PROP. XXVII.  We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, save
such things as really conduce to understanding, or such as are
able to hinder us from understanding.
    Proof.-The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing
beyond understanding, and judges nothing to be useful to itself,
save such things as conduce to understanding (by the foregoing
Prop.).  But the mind (II. xli., xliii. and note) cannot possess
certainty concerning anything, except in so far as it has
adequate ideas, or (what by II. xl. note, is the same thing) in
so far as it reasons.  Therefore we know nothing to be good or
evil save such things as really conduce, &c.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVIII.  The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God,
and the mind's highest virtue is to know God.
    Proof.-The mind is not capable of understanding anything
higher than God, that is (I. Def. vi.), than a Being absolutely
infinite, and without which (I. xv.) nothing can either be or be
conceived; therefore (IV. xxvi. and xxvii.), the mind's highest
utility or (IV. Def. i.) good is the knowledge of God.  Again,
the mind is active, only in so far as it understands, and only to
the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously.  The
mind's absolute virtue is therefore to understand.  Now, as we
have already shown, the highest that the mind can understand is
God; therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to understand
or to know God.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIX.  No individual thing, which is entirely different
from our own nature, can help or check our power of activity, and
absolutely nothing can do us good or harm, unless it has
something in common with our nature.
    Proof.-The power of every individual thing, and consequently
the power of man, whereby he exists and operates, can only be
determined by an individual thing (I. xxviii.), whose nature (II.
vi.) must be understood through the same nature as that, through
which human nature is conceived.  Therefore our power of
activity, however it be conceived, can be determined and
consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other
individual thing, which has something in common with us, but not
by the power of anything, of which the nature is entirely
different from our own; and since we call good or evil that
which is the cause of pleasure or pain (IV. viii.), that is (III.
xi. note), which increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our
power of activity; therefore, that which is entirely different
from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXX.  A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality
which it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us in
so far as it is contrary to our nature.
    Proof.-We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV.
viii.), that is (by the Def., which see in III. xi. note), when
it diminishes or checks our power of action.  Therefore, if
anything were bad for us through that quality which it has in
common with our nature, it would be able itself to diminish or
check that which it has in common with our nature, which (III.
iv.) is absurd.  Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through that
quality which it has in common with us, but, on the other hand,
in so far as it is bad for us, that is (as we have just shown),
in so far as it can diminish or check our power of action, it is
contrary to our nature.
Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXI.  In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature,
it is necessarily good.
    Proof.-In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it
cannot be bad for it.  It will therefore necessarily be either
good or indifferent.  If it be assumed that it be neither good
nor bad, nothing will follow from its nature (IV. Def. i.), which
tends to the preservation of our nature, that is (by the
hypothesis), which tends to the preservation of the thing itself;
but this (III. vi.) is absurd; therefore, in so far as a thing
is in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good.  Q.E.D.
    Corollary.-Hence it follows, that, in proportion as a thing
is in harmony with our nature, so is it more useful or better for
us, and vice versГў, in proportion as a thing is more useful for
us, so is it more in harmony with our nature.  For, in so far as
it is not in harmony with our nature, it will necessarily be
different therefrom or contrary thereto.  If different, it can
neither be good nor bad (IV. xxix.); if contrary, it will be
contrary to that which is in harmony with our nature, that is,
contrary to what is good-in short, bad.  Nothing, therefore, can
be good, except in so far as it is in harmony with our nature;
and hence a thing is useful, in proportion as it is in harmony
with our nature, and vice versГў.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXII.  In so far as men are a prey to passion, they
cannot, in that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony.
    Proof.-Things, which are said to be in harmony naturally, are
understood to agree in power (III. vii.), not in want of power or
negation, and consequently not in passion (III. iii. note);
wherefore men, in so far as they are a prey to their passions,
cannot be said to be naturally in harmony.  Q.E.D.
    Note.-This is also self-evident; for, if we say that white
and black only agree in the fact that neither is red, we
absolutely affirm that the do not agree in any respect.  So, if
we say that a man and a stone only agree in the fact that both
are finite-wanting in power, not existing by the necessity of
their own nature, or, lastly, indefinitely surpassed by the power
of external causes-we should certainly affirm that a man and a
stone are in no respect alike; therefore, things which agree
only in negation, or in qualities which neither possess, really
agree in no respect.

