist," vi. 1071. [T.S.]]

[Footnote 2: Walpole was not too obscure, however, to be then the object
of Bolingbroke's attack; and in 1726, when Bolingbroke had again
attacked Walpole, this time in a letter, the latter replied: "Whatever
contradictions these gentlemen may have observed in my character; there
is one which I'll venture to assure you, you will never discover, which
is my ever being alarmed at an opposition from one in the impotence of
disgrace, who could never terrify me in the zenith of his prosperity."
"An Answer to the Occasional Writer." [T.S.]]

Another part of the report concerned the Duke of Marlborough, who had
received large sums of money, by way of gratuity, from those who were
the undertakers for providing the army with bread.[3] This the Duke
excused, in a letter to the commissioners, from the like practice of
other generals: but that excuse appeared to be of little weight, and the
mischievous consequences of such a corruption were visible enough; since
the money given by these undertakers were but bribes for connivance at
their indirect dealings with the army. And as frauds, that begin at the
top, are apt to spread through all the subordinate ranks of those who
have any share in the management, and to increase as they circulate: so,
in this case, for every thousand pounds given to the general, the
soldiers at least suffered fourfold.

[Footnote 3: See "The Examiner," Nos. 17 and 28, in vol. ix. of this
edition. [W.S.J.]]

Another article of this report, relating to the Duke, was yet of more
importance. The greatest part of Her Majesty's forces in Flanders were
mercenary troops, hired from several princes of Europe. It was found
that the Queen's general subtracted two and a half _per cent_, out of
the pay of those troops, for his own use, which amounted to a great
annual sum. The Duke of Marlborough, in his letter already mentioned,
endeavouring to extenuate the matter, told the commissioners, "That this
deduction was a free gift from the foreign troops, which he had
negotiated with them by the late King's orders, and had obtained the
Queen's warrant for reserving and receiving it: That it was intended for
secret service, the ten thousand pounds a year given by Parliament not
proving sufficient, and had all been laid out that way." The
commissioners observed, in answer, "That the warrant was kept dormant
for nine years, as indeed no entry of it appeared in the secretary of
state's books, and the deduction of it concealed all that time from the
knowledge of Parliament: That, if it had been a free gift from the
foreign troops, it would not have been stipulated by agreement, as the
Duke's letter confessed, and as his warrant declared, which latter
affirmed this stoppage to be intended for defraying extraordinary
contingent expenses of the troops, and therefore should not have been
applied to secret services." They submitted to the House, whether the
warrant itself were legal, or duly countersigned. The commissioners
added, "That no receipt was ever given for this deducted money, nor was
it mentioned in any receipts from the foreign troops, which were always
taken in full. And lastly, That the whole sum, on computation, amounted
to near three hundred thousand pounds."

The House, after a long debate, resolved, "That the taking several sums
from the contractors for bread by the Duke of Marlborough, was
unwarrantable and illegal; and that the two and a half _per cent_,
deducted from the foreign troops, was public money, and ought to be
accounted for:" which resolutions were laid before the Queen by the
whole House, and Her Majesty promised to do her part in redressing what
was complained of. The Duke and his friends had, about the beginning of
the war, by their credit with the Queen, procured a warrant from Her
Majesty for this perquisite of two and a half _per cent_. The warrant
was directed to the Duke of Marlborough, and countersigned by Sir
Charles Hedges, then secretary of state; by virtue of which the
paymaster-general of the army was to pay the said deducted money to the
general, and take a receipt in full from the foreign troops.

It was observed, as very commendable and becoming the dignity of such an
assembly, that this debate was managed with great temper, and with few
personal reflections upon the Duke of Marlborough. They seemed only
desirous to come at the truth, without which they could not answer the
trust reposed in them by those whom they represented, and left the rest
to Her Majesty's prudence. The attorney-general was ordered to commence
an action against the Duke for the subtracted money, which would have
amounted to a great sum, enough to ruin any private person, except
himself. This process is still depending, although very moderately
pursued, either by the Queen's indulgence to one whom she had formerly
so much trusted, or perhaps to be revived or slackened, according to the
future demeanour of the defendant.[4]

[Footnote 4: Marlborough's defence of himself may be found in the
"Parliamentary History," vol. vi., 1079. Writing to the Earl of
Strafford, under date January 27, 1711, Bolingbroke speaking of this
debate on Marlborough says: "What passed on Thursday in the House of
Commons, will, I hope, show people abroad, as well as at home, that no
merit, no grandeur, no riches can excuse, or save any one, who sets
himself up in opposition to the Queen;" and, he might have added, to
Mrs. Masham. It is to be questioned if Marlborough would have had to
undergo the ordeal of this debate had it not been for the animosity
against him on the part of this lady and her royal mistress, so deftly
aroused by Harley. [T.S.]]

