PROP. VIII. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number
of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.
Proof.-Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few
(III. vii.): therefore (IV. v.), in proportion to the increased
number of simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused, an emotion
becomes stronger. Q.E.D.
Note-This proposition is also evident from V. Ax. ii.
PROP. IX. An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse
causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion
itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less
affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different
and equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a
single cause.
Proof.-An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it
hinders the mind from being able to think (IV. xxvi. xxvii.);
therefore, an emotion, whereby the mind is determined to the
contemplation of several things at once, is less hurtful than
another equally powerful emotion, which so engrosses the mind in
the single contemplation of a few objects or of one, that it is
unable to think of anything else; this was our first point.
Again, as the mind's essence, in other words, its power (III.
vii.), consists solely in thought (II. xi.), the mind is less
passive in respect to an emotion, which causes it to think of
several things at once, than in regard to an equally strong
emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few
or of a single object: this was our second point. Lastly, this
emotion (III. xlviii.), in so far as it is attributable to
several causes, is less powerful in regard to each of them.
Q.E.D.
PROP. X. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to
our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the
modifications of our body according to the intellectual order.
Proof.-The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that
is (IV. xxx.), which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede
the mind from understanding (IV. xxvii.). So long, therefore, as
we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, the
mind's power, whereby it endeavours to understand things (IV.
xxvi.), is not impeded, and therefore it is able to form clear
and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another (II. xl.
note. ii. and II. xlvii. note); consequently we have in such
cases the power of arranging and associating the modifications of
the body according to the intellectual order. Q.E.D.
Note.-By this power of rightly arranging and associating the
bodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily
affected by evil emotions. For (V. vii.) a greater force is
needed for controlling the emotions, when they are arranged and
associated according to the intellectual order, than when they,
are uncertain and unsettled. The best we can do, therefore, so
long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is
to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical precepts,
to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith[16] to the
particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so
that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that
it may be always ready to our hand. For instance, we have laid
down among the rules of life (IV. xlvi. and note), that hatred
should be overcome with love or high-mindedness, and not required
with hatred in return. Now, that this precept of reason may be
always ready to our hand in time of need, we should often think
over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and
in what manner and way they may be best warded off by
high-mindedness: we shall thus associate the idea of wrong with
the idea of this precept, which accordingly will always be ready
for use when a wrong is done to us (II. xviii.). If we keep also
in readiness the notion of our true advantage, and of the good
which follows from mutual friendships, and common fellowships;
further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result
of the right way of life ( IV. lii.), and that men, no less than
everything else, act by the necessity of their nature: in such
case I say the wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises
therefrom, will engross a very small part of our imagination and
will be easily overcome; or, if the anger which springs from a
grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will nevertheless be
overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far sooner
than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand. As
is indeed evident from V. vi. vii. viii. We should, in the same
way, reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear; the
ordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind and
imagined, together with the means whereby through readiness of
resource and strength of mind we can avoid and overcome them.
But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and conceptions
we should always bear in mind that which is good in every
individual thing (IV. lxiii. Coroll. and III. lix.), in order
that we may always be determined to action by an emotion of
pleasure. For instance, if a man sees that he is too keen in the
pursuit of honour, let him think over its right use, the end for
which it should be pursued, and the means whereby he may attain
it. Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and the
fickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except
through a morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these do
the most ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of
gaining the distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving
vent to their anger would fain appear wise. Wherefore it is
certain that those, who cry out the loudest against the misuse of
honour and the vanity of the world, are those who most greedily
covet it. This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is common
to all who are ill-used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit.
For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the
misuse of wealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merely
torments himself, and shows the world that he is intolerant, not
only of his own poverty, but also of other people's riches. So,
again, those who have been ill received by a woman they love
think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other stock
faults of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion,
directly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart.
