Mr. Harley, whom we mentioned above to have been sent early in the
spring to Utrecht, continued longer in Holland than was at first
expected; but having received Her Majesty's farther instructions, was
about this time arrived at Hanover. It was the misfortune of his
Electoral Highness, to be very ill served by Mons. Bothmar, his envoy
here, who assisted at all the factious meetings of the discontented
party, and deceived his master by a false representation of the kingdom,
drawn from the opinion of those to whom he confined his conversation.
There was likewise at the Elector's court a little Frenchman, without
any merit or consequence, called Robethon,[15] who, by the assistance
and encouragement of the last ministry, had insinuated himself into some
degree of that prince's favour, which he used in giving his master the
worst impressions he was able, of those whom the Queen employed in her
service; insinuating, that the present ministers were not in the
interest of his Highness's family; that their views were towards the
Pretender; that they were making an unsecure and dishonourable peace;
that the weight of the nation was against them; and that it was
impossible for them to preserve much longer their credit or power.
[Footnote 15: One of the Elector's privy councillors. See note, vol. v.,
p. 468. "As little a fellow as Robethon is," wrote Bolingbroke to Thomas
Harley, "I have reason to believe that most of the ill impressions which
have been given at that court have chiefly come from him; and as I know
him to be mercenary, I doubt not but he has found his account in this
his management." (Bol., "Correspondence," vol. ii., p. 385). [T.S.]]
The Earl Rivers had, in the foregoing year, been sent to Hanover, in
order to undeceive the Elector, and remove whatever prejudices might be
infused into his Highness against Her Majesty's proceedings; but it
should seem that he had no very great success in his negotiation: for
soon after his return to England, Mons. Bothmar's "Memorial" appeared in
the manner I have already related, which discovered the sentiments of
his electoral Highness (if they were truly represented in that
"Memorial") to differ not a little from those of the Queen. Mr. Harley
was therefore directed to take the first opportunity of speaking to the
Elector in private, to assure him, "That although Her Majesty had
thought herself justly provoked by the conduct of his minister, yet such
was her affection for his Highness, and concern for the interests of his
family, that instead of showing the least mark of resentment, she had
chosen to send him (Mr. Harley) fully instructed to open her designs,
and shew his Highness the real interest of Britain in the present
conjuncture." Mr. Harley was to give the Elector a true account of what
had passed in England, during the first part of this session of
Parliament; to expose to his Highness the weakness of those with whom
his minister had consulted, and under whose directions he had acted; to
convince him how much lower that faction must become, when a peace
should be concluded, and when the natural strength of the kingdom,
disencumbered from the burthen of the war, should be at liberty to exert
itself; to shew him how his interest in the succession was sacrificed to
that of a party: that his Highness had been hitherto a friend to both
sides, but that the measures taken by his ministers, had tended only to
set him at the head of one in opposition to the other: to explain to the
Elector, how fully the safety of Europe was provided for by the plan of
peace in Her Majesty's speech; and how little reason those would appear
to have, who complained the loudest of this plan, if it were compared
either with our engagements to them when we began the war, or with their
performances in the course of it.
Upon this occasion Mr, Harley was to observe to the Elector, "That it
should rather be wondered at, how the Queen had brought France to offer
so much, than yet to offer no more; because, as soon as ever it
appeared, that Her Majesty would be at the head of this treaty, and that
the interests of Britain were to be provided for, such endeavours were
used to break off the negotiation, as are hardly to be paralleled; and
the disunion thereby created among the allies, had given more
opportunities to the enemy, of being slow in their concessions, than any
other measures might possibly have done: That this want of concert among
the allies, could not in any sort be imputed to the Queen, who had all
along invited them to it with the greatest earnestness, as the surest
means to bring France to reason: That she had always, in a particular
manner, pressed the States General to come into the strictest union with
her, and opened to them her intentions with the greatest freedom; but
finding, that instead of concurring with Her Majesty, they were daily
carrying on intrigues to break off the negotiation, and thereby deprive
her of the advantages she might justly expect from the ensuing peace,
having no other way left, she was forced to act with France as she did,
by herself: That, however, the Queen had not taken upon herself to
determine the interests of the allies, who were at liberty of insisting
on farther pretensions, wherein Her Majesty would not be wanting to
support them as far as she was able, and improve the concessions already
made by France; in which case, a good understanding and harmony among
the confederates, would yet be of the greatest use for making the enemy
more tractable and easy."
I have been more particular in reciting the substance of Mr. Harley's
instructions, because it will serve as a recapitulation of what I have
already said upon this subject, and seems to set Her Majesty's
intentions, and proceedings at this time, in the clearest light.