Some time after, Mr. Cardonnell,[5] a Member of Parliament, and
secretary to the general in Flanders, was expelled the House, for the
offence of receiving yearly bribes from those who had contracted to
furnish bread for the army; and met with no further punishment for a
practice, voted to be unwarrantable and corrupt.

These were all the censures of any moment which the Commons, under so
great a weight of business, thought fit to make, upon the reports of
their commissioners for inspecting the public accounts. But having
promised, in the beginning of this History, to examine the state of the
nation, with respect to its debts; by what negligence or corruption they
first began, and in process of time made such a prodigious increase;
and, lastly, what courses have been taken, under the present
administration, to find out funds for answering so many unprovided
incumbrances, as well as put a stop to new ones; I shall endeavour to
satisfy the reader upon this important article.

By all I have yet read of the history of our own country, it appears to
me, that the national debts, secured upon parliamentary funds of
interest, were things unknown in England before the last Revolution
under the Prince of Orange. It is true, that in the grand rebellion the
king's enemies borrowed money of particular persons, upon what they
called the public faith; but this was only for short periods, and the
sums no more than what they could pay at once, as they constantly did.
Some of our kings have been very profuse in peace and war, and are
blamed in history for their oppressions of the people by severe taxes,
and for borrowing money which they never paid:[6] but national debts was
a style, which, I doubt, would hardly then be understood. When the
Prince of Orange was raised to the throne, and a general war began in
these parts of Europe, the King and his counsellors thought it would be
ill policy to commence his reign with heavy taxes upon the people, who
had lived long in ease and plenty, and might be apt to think their
deliverance too dearly bought: wherefore one of the first actions of the
new government was to take off the tax upon chimneys, as a burthen very
ungrateful to the commonalty. But money being wanted to support the war
(which even the convention-parliament, that put the crown upon his head,
were very unwilling he should engage in), the present Bishop of
Salisbury[7] is said to have found out that expedient (which he had
learned in Holland) of raising money upon the security of taxes, that
were only sufficient to pay a large interest. The motives which
prevailed on people to fall in with this project were many, and
plausible; for supposing, as the ministers industriously gave out, that
the war could not last above one or two campaigns at most, it might be
carried on with very moderate taxes; and the debts accruing would, in
process of time, be easily cleared after a peace. Then the bait of large
interest would draw in a great number of those whose money, by the
dangers and difficulties of trade, lay dead upon their hands; and
whoever were lenders to the government, would, by surest principle, be
obliged to support it. Besides, the men of estates could not be
persuaded, without time and difficulty, to have those taxes laid on
their lands, which custom hath since made so familiar; and it was the
business of such as were then in power to cultivate a moneyed interest;
because the gentry of the kingdom did not very much relish those new
notions in government, to which the King, who had imbibed his politics
in his own country, was thought to give too much way. Neither perhaps
did that Prince think national incumbrances to be any evil at all, since
the flourishing republic, where he was born, is thought to owe more than
ever it will be able or willing to pay. And I remember, when I mentioned
to Mons. Buys the many millions we owed, he would advance it as a maxim,
that it was for the interest of the public to be in debt: which perhaps
may be true in a commonwealth so crazily instituted, where the governors
cannot have too many pledges of their subjects' fidelity, and where a
great majority must inevitably be undone by any revolution, however
brought about: but to prescribe the same rules to a monarchy, whose
wealth ariseth from the rents and improvements of lands, as well as
trade and manufactures, is the mark of a confined and cramped
understanding.

[Footnote 5: Adam Cardonnell, Esq., secretary to the Duke of
Marlborough, shared in his disgrace. See "The Examiner," No. 28.
[W.S.J.]]

