In return for these important cessions, France engaged to effect a diversion
in favour of the Swedes, by commencing hostilities against the Spaniards;
and if this should lead to an open breach with the Emperor, to maintain
an army upon the German side of the Rhine, which was to act in conjunction
with the Swedes and Germans against Austria.  For a war with Spain,
the Spaniards themselves soon afforded the desired pretext.
Making an inroad from the Netherlands, upon the city of Treves,
they cut in pieces the French garrison; and, in open violation
of the law of nations, made prisoner the Elector, who had placed himself
under the protection of France, and carried him into Flanders.
When the Cardinal Infante, as Viceroy of the Spanish Netherlands,
refused satisfaction for these injuries, and delayed
to restore the prince to liberty, Richelieu, after the old custom,
formally proclaimed war at Brussels by a herald, and the war
was at once opened by three different armies in Milan, in the Valteline,
and in Flanders.  The French minister was less anxious to commence hostilities
with the Emperor, which promised fewer advantages, and threatened
greater difficulties.  A fourth army, however, was detached across the Rhine
into Germany, under the command of Cardinal Lavalette, which was to act
in conjunction with Duke Bernard, against the Emperor, without a previous
declaration of war.

A heavier blow for the Swedes, than even the defeat of Nordlingen,
was the reconciliation of the Elector of Saxony with the Emperor.
After many fruitless attempts both to bring about and to prevent it,
it was at last effected in 1634, at Pirna, and, the following year,
reduced into a formal treaty of peace, at Prague.  The Elector of Saxony
had always viewed with jealousy the pretensions of the Swedes in Germany;
and his aversion to this foreign power, which now gave laws within the Empire,
had grown with every fresh requisition that Oxenstiern was obliged to make
upon the German states.  This ill feeling was kept alive by the Spanish court,
who laboured earnestly to effect a peace between Saxony and the Emperor.
Wearied with the calamities of a long and destructive contest,
which had selected Saxony above all others for its theatre;
grieved by the miseries which both friend and foe inflicted upon his subjects,
and seduced by the tempting propositions of the House of Austria,
the Elector at last abandoned the common cause, and, caring little
for the fate of his confederates, or the liberties of Germany,
thought only of securing his own advantages, even at the expense
of the whole body.

In fact, the misery of Germany had risen to such a height,
that all clamorously vociferated for peace; and even the most disadvantageous
pacification would have been hailed as a blessing from heaven.  The plains,
which formerly had been thronged with a happy and industrious population,
where nature had lavished her choicest gifts, and plenty and prosperity
had reigned, were now a wild and desolate wilderness.  The fields,
abandoned by the industrious husbandman, lay waste and uncultivated;
and no sooner had the young crops given the promise of a smiling harvest,
than a single march destroyed the labours of a year, and blasted
the last hope of an afflicted peasantry.  Burnt castles, wasted fields,
villages in ashes, were to be seen extending far and wide on all sides,
while the ruined peasantry had no resource left but to swell
the horde of incendiaries, and fearfully to retaliate upon their fellows,
who had hitherto been spared the miseries which they themselves had suffered.
The only safeguard against oppression was to become an oppressor.  The towns
groaned under the licentiousness of undisciplined and plundering garrisons,
who seized and wasted the property of the citizens, and, under the license
of their position, committed the most remorseless devastation and cruelty.
If the march of an army converted whole provinces into deserts,
if others were impoverished by winter quarters, or exhausted by contributions,
these still were but passing evils, and the industry of a year might efface
the miseries of a few months.  But there was no relief for those who had
a garrison within their walls, or in the neighbourhood; even the change
of fortune could not improve their unfortunate fate, since the victor
trod in the steps of the vanquished, and friends were not more merciful
than enemies.  The neglected farms, the destruction of the crops,
and the numerous armies which overran the exhausted country,
were inevitably followed by scarcity and the high price of provisions,
which in the later years was still further increased by a general failure
in the crops.  The crowding together of men in camps and quarters --
want upon one side, and excess on the other, occasioned contagious distempers,
which were more fatal than even the sword.  In this long
and general confusion, all the bonds of social life were broken up; --
respect for the rights of their fellow men, the fear of the laws,
purity of morals, honour, and religion, were laid aside, where might
ruled supreme with iron sceptre.  Under the shelter of anarchy and impunity,
every vice flourished, and men became as wild as the country.
No station was too dignified for outrage, no property too holy
for rapine and avarice.  In a word, the soldier reigned supreme;
and that most brutal of despots often made his own officer feel his power.
The leader of an army was a far more important person within any country
where he appeared, than its lawful governor, who was frequently obliged
to fly before him into his own castles for safety.  Germany swarmed
with these petty tyrants, and the country suffered equally from its enemies
and its protectors.  These wounds rankled the deeper, when the unhappy victims
recollected that Germany was sacrificed to the ambition of foreign powers,
who, for their own ends, prolonged the miseries of war.  Germany bled
under the scourge, to extend the conquests and influence of Sweden;
and the torch of discord was kept alive within the Empire,
that the services of Richelieu might be rendered indispensable in France.