Thus he who would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the
love of freedom strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of
the virtues and their causes, and to fill his spirit with the joy
which arises from the true knowledge of them: he will in no wise
desire to dwell on men's faults, or to carp at his fellows, or to
revel in a false show of freedom. Whosoever will diligently
observe and practise these precepts (which indeed are not
difficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for
the most part, to direct his actions according to the
commandments of reason.
[16] Continuo. Rendered "constantly" by Mr. Pollock on the ground
that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context.
PROP. XI. In proportion as a mental image is referred to more
objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and
occupies the mind more.
Proof.-In proportion as a mental image or an emotion is
referred to more objects, so are there more causes whereby it can
be aroused and fostered, all of which (by hypothesis) the mind
contemplates simultaneously in association with the given emotion;
therefore the emotion is more frequent, or is more often in
full vigour, and (V. viii.) occupies the mind more. Q.E.D.
PROP. XII. The mental images of things are more easily
associated with the images referred to things which we clearly
and distinctly understand, than with others.
Proof.-Things, which we clearly and distinctly understand,
are either the common properties of things or deductions
therefrom (see definition of Reason, II. xl. note ii.), and are
consequently (by the last Prop.) more often aroused in us.
Wherefore it may more readily happen, that we should contemplate
other things in conjunction with these than in conjunction with
something else, and consequently (II. xviii.) that the images of
the said things should be more often associated with the images
of these than with the images of something else. Q.E.D.
PROP. XIII. A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion as
it is associated with a greater number of other images.
Proof.-In proportion as an image is associated with a greater
number of other images, so (II. xviii.) are there more causes
whereby it can be aroused. Q.E.D.
PROP. XIV. The mind can bring it about, that all bodily
modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of
God.
Proof.-There is no modification of the body, whereof the mind
may not form some clear and distinct conception (V. iv.);
wherefore it can bring it about, that they should all be referred
to the idea of God (I. xv.). Q.E.D.
PROP. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and
his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he
more understands himself and his emotions.
Proof.-He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and
his emotions feels pleasure (III. liii.), and this pleasure is
(by the last Prop.) accompanied by the idea of God; therefore
(Def. of the Emotions, vi.) such an one loves God, and (for the
same reason) so much the more in proportion as he more
understands himself and his emotions. Q.E.D.
PROP. XVI. This love towards God must hold the chief place in
the mind.
Proof.-For this love is associated with all the modifications
of the body (V. xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V. xv.);
therefore (V. xi.), it must hold the chief place in the mind.
Q.E.D.
PROP. XVII. God is without passions, neither is he affected by
any emotion of pleasure or pain.
Proof.-All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are
true (II. xxxii.), that is (II. Def. iv.) adequate; and
therefore (by the general Def. of the Emotions) God is without
passions. Again, God cannot pass either to a greater or to a
lesser perfection (I. xx. Coroll. ii.); therefore (by Def. of
the Emotions, ii. iii.) he is not affected by any emotion of
pleasure or pain.
Corollary.-Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate
anyone. For God (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any
emotion of pleasure or pain, consequently (Def. of the Emotions,
vi. vii.) he does not love or hate anyone.
PROP. XVIII. No one can hate God.
Proof.-The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect
(II. xlvi. xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God,
we are active (III. iii.); consequently (III. lix.) there can be
no pain accompanied by the idea of God, in other words (Def. of
the Emotions, vii.), no one can hate God. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-Love towards God cannot be turned into hate.
Note.-It may be objected that, as we understand God as the
cause of all things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause
of pain. But I make answer, that, in so far as we understand the
causes of pain, it to that extent (V. iii.) ceases to be a
passion, that is, it ceases to be pain (III. lix.); therefore,
in so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain, we to
that extent feel pleasure.
PROP. XIX. He, who loves God, cannot endeavour that God should
love him in return.
Proof.-For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V.
xvii. Coroll.) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and
consequently he would desire to feel pain (III. xix.); which is
absurd (III. xxviii.). Therefore, he who loves God, &c. Q.E.D.
