PROP. XXIX.  Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all
things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular
manner by the necessity of the divine nature.
    Proof.-Whatsoever is, is in God (Prop. xv.).  But God cannot
be called a thing contingent.  For (by Prop. xi.) he exists
necessarily, and not contingently.  Further, the modes of the
divine nature follow therefrom necessarily, and not contingently
(Prop. xvi.); and they thus follow, whether we consider the
divine nature absolutely, or whether we consider it as in any way
conditioned to act (Prop. xxvii.).  Further, God is not only the
cause of these modes, in so far as they simply exist (by Prop.
xxiv, Coroll.), but also in so far as they are considered as
conditioned for operating in a particular manner (Prop. xxvi.).
If they be not conditioned by God (Prop. xxvi.), it is
impossible, and not contingent, that they should condition
themselves; contrariwise, if they be conditioned by God, it is
impossible, and not contingent, that they should render
themselves unconditioned. Wherefore all things are conditioned by
the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also
to exist and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothing
that is contingent.  Q.E.D.
    Note.-Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what
we should understand by nature viewed as active (natura
naturans), and nature viewed as passive (natura naturata).  I say
to explain, or rather call attention to it, for I think that,
from what has been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by nature
viewed as active we should understand that which is in itself,
and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of
substance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in other
words (Prop. xiv., Coroll. i., and Prop. xvii., Coroll. ii) God,
in so far as he is considered as a free cause.
    By nature viewed as passive I understand all that which
follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the
attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of
God, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God,
and which without God cannot exist or be conceived.

PROP. XXX.  Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function
infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the
modifications of God, and nothing else.
    Proof.-A true idea must agree with its object (Ax. vi.); in
other words (obviously), that which is contained in the intellect
in representation must necessarily be granted in nature.  But in
nature (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) there is no substance save
God, nor any modifications save those (Prop. xv.) which are in
God, and cannot without God either be or be conceived.  Therefore
the intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must
comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God,
and nothing else.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXI.  The intellect in function, whether finite or
infinite, as will, desire, love, &c., should be referred to
passive nature and not to active nature.
    Proof.-By the intellect we do not (obviously) mean absolute
thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing from
other modes, such as love, desire, &c., and therefore (Def. v.)
requiring to be conceived through absolute thought.  It must (by
Prop. xv. and Def. vi.), through some attribute of God which
expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, be so
conceived, that without such attribute it could neither be nor be
conceived.  It must therefore be referred to nature passive
rather than to nature active, as must also the other modes of
thinking.  Q.E.D.
    Note.-I do not here, by speaking of intellect in function,
admit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality:
but, wishing to avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only of
what is most clearly perceived by us, namely, of the very act of
understanding, than which nothing is more clearly perceived.  For
we cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge of
the act of understanding.

PROP. XXXII.  Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a
necessary cause.
    Proof.-Will is only a particular mode of thinking, like
intellect; therefore (by Prop. xxviii.) no volition can exist,
nor be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned by some cause
other than itself, which cause is conditioned by a third cause,
and so on to infinity.  But if will be supposed infinite, it must
also be conditioned to exist and act by God, not by virtue of his
being substance absolutely infinite, but by virtue of his
possessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal
essence of thought (by Prop. xxiii.).  Thus, however it be
conceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by
which it should be conditioned to exist and act.  Thus (Def.
vii.) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or
constrained cause.  Q.E.D.
    Coroll. I.-Hence it follows, first, that God does not act
according to freedom of the will.
    Coroll. II.-It follows, secondly, that will and intellect
stand in the same relation to the nature of God as do motion, and
rest, and absolutely all natural phenomena, which must be
conditioned by God (Prop. xxix.) to exist and act in a particular
manner.  For will, like the rest, stands in need of a cause, by
which it is conditioned to exist and act in a particular manner.
And although, when will or intellect be granted, an infinite
number of results may follow, yet God cannot on that account be
said to act from freedom of the will, any more than the infinite
number of results from motion and rest would justify us in saying
that motion and rest act by free will.  Wherefore will no more
appertains to God than does anything else in nature, but stands
in the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like, which
we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature,
and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular
manner.