But, in truth, it was not merely interested voices which opposed a peace;
and if both Sweden and the German states were anxious, from corrupt motives,
to prolong the conflict, they were seconded in their views by sound policy.
After the defeat of Nordlingen, an equitable peace was not to be expected
from the Emperor; and, this being the case, was it not too great a sacrifice,
after seventeen years of war, with all its miseries, to abandon the contest,
not only without advantage, but even with loss?  What would avail
so much bloodshed, if all was to remain as it had been; if their rights
and pretensions were neither larger nor safer; if all that had been won
with so much difficulty was to be surrendered for a peace at any cost?
Would it not be better to endure, for two or three years more,
the burdens they had borne so long, and to reap at last some recompense
for twenty years of suffering?  Neither was it doubtful,
that peace might at last be obtained on favourable terms,
if only the Swedes and the German Protestants should continue united
in the cabinet and in the field, and pursued their common interests
with a reciprocal sympathy and zeal.  Their divisions alone,
had rendered the enemy formidable, and protracted the acquisition
of a lasting and general peace.  And this great evil the Elector of Saxony
had brought upon the Protestant cause by concluding a separate treaty
with Austria.

He, indeed, had commenced his negociations with the Emperor, even before
the battle of Nordlingen; and the unfortunate issue of that battle
only accelerated their conclusion.  By it, all his confidence in the Swedes
was lost; and it was even doubted whether they would ever recover
from the blow.  The jealousies among their generals, the insubordination
of the army, and the exhaustion of the Swedish kingdom,
shut out any reasonable prospect of effective assistance on their part.
The Elector hastened, therefore, to profit by the Emperor's magnanimity,
who, even after the battle of Nordlingen, did not recall the conditions
previously offered.  While Oxenstiern, who had assembled the estates
in Frankfort, made further demands upon them and him, the Emperor,
on the contrary, made concessions; and therefore it required
no long consideration to decide between them.

In the mean time, however, he was anxious to escape the charge
of sacrificing the common cause and attending only to his own interests.
All the German states, and even the Swedes, were publicly invited
to become parties to this peace, although Saxony and the Emperor
were the only powers who deliberated upon it, and who assumed the right
to give law to Germany.  By this self-appointed tribunal, the grievances
of the Protestants were discussed, their rights and privileges decided,
and even the fate of religions determined, without the presence of those
who were most deeply interested in it.  Between them, a general peace
was resolved on, and it was to be enforced by an imperial army of execution,
as a formal decree of the Empire.  Whoever opposed it, was to be treated
as a public enemy; and thus, contrary to their rights, the states were to be
compelled to acknowledge a law, in the passing of which they had no share.
Thus, even in form, the pacification at Prague was an arbitrary measure;
nor was it less so in its contents.  The Edict of Restitution
had been the chief cause of dispute between the Elector and the Emperor;
and therefore it was first considered in their deliberations.
Without formally annulling it, it was determined by the treaty of Prague,
that all the ecclesiastical domains holding immediately of the Empire,
and, among the mediate ones, those which had been seized by the Protestants
subsequently to the treaty at Passau, should, for forty years, remain in
the same position as they had been in before the Edict of Restitution,
but without any formal decision of the diet to that effect.
Before the expiration of this term a commission, composed of equal numbers
of both religions, should proceed to settle the matter peaceably
and according to law; and if this commission should be unable
to come to a decision, each party should remain in possession of the rights
which it had exercised before the Edict of Restitution.  This arrangement,
therefore, far from removing the grounds of dissension, only suspended
the dispute for a time; and this article of the treaty of Prague
only covered the embers of a future war.