PROP. XX. This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion
of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in
proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to
God by the same bond of love.
Proof.-This love towards God is the highest good which we can
seek for under the guidance of reason (IV. xxviii.), it is common
to all men (IV. xxxvi.), and we desire that all should rejoice
therein (IV. xxxvii.); therefore (Def. of the Emotions, xxiii.),
it cannot be stained by the emotion envy, nor by the emotion of
jealousy (V. xviii. see definition of Jealousy, III. xxxv. note);
but, contrariwise, it must needs be the more fostered, in
proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice
therein. Q.E.D.
Note.-We can in the same way show, that there is no emotion
directly contrary to this love, whereby this love can be
destroyed; therefore we may conclude, that this love towards God
is the most constant of all the emotions, and that, in so far as
it is referred to the body, it cannot be destroyed, unless the
body be destroyed also. As to its nature, in so far as it is
referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire.
I have now gone through all the remedies against the
emotions, or all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can
do against them. Whence it appears that the mind's power over
the emotions consists:--
I. In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V. iv. note).
II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the
thought of an external cause, which we conceive confusedly (V.
ii. and V. iv. note).
III. In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions
referred to things, which we distinctly understand, surpass those
referred to what we conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner
(V. vii.).
IV. In the number of causes whereby those modifications[17]
are fostered, which have regard to the common properties of
things or to God (V. ix. xi.).
[17] Affectiones. Camerer reads affectus--emotions.
V. Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and
associate, one with another, its own emotions (V. x. note and
xii. xiii. xiv.).
But, in order that this power of the mind over the emotions
may be better understood, it should be specially observed that
the emotions are called by us strong, when we compare the emotion
of one man with the emotion of another, and see that one man is
more troubled than another by the same emotion; or when we are
comparing the various emotions of the same man one with another,
and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion than
by another. For the strength of every emotion is defined by a
comparison of our own power with the power of an external cause.
Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its
infirmity or passion is defined by the privation of knowledge
only: it therefore follows, that that mind is most passive,
whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it
may be characterized more readily by its passive states than by
its activities: on the other hand, that mind is most active,
whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that,
although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former
mind, it may yet be more easily characterized by ideas
attributable to human virtue, than by ideas which tell of human
infirmity. Again, it must be observed, that spiritual
unhealthiness and misfortunes can generally be traced to
excessive love for something which is subject to many variations,
and which we can never become masters of. For no one is
solicitous or anxious about anything, unless he loves it;
neither do wrongs, suspicions, enmities, &c. arise, except in
regard to things whereof no one can be really master.
We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and
distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge
(II. xlvii. note), founded on the actual knowledge of God,
possesses over the emotions: if it does not absolutely destroy
them, in so far as they are passions (V. iii. and iv. note); at
any rate, it causes them to occupy a very small part of the mind
(V. xiv.). Further, it begets a love towards a thing immutable
and eternal (V. xv.), whereof we may really enter into possession
(II. xlv.); neither can it be defiled with those faults which
are inherent in ordinary love; but it may grow from strength to
strength, and may engross the greater part of the mind, and
deeply penetrate it.
And now I have finished with all that concerns this present
life: for, as I said in the beginning of this note, I have
briefly described all the remedies against the emotions. And
this everyone may readily have seen for himself, if he has
attended to what is advanced in the present note, and also to the
definitions of the mind and its emotions, and, lastly, to
Propositions i. and iii. of Part III. It is now, therefore, time
to pass on to those matters, which appertain to the duration of
the mind, without relation to the body.
PROP. XXI. The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what
is past, while the body endures.
Proof.-The mind does not express the actual existence of its
body, nor does it imagine the modifications of the body as
actual, except while the body endures (II. viii. Coroll.); and,
consequently (II. xxvi.), it does not imagine
any body as actually existing, except while its own body endures.