[Footnote 6: P. Fitzgerald says "which they have not been able or
willing to pay." [W.S.J.]]

[Footnote 7: Dr. Gilbert Burnet. [ORIGINAL NOTE.]]

I was moved to speak thus, because I am very well satisfied, that the
pernicious counsels of borrowing money upon public funds of interest, as
well as some other state lessons, were taken indigested from the like
practices among the Dutch, without allowing in the least for any
difference in government, religion, law, custom, extent of country, or
manners and dispositions of the people.

But when this expedient of anticipations and mortgages was first put in
practice, artful men, in office and credit, began to consider what uses
it might be applied to; and soon found it was likely to prove the most
fruitful seminary, not only to establish a faction they intended to set
up for their own support, but likewise to raise vast wealth for
themselves in particular, who were to be the managers and directors in
it. It was manifest, that nothing could promote these two designs so
much, as burthening the nation with debts, and giving encouragement to
lenders: for, as to the first, it was not to be doubted, that moneyed
men would be always firm to the party of those who advised the borrowing
upon such good security, and with such exorbitant premiums and interest;
and every new sum that was lent, took away as much power from the landed
men, as it added to theirs: so that the deeper the kingdom was engaged,
it was still the better for them. Thus a new estate and property sprung
up in the hands of mortgagees, to whom every house and foot of land in
England paid a rent-charge, free of all taxes and defalcations, and
purchased at less than half value. So that the gentlemen of estates
were, in effect, but tenants to these new landlords; many of whom were
able, in time, to force the election of boroughs out of the hands of
those who had been the old proprietors and inhabitants. This was arrived
at such a height, that a very few years more of war and funds would have
clearly cast the balance on the moneyed side.

As to the second, this project of borrowing upon funds, was of mighty
advantage to those who were in the management of it, as well as to their
friends and dependants; for, funds proving often deficient, the
government was obliged to strike tallies for making up the rest, which
tallies were sometimes (to speak in the merchants' phrase) at above
forty _per cent_, discount. At this price those who were in the secret
bought them up, and then took care to have that deficiency supplied in
the next session of Parliament, by which they doubled their principal in
a few months; and, for the encouragement of lenders, every new project
of lotteries or annuities proposed some farther advantage, either as to
interest or premium.

In the year one thousand six hundred and ninety-seven, a general
mortgage was made of certain revenues and taxes already settled, which
amounted to near a million a year. This mortgage was to continue till
one thousand seven hundred and six, to be a fund for the payment of
about five millions one hundred thousand pounds. In the first Parliament
of the Queen, the said mortgage was continued till one thousand seven
hundred and ten, to supply a deficiency of two millions three hundred
thousand pounds, and interest of above a million; and in the
intermediate years a great part of that fund was branched out into
annuities for ninety-nine years; so that the late ministry raised all
their money to one thousand seven hundred and ten, only by continuing
funds which were already granted to their hands. This deceived the
people in general, who were satisfied to continue the payments they had
been accustomed to, and made the administration seem easy, since the war
went on without any new taxes raised, except the very last year they
were in power; not considering what a mighty fund was exhausted, and
must be perpetuated, although extremely injurious to trade, and to the
true interest of the nation.

This great fund of the general mortgage was not only loaded, year after
year, by mighty sums borrowed upon it, but with the interests due upon
those sums; for which the treasury was forced to strike tallies, payable
out of that fund, after all the money already borrowed upon it, there
being no other provision of interest for three or four years: till at
last the fund was so overloaded, that it could neither pay principal nor
interest, and tallies were struck for both, which occasioned their great
discount.

But to avoid mistakes upon a subject, where I am not very well versed
either in the style or matter, I will transcribe an account sent me by a
person[8] who is thoroughly instructed in these affairs.

[Footnote 8: Sir John Blunt. [ORIGINAL NOTE.] He was one of the first
projectors of the South Sea Company, and died in January, 1733. [W.S.J.]]

"In the year one thousand seven hundred and seven, the sum of eight
hundred twenty-two thousand three hundred and eighty one pounds, fifteen
shillings and sixpence, was raised, by continuing part of the general
mortgage from one thousand seven hundred and ten to one thousand seven
hundred and twelve; but with no provision of interest till August the
first, one thousand seven hundred and ten, otherwise than by striking
tallies for it on that fund, payable after all the other money borrowed.