PROP. XXXIII.  Men can differ in nature, in so far as they are
assailed by those emotions, which are passions, or passive states;
and to this extent one and the same man is variable and
inconstant.
    Proof.-The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be
explained solely through our essence or nature (III. Deff. i.,
ii.), but it must be defined by
the power, that is (III. vii.), by the nature of external causes
in
comparison with our own; hence it follows, that there are as
many kinds of
each emotion as there are external objects whereby we are
affected
(III. lvi.), and that men may be differently affected by one and
the same
object (III. li.), and to this extent differ in nature; lastly,
that one and
the same man may be differently affected towards the same object,
and may
therefore be variable and inconstant.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXIV.  In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are
passions, they can be contrary one to another.
    Proof.-A man, for instance Peter, can be the cause of Paul's
feeling pain, because he (Peter) possesses something similar to
that which Paul hates (III. xvi.), or because Peter has sole
possession of a thing which Paul also loves (III. xxxii. and
note), or for other causes (of which the chief are enumerated in
III. lv. note); it may therefore happen that Paul should hate
Peter (Def. of Emotions, vii.), consequently it may easily happen
also, that Peter should hate Paul in return, and that each should
endeavour to do the other an injury, (III. xxxix.), that is (IV.
xxx.), that they should be contrary one to another.  But the
emotion of pain is always a passion or passive state (III. lix.);
hence men, in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are
passions, can be contrary one to another.  Q.E.D.
    Note.-I said that Paul may hate Peter, because he conceives
that Peter possesses something which he (Paul) also loves; from
this it seems, at first sight, to follow, that these two men,
through both loving the same thing, and, consequently, through
agreement of their respective natures, stand in one another's way;
if this were so, Props. xxx. and xxxi. of this part would be
untrue.  But if we give the matter our unbiased attention, we
shall see that the discrepancy vanishes.  For the two men are not
in one another's way in virtue of the agreement of their natures,
that is, through both loving the same thing, but in virtue of one
differing from the other.  For, in so far as each loves the same
thing, the love of each is fostered thereby (III. xxxi.), that is
(Def. of the Emotions, vi.) the pleasure of each is fostered
thereby.  Wherefore it is far from being the case, that they are
at variance through both loving the same thing, and through the
agreement in their natures.  The cause for their opposition lies,
as I have said, solely in the fact that they are assumed to
differ.  For we assume that Peter has the idea of the loved
object as already in his possession, while Paul has the idea of
the loved object as lost.  Hence the one man will be affected
with pleasure, the other will be affected with pain, and thus
they will be at variance one with another.  We can easily show in
like manner, that all other causes of hatred depend solely on
differences, and not on the agreement between men's natures.

PROP. XXXV.  In so far only as men live in obedience to reason,
do they always necessarily agree in nature.
    Proof.-In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are
passions, they can be different in nature (IV. xxxiii.), and at
variance one with another.  But men are only said to be active,
in so far as they act in obedience to reason (III. iii.);
therefore, what so ever follows from human nature in so far as it
is defined by reason must (III. Def. ii.) be understood solely
through human nature as its proximate cause.  But, since every
man by the laws of his nature desires that which he deems good,
and endeavours to remove that which he deems bad (IV. xix.); and
further, since that which we, in accordance with reason, deem
good or bad, necessarily is good or bad (II. xli.); it follows
that men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason,
necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for human
nature, and consequently for each individual man (IV. xxxi.
Coroll.); in other words, such things as are in harmony with
each man's nature.  Therefore, men in so far as they live in
obedience to reason, necessarily live always in harmony one with
another.  Q.E.D.
    Corollary I.-There is no individual thing in nature, which is
more useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason.
For that thing is to man most useful, which is most in harmony
with his nature (IV. xxxi. Coroll.); that is, obviously, man.
But man acts absolutely according to the laws of his nature, when
he lives in obedience to reason (III. Def. ii.), and to this
extent only is always necessarily in harmony with the nature of
another man (by the last Prop.); wherefore among individual
things nothing is more useful to man, than a man who lives in
obedience to reason.  Q.E.D.
    Corollary II.-As every man seeks most that which is useful to
him, so are men most useful one to another.  For the more a man
seeks what is useful to him and endeavours to preserve himself,
the more is he endowed with virtue (IV. xx.), or, what is the
same thing (IV. Def. viii.), the more is he endowed with power to
act according to the laws of his own nature, that is to live in
obedience to reason.  But men are most in natural harmony, when
they live in obedience to reason (by the last Prop.); therefore
(by the foregoing Coroll.) men will be most useful one to
another, when each seeks most that which is useful to him.
Q.E.D.
    Note.-What we have just shown is attested by experience so
conspicuously, that it is in the mouth of nearly everyone: "Man
is to man a God."  Yet it rarely happens that men live in
obedience to reason, for things are so ordered among them, that
they are generally envious and troublesome one to another.
Nevertheless they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life, so
that the definition of man as a social animal has met with
general assent; in fact, men do derive from social life much
more convenience than injury.  Let satirists then laugh their
fill at human affairs, let theologians rail, and let misanthropes
praise to their utmost the life of untutored rusticity, let them
heap contempt on men and praises on beasts; when all is said,
they will find that men can provide for their wants much more
easily by mutual help, and that only by uniting their forces can
they escape from the dangers that on every side beset them: not
to say how much more excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is,
to study the actions of men than the actions of beasts.  But I
will treat of this more at length elsewhere.