Thus it
cannot imagine anything (for definition of Imagination, see II.
xvii. note),
or remember things past, except while the body endures (see
definition of Memory, II. xviii. note). Q.E.D.
PROP. XXII. Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea,
which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the
form of eternity.
Proof.-God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or
that human body, but also of its essence (I. xxv.). This
essence, therefore, must necessarily be conceived through the
very essence of God (I. Ax. iv.), and be thus conceived by a
certain eternal necessity (I. xvi.); and this conception must
necessarily exist in God (II. iii.). Q.E.D.
PROP. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with
the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.
Proof.-There is necessarily in God a concept or idea, which
expresses the essence of the human body (last Prop.), which,
therefore, is necessarily something appertaining to the essence
of the human mind (II. xiii.). But we have not assigned to the
human mind any duration, definable by time, except in so far as
it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained
through duration, and may be defined by time-that is (II. viii.
Coroll.), we do not assign to it duration, except while the body
endures. Yet, as there is something, notwithstanding, which is
conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence
of God (last Prop.); this something, which appertains to the
essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal. Q.E.D.
Note.-This idea, which expresses the essence of the body
under the form of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode
of thinking, which belongs to the essence of the mind, and is
necessarily eternal. Yet it is not possible that we should
remember that we existed before our body, for our body can bear
no trace of such existence, neither can eternity be defined in
terms of time, or have any relation to time. But,
notwithstanding, we feel and know that we are eternal. For the
mind feels those things that it conceives by understanding, no
less than those things that it remembers. For the eyes of the
mind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other than
proofs. Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before
the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the
essence of the body, under the form of eternity, is eternal, and
that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time, or
explained through duration. Thus our mind can only be said to
endure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed time, in
so far as it involves the actual existence of the body. Thus far
only has it the power of determining the existence of things by
time, and conceiving them under the category of duration.
PROP. XXIV. The more we understand particular things, the more
do we understand God.
Proof.-This is evident from I. xxv. Coroll.
PROP. XXV. The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highest
virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.
Proof.-The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate
idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the
essence of things (see its definition II. xl. note. ii.); and,
in proportion as we understand things more in this way, we better
understand God (by the last Prop.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the
highest virtue of the mind, that is (IV. Def. viii.) the power, or
nature, or (III. vii.) highest endeavour of the mind, is to
understand things by the third kind of knowledge. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXVI. In proportion as the mind is more capable of
understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, it desires
more to understand things by that kind.
Proof-This is evident. For, in so far as we conceive the
mind to be capable of conceiving things by this kind of
knowledge, we, to that extent, conceive it as determined thus to
conceive things; and consequently (Def. of the Emotions, i.),
the mind desires so to do, in proportion as it is more capable
thereof. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXVII. From this third kind of knowledge arises the
highest possible mental acquiescence.
Proof.-The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (IV.
xxviii.), or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge
(V. xxv.), and this virtue is greater in proportion as the mind
knows things more by the said kind of knowledge (V. xxiv.):
consequently, he who knows things by this kind of knowledge
passes to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore (Def.
of the Emotions, ii.) affected by the highest pleasure, such
pleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own
virtue; thus (Def. of the Emotions, xxv.), from this kind of
knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXVIII. The endeavour or desire to know things by the
third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the
second kind of knowledge.
Proof.-This proposition is self-evident. For whatsoever we
understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through
itself, or through that which is conceived through itself; that
is, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are
referred to the third kind of knowledge (II. xl. note. ii.)
cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused, and
are referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow from
adequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind of
knowledge; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the desire of
knowing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from
the first, but from the second kind. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXIX. Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of
eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the
present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving
the essence of the body under the form of eternity.