"In one thousand seven hundred and eight, the same funds were continued
from one thousand seven hundred and twelve to one thousand seven hundred
and fourteen, to raise seven hundred twenty-nine thousand sixty-seven
pounds fifteen shillings and sixpence; but no provision for interest
till August the first, one thousand seven hundred and twelve, otherwise
than as before, by striking tallies for it on the same fund, payable
after all the rest of the money borrowed. And the discount of tallies
then beginning to rise, great part of that money remains still unraised;
and there is nothing to pay interest for the money lent, till August the
first, one thousand seven hundred and twelve. But the late lord
treasurer struck tallies for the full sum directed by the act to be
borrowed, great part of which have been delivered in payment to the navy
and victualling offices, and some are still in the hands of the
government.

"In one thousand seven hundred and nine, part of the same fund was
continued from August the first, one thousand seven hundred and
fourteen, to August the first, one thousand seven hundred and sixteen,
to raise six hundred and forty-five thousand pounds; and no provision
for interest till August the first, one thousand seven hundred and
fourteen (which was about five years), but by borrowing money on the
same fund, payable after the sums before lent; so that little of that
money was lent But the tallies were struck for what was unlent, some of
which were given out for the payment of the navy and victualling, and
some still remain in the hands of the government.

"In one thousand seven hundred and ten, the sums which were before given
from one thousand seven hundred and fourteen, to one thousand seven
hundred and sixteen, were continued from thence to one thousand seven
hundred and twenty, to raise one million two hundred and ninety-six
thousand five hundred and fifty-two pounds nine shillings and
elevenpence three farthings; and no immediate provision for interest
till August the first, one thousand seven hundred and sixteen; only,
after the duty of one shilling _per_ bushel on salt should be cleared
from the money it was then charged with, and which was not so cleared
till Midsummer one thousand seven hundred and twelve last, then that
fund was to be applied to pay the interest till August the first, one
thousand seven hundred and sixteen, which interest amounted to about
seventy-seven thousand seven hundred and ninety-three pounds _per
annum_: and the said salt fund produceth but about fifty-five thousand
pounds _per annum_; so that no money was borrowed upon the general
mortgage in one thousand seven hundred and ten, except one hundred and
fifty thousand pounds lent by the Swiss cantons; but tallies were struck
for the whole sum. These all remained in the late treasurer's hands at
the time of his removal, yet the money was expended, which occasioned
those great demands upon the commissioners of the treasury who succeeded
him, and were forced to pawn those tallies to the bank, or to remitters,
rather than sell them at twenty or twenty-five _per cent_. discount, as
the price then was. About two hundred thousand pounds of them they paid
to clothiers of the army, and others; and all the rest, being above
ninety thousand pounds, have been subscribed into the South Sea Company
for the use of the public."

When the Earl of Godolphin was removed from his employment, he left a
debt upon the navy of ---- millions,[9] all contracted under his
administration,[10] which had no Parliament-security, and was daily
increased. Neither could I ever learn, whether that lord had the
smallest prospect of clearing this incumbrance, or whether there were
policy, negligence, or despair at the bottom of this unaccountable
management. But the consequences were visible and ruinous; for by this
means navy-bills grew to be forty _per cent_. discount, and upwards; and
almost every kind of stores, bought by the navy and victualling offices,
cost the government double rates, and sometimes more: so that the public
hath directly lost several millions upon this one article, without any
sort of necessity, that I could ever hear assigned by the ablest
vindicators of that party.

[Footnote 9: "Of      millions" in original. "Of ---- millions" in 1775.
[W.S.J.]]

[Footnote 10: See "The Examiner," No. 45, and note in vol. ix. of this
edition, p. 295. [W.S.J.]]