After the cessation of arms declared by the Duke of Ormonde, upon the
delivery of Dunkirk, the British plenipotentiaries very earnestly
pressed those of Holland to come into a general armistice; for if the
whole confederacy acted in conjunction, this would certainly be the best
means for bringing the common enemy to reasonable terms of peace: but
the States, deluded by the boundless promises of Count Zinzendorf, and
the undertaking talent of Prince Eugene, who dreaded the conclusion of
the war, as the period of his glory, would not hear of a cessation. The
loss of eighteen thousand Britons was not a diminution of weight in the
balance of such an ally as the Emperor, and such a general as the
Prince. Besides, they looked upon themselves to be still superior to
France in the field; and although their computation was certainly right
in point of number, yet, in my opinion, the conclusion drawn from it,
was grounded upon a great mistake. I have been assured by several
persons of our own country, and some foreigners of the first rank, both
for skill and station in arms, that in most victories obtained in the
present war, the British troops were ever employed in the post of danger
and honour, and usually began the attack (being allowed to be naturally
more fearless than the people of any other country), by which they were
not only an example of courage to the rest, but must be acknowledged,
without partiality, to have governed the fortune of the day; since it is
known enough, how small a part of an army is generally engaged in any
battle. It may likewise be added, that nothing is of greater moment in
war than opinion. The French, by their frequent losses, which they
chiefly attributed to the courage of our men, believed that a British
general, at the head of British troops, was not to be overcome; and the
Maréchal de Villars was quickly sensible of the advantage he had got;
for, in a very few days after the desertion of the allies, happened the
Earl of Albemarle's disgrace at Denain, by a feint of the Maréchal's,
and a manifest failure somewhere or other, both of courage and conduct
on the side of the confederates. The blame of which was equally shared
between Prince Eugene and the Earl; although it is certain, the Duke of
Ormonde gave the latter timely warning of his danger, observing he was
neither intrenched as he ought, nor provided with bridges sufficient for
the situation he was in, and at such a distance from the main army.[16]
[Footnote 16: It is alleged by the continuator of Rapin, that the
surprise and defeat of the confederated troops under the Earl of
Albemarle, at Denain, was, in a great measure, owing to the Duke of
Ormonde having, in spite of all remonstrance, reclaimed and carried off
certain pontoons which had been lent to the allies. For Prince Eugene
having received intelligence of the design against Albemarle, marched to
his succour; but the bridge having broken under the quantity of the
baggage which had been transported across the Scheldt, he could only
remain the spectator of their misfortune. [S.]]
The Marquis de Torcy had likewise the same sentiments, of what mighty
consequence those few British battalions were to the confederate army;
since he advised his master to deliver up Dunkirk, although the Queen
could not perform the condition understood, which was a cessation of
arms of all the foreign forces in her pay.
It must be owned, that Mons. de Torcy made great merit of this
confidence that his master placed in the Queen; and observing Her
Majesty's displeasure against the Dutch, on account of their late
proceedings, endeavoured to inflame it with aggravations enough;
insinuating, "That, since the States had acted so ungratefully, the
Queen should let her forces join with those of France, in order to
compel the confederates to a peace." But although this overture were
very tenderly hinted from the French court, Her Majesty heard it with
the utmost abhorrence; and ordered her secretary, Mr. St. John (created
about this time Viscount Bolingbroke),[17] to tell Mons. de Torcy, "That
no provocations whatever should tempt her to distress her allies; but
she would endeavour to bring them to reason by fair means, or leave them
to their own conduct: That if the former should be found impracticable,
she would then make her own peace, and content herself with doing the
office of a mediator between both parties: but if the States should at
any time come to a better mind, and suffer their ministers to act in
conjunction with hers, she would assert their just interests to the
utmost, and make no farther progress in any treaty with France, until
those allies received all reasonable satisfaction, both as to their
barrier and their trade." The British plenipotentiaries were directed to
give the same assurances to the Dutch ministers at Utrecht, and withal
to let them know, "That the Queen was determined, by their late conduct,
to make peace either with or without them; but would much rather choose
the former."
[Footnote 17: Bolingbroke had understood that he would not lose rank on
his promotion, from which he concluded that the earldom of Bolingbroke,
extinct in his family, would be revived in his favour. His indignation,
however, was very keen when he was created only a Viscount. He wrote to
Strafford at Utrecht, that his promotion had been a mortification to
him. "In the House of Commons," he said, "I may say that I was at the
head of business. ... There was, therefore, nothing to flatter my
ambition in removing me from thence, but giving me the title which had
been many years in my family, and which reverted to the Crown about a
year ago, by the death of the last of the elder house. ... I own to you
that I felt more indignation than ever in my life I had done." (Letter
to the Earl of Strafford, July 23, 1712). [T.S.]]
There was, however, one advantage which Her Majesty resolved to make by
this defection of her foreigners. She had been led, by the mistaken
politics of some years past, to involve herself in several guaranties
with the princes of the north, which were, in some sort, contradictory
to one another; but this conduct of theirs wholly annulled all such
engagements, and left her at liberty to interpose in the affairs of
those parts of Europe, in such a manner as would best serve the
interests of her own kingdoms, as well as that of the Protestant
religion, and settle a due balance of power in the north.