PROP. XXXIII.  Things could not have been brought into being by
God in any manner or in any order different from that which has
in fact obtained.
    Proof-All things necessarily follow from the nature of God
(Prop. xvi.), and by the nature of God are conditioned to exist
and act in a particular way (Prop. xxix.).  If things, therefore,
could have been of a different nature, or have been conditioned
to act in a different way, so that the order of nature would have
been different, God's nature would also have been able to be
different from what it now is; and therefore (by Prop. xi.) that
different nature also would have perforce existed, and
consequently there would have been able to be two or more Gods.
This (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) is absurd.  Therefore things
could not have been brought into being by God in any other
manner, &c.  Q.E.D.
    Note I.-As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun at
noonday, that there is nothing to justify us in calling things
contingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we shall
attach to the word contingent; but I will first explain the
words necessary and impossible.
    A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence
or in respect to its cause; for the existence of a thing
necessarily follows, either from its essence and definition, or
from a given efficient cause.  For similar reasons a thing is
said to be impossible; namely, inasmuch as its essence or
definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause
is granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect; but
a thing can in no respect be called contingent, save in relation
to the imperfection of our knowledge.
    A thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or
does not involve a contradiction, or of which, knowing that it
does not involve a contradiction, we are still in doubt
concerning the existence, because the order of causes escapes
us,-such a thing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary or
impossible.  Wherefore we call it contingent or possible.
    Note II.-It clearly follows from what we have said, that
things have been brought into being by God in the highest
perfection, inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from a
most perfect nature.  Nor does this prove any imperfection in
God, for it has compelled us to affirm his perfection.  From its
contrary proposition, we should clearly gather (as I have just
shown), that God is not supremely perfect, for if things had been
brought into being in any other way, we should have to assign to
God a nature different from that, which we are bound to attribute
to him from the consideration of an absolutely perfect being.
    I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and
will refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simply
because they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom very
different from that which we (Def. vii.) have deduced.  They
assign to him, in short, absolute free will.  However, I am also
convinced that if such persons reflect on the matter, and duly
weigh in their minds our series of propositions, they will reject
such freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory,
but also as a great impediment to organized knowledge.  There is
no need for me to repeat what I have said in the note to Prop.
xvii.  But, for the sake of my opponents, I will show further,
that although it be granted that will pertains to the essence of
God, it nevertheless follows from his perfection, that things
could not have been by him created other than they are, or in a
different order; this is easily proved, if we reflect on what
our opponents themselves concede, namely, that it depends solely
on the decree and will of God, that each thing is what it is.  If
it were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things.
Further, that all the decrees of God have been ratified from all
eternity by God himself.  If it were otherwise, God would be
convicted of imperfection or change.  But in eternity there is no
such thing as when, before, or after; hence it follows solely
from the perfection of God, that God never can decree, or never
could have decreed anything but what is; that God did not exist
before his decrees, and would not exist without them.  But, it is
said, supposing that God had made a different universe, or had
ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature and
her order, we could not therefore conclude any imperfection in
God.  But persons who say this must admit that God can change his
decrees.  For if God had ordained any decrees concerning nature
and her order, different from those which he has ordained-in
other words, if he had willed and conceived something different
concerning nature-he would perforce have had a different
intellect from that which he has, and also a different will.  But
if it were allowable to assign to God a different intellect and a
different will, without any change in his essence or his
perfection, what would there be to prevent him changing the
decrees which he has made concerning created things, and
nevertheless remaining perfect?  For his intellect and will
concerning things created and their order are the same, in
respect to his essence and perfection, however they be conceived.
    Further, all the philosophers whom I have read admit that
God's intellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential; as
they also admit that God's intellect, and God's will, and God's
essence are identical, it follows that, if God had had a
different actual intellect and a different will, his essence
would also have been different; and thus, as I concluded at
first, if things had been brought into being by God in a
different way from that which has obtained, God's intellect and
will, that is (as is admitted) his essence would perforce have
been different, which is absurd.
    As these things could not have been brought into being by God
in any but the actual way and order which has obtained; and as
the truth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfection
of God; we can have no sound reason for persuading ourselves to
believe that God did not wish to create all the things which were
in his intellect, and to create them in the same perfection as he
had understood them.
    But, it will be said, there is in things no perfection nor
imperfection; that which is in them, and which causes them to be
called perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on the
will of God.  If God had so willed, he might have brought it
about that what is now perfection should be extreme imperfection,
and vice versГў.  What is such an assertion, but an open
declaration that God, who necessarily understands that which he
wishes, might bring it about by his will, that he should
understand things differently from the way in which he does
understand them?  This (as we have just shown) is the height of
absurdity.  Wherefore, I may turn the argument against its
employers, as follows:-All things depend on the power of God.
In order that things should be different from what they are,
God's will would necessarily have to be different.  But God's
will cannot be different (as we have just most clearly
demonstrated) from God's perfection.  Therefore neither can
things be different.  I confess, that the theory which subjects
all things to the will of an indifferent deity, and asserts that
they are all dependent on his fiat, is less far from the truth
than the theory of those, who maintain that God acts in all
things with a view of promoting what is good.  For these latter
persons seem to set up something beyond God, which does not
depend on God, but which God in acting looks to as an exemplar,
or which he aims at as a definite goal.  This is only another
name for subjecting God to the dominion of destiny, an utter
absurdity in respect to God, whom we have shown to be the first
and only free cause of the essence of all things and also of
their existence.  I need, therefore, spend no time in refuting
such wild theories.