The archbishopric of Magdeburg remained in possession of Prince Augustus
of Saxony, and Halberstadt in that of the Archduke Leopold William.
Four estates were taken from the territory of Magdeburg,
and given to Saxony, for which the Administrator of Magdeburg,
Christian William of Brandenburg, was otherwise to be indemnified.
The Dukes of Mecklenburg, upon acceding to this treaty,
were to be acknowledged as rightful possessors of their territories,
in which the magnanimity of Gustavus Adolphus had long ago reinstated them.
Donauwerth recovered its liberties.  The important claims
of the heirs of the Palatine, however important it might be
for the Protestant cause not to lose this electorate vote in the diet,
were passed over in consequence of the animosity subsisting between
the Lutherans and the Calvinists.  All the conquests which,
in the course of the war, had been made by the German states,
or by the League and the Emperor, were to be mutually restored;
all which had been appropriated by the foreign powers of France and Sweden,
was to be forcibly wrested from them by the united powers.  The troops
of the contracting parties were to be formed into one imperial army,
which, supported and paid by the Empire, was, by force of arms,
to carry into execution the covenants of the treaty.

As the peace of Prague was intended to serve as a general law of the Empire,
those points, which did not immediately affect the latter,
formed the subject of a separate treaty.  By it, Lusatia was ceded
to the Elector of Saxony as a fief of Bohemia, and special articles
guaranteed the freedom of religion of this country and of Silesia.

All the Protestant states were invited to accede to the treaty of Prague,
and on that condition were to benefit by the amnesty.
The princes of Wurtemberg and Baden, whose territories
the Emperor was already in possession of, and which he was not disposed
to restore unconditionally; and such vassals of Austria as had borne arms
against their sovereign; and those states which, under the direction
of Oxenstiern, composed the council of the Upper German Circle,
were excluded from the treaty, -- not so much with the view
of continuing the war against them, as of compelling them to purchase peace
at a dearer rate.  Their territories were to be retained in pledge,
till every thing should be restored to its former footing.
Such was the treaty of Prague.  Equal justice, however, towards all,
might perhaps have restored confidence between the head of the Empire
and its members -- between the Protestants and the Roman Catholics --
between the Reformed and the Lutheran party; and the Swedes, abandoned by
all their allies, would in all probability have been driven from Germany
with disgrace.  But this inequality strengthened, in those who were
more severely treated, the spirit of mistrust and opposition,
and made it an easier task for the Swedes to keep alive the flame of war,
and to maintain a party in Germany.

The peace of Prague, as might have been expected, was received
with very various feelings throughout Germany.  The attempt
to conciliate both parties, had rendered it obnoxious to both.
The Protestants complained of the restraints imposed upon them;
the Roman Catholics thought that these hated sectaries had been favoured
at the expense of the true church.  In the opinion of the latter,
the church had been deprived of its inalienable rights,
by the concession to the Protestants of forty years' undisturbed possession
of the ecclesiastical benefices; while the former murmured that the interests
of the Protestant church had been betrayed, because toleration
had not been granted to their co-religionists in the Austrian dominions.
But no one was so bitterly reproached as the Elector of Saxony,
who was publicly denounced as a deserter, a traitor to religion
and the liberties of the Empire, and a confederate of the Emperor.