The grand article for preventing the union of France and Spain, was to
be executed during a cessation of arms. But many difficulties arising
about that, and some other points of great importance to the common
cause, which could not easily be adjusted either between the French and
British plenipotentiaries at Utrecht, or by correspondence between Mons.
de Torcy and the ministry here; the Queen took the resolution of sending
the Lord Viscount Bolingbroke immediately to France, fully instructed in
all her intentions, and authorized to negotiate every thing necessary
for settling the treaty of peace in such a course, as might bring it to
a happy and speedy conclusion. He was empowered to agree to a general
suspension of arms, by sea and land, between Great Britain, France and
Spain, to continue for four months, or until the conclusion of the
peace; provided France and Spain would previously give positive
assurances to make good the terms demanded by Her Majesty for the Duke
of Savoy, and would likewise adjust and determine the forms of the
several renunciations to be made by both those crowns, in order to
prevent their being ever united. The Lord Bolingbroke was likewise
authorized to settle some differences relating to the Elector of
Bavaria, for whose interests France was as much concerned as Her Majesty
was for those of the Duke of Savoy; to explain all doubtful articles
which particularly related to the advantages of Britain; to know the
real _ultimatum_, as it is termed, of France upon the general plan of
peace; and lastly, to cut off all hopes from that court of ever bringing
the Queen to force her allies to a disadvantageous peace; Her Majesty
resolving to impose no scheme at all upon them, or to debar them from
the liberty of endeavouring to obtain the best conditions they could.
The Lord Bolingbroke went to France in the beginning of August,[18] was
received at court with particular marks of distinction and respect; and
in a very few days, by his usual address and ability, performed every
part of his commission, extremely to the Queen's content and his own
honour. He returned to England before the end of the month; but Mr.
Prior, who went along with him, was left behind, to adjust whatever
differences might remain or arise between the two crowns.[19]
[Footnote 18: "Lord Bolingbroke and Prior set out for France last
Saturday. My lord's business is to hasten the peace before the Dutch are
too much mauled, and hinder France from carrying the jest of beating
them too far." ("Journal to Stella," August 7th, 1712. See vol. ii., p.
381 of present edition). The result of Bolingbroke's visit was the
signing, on August 19th, of an agreement for the suspension of arms for
four months. Torcy's reception of Bolingbroke was so managed that the
_bon vivant_ peer had as pleasant a time as he could well have wished.
How much influence that had on Bolingbroke we can only speculate; but it
is certain that he would have made a separate peace with France, after
his return, had Oxford been willing. See Torcy's "Mémoires" (vol. ii.,
p. 202). "Bolingbroke avoit conseillé à la Reine sa maîtresse de
préférer une paix particulière à la suspension d'armes, et d'assurer au
plus tôt à ses sujets la jouissance de toutes les conditions dont le Roi
étoit convenu en faveur de l'Angleterre." [T.S.]]
[Footnote 19: There is a long letter from Lord Bolingbroke to Mr. Prior,
on the subject of this negotiation, printed in Scott's edition of Swift,
vol. xv., pp. 524-529. [W.S.J.]]
In the mean time the general conferences at Utrecht, which for several
weeks had been let fall, since the delivery of Dunkirk, were now
resumed. But the Dutch still declaring against a suspension of arms, and
refusing to accept the Queen's speech as a plan to negotiate upon, there
was no progress made for some time in the great work of the peace.
Whereupon the British plenipotentiaries told those of the States, "That
if the Queen's endeavours could not procure more than the contents of
her speech, or if the French should ever fall short of what was there
offered, the Dutch could blame none but themselves, who, by their
conduct, had rendered things difficult, that would otherwise have been
easy." However, Her Majesty thought it prudent to keep the States still
in hopes of her good offices, to prevent them from taking the desperate
course of leaving themselves wholly at the mercy of France; which was an
expedient they formerly practised, and which a party among them was now
inclined to advise.
Whilst the congress at Utrecht remained in this inactive state, the
Queen proceeded to perfect that important article for preventing the
union of France and Spain. It was proposed and accepted, that Philip
should renounce France, for himself and his posterity; and that the Most
Christian King, and all the princes of his blood, should, in the like
manner, renounce Spain.
It must be confessed, that this project of renunciation lay under a
great disrepute, by the former practices of this very King, Lewis XIV.
pursuant to an absurd notion among many in that kingdom, of a divine
right, annexed to proximity of blood, not to be controlled by any human
law.
But it is plain, the French themselves had recourse to this method,
after all their infractions of it, since the Pyrenean treaty; for the
first dauphin, in whom the original claim was vested, renounced, for
himself and his eldest son, which opened the way to Philip Duke of
Anjou; who would however hardly have succeeded, if it had not been for
the will made in his favour by the last King, Charles II.
It is indeed hard to reflect, with any patience, upon the unaccountable
stupidity of the princes of Europe for some centuries past, who left a
probability to France of succeeding in a few ages to all their
dominions; whilst, at the same time, no alliance with that kingdom could
be of advantage to any prince, by reason of the salique law. Should not
common prudence have taught every sovereign in Christendom to enact a
salique law, with respect to France; for want of which, it is almost a
miracle, that the Bourbon family hath not possessed the universal
monarchy by right of inheritance? When the French assert a proximity of
blood gives a divine right, as some of their ministers, who ought to be
more wise or honest, have lately advanced in this very case, to the
title of Spain; do they not, by allowing a French succession, make their
own kings usurpers? Or, if the salique law be divine, is it not of
universal obligation, and consequently of force, to exclude France from
inheriting by daughters? Or, lastly, if that law be of human
institution, may it not be enacted in any state, with whatever extent or
limitation the legislature shall think fit? For the notion of an
unchangeable human law is an absurdity in government, to be believed
only by ignorance, and supported by power. From hence it follows, that
the children of the late Queen of France, although she had renounced,
were as legally excluded from succeeding to Spain, as if the salique law
had been fundamental in that kingdom; since that exclusion was
established by every power in Spain, which could possibly give a
sanction to any law there; and therefore the Duke of Anjou's title is
wholly founded upon the bequest of his predecessor (which hath great
authority in that monarchy, as it formerly had in ours), upon the
confirmation of the Cortes, and the general consent of the people.