PROP. XXXIV.  God's power is identical with his essence.
    Proof.-From the sole necessity of the essence of God it
follows that God is the cause of himself (Prop. xi.) and of all
things (Prop. xvi. and Coroll.).  Wherefore the power of God, by
which he and all things are and act, is identical with his
essence.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXV.  Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God,
necessarily exists.
    Proof.-Whatsoever is in God's power, must (by the last Prop.)
be comprehended in his essence in such a manner, that it
necessarily follows therefrom, and therefore necessarily exists.
Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXVI.  There is no cause from whose nature some effect
does not follow.
    Proof.-Whatsoever exists expresses God's nature or essence in
a given conditioned manner (by Prop. xxv., Coroll.); that is,
(by Prop. xxxiv.), whatsoever exists, expresses in a given
conditioned manner God's power, which is the cause of all things,
therefore an effect must (by Prop. xvi.) necessarily follow.
Q.E.D.


APPENDIX:
    In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties
of God.  I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one:
that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature;
that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so;
that all things are in God, and so depend on him, that without
him they could neither exist nor be conceived; lastly, that all
things are predetermined by God, not through his free will or
absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power.
I have further, where occasion afforded, taken care to remove the
prejudices, which might impede the comprehension of my
demonstrations.  Yet there still remain misconceptions not a few,
which might and may prove very grave hindrances to the
understanding of the concatenation of things, as I have explained
it above.  I have therefore thought it worth while to bring these
misconceptions before the bar of reason.
    All such opinions spring from the notion commonly
entertained, that all things in nature act as men themselves act,
namely, with an end in view.  It is accepted as certain, that God
himself directs all things to a definite goal (for it is said
that God made all things for man, and man that he might worship
him).  I will, therefore, consider this opinion, asking first,
why it obtains general credence, and why all men are naturally so
prone to adopt it? secondly, I will point out its falsity; and,
lastly, I will show how it has given rise to prejudices about
good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order and
confusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like.  However, this is
not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of
the human mind: it will be sufficient here, if I assume as a
starting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely,
that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that all
have the desire to seek for what is useful to them, and that they
are conscious of such desire.  Herefrom it follows, first, that
men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their
volitions and desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance,
of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire.
Secondly, that men do all things for an end, namely, for that
which is useful to them, and which they seek.  Thus it comes to
pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final causes of
events, and when these are learned, they are content, as having
no cause for further doubt.  If they cannot learn such causes
from external sources, they are compelled to turn to considering
themselves, and reflecting what end would have induced them
personally to bring about the given event, and thus they
necessarily judge other natures by their own.  Further, as they
find in themselves and outside themselves many means which assist
them not a little in the search for what is useful, for instance,
eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for
yielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding
fish, &c., they come to look on the whole of nature as a means
for obtaining such conveniences.  Now as they are aware, that
they found these conveniences and did not make them, they think
they have cause for believing, that some other being has made
them for their use.  As they look upon things as means, they
cannot believe them to be self-created; but, judging from the
means which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they
are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe
endowed with human freedom, who have arranged and adapted
everything for human use.  They are bound to estimate the nature
of such rulers (having no information on the subject) in
accordance with their own nature, and therefore they assert that
the gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order to bind
man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honor.  Hence
also it follows, that everyone thought out for himself, according
to his abilities, a different way of worshipping God, so that God
might love him more than his fellows, and direct the whole course
of nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity and
insatiable avarice.  Thus the prejudice developed into
superstition, and took deep root in the human mind; and for this
reason everyone strove most zealously to understand and explain
the final causes of things; but in their endeavor to show that
nature does nothing in vain, i.e. nothing which is useless to
man, they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods,
and men are all mad together.  Consider, I pray you, the result:
among the many helps of nature they were bound to find some
hindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, &c.: so they
declared that such things happen, because the gods are angry at
some wrong done to them by men, or at some fault committed in
their worship.  Experience day by day protested and showed by
infinite examples, that good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of
pious and impious alike; still they would not abandon their
inveterate prejudice, for it was more easy for them to class such
contradictions among other unknown things of whose use they were
ignorant, and thus to retain their actual and innate condition of
ignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning
and start afresh.  They therefore laid down as an axiom, that
God's judgments far transcend human understanding.  Such a
doctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the
human race for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnished
another standard of verity in considering solely the essence and
properties of figures without regard to their final causes.
There are other reasons (which I need not mention here) besides
mathematics, which might have caused men's minds to be directed
to these general prejudices, and have led them to the knowledge
of the truth.
    I have now sufficiently explained my first point.  There is
no need to show at length, that nature has no particular goal in
view, and that final causes are mere human figments.  This, I
think, is already evident enough, both from the causes and
foundations on which I have shown such prejudice to be based, and
also from Prop. xvi., and the Corollary of Prop. xxxii., and, in
fact, all those propositions in which I have shown, that
everything in nature proceeds from a sort of necessity, and with
the utmost perfection.  However, I will add a few remarks, in
order to overthrow this doctrine of a final cause utterly.  That
which is really a cause it considers as an effect, and vice versГў:
it makes that which is by nature first to be last, and that
which is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect.  Passing
over the questions of cause and priority as self-evident, it is
plain from Props. xxi., xxii., xxiii. that the effect is most
perfect which is produced immediately by God; the effect which
requires for its production several intermediate causes is, in
that respect, more imperfect.  But if those things which were
made immediately by God were made to enable him to attain his
end, then the things which come after, for the sake of which the
first were made, are necessarily the most excellent of all.
    Further, this doctrine does away with the perfection of God:
for, if God acts for an object, he necessarily desires something
which he lacks.  Certainly, theologians and metaphysicians draw a
distinction between the object of want and the object of
assimilation; still they confess that God made all things for
the sake of himself, not for the sake of creation.  They are
unable to point to anything prior to creation, except God
himself, as an object for which God should act, and are therefore
driven to admit (as they clearly must), that God lacked those
things for whose attainment he created means, and further that he
desired them.
    We must not omit to notice that the followers of this
doctrine, anxious to display their talent in assigning final
causes, have imported a new method of argument in proof of their
theory-namely, a reduction, not to the impossible, but to
ignorance; thus showing that they have no other method of
exhibiting their doctrine.  For example, if a stone falls from a
roof on to someone's head, and kills him, they will demonstrate
by their new method, that the stone fell in order to kill the man;
for, if it had not by God's will fallen with that object, how
could so many circumstances (and there are often many concurrent
circumstances) have all happened together by chance?  Perhaps you
will answer that the event is due to the facts that the wind was
blowing, and the man was walking that way.  "But why," they will
insist, "was the wind blowing, and why was the man at that very
time walking that way?"  If you again answer, that the wind had
then sprung up because the sea had begun to be agitated the day
before, the weather being previously calm, and that the man had
been invited by a friend, they will again insist: "But why was
the sea agitated, and why was the man invited at that time?"
So they will pursue their questions from cause to cause, till at
last you take refuge in the will of God-in other words, the
sanctuary of ignorance.  So, again, when they survey the frame of
the human body, they are amazed; and being ignorant of the
causes of so great a work of art, conclude that it has been
fashioned, not mechanically, but by divine and supernatural
skill, and has been so put together that one part shall not hurt
another.
    Hence anyone who seeks for the true causes of miracles, and
strives to understand natural phenomena as an intelligent being,
and not to gaze at them like a fool, is set down and denounced as
an impious heretic by those, whom the masses adore as the
interpreters of nature and the gods.  Such persons know that,
with the removal of ignorance, the wonder which forms their only
available means for proving and preserving their authority would
vanish also.  But I now quit this subject, and pass on to my
third point.
    After men persuaded themselves, that everything which is
created is created for their sake, they were bound to consider as
the chief quality in everything that which is most useful to
themselves, and to account those things the best of all which