Proof.-In so far as the mind conceives the present existence
of its body, it to that extent conceives duration which can be
determined by time, and to that extent only has it the power of
conceiving things in relation to time (V. xxi. II. xxvi.). But
eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration (I. Def. viii.
and explanation). Therefore to this extent the mind has not the
power of conceiving things under the form of eternity, but it
possesses such power, because it is of the nature of reason to
conceive things under the form of eternity (II. xliv. Coroll.
ii.), and also because it is of the nature of the mind to
conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity (V.
xxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to
the essence of mind (II. xiii.). Therefore this power of
conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to the
mind in virtue of the mind's conceiving the essence of the body
under the form of eternity. Q.E.D.
Note.-Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways;
either as existing
in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in God and
following
from the necessity of the divine nature. Whatsoever we conceive
in this
second way as true or real, we conceive under the form of
eternity, and
their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as
we showed
in II. xlv. and note, which see.
PROP. XXX. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body
under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a
knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived
through God.
Proof.-Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as this
involves necessary existence (I. Def. viii.). Therefore to
conceive things under the form of eternity, is to conceive things
in so far as they are conceived through the essence of God as
real entities, or in so far as they involve existence through the
essence of God; wherefore our mind, in so far as it conceives
itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that
extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, &c. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as
its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.
Proof.-The mind does not conceive anything under the form of
eternity, except in so far as it conceives its own body under the
form of eternity (V. xxix.); that is, except in so far as it is
eternal (V. xxi. xxiii.); therefore (by the last Prop.), in so
far as it is eternal, it possesses the knowledge of God, which
knowledge is necessarily adequate (II. xlvi.); hence the mind,
in so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing everything
which can follow from this given knowledge of God (II. xl.), in
other words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge
(see Def. in II. xl. note. ii.), whereof accordingly the mind
(III. Def. i.), in so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or
formal cause of such knowledge. Q.E.D.
Note.-In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in
this kind of knowledge, he will be more completely conscious of
himself and of God; in other words, he will be more perfect and
blessed, as will appear more clearly in the sequel. But we must
here observe that, although we are already certain that the mind
is eternal, in so far as it conceives things under the form of
eternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be more
readily explained and better understood, we will consider the
mind itself, as though it had just begun to exist and to
understand things under the form of eternity, as indeed we have
done hitherto; this we may do without any danger of error, so
long as we are careful not to draw any conclusion, unless our
premisses are plain.
PROP. XXXII. Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of
knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by
the idea of God as cause.
Proof.-From this kind of knowledge arises the highest
possible mental acquiescence, that is (Def of the Emotions,
xxv.), pleasure, and this acquiescence is accompanied by the idea
of the mind itself (V. xxvii.), and consequently (V. xxx.) the
idea also of God as cause. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-From the third kind of knowledge necessarily
arises the intellectual love of God. From this kind of knowledge
arises pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is
(Def. of the Emotions, vi.), the love of God; not in so far as
we imagine him as present (V. xxix.), but in so far as we
understand him to be eternal; this is what I call the
intellectual love of God.
PROP. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God, which arises from
the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.
Proof.-The third kind of knowledge is eternal (V. xxxi. I.
Ax. iii.); therefore (by the same Axiom) the love which arises
therefrom is also necessarily eternal. Q.E.D.
Note.-Although this love towards God has (by the foregoing
Prop.) no beginning, it yet possesses all the perfections of
love, just as though it had arisen as we feigned in the Coroll.
of the last Prop. Nor is there here any difference, except that
the mind possesses as eternal those same perfections which we
feigned to accrue to it, and they are accompanied by the idea of
God as eternal cause. If pleasure consists in the transition to
a greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must consist in the
mind being endowed with perfection itself.
PROP. XXXIV. The mind is, only while the body endures, subject
to those emotions which are attributable to passions.
Proof.-Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind
contemplates a thing as present (II. xvii. note); yet this idea
indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than
the nature of the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.).
Therefore emotion (see general Def. of Emotions) is imagination,
in so far as it indicates the present disposition of the body;
therefore (V. xxi.) the mind is, only while the body endures,
subject to emotions which are attributable to passions. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-Hence it follows that no love save intellectual
love is eternal.