It is certain, the faith of princes is so frequently subservient to
their ambition, that renunciations have little validity, otherwise than
from the powers and parties whose interest it is to support them. But
this renunciation, which the Queen hath exacted from the French King and
his grandson, I take to be armed with all the essential circumstances
that can fortify such an act. For as it is necessary, for the security
of every prince in Europe, that those two great kingdoms should never be
united; so the chief among them will readily consent to be guarantees
for preventing such a misfortune.
Besides, this proposal (according to Her Majesty's expression in her
speech) is of such a nature, that it executes itself; because the
Spaniards, who dread such an union, for every reason that can have
weight among men, took care that their king should not only renounce, in
the most solemn manner; but likewise, that the act should be framed in
the strongest terms themselves could invent, or we could furnish them
with. As to France, upon supposal of the young dauphin's dying in a few
years, that kingdom will not be in a condition to engage in a long war
against a powerful alliance, fortified with the addition of the
Spaniards, and the party of the Duke of Berry, or whoever else shall be
next claimer: and the longer the present dauphin lives, the weaker must
Philip's interest be in France; because the princes, who are to succeed
by this renunciation, will have most power and credit in the kingdom.
The mischiefs occasioned by the want of a good understanding between the
allies, especially Britain and Holland, were raised every day; the
French taking the advantage, and raising difficulties, not only upon the
general plan of peace, but likewise upon the explanation of several
articles in the projected treaty between them and Her Majesty: They
insisted to have Lille, as the equivalent for Dunkirk; and demanded
Tournay, Maubeuge, and Condé, for the two or three towns mentioned in
the Queen's speech; which the British plenipotentiaries were so far from
allowing, that they refused to confer with those of France upon that
foot; although, at the same time, the former had fresh apprehensions
that the Dutch, in a fit of despair, would accept whatever terms the
enemy pleased to offer, and, by precipitating their own peace, prevent
Her Majesty from obtaining any advantages, both for her allies and
herself.
It is most certain, that the repeated losses suffered by the States, in
little more than two months after they had withdrawn themselves from the
Queen's assistance, did wholly disconcert their counsels;[20] and their
prudence (as it is usual) began to forsake them with their good fortune.
They were so weak as to be still deluded by their friends in England,
who continued to give them hopes of some mighty and immediate resource
from hence; for when the Duke of Ormonde had been about a month in
Ghent, he received a letter from the Maréchal de Villars, to inform him,
that the Dutch generals, taken at Denain, had told the maréchal
publicly, of a sudden revolution expected in Britain; that particularly
the Earl of Albemarle and Mons. Hompesch discoursed very freely of it,
and that nothing was more commonly talked of in Holland. It was then
likewise confidently reported in Ghent, that the Queen was dead; and we
all remember what rumour flew about here at the very same time, as if
Her Majesty's health were in a bad condition.
[Footnote 20: The Dutch had been defeated at Douay, and the Allies had
suffered reverses by the reduction of Quesnoy and Bouchain. [T.S.]]
Whether such vain hopes as these gave spirit to the Dutch; whether their
frequent misfortunes made them angry and sullen; whether they still
expected to overreach us by some private stipulations with France,
through the mediation of the Elector of Bavaria, as that prince
afterwards gave out; or whatever else was the cause, they utterly
refused a cessation of arms; and made not the least return to all the
advances and invitations made by Her Majesty, until the close of the
campaign.
It was then the States first began to view their affairs in another
light; to consider how little the vast promises of Count Zinzendorf were
to be relied on; to be convinced that France was not disposed to break
with Her Majesty, only to gratify their ill humour, or unreasonable
demands; to discover that their factious correspondents on this side the
water had shamefully misled them; that some of their own principal towns
grew heartily weary of the war, and backward in their loans; and,
lastly, that Prince Eugene, their new general, whether his genius or
fortune had left him, was not for their turn. They, therefore, directed
their ministers at Utrecht to signify to the lord privy seal and the
Earl of Strafford, "That the States were disposed to comply with Her
Majesty, and to desire her good offices with France; particularly, that
Tournay and Condé might be left to them as part of their barrier,
without which they could not be safe: That the Elector of Bavaria might
not be suffered to retain any town in the Netherlands, which would be as
bad for Holland as if those places were in the hands of France:
Therefore the States proposed, that Luxembourg, Namur, Charleroy, and
Nieuport, might be delivered to the Emperor. Lastly, That the French
might not insist on excepting the four species of goods out of the
tariff of one thousand six hundred and sixty-four: That if Her Majesty
could prevail with France to satisfy their masters on these articles,
they would be ready to submit in all the rest."