In this oppressed and entangled state was the kingdom, with relation to
its debts, when the Queen removed the Earl of Godolphin from his office,
and put it into commission, of which the present treasurer was one. This
person had been chosen speaker successively to three Parliaments, was
afterwards secretary of state, and always in great esteem with the Queen
for his wisdom and fidelity. The late ministry, about two years before
their fall, had prevailed with Her Majesty, much against her
inclination, to dismiss him from her service; for which they cannot be
justly blamed, since he had endeavoured the same thing against them, and
very narrowly failed; which makes it the more extraordinary that he
should succeed in a second attempt against those very adversaries, who
had such fair warning by the first. He is firm and steady in his
resolutions, not easily diverted from them after he hath once possessed
himself of an opinion that they are right, nor very communicative where
he can act by himself, being taught by experience, that a secret is
seldom safe in more than one breast. That which occurs to other men
after mature deliberation, offers to him as his first thoughts; so that
he decides immediately what is best to be done, and therefore is seldom
at a loss upon sudden exigencies. He thinks it a more easy and safe rule
in politics to watch incidents as they come, and then turn them to the
advantage of what he pursues, than pretend to foresee them at a great
distance. Fear, cruelty, avarice, and pride, are wholly strangers to his
nature; but he is not without ambition. There is one thing peculiar in
his temper, which I altogether disapprove, and do not remember to have
heard or met with in any other man's character: I mean, an easiness and
indifference under any imputation, although he be never so innocent, and
although the strongest probabilities and appearance are against him; so
that I have known him often suspected by his nearest friends, for some
months, in points of the highest importance, to a degree, that they were
ready to break with him, and only undeceived by time and accident. His
detractors, who charge him with cunning, are but ill acquainted with his
character; for, in the sense they take the word, and as it is usually
understood, I know no man to whom that mean talent could be with less
justice applied, as the conduct of affairs, while he hath been at the
helm, doth clearly demonstrate, very contrary to the nature and
principles of cunning, which is always employed in serving little turns,
proposing little ends, and supplying daily exigencies by little shifts
and expedients. But to rescue a prince out of the hands of insolent
subjects, bent upon such designs as must probably end in the ruin of the
government; to find out means for paying such exorbitant debts as this
nation hath been involved in, and reduce it to a better management; to
make a potent enemy offer advantageous terms of peace, and deliver up
the most important fortress of his kingdom, as a security;[11] and this
against all the opposition, mutually raised and inflamed by parties and
allies; such performances can only be called cunning by those whose want
of understanding, or of candour, puts them upon finding ill names for
great qualities of the mind, which themselves do neither possess, nor
can form any just conception of. However, it must be allowed, that an
obstinate love of secrecy in this minister seems, at distance, to have
some resemblance of cunning; for he is not only very retentive of
secrets, but appears to be so too, which I number amongst his defects.
He hath been blamed by his friends for refusing to discover his
intentions, even in those points where the wisest man may have need of
advice and assistance, and some have censured him, upon that account, as
if he were jealous of power but he hath been heard to answer, "That he
seldom did otherwise, without cause to repent"

[Footnote 11: This is surely a piece of Swift's partiality for Oxford;
since it practically deprives Bolingbroke of whatever credit was his for
the Peace of Utrecht, and that was not a little; certainly more than may
be given to Oxford. [T.S.]]

However, so undistinguished a caution cannot, in my opinion, be
justified, by which the owner loseth many advantages, and whereof all
men, who deserved to be confided in, may with some reason complain. His
love of procrastination (wherein doubtless nature hath her share) may
probably be increased by the same means, but this is an imputation laid
upon many other great ministers, who, like men under too heavy a load,
let fall that which is of the least consequence, and go back to fetch it
when their shoulders are free, for time is often gained, as well as
lost, by delay, which at worst is a fault on the securer side.[12]
Neither probably is this minister answerable for half the clamour raised
against him upon that article: his endeavours are wholly turned upon the
general welfare of his country, but perhaps with too little regard to
that of particular persons, which renders him less amiable, than he
would otherwise have been from the goodness of his humour, and agreeable
conversation in a private capacity, and with few dependers. Yet some
allowance may perhaps be given to this failing, which is one of the
greatest he hath, since he cannot be more careless of other men's
fortunes than he is of his own. He is master of a very great and
faithful memory, which is of mighty use in the management of public
affairs; and I believe there are few examples to be produced in any age,
of a person who hath passed through so many employments in the state,
endowed with a great share, both of divine and human learning.