Note.-If we look to men's general opinion, we shall see that
they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that
they confuse eternity with duration, and ascribe it to the
imagination or the memory which they believe to remain after
death.
PROP. XXXV. God loves himself with an infinite intellectual
love.
Proof.-God is absolutely infinite (I. Def. vi.), that is (II.
Def. vi.), the nature of God rejoices in infinite perfection;
and such rejoicing is (II. iii.) accompanied by the idea of
himself, that is (I. xi. and Def. i.), the idea of his own cause:
now this is what we have (in V. xxxii. Coroll.) described as
intellectual love.
PROP. XXXVI. The intellectual love of the mind towards God is
that very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as
he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the
essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity;
in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is
part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.
Proof.-This love of the mind must be referred to the
activities of the mind (V. xxxii. Coroll. and III. iii.); it is
itself, indeed, an activity whereby the mind regards itself
accompanied by the idea of God as cause (V. xxxii. and Coroll.);
that is (I. xxv. Coroll. and II. xi. Coroll.), an activity
whereby God, in so far as he can be explained through the human
mind, regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself;
therefore (by the last Prop.), this love of the mind is part of
the infinite love wherewith God loves himself. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves
himself, loves man, and, consequently, that the love of God
towards men, and the intellectual love of the mind towards God
are identical.
Note.-From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein
our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely, in
the constant and eternal love towards God, or in God's love
towards men. This love or blessedness is, in the Bible, called
Glory, and not undeservedly. For whether this love be referred
to God or to the mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence of
spirit, which (Def. of the Emotions, xxv. xxx.) is not really
distinguished from glory. In so far as it is referred to God, it
is (V. xxxv.) pleasure, if we may still use that term,
accompanied by the idea of itself, and, in so far as it is
referred to the mind, it is the same (V. xxvii.).
Again, since the essence of our mind consists solely in
knowledge, whereof the beginning and the foundation is God (I.
xv., and II. xlvii. note), it becomes clear to us, in what manner
and way our mind, as to its essence and existence, follows from
the divine nature and constantly depends on God. I have thought
it worth while here to call attention to this, in order to show
by this example how the knowledge of particular things, which I
have called intuitive or of the third kind (II. xl. note. ii.),
is potent, and more powerful than the universal knowledge, which
I have styled knowledge of the second kind. For, although in
Part I. I showed in general terms, that all things (and
consequently, also, the human mind) depend as to their essence
and existence on God, yet that demonstration, though legitimate
and placed beyond the chances of doubt, does not affect our mind
so much, as when the same conclusion is derived from the actual
essence of some particular thing, which we say depends on God.
PROP. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to
this intellectual love, or which can take it away.
Proof.-This intellectual love follows necessarily from the
nature of the mind, in so far as the latter is regarded through
the nature of God as an eternal truth (V. xxxiii. and xxix.).
If, therefore, there should be anything which would be contrary
to this love, that thing would be contrary to that which is true;
consequently, that, which should be able to take away this
love, would cause that which is true to be false; an obvious
absurdity. Therefore there is nothing in nature which, &c.
Q.E.D.
Note.-The Axiom of Part IV. has reference to particular
things, in so far as they are regarded in relation to a given
time and place: of this, I think, no one can doubt.
PROP. XXXVIII. In proportion as the mind understands more things
by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to
those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death.
Proof.-The mind's essence consists in knowledge (II. xi.);
therefore, in proportion as the mind understands more things by
the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the
part of it that endures (V. xxix. and xxiii.), and, consequently
(by the last Prop.), the greater will be the part that is not
touched by the emotions, which are contrary to our nature, or in
other words, evil (IV. xxx.). Thus, in proportion as the mind
understands more things by the second and third kinds of
knowledge, the greater will be the part of it, that remains
unimpaired, and, consequently, less subject to emotions, &c.