When the Queen received an account of this good disposition in the
States General, immediately orders were sent to Mr. Prior, to inform the
ministers of the French court, "That Her Majesty had now some hopes of
the Dutch complying with her measures; and therefore she resolved, as
she had always declared, whenever those allies came to themselves, not
to make the peace without their reasonable satisfaction." The difficulty
that most pressed, was about the disposal of Tournay and Condé. The
Dutch insisted strongly to have both, and the French were extremely
unwilling to part with either.
The Queen judged the former would suffice, for completing the barrier of
the States. Mr. Prior was therefore directed to press the Marquis de
Torcy effectually on this head, and to terminate all that minister's
objections, by assuring him of Her Majesty's resolutions to appear
openly on the side of the Dutch, if this demand were refused. It was
thought convenient to act in this resolute manner with France, whose
late success, against Holland, had taught the ministers of the Most
Christian King to resume their old imperious manner of treating with
that republic; to which they were farther encouraged by the ill
understanding between Her Majesty and the allies.
This appeared from the result of an idle quarrel that happened, about
the end of August,[21] at Utrecht, between a French and a Dutch
plenipotentiary, Mons. Mesnager and Count Rechteren;[22] wherein the
court of France demanded such abject submissions, and with so much
haughtiness, as plainly shewed they were pleased with any occasion of
mortifying the Dutch.
[Footnote 21: July. [S]]
[Footnote 22: See note on p. 95. [T.S.]]
Besides, the politics of the French ran at this time very opposite to
those of Britain: They thought the ministers here durst not meet the
Parliament without a peace; and that, therefore, Her Majesty would
either force the States to comply with France, by delivering up Tournay,
which was the principal point in dispute, or would finish her own peace
with France and Spain, leaving a fixed time for Holland to refuse or
accept the terms imposed on them. But the Queen, who thought the demand
of Tournay by the States to be very necessary and just, was determined
to insist upon it, and to declare openly against France, rather than
suffer her ally to want a place so useful for their barrier. And Mr.
Prior was ordered to signify this resolution of Her Majesty to Mons. de
Torcy, in case that minister could not be otherwise prevailed on.
The British plenipotentiaries did likewise, at the same time, express to
those of Holland Her Majesty's great satisfaction, that the States were
at last disposed to act in confidence with her: "That she wished this
resolution had been sooner taken, since nobody had gained by the delay,
but the French King; that, however, Her Majesty did not question the
procuring a safe and honourable peace, by united counsels, reasonable
demands, and prudent measures; that she would assist them in getting
whatever was necessary to their barrier, and in settling, to their
satisfaction, the exceptions made by France out of the tariff of one
thousand six hundred and sixty-four; that no other difficulties remained
of moment to retard the peace, since the Queen had obtained Sicily for
the Duke of Savoy; and, in the settlement of the Low Countries, would
adhere to what she delivered from the throne: That as to the empire, Her
Majesty heartily wished their barrier as good as could be desired; but
that we were not now in circumstances to expect every thing exactly
according to the scheme of Holland: France had already offered a great
part, and the Queen did not think the remainder worth the continuance of
the war."
Her Majesty conceived the peace in so much forwardness, that she thought
fit, about this time, to nominate the Duke of Hamilton and the Lord
Lexington for ambassadors in France and Spain, to receive the
renunciations in both courts, and adjust matters of commerce.
The duke[23] was preparing for his journey, when he was challenged to a
duel[24] by the Lord Mohun,[25] a person of infamous character. He
killed his adversary upon the spot, though he himself received a wound;
and, weakened by the loss of blood, as he was leaning in the arms of his
second, was most barbarously stabbed in the breast by Lieutenant-General
Macartney,[26] who was second to Lord Mohun. He died a few minutes after
in the field, and the murderer made his escape. I thought so surprising
an event might deserve barely to be related, although it be something
foreign to my subject.
[Footnote 23: James, Duke of Hamilton, was a gentleman of the
bed-chamber to King Charles II. He succeeded his father in the title,
April 18th, 1694, and was sent the same year envoy extraordinary to
France; ... he was killed, November 15th, 1712. [S.]]
[Footnote 24: Swift's account of the duel is exactly agreeable to the
depositions of Colonel Hamilton before a committee of the council. [S.]]
[Footnote 25: Charles Lord Mohun was the last offspring of a very noble
and ancient family, of which William de Mohun, who accompanied the
Norman conqueror, was the first founder in England. [S.]]
[Footnote 26: General Macartney was tried, at the King's Bench bar, for
the murder, June 13th, 1716; and the jury found him guilty of
man-slaughter. [S.]]