PROP. XXXVI.  The highest good of those who follow virtue is
common to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein.
    Proof.-To act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason
(IV. xxiv.), and whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience to
reason is to understand (IV. xxvi.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the
highest good for those who follow after virtue is to know God;
that is (II. xlvii. and note) a good which is common to all and
can be possessed by all men equally, in so far as they are of
the same nature.  Q.E.D.
    Note.-Someone may ask how it would be, if the highest good of
those who follow after virtue were not common to all?  Would it
not then follow, as above (IV. xxxiv.), that men living in
obedience to reason, that is (IV. xxxv.), men in so far as they
agree in nature, would be at variance one with another?  To such
an inquiry, I make answer, that it follows not accidentally but
from the very nature of reason, that main's highest good is
common to all, inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence of
man, in so far as defined by reason; and that a man could
neither be, nor be conceived without the power of taking pleasure
in this highest good.  For it belongs to the essence of the human
mind (II. xlvii.), to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal
and infinite essence of God.

PROP. XXXVII.  The good which every man, who follows after
virtue, desires for himself he will also desire for other men,
and so much the more, in proportion as he has a greater knowledge
of God.
    Proof.-Men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason,
are most useful to their fellow men (IV. xxxv; Coroll. i.);
therefore (IV. xix.), we shall in obedience to reason necessarily
endeavour to bring about that men should live in obedience to
reason.  But the good which every man, in so far as he is guided
by reason, or, in other words, follows after virtue, desires for
himself, is to understand (IV. xxvi.); wherefore the good, which
each follower of virtue seeks for himself, he will desire also
for others.  Again, desire, in so far as it is referred to the
mind, is the very essence of the mind (Def. of the Emotions, i.);
now the essence of the mind consists in knowledge (II. xi.),
which involves the knowledge of God (II. xlvii.), and without it
(I. xv.), can neither be, nor be conceived; therefore, in
proportion as the mind's essence involves a greater knowledge of
God, so also will be greater the desire of the follower of
virtue, that other men should possess that which he seeks as good
for himself.  Q.E.D.
    Another Proof.-The good, which a man desires for himself and
loves, he will love more constantly, if he sees that others love
it also (III. xxxi.); he will therefore endeavour that others
should love it also; and as the good in question is common to
all, and therefore all can rejoice therein, he will endeavour,
for the same reason, to bring about that all should rejoice
therein, and this he will do the more (III. xxxvii.), in
proportion as his own enjoyment of the good is greater.
    Note I.-He who, guided by emotion only, endeavours to cause
others to love what he loves himself, and to make the rest of the
world live according to his own fancy, acts solely by impulse,
and is, therefore, hateful, especially, to those who take delight
in something different, and accordingly study and, by similar
impulse, endeavour, to make men live in accordance with what
pleases themselves.  Again, as the highest good sought by men
under the guidance of emotion is often such, that it can only be
possessed by a single individual, it follows that those who love
it are not consistent in their intentions, but, while they
delight to sing its praises, fear to be believed.  But he, who
endeavours to lead men by reason, does not act by impulse but
courteously and kindly, and his intention is always consistent.
Again, whatsoever we desire and do, whereof we are the cause in
so far as we possess the idea of God, or know God, I set down to
Religion.  The desire of well-doing, which is engendered by a
life according to reason, I call piety.  Further, the desire,
whereby a man living according to reason is bound to associate
others with himself in friendship, I call honour[13]; by
honourable I mean that which is praised by men living according
to reason, and by base I mean that which is repugnant to the
gaining of friendship.  I have also shown in addition what are
the foundations of a state; and the difference between true
virtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what I have
said; namely, that true virtue is nothing else but living in
accordance with reason; while infirmity is nothing else but
man's allowing himself to be led by things which are external to
himself, and to be by them determined to act in a manner demanded
by the general disposition of things rather than by his own
nature considered solely in itself.