In the mean time, he consoled himself with the triumph of seeing
most of the Protestant states compelled by necessity to embrace this peace.
The Elector of Brandenburg, Duke William of Weimar, the princes of Anhalt,
the dukes of Mecklenburg, the dukes of Brunswick Lunenburg,
the Hanse towns, and most of the imperial cities, acceded to it.
The Landgrave William of Hesse long wavered, or affected to do so,
in order to gain time, and to regulate his measures by the course of events.
He had conquered several fertile provinces of Westphalia,
and derived from them principally the means of continuing the war;
these, by the terms of the treaty, he was bound to restore.
Bernard, Duke of Weimar, whose states, as yet, existed only on paper,
as a belligerent power was not affected by the treaty, but as a general
was so materially; and, in either view, he must equally be disposed
to reject it.  His whole riches consisted in his bravery,
his possessions in his sword.  War alone gave him greatness and importance,
and war alone could realize the projects which his ambition suggested.

But of all who declaimed against the treaty of Prague,
none were so loud in their clamours as the Swedes, and none had so much reason
for their opposition.  Invited to Germany by the Germans themselves,
the champions of the Protestant Church, and the freedom of the States,
which they had defended with so much bloodshed, and with the sacred life
of their king, they now saw themselves suddenly and shamefully abandoned,
disappointed in all their hopes, without reward and without gratitude
driven from the empire for which they had toiled and bled,
and exposed to the ridicule of the enemy by the very princes
who owed every thing to them.  No satisfaction, no indemnification
for the expenses which they had incurred, no equivalent for the conquests
which they were to leave behind them, was provided by the treaty of Prague.
They were to be dismissed poorer than they came, or, if they resisted,
to be expelled by the very powers who had invited them.  The Elector of Saxony
at last spoke of a pecuniary indemnification, and mentioned the small sum
of two millions five hundred thousand florins; but the Swedes had already
expended considerably more, and this disgraceful equivalent in money
was both contrary to their true interests, and injurious to their pride.
"The Electors of Bavaria and Saxony," replied Oxenstiern, "have been paid
for their services, which, as vassals, they were bound to render the Emperor,
with the possession of important provinces; and shall we,
who have sacrificed our king for Germany, be dismissed with the miserable sum
of 2,500,000 florins?"  The disappointment of their expectations
was the more severe, because the Swedes had calculated upon being recompensed
with the Duchy of Pomerania, the present possessor of which
was old and without heirs.  But the succession of this territory
was confirmed by the treaty of Prague to the Elector of Brandenburg;
and all the neighbouring powers declared against allowing the Swedes
to obtain a footing within the empire.

Never, in the whole course of the war, had the prospects of the Swedes
looked more gloomy, than in the year 1635, immediately after the conclusion
of the treaty of Prague.  Many of their allies, particularly among
the free cities, abandoned them to benefit by the peace; others were compelled
to accede to it by the victorious arms of the Emperor.  Augsburg,
subdued by famine, surrendered under the severest conditions;
Wurtzburg and Coburg were lost to the Austrians.  The League of Heilbronn
was formally dissolved.  Nearly the whole of Upper Germany, the chief seat
of the Swedish power, was reduced under the Emperor.  Saxony, on the strength
of the treaty of Prague, demanded the evacuation of Thuringia, Halberstadt,
and Magdeburg.  Philipsburg, the military depot of France,
was surprised by the Austrians, with all the stores it contained;
and this severe loss checked the activity of France.  To complete
the embarrassments of Sweden, the truce with Poland was drawing to a close.
To support a war at the same time with Poland and in Germany, was far beyond
the power of Sweden; and all that remained was to choose between them.
Pride and ambition declared in favour of continuing the German war,
at whatever sacrifice on the side of Poland.  An army, however, was necessary
to command the respect of Poland, and to give weight to Sweden
in any negotiations for a truce or a peace.