The Earl of Strafford, who had come to England in May last,[27] in order
to give Her Majesty an account of the disposition of affairs in Holland,
was now returning with her last instructions, to let the Dutch minister
know, "That some points would probably meet with difficulties not to be
overcome, which once might have been easily obtained: To shew what evil
consequences had already flowed from their delay and irresolution, and
to entreat them to fix on some proposition, reasonable in itself, as
well as possible to be effected: That the Queen would insist upon the
cession of Tournay by France, provided the States would concur in
finishing the peace, without starting new objections, or insisting upon
farther points: That the French demands, in favour of the Elector of
Bavaria, appeared to be such as, the Queen was of opinion, the States
ought to agree to; which were, to leave the Elector in possession of
Luxembourg, Namur, and Charleroy, subject to the terms of their barrier,
until he should be restored to his electorate; and to give him the
kingdom of Sardinia, to efface the stain of his degradation in the
electoral college: That the earl had brought over a project of a new
Treaty of Succession and Barrier, which Her Majesty insisted the States
should sign, before the conclusion of the peace; the former treaty
having been disadvantageous to her subjects, containing in it the seeds
of future dissensions, and condemned by the sense of the nation. Lastly,
That Her Majesty, notwithstanding all provocations, had, for the sake of
the Dutch, and in hopes of their recovery from those false notions which
had so long misled them, hitherto kept the negotiations open: That the
offers now made them were her last, and this the last time she would
apply to them: That they must either agree, or expect the Queen would
proceed immediately to conclude her treaty with France and Spain, in
conjunction with such of her allies as would think fit to adhere to her.
[Footnote 27: "Come to England in ... last" in original edition. The
word "May" was supplied in the edition of 1775. [W.S.J.]]
"As to Savoy, that the Queen expected the States would concur with her
in making good the advantages stipulated for that duke, and in
prevailing with the Emperor to consent to an absolute neutrality in
Italy, until the peace should be concluded."
The governing party in Holland, however in appearance disposed to
finish, affected new delays, and raised many difficulties about the four
species of goods, which the French had excepted out of the tariff. Count
Zinzendorf, the Emperor's plenipotentiary, did all that was possible to
keep up this humour in the Dutch, in hopes to put them under a necessity
of preparing for the next campaign; and some time after went so far in
this pursuit, that he summoned the several ministers of the empire, and
told them he had letters from his master, with orders to signify to
them, "That his Imperial Majesty resolved to begin the campaign early,
with all his forces united against France; of which he desired they
would send notice to all their courts, that the several princes might be
ready to furnish their contingents and recruits." At the same time
Zinzendorf endeavoured to borrow two millions of florins upon the
security of some imperial cities; but could not succeed either amongst
the Jews or at Amsterdam.
When the Earl of Strafford arrived at Utrecht, the lord privy seal and
he communicated to the Dutch ministers the new Treaty for a Succession
and Barrier, as the Queen had ordered it to be prepared here in England,
differing from the former in several points of the greatest moment,
obvious to any who will be at the pains to compare them. This was
strenuously opposed for several weeks by the plenipotentiaries of the
States; but the province of Utrecht, where the congress was held,
immediately sent orders to their representatives at The Hague, to
declare their province thankful to the Queen; that they agreed the peace
should be made on the terms proposed by France, and consented to the new
projected Treaty of Barrier and Succession: and about the close of the
year, one thousand seven hundred and twelve, four of the seven
provinces, had delivered their opinions for putting an end to the war.
This unusual precipitation in the States, so different from the whole
tenor of their former conduct, was very much suspected by the British
plenipotentiaries. Their Lordships had received intelligence, that the
Dutch ministers held frequent conferences with those of France, and had
offered to settle their interests with that crown, without the
concurrence of Britain. Count Zinzendorf, and his colleagues, appeared
likewise, all on the sudden, to have the same dispositions, and to be in
great haste to settle their several differences with the States. The
reasons for this proceeding were visible enough; many difficulties were
yet undetermined in the treaty of commerce between Her Majesty and
France, for the adjusting of which, and some other points, the Queen had
lately dispatched the Duke of Shrewsbury to that court. Some of these
were of hard digestion, with which the Most Christian King would not be
under a necessity of complying, when he had no farther occasion for us,
and might, upon that account, afford better terms to the other two
powers. Besides, the Emperor and the States could very well spare Her
Majesty the honour of being arbitrator of a general peace; and the
latter hoped by this means, to avoid the new Treaty of Barrier and
Succession, which we were now forcing on them.
To prevent the consequences of this evil, there fortunately fell out an
incident, which the two lords at Utrecht knew well how to make use of:
the quarrel between Mons. Mesnager and Count Rechteren (formerly
mentioned) had not yet been made up. The French and Dutch differing in
some circumstances, about the satisfaction to be given by the count for
the affront he had offered, the British plenipotentiaries kept this
dispute on foot for several days; and, in the mean time, pressed the
Dutch to finish the new Treaty of Barrier and Succession between Her
Majesty and them, which, about the middle of January, was concluded
fully to the Queen's satisfaction.
But while these debates and differences continued at the congress, the
Queen resolved to put a speedy end to her part in the war; she therefore
sent orders to the lord privy seal, and the Earl of Stafford, to prepare
every thing necessary for signing her own treaty with France. This she
hoped might be done against the meeting of her Parliament, now prorogued
to the third of February; in which time, those among the allies, who
were really inclined towards a peace, might settle their several
interests by the assistance and support of Her Majesty's
plenipotentiaries; and as for the rest, who would either refuse to
comply, or endeavour to protract the negotiation, the heads of their
respective demands, which France had yielded by Her Majesty's
intervention, and agreeable to the plan laid down in her speech, should
be mentioned in the treaty, and a time limited for the several powers
concerned to receive or reject them.