[13] Honestas

    Such are the matters which I engaged to prove in Prop. xviii.
of this Part, whereby it is plain that the law against the
slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition
and womanish pity than on sound reason.  The rational quest of
what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of
associating ourselves with our fellow men, but not with beasts,
or things, whose nature is different from our own; we have the
same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us.
Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men
have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men.
Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that we
may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please,
treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature
is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from
human emotions (III. lvii. note).  It remains for me to explain
what I mean by just and unjust, sin and merit.  On these points
see the following note.
    Note II.-In the Appendix to Part I. I undertook to explain
praise and blame, merit and sin, justice and injustice.
    Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in III. xxix. note:
the time has now come to treat of the remaining terms.  But I
must first say a few words concerning man in the state of nature
and in society.
    Every man exists by sovereign natural right, and,
consequently, by sovereign natural right performs those actions
which follow from the necessity of his own nature; therefore by
sovereign natural right every man judges what is good and what is
bad, takes care of his own advantage according to his own
disposition (IV. xix. and IV. xx.), avenges the wrongs done to
him (III. xl. Coroll. ii.), and endeavours to preserve that which
he loves and to destroy that which he hates (III. xxviii.).  Now,
if men lived under the guidance of reason, everyone would remain
in possession of this his right, without any injury being done to
his neighbour (IV. xxxv. Coroll. i.).  But seeing that they are a
prey to their emotions, which far surpass human power or virtue
(IV. vi.), they are often drawn in different directions, and
being at variance one with another (IV. xxxiii. xxxiv.), stand in
need of mutual help (IV. xxxv. note).  Wherefore, in order that
men may live together in harmony, and may aid one another, it is
necessary that they should forego their natural right, and, for
the sake of security, refrain from all actions which can injure
their fellow-men.  The way in which this end can be obtained, so
that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions (IV. iv.
Coroll.), inconstant, and diverse, should be able to render each
other mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is evident from IV.
vii. and III. xxxix.  It is there shown, that an emotion can only
be restrained by an emotion stronger than, and contrary to
itself, and that men avoid inflicting injury through fear of
incurring a greater injury themselves.
    On this law society can be established, so long as it keeps
in its own hand the right, possessed by everyone, of avenging
injury, and pronouncing on good and evil; and provided it also
possesses the power to lay down a general rule of conduct, and to
pass laws sanctioned, not by reason, which is powerless in
restraining emotion, but by threats (IV. xvii. note).  Such a
society established with laws and the power of preserving itself
is called a State, while those who live under its protection are
called citizens.  We may readily understand that there is in the
state of nature nothing, which by universal consent is pronounced
good or bad; for in the state of nature everyone thinks solely
of his own advantage, and according to his disposition, with
reference only to his individual advantage, decides what is good
or bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself.
    In the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable; it
can only exist in a state, where good and evil are pronounced on
by common consent, and where everyone is bound to obey the State
authority.  Sin, then, is nothing else but disobedience, which is
therefore punished by the right of the State only.  Obedience, on
the other hand, is set down as merit, inasmuch as a man is
thought worthy of merit, if he takes delight in the advantages
which a State provides.
    Again, in the state of nature, no one is by common consent
master of anything, nor is there anything in nature, which can be
said to belong to one man rather than another: all things are
common to all.  Hence, in the state of nature, we can conceive no
wish to render to every man his own, or to deprive a man of that
which belongs to him; in other words, there is nothing in the
state of nature answering to justice and injustice.  Such ideas
are only possible in a social state, when it is decreed by common
consent what belongs to one man and what to another.
    From all these considerations it is evident, that justice and
injustice, sin and merit, are extrinsic ideas, and not attributes
which display the nature of the mind.  But I have said enough.

PROP. XXXVIII.  Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to
render it capable of being affected in an increased number of
ways, or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of
ways, is useful to man; and is so, in proportion as the body is
thereby rendered more capable of being affected or affecting
other bodies in an increased number of ways; contrariwise,
whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is
hurtful to man.
    Proof.-Whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the body
increases also the mind's capability of perception (II. xiv.);
therefore, whatsoever thus disposes the body and thus renders it
capable, is necessarily good or useful (IV. xxvi. xxvii.); and
is so in proportion to the extent to which it can render the body
capable; contrariwise (II. xiv., IV. xxvi. xxvii.), it is
hurtful, if it renders the body in this respect less capable.
Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXIX.  Whatsoever brings about the preservation of the
proportion of motion and rest, which the parts of the human body
mutually possess, is good; contrariwise, whatsoever causes a
change in such proportion is bad.
    Proof.-The human body needs many other bodies for its
preservation (II. Post. iv.).  But that which constitutes the
specific reality (forma) of a human body is, that its parts
communicate their several motions one to another in a certain
fixed proportion (Def. before Lemma iv. after II. xiii.).
Therefore, whatsoever brings about the preservation of the
proportion between motion and rest, which the parts of the human
body mutually possess, preserves the specific reality of the
human body, and consequently renders the human body capable of
being affected in many ways and of affecting external bodies in
many ways; consequently it is good (by the last Prop.).  Again,
whatsoever brings about a change in the aforesaid proportion
causes the human body to assume another specific character, in
other words (see Preface to this Part towards the end, though the
point is indeed self-evident), to be destroyed, and consequently
totally incapable of being affected in an increased numbers of
ways; therefore it is bad.  Q.E.D.
    Note.-The extent to which such causes can injure or be of
service to the mind will be explained in the Fifth Part.  But I
would here remark that I consider that a body undergoes death,
when the proportion of motion and rest which obtained mutually
among its several parts is changed.  For I do not venture to deny
that a human body, while keeping the circulation of the blood and
other properties, wherein the life of a body is thought to
consist, may none the less be changed into another nature totally
different from its own.  There is no reason, which compels me to
maintain that a body does not die, unless it becomes a corpse;
nay, experience would seem to point to the opposite conclusion.
It sometimes happens, that a man undergoes such changes, that I
should hardly call him the same.  As I have heard tell of a
certain Spanish poet, who had been seized with sickness, and
though he recovered therefrom yet remained so oblivious of his
past life, that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he
had written to be his own: indeed, he might have been taken for
a grown-up child, if he had also forgotten his native tongue.  If
this instance seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? A
man of ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own, that he can
only be persuaded that he too has been an infant by the analogy
of other men.  However, I prefer to leave such questions
undiscussed, lest I should give ground to the superstitious for
raising new issues.