[Footnote 12: Unfortunately, procrastination too often ended for Harley
in very unpleasant results, and it is not too much to say, this failing
was the indirect cause of his downfall. Swift's character of Oxford, as
given in this "History," should be compared with that given of him in
"An Enquiry into the Behaviour of the Queen's Last Ministry" (vol v, pp
431-434, of present edition). Dr William King, to whom Swift had written
in 1736, for certain dates and official extracts to be included in this
"History," wrote to Swift (December 7th, 1736), referring to this very
matter of Oxford's character. As the letter applies to some other
portions of this "History," it will be better if it be given here.

"London, December 7th, 1736

SIR,

I arrived here yesterday [King had been on a visit to Paris], and I am
now ready to obey your commands. I hope you are come to a positive
resolution concerning the History. You need not hesitate about the
dates, or the references which are to be made to any public papers, for
I can supply them without the least trouble. As well as I remember,
there is but one of those public pieces which you determined should be
inserted at length; I mean Sir Thomas Hanmer's Representation; this I
have now by me. If you incline to publish the two tracts as an Appendix
to the History, you will be pleased to see if the character given of the
Earl of Oxford in the pamphlet of 1715 agrees with the character given
of the same person in the History. Perhaps on a review, you may think
proper to leave one of them quite out. You have (I think) barely
mentioned the attempt of Guiscard, and the quarrel between Rechteren and
Mesnager. But as these are facts which are probably now forgot or
unknown, it would not be amiss if they were related at large in the
notes, which may be done from the Gazettes, or any other newspapers of
those times," etc. See Sir W. Scott's edit, vol xix, pp 20-21 [T.S.]]

I am persuaded that foreigners, as well as those at home, who live too
remote from the scene of business to be rightly informed, will not be
displeased with this account of a person, who in the space of two years,
hath been so highly instrumental in changing the face of affairs in
Europe, and hath deserved so well of his own Prince and country.[13]

[Footnote 13: See also Swift's "Enquiry" (vol. v., pp. 425-476).
[W.S.J.]]

In that perplexed condition of the public debts, which I have already
described, this minister was brought into the treasury and exchequer,
and had the chief direction of affairs. His first regulation was that of
exchequer bills, which, to the great discouragement of public credit,
and scandal to the crown, were three _per cent._ less in value than the
sums specified in them. The present treasurer, being then chancellor of
the exchequer, procured an Act of Parliament, by which the Bank of
England should be obliged, in consideration of forty-five thousand
pounds, to accept and circulate those bills without any discount. He
then proceeded to stop the depredations of those who dealt in
remittances of money to the army, who, by unheard of exactions in that
kind of traffic, had amassed prodigious wealth at the public cost, to
which the Earl of Godolphin had given too much way,[14] _possibly by
neglect; for I think he cannot be accused of corruption_.

[Footnote 14: Added in the author's own handwriting. [ORIGINAL NOTE.] P.
Fitzgerald gives the addition as "either through ignorance, connivance,
or neglect." [W.S.J.]]

But the new treasurer's chief concern was to restore the credit of the
nation, by finding some settlement for unprovided debts, amounting in
the whole to ten millions, which hung on the public as a load equally
heavy and disgraceful, without any prospect of being removed, and which
former ministers never had the care or courage to inspect. He resolved
to go at once to the bottom of this evil; and having computed and summed
up the debt of the navy, and victualling, ordnance, and transport of the
army, and transport debentures made out for the service of the last war,
of the general mortgage tallies for the year one thousand seven hundred
and ten, and some other deficiencies, he then found out a fund of
interest sufficient to answer all this, which, being applied to other
uses, could not raise present money for the war, but in a very few years
would clear the debt it was engaged for. The intermediate accruing
interest was to be paid by the treasurer of the navy; and, as a farther
advantage to the creditors, they should be erected into a company for
trading to the South Seas, and for encouragement of fishery. When all
this was fully prepared and digested, he made a motion in the House of
Commons (who deferred extremely to his judgment and abilities) for
paying the debts of the navy, and other unprovided deficiencies, without
entering into particulars, which was immediately voted. But a sudden
stop was put to this affair by an unforeseen accident. The chancellor of
the exchequer (which was then his title) being stabbed with a penknife,
the following day, at the Cockpit, in the midst of a dozen lords of the
council, by the Sieur de Guiscard, a French papist; the circumstances of
which fact being not within the compass of this History, I shall only
observe, that after two months' confinement, and frequent danger of his
life, he returned to his seat in Parliament.[15]

[Footnote 15: See the particular account in "The Examiner." [ORIGINAL
NOTE.] The reference is to Nos. 33, 41, and 42 of that paper (see vol.
ix, of this edition). [W.S.J.]]