The Pretender was not yet gone out of France, upon some difficulties
alleged by the French, about procuring him a safe conduct to Bar-le-duc,
in the Duke of Lorraine's dominions, where it was then proposed he
should reside. The Queen, altogether bent upon quieting the minds of her
subjects, declared, she would not sign the peace till that person were
removed; although several wise men believed he could be no where less
dangerous to Britain, than in the place where he was.
The argument which most prevailed on the States to sign the new Treaty
of Barrier and Succession with Britain, was Her Majesty's promise to
procure Tournay for them from France; after which, no more differences
remained between us and that republic, and consequently they had no
farther temptations to any separate transactions with the French, who
thereupon began to renew their litigious and haughty manner of treating
with the Dutch. The satisfaction they extorted for the affront given by
Count Rechteren to Mons. Mesnager, although somewhat softened by the
British ministers at Utrecht, was yet so rigorous, that Her Majesty
could not forbear signifying her resentment of it to the Most Christian
King. Mons. Mesnager, who seemed to have more the genius of a merchant
than a minister, began, in his conferences with the plenipotentiaries of
the States, to raise new disputes upon points which both we and they had
reckoned upon as wholly settled. The Abbé de Polignac, a most
accomplished person, of great generosity and universal understanding,
was gone to France to receive the cardinal's cap; and the Maréchal
d'Uxelles was wholly guided by his colleague, Mons. Mesnager, who kept
up those brangles, that for a time obstructed the peace; some of which
were against all justice, and others of small importance, both of very
little advantage to his country, and less to the reputation of his
master or himself. This low talent in business, which the Cardinal de
Polignac used, in contempt, to call a "spirit of negotiating," made it
impossible for the two lords plenipotentiaries, with all their abilities
and experience, to bring Mesnager to reason, in several points both with
us and the States: his concessions were few and constrained, serving
only to render him more tenacious of what he refused. In several of the
towns, which the States were to keep, he insisted that France should
retain the chatellanies, or extent of country depending on them,
particularly that of Tournay; a demand the more unjustifiable, because
he knew his master had not only proceeded directly contrary, but had
erected a court in his kingdom, where his own judges extended the
territories about those towns he had taken, as far as he pleased to
direct them. Mons. Mesnager showed equal obstinacy in what his master
expected for the Elector of Bavaria, and in refusing the tariff of one
thousand six hundred and sixty-four: so that the Queen's
plenipotentiaries represented these difficulties as what might be of
dangerous consequence, both to the peace in general, and to the States
in particular, if they were not speedily prevented.
Upon these considerations Her Majesty thought it her shortest and safest
course to apply directly to France, where she had then so able a
minister as the Duke of Shrewsbury.[28]
[Footnote 28: Shrewsbury had been appointed the Duke of Hamilton's
successor. [T.S.]]
The Marquis de Torcy, secretary to the Most Christian King, was the
minister with whom the Duke was to treat, as having been the first who
moved his master to apply to the Queen for a peace, in opposition to a
violent faction in that kingdom, who were as eagerly bent to continue
the war, as any other could be either here or in Holland.
It would be very unlike a historian, to refuse this great minister the
praise he so justly deserveth, of having treated, through the whole
course of so great a negotiation, with the utmost candour and integrity;
never once failing in any promise he made, and tempering a firm zeal to
his master's interest, with a ready compliance to what was reasonable
and just. Mr. Prior, whom I have formerly mentioned, resided likewise
now at Paris, with the character of minister plenipotentiary, and was
very acceptable to that court, upon the score of his wit and humour.[29]
[Footnote 29: P. Fitzgerald adds, "as well as useful to Her Majesty by
his knowledge and dexterity in the management of affairs." [W.S.J.]]
The Duke of Shrewsbury was directed to press the French court upon the
points yet unsettled in the treaty of commerce between both crowns; to
make them drop their unreasonable demands for the Elector of Bavaria; to
let them know, that the Queen was resolved not to forsake her allies who
were now ready to come in; that she thought the best way of hastening
the general peace, was to determine her own particular one with France,
until which time she could not conveniently suffer her Parliament to
meet.
The States were, by this time, so fully convinced of the Queen's
sincerity and affection to their republic, and how much they had been
deceived by the insinuations of the factious party in England, that they
wrote a very humble letter to Her Majesty, to desire her assistance
towards settling those points they had in dispute with France, and
professing themselves ready to acquiesce in whatever explanation Her
Majesty would please to make of the plan proposed in her speech to the
Parliament.
But the Queen had already prevented their desires; and in the beginning
of February, one thousand seven hundred and twelve-thirteen, directed
the Duke of Shrewsbury to inform the French court, "That since she had
prevailed on her allies, the Dutch, to drop the demand of Condé, and the
other of the four species of goods, which the French had excepted out of
the tariff of one thousand six hundred and sixty-four, she would not
sign without them: That she approved of the Dutch insisting to have the
chatellanies restored, with the towns, and was resolved to stand or fall
with them, until they were satisfied in this point."