PROP. XL.  Whatsoever conduces to man's social life, or causes
men to live together in harmony, is useful, whereas whatsoever
brings discord into a State is bad.
    Proof.-For whatsoever causes men to live together in harmony
also causes them to live according to reason (IV. xxxv.), and is
therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.) good, and (for the same reason)
whatsoever brings about discord is bad.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XLI.  Pleasure in itself is not bad but good:
contrariwise, pain in itself is bad.
    Proof.-Pleasure (III. xi. and note) is emotion, whereby the
body's power of activity is increased or helped; pain is
emotion, whereby the body's power of activity is diminished or
checked; therefore (IV. xxxviii.) pleasure in itself is good,
&c.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XLII.  Mirth cannot be excessive, but is always good;
contrariwise, Melancholy is always bad.
    Proof.-Mirth (see its Def. in III. xi. note) is pleasure,
which, in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in all
parts of the body being affected equally: that is (III. xi.),
the body's power of activity is increased or aided in such a
manner, that the several parts maintain their former proportion
of motion and rest; therefore Mirth is always good (IV. xxxix.),
and cannot be excessive.  But Melancholy (see its Def. in the
same note to III. xi.) is pain, which, in so far as it is
referred to the body, consists in the absolute decrease or
hindrance of the body's power of activity; therefore (IV.
xxxviii.) it is always bad.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XLIII.  Stimulation may be excessive and bad; on the other
hand, grief may be good, in so far as stimulation or pleasure is
bad.
    Proof.-Localized pleasure or stimulation (titillatio) is
pleasure, which, in so far as it is referred to the body,
consists in one or some of its parts being affected more than the
rest (see its Definition, III. xi. note); the power of this
emotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of the body
(IV. vi.), and may remain obstinately fixed therein, thus
rendering it incapable of being affected in a variety of other
ways: therefore (IV. xxxviii.) it may be bad.  Again, grief,
which is pain, cannot as such be good (IV. xli.).  But, as its
force and increase is defined by the power of an external cause
compared with our own (IV. v.), we can conceive infinite degrees
and modes of strength in this emotion (IV. iii.); we can,
therefore, conceive it as capable of restraining stimulation, and
preventing its becoming excessive, and hindering the body's
capabilities; thus, to this extent, it will be good.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XLIV.  Love and desire may be excessive.
    Proof.-Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an
external cause (Def. of Emotions, vi.); therefore stimulation,
accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love (III. xi.
note); hence love maybe excessive.  Again, the strength of
desire varies in proportion to the emotion from which it arises
(III. xxxvii.).  Now emotion may overcome all the rest of men's
actions (IV. vi.); so, therefore, can desire, which arises from
the same emotion, overcome all other desires, and become
excessive, as we showed in the last proposition concerning
stimulation.
    Note.-Mirth, which I have stated to be good, can be conceived
more easily than it can be observed.  For the emotions, whereby
we are daily assailed, are generally referred to some part of the
body which is affected more than the rest; hence the emotions
are generally excessive, and so fix the mind in the contemplation
of one object, that it is unable to think of others; and
although men, as a rule, are a prey to many emotions-and very few
are found who are always assailed by one and the same-yet there
are cases, where one and the same emotion remains obstinately
fixed.  We sometimes see men so absorbed in one object, that,
although it be not present, they think they have it before them;
when this is the case with a man who is not asleep, we say he is
delirious or mad; nor are those persons who are inflamed with
love, and who dream all night and all day about nothing but their
mistress, or some woman, considered as less mad, for they are
made objects of ridicule.  But when a miser thinks of nothing but
gain or money, or when an ambitious man thinks of nothing but
glory, they are not reckoned to be mad, because they are
generally harmful, and are thought worthy of being hated.  But,
in reality, Avarice, Ambition, Lust, &c., are species of madness,
though they may not be reckoned among diseases.

PROP. XLV.  Hatred can never be good.
    Proof.-When we hate a man, we endeavour to destroy him (III.
xxxix.), that is (IV. xxxvii.), we endeavour to do something that
is bad.  Therefore, &c.  Q.E.D.
    N.B.  Here, and in what follows, I mean by hatred only hatred
towards men.
    Corollary I.-Envy, derision, contempt, anger, revenge, and
other emotions attributable to hatred, or arising therefrom, are
bad; this is evident from III. xxxix. and IV. xxxvii.
    Corollary II.-Whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred is
base, and in a State unjust.  This also is evident from III.
xxxix., and from the definitions of baseness and injustice in IV.
xxxvii. note.
    Note.-Between derision (which I have in Coroll. I. stated to
be bad) and laughter I recognize a great difference.  For
laughter, as also jocularity, is merely pleasure; therefore, so
long as it be not excessive, it is in itself good (IV. xli.).
Assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself, save grim and
gloomy superstition.  For why is it more lawful to satiate one's
hunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy? I reason,
and have convinced myself as follows: No deity, nor anyone else,
save the envious, takes pleasure in my infirmity and discomfort,
nor sets down to my virtue the tears, sobs, fear, and the like,
which axe signs of infirmity of spirit; on the contrary, the
greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected, the greater the
perfection whereto we pass; in other words, the more must we
necessarily partake of the divine nature.  Therefore, to make use
of what comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as possible
(not to the point of satiety, for that would not be enjoyment) is
the part of a wise man.  I say it is the part of a wise man to
refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and
drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty of growing
plants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres,
and the like, such as every man may make use of without injury to
his neighbour.  For the human body is composed of very numerous
parts, of diverse nature, which continually stand in need of
fresh and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be
equally capable of performing all the actions, which follow from
the necessity of its own nature; and, consequently, so that the
mind may also be equally capable of understanding many things
simultaneously.  This way of life, then, agrees best with our
principles, and also with general practice; therefore, if there
be any question of another plan, the plan we have mentioned is
the best, and in every way to be commended.  There is no need for
me to set forth the matter more clearly or in more detail.