Q.E.D.
Note.-Hence we understand that point which I touched on in
IV. xxxix. note, and which I promised to explain in this Part;
namely, that death becomes less hurtful, in proportion as the
mind's clear and distinct knowledge is greater, and,
consequently, in proportion as the mind loves God more. Again,
since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest
possible acquiescence (V. xxvii.), it follows that the human mind
can attain to being of such a nature, that the part thereof which
we have shown to perish with the body (V. xxi.) should be of
little importance when compared with the part which endures. But
I will soon treat of the subject at greater length.
PROP. XXXIX. He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest
number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part
is eternal.
Proof.-He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest
number of activities, is least agitated by those emotions which
are evil (IV. xxxviii.)-that is (IV. xxx.), by those emotions
which are contrary to our nature; therefore (V. x.), he
possesses the power of arranging and associating the
modifications of the body according to the intellectual order,
and, consequently, of bringing it about, that all the
modifications of the body should be referred to the idea of God;
whence it will come to pass that (V. xv.) he will be affected
with love towards God, which (V. xvi.) must occupy or constitute
the chief part of the mind; therefore (V. xxxiii.), such a man
will possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal. Q.E.D.
Note.-Since human bodies are capable of the greatest number
of activities, there is no doubt but that they may be of such a
nature, that they may be referred to minds possessing a great
knowledge of themselves and of God, and whereof the greatest or
chief part is eternal, and, therefore, that they should scarcely
fear death. But, in order that this may be understood more
clearly, we must here call to mind, that we live in a state of
perpetual variation, and, according as we are changed for the
better or the worse, we are called happy or unhappy.
For he, who, from being an infant or a child, becomes a
corpse, is called unhappy; whereas it is set down to happiness,
if we have been able to live through the whole period of life
with a sound mind in a sound body. And, in reality, he, who, as
in the case of an infant or a child, has a body capable of very
few activities, and depending, for the most part, on external
causes, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is scarcely
conscious of itself, or of God, or of things; whereas, he, who
has a body capable of very many activities, has a mind which,
considered in itself alone, is highly conscious of itself, of
God, and of things. In this life, therefore, we primarily
endeavour to bring it about, that the body of a child, in so far
as its nature allows and conduces thereto, may be changed into
something else capable of very many activities, and referable to
a mind which is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things;
and we desire so to change it, that what is referred to its
imagination and memory may become insignificant, in comparison
with its intellect, as I have already said in the note to the
last Proposition.
PROP. XL. In proportion as each thing possesses more of
perfection, so is it more active, and less passive; and, vice
versГў, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect.
Proof.-In proportion as each thing is more perfect, it
possesses more of reality (II. Def. vi.), and, consequently (III.
iii. and note), it is to that extent more active and less
passive. This demonstration may be reversed, and thus prove
that, in proportion as a thing is more active, so is it more
perfect. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-Hence it follows that the part of the mind which
endures, be it great or small, is more perfect than the rest.
For the eternal part of the mind (V. xxiii. xxix.) is the
understanding, through which alone we are said to act (III. iii.);
the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination (V.
xxi.), through which only we are said to be passive (III. iii.
and general Def. of the Emotions); therefore, the former, be it
great or small, is more perfect than the latter. Q.E.D.
Note.-Such are the doctrines which I had purposed to set
forth concerning the mind, in so far as it is regarded without
relation to the body; whence, as also from I. xxi. and other
places, it is plain that our mind, in so far as it understands,
is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another
eternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on to
infinity; so that all taken together at once constitute the
eternal and infinite intellect of God.
PROP. XLI. Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we
should still consider as of primary importance piety and
religion, and generally all things which, in Part IV., we showed
to be attributable to courage and high-mindedness.