have the most beneficial effect on mankind.  Further, they were
bound to form abstract notions for the explanation of the nature
of things, such as goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth,
cold, beauty, deformity, and so on; and from the belief that
they are free agents arose the further notions of praise and
blame, sin and merit.
    I will speak of these latter hereafter, when I treat of human
nature; the former I will briefly explain here.
    Everything which conduces to health and the worship of God
they have called good, everything which hinders these objects
they have styled bad; and inasmuch as those who do not
understand the nature of things do not verify phenomena in any
way, but merely imagine them after a fashion, and mistake their
imagination for understanding, such persons firmly believe that
there is an order in things, being really ignorant both of things
and their own nature.  When phenomena are of such a kind, that
the impression they make on our senses requires little effort of
imagination, and can consequently be easily remembered, we say
that they are well-ordered; if the contrary, that they are
ill-ordered or confused.  Further, as things which are easily
imagined are more pleasing to us, men prefer order to
confusion-as though there were any order in nature, except in
relation to our imagination-and say that God has created all
things in order; thus, without knowing it, attributing
imagination to God, unless, indeed, they would have it that God
foresaw human imagination, and arranged everything, so that it
should be most easily imagined.  If this be their theory, they
would not, perhaps, be daunted by the fact that we find an
infinite number of phenomena, far surpassing our imagination, and
very many others which confound its weakness.  But enough has
been said on this subject.  The other abstract notions are
nothing but modes of imagining, in which the imagination is
differently affected: though they are considered by the ignorant
as the chief attributes of things, inasmuch as they believe that
everything was created for the sake of themselves; and,
according as they are affected by it, style it good or bad,
healthy or rotten and corrupt.  For instance, if the motion which
objects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health,
the objects causing it are styled beautiful; if a contrary
motion be excited, they are styled ugly.
    Things which are perceived through our sense of smell are
styled fragrant or fetid; if through our taste, sweet or bitter,
full-flavored or insipid; if through our touch, hard or soft,
rough or smooth, &c.
    Whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise,
sound, or harmony.  In this last case, there are men lunatic
enough to believe, that even God himself takes pleasure in
harmony; and philosophers are not lacking who have persuaded
themselves, that the motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise to
harmony-all of which instances sufficiently show that everyone
judges of things according to the state of his brain, or rather
mistakes for things the forms of his imagination.  We need no
longer wonder that there have arisen all the controversies we
have witnessed, and finally skepticism: for, although human
bodies in many respects agree, yet in very many others they
differ; so that what seems good to one seems bad to another;
what seems well ordered to one seems confused to another; what
is pleasing to one displeases another, and so on.  I need not
further enumerate, because this is not the place to treat the
subject at length, and also because the fact is sufficiently well
known.  It is commonly said: "So many men, so many minds;
everyone is wise in his own way; brains differ as completely as
palates."  All of which proverbs show, that men judge of things
according to their mental disposition, and rather imagine than
understand: for, if they understood phenomena, they would, as
mathematicians attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what I
have urged.
    We have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly
given of nature are mere modes of imagining, and do not indicate
the true nature of anything, but only the constitution of the
imagination; and, although they have names, as though they were
entities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them
entities imaginary rather than real; and, therefore, all
arguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily
rebutted.
    Many argue in this way.  If all things follow from a
necessity of the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there
so many imperfections in nature? such, for instance, as things
corrupt to the point of putridity, loathsome deformity,
confusion, evil, sin, &c.  But these reasoners are, as I have
said, easily confuted, for the perfection of things is to be
reckoned only from their own nature and power; things are not
more or less perfect, according as they delight or offend human
senses, or according as they are serviceable or repugnant to
mankind.  To those who ask why God did not so create all men,
that they should be governed only by reason, I give no answer but
this: because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of
every degree of perfection from highest to lowest; or, more
strictly, because the laws of his nature are so vast, as to
suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an
infinite intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. xvi.
    Such are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note; if
there are any more of the same sort, everyone may easily
dissipate them for himself with the aid of a little reflection.