PROP. XLVI.  He, who lives under the guidance of reason,
endeavours, as far as possible, to render back love, or kindness,
for other men's hatred, anger, contempt, &c., towards him.
    Proof.-All emotions of hatred are bad (IV. xlv. Coroll. i.);
therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will
endeavour, as far as possible, to avoid being assailed by such
emotions (IV. xix.); consequently, he will also endeavour to
prevent others being so assailed (IV. xxxvii.).  But hatred is
increased by being reciprocated, and can be quenched by love
(III. xliii.), so that hatred may pass into love (III. xliv.);
therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will
endeavour to repay hatred with love, that is, with kindness.
Q.E.D.
    Note.-He who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is
assuredly wretched.  But he, who strives to conquer hatred with
love, fights his battle in joy and confidence; he withstands
many as easily as one, and has very little need of fortune's aid.
Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure, but
through increase in their powers; all these consequences follow
so plainly from the mere definitions of love and understanding,
that I have no need to prove them in detail.

PROP. XLVII.  Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves
good.
    Proof.-Emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without pain.
For fear is pain (Def. of the Emotions, xiii.), and hope (Def. of
the Emotions, Explanation xii. and xiii.) cannot exist without
fear; therefore (IV. xli.) these emotions cannot be good in
themselves, but only in so far as they can restrain excessive
pleasure (IV. xliii.).  Q.E.D.
    Note.-We may add, that these emotions show defective
knowledge and an absence of power in the mind; for the same
reason confidence, despair, joy, and disappointment are signs of
a want of mental power.  For although confidence and joy are
pleasurable emotions, they nevertheless imply a preceding pain,
namely, hope and fear.  Wherefore the more we endeavour to be
guided by reason, the less do we depend on hope; we endeavour to
free ourselves from fear, and, as far as we can, to dominate
fortune, directing our actions by the sure counsels of wisdom.

PROP. XLVIII.  The emotions of over-esteem and disparagement are
always bad.
    Proof.-These emotions (see Def. of the Emotions, xxi. xxii.)
are repugnant to reason; and are therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.)
bad.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XLIX.  Over-esteem is apt to render its object proud.
    Proof.-If we see that any one rates us too highly, for love's
sake, we are apt to become elated (III. xli.), or to be
pleasurably affected (Def. of the Emotions, xxx.); the good
which we hear of ourselves we readily believe (III. xxv.); and
therefore, for love's sake, rate ourselves too highly; in other
words, we are apt to become proud.  Q.E.D.

PROP. L.  Pity, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason,
is in itself bad and useless.
    Proof.-Pity (Def. of the Emotions, xviii.) is a pain, and
therefore (IV. xli.) is in itself bad.  The good effect which
follows, namely, our endeavour to free the object of our pity
from misery, is an action which we desire to do solely at the
dictation of reason (IV. xxxvii.); only at the dictation of
reason are we able to perform any action, which we know for
certain to be good (IV. xxvii.); thus, in a man who lives under
the guidance of reason, pity in itself is useless and bad.
Q.E.D.
    Note.-He who rightly realizes, that all things follow from
the necessity of the divine nature, and come to pass in
accordance with the eternal laws and rules of nature, will not
find anything worthy of hatred, derision, or contempt, nor will
he bestow pity on anything, but to the utmost extent of human
virtue he will endeavour to do well, as the saying is, and to
rejoice.  We may add, that he, who is easily touched with
compassion, and is moved by another's sorrow or tears, often does
something which he afterwards regrets; partly because we can
never be sure that an action caused by emotion is good, partly
because we are easily deceived by false tears.  I am in this
place expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of
reason.  He who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by
compassion, is rightly styled inhuman, for (III. xxvii.) he seems
unlike a man.

PROP. LI.  Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agree
therewith and arise therefrom.
    Proof.-Approval is love towards one who has done good to
another (Def. of the Emotions, xix.); therefore it may be
referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active (III.
lix.), that is (III. iii.), in so far as it understands;
therefore, it is in agreement with reason, &c.  Q.E.D.
    Another Proof.-He, who lives under the guidance of reason,
desires for others the good which he seeks for himself (IV.
xxxvii.); wherefore from seeing someone doing good to his fellow
his own endeavour to do good is aided; in other words, he will
feel pleasure (III. xi. note) accompanied by the idea of the
benefactor.  Therefore he approves of him.  Q.E.D.
    Note.-Indignation as we defined it (Def. of the Emotions,
xx.) is necessarily evil (IV. xlv.); we may, however, remark
that, when the sovereign power for the sake of preserving peace
punishes a citizen who has injured another, it should not be said
to be indignant with the criminal, for it is not incited by
hatred to ruin him, it is led by a sense of duty to punish him.