Proof.-The first and only foundation of virtue, or the rule
of right living is (IV. xxii. Coroll. and xxiv.) seeking one's
own true interest. Now, while we determined what reason
prescribes as useful, we took no account of the mind's eternity,
which has only become known to us in this Fifth Part. Although
we were ignorant at that time that the mind is eternal, we
nevertheless stated that the qualities attributable to courage
and high-mindedness are of primary importance. Therefore, even
if we were still ignorant of this doctrine, we should yet put the
aforesaid precepts of reason in the first place. Q.E.D.
Note.-The general belief of the multitude seems to be
different. Most people seem to believe that they are free, in so
far as they may obey their lusts, and that they cede their
rights, in so far as they are bound to live according to the
commandments of the divine law. They therefore believe that
piety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to
firmness of mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to
lay aside, and to receive the reward for their bondage, that is,
for their piety and religion; it is not only by this hope, but
also, and chiefly, by the fear of being horribly punished after
death, that they are induced to live according to the divine
commandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will carry
them.
If men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the
mind perishes with the body, and that no hope of prolonged life
remains for the wretches who are broken down with the burden of
piety, they would return to their own inclinations, controlling
everything in accordance with their lusts, and desiring to obey
fortune rather than themselves. Such a course appears to me not
less absurd than if a man, because he does not believe that he
can by wholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish to
cram himself with poisons and deadly fare; or if, because he
sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should prefer
to be out of his mind altogether, and to live without the use of
reason; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth
refuting.
PROP. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue
itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our
lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able
to control our lusts.
Proof.-Blessedness consists in love towards God (V. xxxvi and
note), which love springs from the third kind of knowledge (V.
xxxii. Coroll.); therefore this love (III. iii. lix.) must be
referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active;
therefore (IV. Def. viii.) it is virtue itself. This was our
first point. Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more in
this divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand
(V. xxxii.); that is (V. iii. Coroll.), so much the more power
has it over the emotions, and (V. xxxviii.) so much the less is
it subject to those emotions which are evil; therefore, in
proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or
blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts. And,
since human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in
the understanding, it follows that no one rejoices in
blessedness, because he has controlled his lusts, but,
contrariwise, his power of controlling his lusts arises from this
blessedness itself. Q.E.D.
Note.-I have thus completed all I wished to set forth
touching the mind's power over the emotions and the mind's
freedom. Whence it appears, how potent is the wise man, and how
much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven only by his
lusts. For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various
ways by external causes without ever gaining the true
acquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were
unwitting of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as
he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be.
Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is
scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of
himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal
necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true
acquiescence of his spirit.
If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result
seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. Needs
must it be hard, since it is so seldom found. How would it be
possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without
great labour be found, that it should be by almost all men
neglected? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are
rare.
End of the Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza
[1] "Affectiones"
[2] "Forma"
[3] "Animata"
[4] A Baconian phrase. Nov. Org. Aph. 100. [Pollock, p. 126, n.]
[5] Conscientiæ morsus-thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.
[6] By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean men
whom we regard without any particular emotion.
[7] So Van Vloten and Bruder. The Dutch version and Camerer read,
"an internal cause." "Honor" = Gloria.
[8] See previous endnote.
[9] Ovid, "Amores," II. xix. 4,5. Spinoza transposes the verses.
"Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;
Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat."
[10] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine
intellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.
[11] Gloria.
[12] Ov. Met. vii.20, "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor."
[13] Honestas
[14] Land reads: "Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur"-which I
have translated above. He suggests as alternative readings to
`quod', 'quo' (= whereby) and 'quodque' (= and that).
[15] "Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro." (Van Vloten).
Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi
alicujus mali." The last word of the latter is an obvious
misprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into "majoris
boni." (Pollock, p. 268, note.)
[16] Continuo. Rendered "constantly" by Mr. Pollock on the ground
that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context.
I venture to think, however, that a tolerable sense may be
obtained without doing violence to Spinoza's scholarship.
[17] Affectiones. Camerer reads affectus--emotions.