The overtures made by this minister, of paying so vast a debt, under the
pressures of a long war, and the difficulty of finding supplies for
continuing it, was, during the time of his illness, ridiculed by his
enemies as an impracticable and visionary project: and when, upon his
return to the House, he had explained his proposal, the very proprietors
of the debt were, many of them, prevailed on to oppose it; although the
obtaining this trade, either through Old Spain, or directly to the
Spanish West Indies, had been one principal end we aimed at by this war.
However, the bill passed; and, as an immediate consequence, the naval
bills rose to about twenty _per cent_., nor ever fell within ten of
their discount. Another good effect of this work appeared by the
parliamentary lotteries, which have been since erected. The last of that
kind, under the former ministry, was eleven weeks in filling; whereas
the first, under the present, was filled in a very few hours, although
it cost the government less; and the others, which followed, were full
before the Acts concerning them could pass. And to prevent incumbrances
of this kind from growing for the future, he took care, by the utmost
parsimony, or by suspending payments, where they seemed less to press,
that all stores for the navy should be bought with ready money; by which
_cent. per cent._ hath been saved in that mighty article of our expense,
as will appear from an account taken at the victualling office on the
9th of August, one thousand seven hundred and twelve. And the payment of
the interest was less a burthen upon the navy, by the stores being
bought at so cheap a rate.

It might look invidious to enter into farther particulars upon this
head, but of smaller moment. What I have above related, may serve to
shew in how ill a condition the kingdom stood, with relation to its
debts, by the corruption as well as negligence of former management; and
what prudent, effectual measures have since been taken to provide for
old incumbrances, and hinder the running into new. This may be
sufficient for the information of the reader, perhaps already tired with
a subject so little entertaining as that of accounts: I shall therefore
now return to relate some of the principal matters that passed in
Parliament, during this session.

Upon the eighteenth of January the House of Lords sent down a bill to
the Commons, for fixing the precedence of the Hanover family, which
probably had been forgot in the Acts for settling the succession of the
crown. That of Henry VIII. which gives the rank to princes of the blood,
carries it no farther than to nephews, nieces, and grandchildren of the
crown, by virtue of which the Princess Sophia is a princess of the
blood, as niece to King Charles I of England, and precedes accordingly,
but this privilege doth not descend to her son the Elector, or the
electoral prince. To supply which defect, and pay a compliment to the
presumptive heirs of the crown, this bill, as appeareth by the preamble,
was recommended by Her Majesty to the House of Lords, which the Commons,
to shew their zeal for every thing that might be thought to concern the
interest or honour of that illustrious family, ordered to be read thrice,
passed _nemine contradicente_ and returned to the Lords, without any
amendment, on the very day it was sent down.

But the House seemed to have nothing more at heart than a strict inquiry
into the state of the nation, with respect to foreign alliances. Some
discourses had been published in print, about the beginning of the
session, boldly complaining of certain articles in the Barrier Treaty,
concluded about three years since by the Lord Viscount Townshend,
between Great Britain and the States General, and shewing, in many
particulars, the unequal conduct of these powers in our alliance, in
furnishing their quotas and supplies. It was asserted by the same
writers, "That these hardships, put upon England, had been countenanced
and encouraged by a party here at home, in order to preserve their
power, which could be no otherwise maintained than by continuing the
war, as well as by Her Majesty's general abroad, upon account of his own
peculiar interest and grandeur." These loud accusations spreading
themselves throughout the kingdom, delivered in facts directly charged,
and thought, whether true or not, to be but weakly confuted, had
sufficiently prepared the minds of the people, and, by putting arguments
into every body's mouth, had filled the town and country with
controversies, both in writing and discourse. The point appeared to be
of great consequence, whether the war continued or not for, in the
former case, it was necessary that the allies should be brought to a
more equal regulation, and that the States in particular, for whom Her
Majesty had done such great things, should explain and correct those
articles in the Barrier Treaty which were prejudicial to Britain, and,
in either case, it was fit the people should have at least the
satisfaction of knowing by whose counsels, and for what designs, they
had been so hardly treated.