Part II.

ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND


PREFACE


    I now pass on to explaining the results, which must
necessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal and
infinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in Part
i., Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must follow in an
infinite number of ways), but only those which are able to lead
us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind
and its highest blessedness.


DEFINITIONS

DEFINITION I.  By body I mean a mode which expresses in a certain
determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as he is
considered as an extended thing.  (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv.,
Coroll.)

DEFINITION II.  I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing
that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also,
and, which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also;
in other words, that without which the thing, and which itself
without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.

DEFINITION III. By idea, I mean the mental conception which is
formed by the mind as a thinking thing.
    Explanation.-I say conception rather than perception, because
the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in
respect to the object; whereas conception seems to express an
activity of the mind.

DEFINITION IV.  By an adequate idea, I mean an idea which, in so
far as it is considered in itself, without relation to the
object, has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.
    Explanation.-I say intrinsic, in order to exclude that mark
which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea and
its object (ideatum).

DEFINITION V.  Duration is the indefinite continuance of
existing.
    Explanation.-I say indefinite, because it cannot be
determined through the existence itself of the existing thing, or
by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence of
the thing, but does not take it away.

DEFINITION VI.  Reality and perfection I use as synonymous terms.

DEFINITION VII.  By particular things, I mean things which are
finite and have a conditioned existence; but if several
individual things concur in one action, so as to be all
simultaneously the effect of one cause, I consider them all, so
far, as one particular thing.


AXIOMS

I.  The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, that
is, it may, in the order of nature, come to pass that this or
that man does or does not exist.

II.  Man thinks.

III.  Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of
the passions, do not take place, unless there be in the same
individual an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c.  But the idea
can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.

IV.  We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.

V.  We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and
modes of thought.

N.B.  The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop.
xiii.


PROPOSITIONS

PROP. I.  Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking
thing.
    Proof.-Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are
modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature
of God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.).  God therefore possesses
the attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved
in all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby.
Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God,
which express God's eternal and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def.
vi.).  In other words, God is a thinking thing.  Q.E.D.
    Note.-This proposition is also evident from the fact, that we
are able to conceive an infinite thinking being.  For, in
proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more
thoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality or
perfection.  Therefore a being, which can think an infinite
number of things in an infinite number of ways, is, necessarily,
in respect of thinking, infinite.  As, therefore, from the
consideration of thought alone, we conceive an infinite being,
thought is necessarily (Pt. i., Deff. iv. and vi.) one of the
infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.

PROP. II.  Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an
extended thing.
    Proof.-The proof of this proposition is similar to that of
the last.

PROP. III.  In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his
essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his
essence.
    Proof.-God (by the first Prop. of this Part) can think an
infinite number of things in infinite ways, or (what is the same
thing, by Prop. xvi., Part i.) can form the idea of his essence,
and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom.  Now all
that is in the power of God necessarily is (Pt. i., Prop. xxxv.).
Therefore, such an idea as we are considering necessarily is, and
in God alone.  Q.E.D.  (Part i., Prop. xv.)
    Note.-The multitude understand by the power of God the free
will of God, and the right over all things that exist, which
latter are accordingly generally considered as contingent.  For
it is said that God has the power to destroy all things, and to
reduce them to nothing.  Further, the power of God is very often
likened to the power of kings.  But this doctrine we have refuted
(Pt. i., Prop. xxxii., Corolls. i. and ii.), and we have shown
(Part i., Prop. xvi.) that God acts by the same necessity, as
that by which he understands himself; in other words, as it
follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit),
that God understands himself, so also does it follow by the same
necessity, that God performs infinite acts in infinite ways.  We
further showed (Part i., Prop. xxxiv.), that God's power is
identical with God's essence in action; therefore it is as
impossible for us to conceive God as not acting, as to conceive
him as non-existent.  If we might pursue the subject further, I
could point out, that the power which is commonly attributed to
God is not only human (as showing that God is conceived by the
multitude as a man, or in the likeness of a man), but involves a
negation of power.  However, I am unwilling to go over the same
ground so often.  I would only beg the reader again and again, to
turn over frequently in his mind what I have said in Part I from
Prop. xvi. to the end.  No one will be able to follow my meaning,
unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the power of
God with the human power and right of kings.