PROP. LII.  Self-approval may arise from reason, and that which
arises from reason is the highest possible.
    Proof.-Self-approval is pleasure arising from a man's
contemplation of himself and his own power of action (Def. of the
Emotions, xxv.).  But a man's true power of action or virtue is
reason herself (III. iii.), as the said man clearly and
distinctly contemplates her (II. xl. xliii.); therefore
self-approval arises from reason.  Again, when a man is
contemplating himself, he only perceived clearly and distinctly
or adequately, such things as follow from his power of action
(III. Def. ii.), that is (III. iii.), from his power of
understanding; therefore in such contemplation alone does the
highest possible self-approval arise.  Q.E.D.
    Note.-Self-approval is in reality the highest object for
which we can hope.  For (as we showed in IV. xxv.) no one
endeavours to preserve his being for the sake of any ulterior
object, and, as this approval is more and more fostered and
strengthened by praise (III. liii. Coroll.), and on the contrary
(III. lv. Coroll.) is more and more disturbed by blame, fame
becomes the most powerful of incitements to action, and life
under disgrace is almost unendurable.

PROP. LIII.  Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from
reason.
    Proof.-Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of
his own infirmities (Def. of the Emotions, xxvi.).  But, in so
far as a man knows himself by true reason, he is assumed to
understand his essence, that is, his power (III. vii.).
Wherefore, if a man in self-contemplation perceives any infirmity
in himself, it is not by virtue of his understanding himself, but
(III. lv.) by virtue of his power of activity being checked.
But, if we assume that a man perceives his own infirmity by
virtue of understanding something stronger than himself, by the
knowledge of which he determines his own power of activity, this
is the same as saying that we conceive that a man understands
himself distinctly (IV. xxvi.), because[14] his power of activity
is aided.  Wherefore humility, or the pain which arises from a
man's contemplation of his own infirmity, does not arise from the
contemplation or reason, and is not a virtue but a passion.
Q.E.D.

[14] Land reads: "Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur"-which I
have translated above.  He suggests as alternative readings to
`quod', 'quo' (= whereby) and 'quodque' (= and that).

PROP. LIV.  Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from
reason; but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or
infirm.
    Proof.-The first part of this proposition is proved like the
foregoing one.  The second part is proved from the mere
definition of the emotion in question (Def. of the Emotions,
xxvii.).  For the man allows himself to be overcome, first, by
evil desires; secondly, by pain.
    Note.-As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these
two emotions, namely, Humility and Repentance, as also Hope and
Fear, bring more good than harm; hence, as we must sin, we had
better sin in that direction.  For, if all men who are a prey to
emotion were all equally proud, they would shrink from nothing,
and would fear nothing; how then could they be joined and linked
together in bonds of union?  The crowd plays the tyrant, when it
is not in fear; hence we need not wonder that the prophets, who
consulted the good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously
commended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence.  Indeed those who
are a prey to these emotions may be led much more easily than
others to live under the guidance of reason, that is, to become
free and to enjoy the life of the blessed.

PROP. LV.  Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignorance
of self.
    Proof.-This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and
xxix.

PROP. LVI.  Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme
infirmity of spirit.
    Proof.-The first foundation of virtue is self-preservation
(IV. xxii. Coroll.) under the guidance of reason (IV. xxiv.).
He, therefore, who is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the
foundation of all virtues, and consequently of all virtues.
Again, to act virtuously is merely to act under the guidance of
reason (IV. xxiv.): now he, that acts under the guidance of
reason, must necessarily know that he so acts (II. xliii.).
Therefore he who is in extreme ignorance of himself, and
consequently of all virtues, acts least in obedience to virtue;
in other words (IV. Def. viii.), is most infirm of spirit.  Thus
extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit.
Q.E.D.
    Corollary.-Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and
the dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions.
    Note.-Yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride;
for the latter being a pleasurable emotion, and the former a
painful emotion, the pleasurable is stronger than the painful
(IV. xviii.).