Her Majesty had some apprehensions, that the French created these
difficulties on purpose to spin out the treaty, until the campaign
should begin. They thought it absolutely necessary, that our Parliament
should meet in a few weeks, which could not well be ventured, until the
Queen were able to tell both Houses, that her own peace was signed: That
this would not only facilitate what remained in difference between
Britain and France, but leave the Dutch entirely at the mercy of the
latter.
The Queen, weary of these refined mistakes in the French politics, and
fully resolved to be trifled with no longer, sent her determinate orders
to the Duke of Shrewsbury, to let France know, "That Her Majesty had
hitherto prorogued her Parliament, in hopes of accommodating the
difficulties in her own treaties of peace and commerce with that crown,
as well as settling the interests of her several allies; or, at least,
that the differences in the former being removed, the Most Christian
King would have made such offers for the latter, as might justify Her
Majesty in signing her own peace, whether the confederates intended to
sign theirs or no. But several points being yet unfinished between both
crowns, and others between France and the rest of the allies, especially
the States, to which the plenipotentiaries of that court at Utrecht had
not thought fit to give satisfaction; the Queen was now come to a final
determination, both with relation to her own kingdoms, and to the whole
alliance: That the campaign approaching, she would not willingly be
surprised in case the war was to go on: That she had transmitted to the
Duke of Shrewsbury her last resolutions, and never would be prevailed on
to reduce her own demands, or those of her allies, any lower than the
scheme now sent over, as an explanation of the plan laid down in her
speech: That Her Majesty had sent orders to her plenipotentiaries at
Utrecht, to assume the character of ambassadors, and sign the peace
immediately with the ministers of the Most Christian King, as soon as
the Duke of Shrewsbury should have sent them notice that the French had
complied: That the Queen had therefore farther prorogued her Parliament
to the third of March, in hopes to assure them, by that time, of her
peace being agreed on; for if the two Houses should meet, while any
uncertainty remained, supplies must be asked as for a war."
The Duke of Shrewsbury[30] executed this important commission with that
speed and success, which could only be expected from an able minister.
The French King immediately yielded to the whole scheme Her Majesty
proposed; whereupon directions were sent to the lord privy seal, and the
Earl of Strafford, to sign a peace between Great Britain and France,
without delay.
[Footnote 30: Swift writes to Abp. King, October 20th, 1713, that the
Duke of Shrewsbury "is the finest gentleman we have, and of an excellent
understanding and capacity for business" (Scott's edition, xvi. 71). See
also Swift's remarks in "The Examiner," No. 27 (vol. ix, of this
edition, p. 171), and note in vol. v., p. 377. [W.S.J.]]
Upon the second day of March, the two British plenipotentiaries met
those of the allies in the town-house at Utrecht; where the lord privy
seal addressed himself to them in a short speech, "That the negotiation
had now continued fourteen months with great slowness, which had proved
very injurious to the interests of the allies: That the Queen had stayed
thus long, and stopped the finishing of her own peace, rather than leave
her allies in any uncertainty: That she hoped they would now be all
prepared to put an end to this great work; and therefore had commanded
her plenipotentiaries to tell those of the allies, That she found it
necessary to conclude her own treaty immediately; and it was her
opinion, that the confederates ought to finish theirs at the same time,
to which they were now accordingly invited by Her Majesty's orders." And
lastly, his lordship declared, in the Queen's name, "That whoever could
not be ready on the day prefixed, should have a convenient time allowed
them to come in."
Although the orders sent by the Queen to her plenipotentiaries were very
precise, yet their lordships did not precipitate the performance of
them. They were directed to appoint as short a day for the signing as
they conveniently could; but, however, the particular day was left to
their discretion. They hoped to bring over the Dutch, and most of the
other allies, to conclude at the same time with the Queen; which, as it
would certainly be more popular to their country, so they conceived it
would be more safe for themselves: besides, upon looking over their
commission, a scruple sprang in their minds, that they could not sign a
particular peace with France; their powers, as they apprehended,
authorizing them only to sign a general one. Their lordships therefore
sent to England to desire new powers,[31] and, in the mean time,
employed themselves with great industry, between the ministers of France
and those of the several allies, to find some expedient for smoothing
the way to an agreement among them.
[Footnote 31: "Lord Bolingbroke, who says he has not sagacity enough to
find the objections that the plenipotentiaries had made to their first
full powers, for their satisfaction, sends them a new commission, and
repeats to them positive orders to sign and conclude with France....
These difficulties of the plenipotentiaries made my lord treasurer, who
never failed to exert himself when he found it absolutely necessary,
think it high time to interpose his authority;.... and as his lordship
never yet appeared in vain, all further obstructions at Utrecht were
after this soon removed." ("Report from the Committee of Secrecy," 1715,
pp. 103, 104.) [N.]]
The Earl of Strafford went for a few days to The Hague, to inform the
States of Her Majesty's express commands to his colleague and himself,
for signing the peace as soon as possible; and to desire they would be
ready at the same time: which the pensionary promised; and that their
plenipotentiaries should be empowered accordingly, to the great
contentment of Mons. Buys, who was now so much altered, either in
reality, or appearance, that he complained to the Earl of Mons.
Heinsius's slowness; and charged all the delays and mismanagements of a
twelvemonth past to that minister's account.