PROP. IV.  The idea of God, from which an infinite number of
things follow in infinite ways, can only be one.
    Proof.-Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the
attributes of God and his modifications (Part i., Prop. xxx.).
Now God is one (Part i., Prop. xiv., Coroll.).  Therefore the
idea of God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in
infinite ways, can only be one.  Q.E.D.

PROP. V.  The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only
in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far
as he is unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas
both of the attributes of God and of particular things do not own
as their efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things
perceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.
    Proof.-This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this
Part.  We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the idea
of his essence, and of all things which follow necessarily
therefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not because
he is the object of his own idea.  Wherefore the actual being of
ideas owns for cause God, in so far as he is a thinking thing.
It may be differently proved as follows: the actual being of
ideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part i., Prop.
xxv., Coroll.) a mode which expresses in a certain manner the
nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore
(Part i., Prop. x.) involves the conception of no other attribute
of God, and consequently (by Part i., Ax. iv.) is not the effect
of any attribute save thought.  Therefore the actual being of
ideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a
thinking thing, &c.  Q.E.D.

PROP. VI.  The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in
so far as he is considered through the attribute of which they
are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any
other attribute.
    Proof.-Each attribute is conceived through itself, without
any other (Part i., Prop. x.); wherefore the modes of each
attribute involve the conception of that attribute, but not of
any other.  Thus (Part i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by God, only
in so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modes
they are, and not in so far as he is considered through any
other.  Q.E.D.
    Corollary.-Hence the actual being of things, which are not
modes of thought, does not follow from the divine nature, because
that nature has prior knowledge of the things.  Things
represented in ideas follow, and are derived from their
particular attribute, in the same manner, and with the same
necessity as ideas follow (according to what we have shown) from
the attribute of thought.

PROP. VII.  The order and connection of ideas is the same as the
order and connection of things.
    Proof.-This proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv.  For
the idea of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge of
the cause, whereof it is an effect.
    Corollary.-Hence God's power of thinking is equal to his
realized power of action-that is, whatsoever follows from the
infinite nature of God in the world of extension (formaliter),
follows without exception in the same order and connection from
the idea of God in the world of thought (objective).
    Note.-Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what
has been pointed out above-namely, that whatsoever can be
perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence
of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance:
consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one
and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute,
now through the other.  So, also, a mode of extension and the
idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in
two ways.  This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by
those Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and the
things understood by God are identical.  For instance, a circle
existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is
also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through
different attributes.  Thus, whether we conceive nature under the
attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or
under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one
and the same chain of causes-that is, the same things following
in either case.
    I said that God is the cause of an idea-for instance, of the
idea of a circle,-in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a
circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the
actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a
proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again
through another, and so on to infinity; so that, so long as we
consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order
of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the
attribute of thought only.  And, in so far as we consider things
as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole of
nature through the attributes of extension only; and so on, in
the case of the other attributes.  Wherefore of things as they
are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he
consists of infinite attributes.  I cannot for the present
explain my meaning more clearly.

PROP. VIII.  The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do
not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in
the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes
are contained in the attributes of God.
    Proof.-This proposition is evident from the last; it is
understood more clearly from the preceding note.
    Corollary.-Hence, so long as particular things do not exist,
except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of
God, their representations in thought or ideas do not exist,
except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists; and when
particular things are said to exist, not only in so far as they
are involved in the attributes of God, but also in so far as they
are said to continue, their ideas will also involve existence,
through which they are said to continue.
    Note.-If anyone desires an example to throw more light on
this question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any,
which adequately explains the thing of which I here speak,
inasmuch as it is unique; however, I will endeavour to
illustrate it as far as possible.  The nature of a circle is such
that if any number of straight lines intersect within it, the
rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another;
thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle.  Yet
none of these rectangles can be said to exist, except in so far
as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of these
rectangles be said to exist, except in so far as they are
comprehended in the idea of the circle.  Let us grant that, from
this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist.  The ideas of
these two not only exist, in so far as they are contained in the
idea of the circle, but also as they involve the existence of
those rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished from the
remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.