PROP. LVII.  The proud man delights in the company of flatterers
and parasites, but hates the company of the high-minded.
    Proof.-Pride is pleasure arising from a man's over estimation
of himself (Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and vi.); this
estimation the proud man will endeavour to foster by all the
means in his power (III. xiii. note); he will therefore delight
in the company of flatterers and parasites (whose character is
too well known to need definition here), and will avoid the
company of high-minded men, who value him according to his
deserts.  Q.E.D.
    Note.-It would be too long a task to enumerate here all the
evil results of pride, inasmuch as the proud are a prey to all
the emotions, though to none of them less than to love and pity.
I cannot, however, pass over in silence the fact, that a man may
be called proud from his underestimation of other people; and,
therefore, pride in this sense may be defined as pleasure arising
from the false opinion, whereby a man may consider himself
superior to his fellows.  The dejection, which is the opposite
quality to this sort of pride, may be defined as pain arising
from the false opinion, whereby a man may think himself inferior
to his fellows.  Such being the ease, we can easily see that a
proud man is necessarily envious (III. xli. note), and only takes
pleasure in the company, who fool his weak mind to the top of his
bent, and make him insane instead of merely foolish.
    Though dejection is the emotion contrary to pride, yet is the
dejected man very near akin to the proud man.  For, inasmuch as
his pain arises from a comparison between his own infirmity and
other men's power or virtue, it will be removed, or, in other
words, he will feel pleasure, if his imagination be occupied in
contemplating other men's faults; whence arises the proverb,
"The unhappy are comforted by finding fellow-sufferers."
Contrariwise, he will be the more pained in proportion as he
thinks himself inferior to others; hence none are so prone to
envy as the dejected, they are specially keen in observing men's
actions, with a view to fault-finding rather than correction, in
order to reserve their praises for dejection, and to glory
therein, though all the time with a dejected air.  These effects
follow as necessarily from the said emotion, as it follows from
the nature of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two
right angles.  I have already said that I call these and similar
emotions bad, solely in respect to what is useful to man.  The
laws of nature have regard to nature's general order, whereof man
is but a part.  I mention this, in passing, lest any should think
that I have wished to set forth the faults and irrational deeds
of men rather than the nature and properties of things.  For, as
I said in the preface to the third Part, I regard human emotions
and their properties as on the same footing with other natural
phenomena.  Assuredly human emotions indicate the power and
ingenuity, of nature, if not of human nature, quite as fully as
other things which we admire, and which we delight to
contemplate.  But I pass on to note those qualities in the
emotions, which bring advantage to man, or inflict injury upon
him.

PROP. LVIII.  Honour (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but may
arise therefrom.
    Proof.-This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxx., and
also from the definition of an honourable man (IV. xxxvii. note.
i.).
    Note-Empty honour, as it is styled, is self-approval,
fostered only by the good opinion of the populace; when this
good opinion ceases there ceases also the self-approval, in other
words, the highest object of each man's love (IV. lii. note);
consequently, he whose honour is rooted in popular approval must,
day by day, anxiously strive, act, and scheme in order to retain
his reputation.  For the populace is variable and inconstant, so
that, if a reputation be not kept up, it quickly withers away.
Everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself, and
readily represses the fame of others.  The object of the strife
being estimated as the greatest of all goods, each combatant is
seized with a fierce desire to put down his rivals in every
possible way, till he who at last comes out victorious is more
proud of having done harm to others than of having done good to
himself.  This sort of honour, then, is really empty, being
nothing.
    The points to note concerning shame may easily be inferred
from what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance.  I
will only add that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue,
is yet good, in so far as it shows, that the feeler of shame is
really imbued with the desire to live honourably; in the same
way as suffering is good, as showing that the injured part is not
mortified.  Therefore, though a man who feels shame is sorrowful,
he is yet more perfect than he, who is shameless, and has no
desire to live honourably.
    Such are the points which I undertook to remark upon
concerning the emotions of pleasure and pain; as for the
desires, they are good or bad according as they spring from good
or evil emotions.  But all, in so far as they are engendered in
us by emotions wherein the mind is passive, are blind (as is
evident from what was said in IV. xliv. note), and would be
useless, if men could easily, be induced to live by the guidance
of reason only, as I will now briefly, show.

PROP. LIX.  To all the actions, whereto we are determined by
emotion wherein the mind is passive; we can be determined
without emotion by reason.
    Proof.-To act rationally, is nothing else (III. iii. and Def.
ii.) but to perform those actions, which follow from the
necessity, of our nature considered in itself alone.  But pain is
bad, in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action
(IV. xli.); wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any
action, which we should be unable to perform under the guidance
of reason.  Again, pleasure is bad only in so far as it hinders a
man's capability for action (IV. xli. xliii.); therefore to this
extent we could not be determined by it to any action, which we
could not perform under the guidance of reason.  Lastly,
pleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for
it consists in the fact that a man's capability for action is
increased or aided); nor is the mind passive therein, except in
so far as a man's power of action is not increased to the extent
of affording him an adequate conception of himself and his
actions (III. iii., and note).
    Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to
such a state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception
of himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more,
capable of those actions, to which he is determined by emotion
wherein the mind is passive.  But all emotions are attributable
to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the Emotions, iv.
explanation); and desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) is nothing
else but the attempt to act; therefore, to all actions, &c.
Q.E.D.
    Another Proof.-A given action is called bad, in so far as it
arises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion.
But no action, considered in itself alone, is either good or bad
(as we pointed out in the preface to Pt. IV.), one and the same
action being sometimes good, sometimes bad; wherefore to the
action which is sometimes bad, or arises from some evil emotion,
we may be led by reason (IV. xix.).  Q.E.D.
    Note.-An example will put this point in a clearer light.  The
action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and
in so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his
arm, clenches his fist, and moves his whole arm violently
downwards, is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper
to the structure of the human body.  If, then, a man, moved by
anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm,
this result takes place (as we showed in Pt. II.), because one
and the same action can be associated with various mental images
of things; therefore we may be determined to the performance of
one and the same action by confused ideas, or by clear and
distinct ideas.  Hence it is evident that every desire which
springs from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, would become
useless, if men could be guided by reason.  Let us now see why
desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, is
called by us blind.