PROP. IX.  The idea of an individual thing actually existing is
caused by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as
he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually
existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected
by a third idea, and so on to infinity.
    Proof.-The idea of an individual thing actually existing is
an individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes
(by the Corollary and note to Prop. viii. of this part); thus
(by Prop. vi. of this part) it is caused by God, in so far only
as he is a thinking thing.  But not (by Prop. xxviii. of Part i.)
in so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely, only in so far as
he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking; and he
is the cause of this latter, as being affected by a third, and so
on to infinity.  Now, the order and connection of ideas is (by
Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the order and connection of
causes.   Therefore of a given individual idea another individual
idea, or God, in so far as he is considered as modified by that
idea, is the cause; and of this second idea God is the cause, in
so far as he is affected by another idea, and so on to infinity.
Q.E.D.
    Corollary.-Whatsoever takes place in the individual object of
any idea, the knowledge thereof is in God, in so far only as he
has the idea of the object.
    Proof.-Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its
idea is in God (by Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far as he
is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by
another idea of an individual thing (by the last Prop.); but (by
Prop. vii. of this part) the order and connection of ideas is the
same as the order and connection of things.  The knowledge,
therefore, of that which takes place in any individual object
will be in God, in so far only as he has the idea of that object.
Q.E.D.

PROP. X.  The being of substance does not appertain to the
essence of man-in other words, substance does not constitute the
actual being[2] of man.

[2] "Forma"

    Proof.-The being of substance involves necessary existence
(Part i., Prop. vii.).  If, therefore, the being of substance
appertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, man
would necessarily be granted also (II. Def. ii.), and,
consequently, man would necessarily exist, which is absurd
(II. Ax. i.).  Therefore, &c.  Q.E.D.
    Note.-This proposition may also be proved from I.v., in which
it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same
nature; for as there may be many men, the being of substance is
not that which constitutes the actual being of man.  Again, the
proposition is evident from the other properties of
substance-namely, that substance is in its nature infinite,
immutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone may see for himself.
    Corollary.-Hence it follows, that the essence of man is
constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God.
For (by the last Prop.) the being of substance does not belong to
the essence of man.  That essence therefore (by i.  15) is
something which is in God, and which without God can neither be
nor be conceived, whether it be a modification (i. 25. Coroll.),
or a mode which expresses God's nature in a certain conditioned
manner.
    Note.-Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be
conceived without God.  All men agree that God is the one and
only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their
existence; that is, God is not only the cause of things in
respect to their being made (secundum fieri), but also in respect
to their being (secundum esse).
    At the same time many assert, that that, without which a
thing cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that
thing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of God
appertains to the essence of created things, or else that created
things can be or be conceived without God; or else, as is more
probably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines.  I think the
cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to the
proper order of philosophic thinking.  The nature of God, which
should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the
order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken to be
last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place
what they call the objects of sensation; hence, while they are
considering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to
the divine nature, and, when afterwards they apply their mind to
the study of the divine nature, they are quite unable to bear in
mind the first hypotheses, with which they have overlaid the
knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are
no help towards understanding the divine nature.  So that it is
hardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradict
themselves freely.
    However, I pass over this point.  My intention her was only
to give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing
cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing:
individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God
does not appertain to their essence.  I said that "I considered
as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given,
the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the
thing is necessarily removed also; or that without which the
thing, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be
conceived."  (II. Def. ii.)

PROP. XI.  The first element, which constitutes the actual being
of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually
existing.
    Proof.-The essence of man (by the Coroll. of the last Prop.)
is constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God, namely
(by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II.
Ax. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is
given, the other modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior
in nature) must be in the same individual (by the same Axiom).
Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human
mind.  But not the idea of a non-existent thing, for then (II.
viii. Coroll.) the idea itself cannot be said to exist; it must
therefore be the idea of something actually existing.  But not of
an infinite thing.  For an infinite thing (I. xxi., xxii.), must
always necessarily exist; this would (by II. Ax. i.) involve an
absurdity.  Therefore the first element, which constitutes the
actual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actually
existing.  Q.E.D.
    Corollary.-Hence it follows, that the human mind is part of
the infinite intellect of God; thus when we say, that the human
mind perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God has
this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far
as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in so
far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; and when we
say that God has this or that idea, not only in so far as he
constitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far as
he, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea of
another thing, we assert that the human mind perceives a thing in
part or inadequately.
    Note.-Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and
will call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate;
I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and
not to pronounce on my statements, till they have read to the
end.