The mind of Oxenstiern, firm, and inexhaustible in expedients, set itself
manfully to meet these calamities, which all combined to overwhelm Sweden;
and his shrewd understanding taught him how to turn even misfortunes
to his advantage.  The defection of so many German cities of the empire
deprived him, it is true, of a great part of his former allies,
but at the same time it freed him from the necessity of paying any regard
to their interests.  The more the number of his enemies increased,
the more provinces and magazines were opened to his troops.
The gross ingratitude of the States, and the haughty contempt
with which the Emperor behaved, (who did not even condescend
to treat directly with him about a peace,) excited in him
the courage of despair, and a noble determination to maintain the struggle
to the last.  The continuance of war, however unfortunate it might prove,
could not render the situation of Sweden worse than it now was;
and if Germany was to be evacuated, it was at least better and nobler
to do so sword in hand, and to yield to force rather than to fear.

In the extremity in which the Swedes were now placed by the desertion
of their allies, they addressed themselves to France, who met them
with the greatest encouragement.  The interests of the two crowns
were closely united, and France would have injured herself
by allowing the Swedish power in Germany to decline.  The helpless situation
of the Swedes, was rather an additional motive with France
to cement more closely their alliance, and to take a more active part
in the German war.  Since the alliance with Sweden, at Beerwald, in 1632,
France had maintained the war against the Emperor, by the arms
of Gustavus Adolphus, without any open or formal breach,
by furnishing subsidies and increasing the number of his enemies.
But alarmed at the unexpected rapidity and success of the Swedish arms,
France, in anxiety to restore the balance of power, which was disturbed
by the preponderance of the Swedes, seemed, for a time,
to have lost sight of her original designs.  She endeavoured to protect
the Roman Catholic princes of the empire against the Swedish conqueror,
by the treaties of neutrality, and when this plan failed,
she even meditated herself to declare war against him.  But no sooner
had the death of Gustavus Adolphus, and the desperate situation
of the Swedish affairs, dispelled this apprehension, than she returned
with fresh zeal to her first design, and readily afforded in this misfortune
the aid which in the hour of success she had refused.  Freed from the checks
which the ambition and vigilance of Gustavus Adolphus placed upon her plans
of aggrandizement, France availed herself of the favourable opportunity
afforded by the defeat of Nordlingen, to obtain the entire direction of
the war, and to prescribe laws to those who sued for her powerful protection.
The moment seemed to smile upon her boldest plans, and those which
had formerly seemed chimerical, now appeared to be justified by circumstances.
She now turned her whole attention to the war in Germany; and, as soon
as she had secured her own private ends by a treaty with the Germans,
she suddenly entered the political arena as an active and a commanding power.
While the other belligerent states had been exhausting themselves
in a tedious contest, France had been reserving her strength,
and maintained the contest by money alone; but now, when the state of things
called for more active measures, she seized the sword, and astonished Europe
by the boldness and magnitude of her undertakings.  At the same moment,
she fitted out two fleets, and sent six different armies into the field,
while she subsidized a foreign crown and several of the German princes.
Animated by this powerful co-operation, the Swedes and Germans awoke from
the consternation, and hoped, sword in hand, to obtain a more honourable peace
than that of Prague.  Abandoned by their confederates, who had been reconciled
to the Emperor, they formed a still closer alliance with France,
which increased her support with their growing necessities, at the same time
taking a more active, although secret share in the German war, until at last,
she threw off the mask altogether, and in her own name made an unequivocal
declaration of war against the Emperor.

To leave Sweden at full liberty to act against Austria, France commenced
her operations by liberating it from all fear of a Polish war.
By means of the Count d'Avaux, its minister, an agreement was concluded
between the two powers at Stummsdorf in Prussia, by which the truce
was prolonged for twenty-six years, though not without a great sacrifice
on the part of the Swedes, who ceded by a single stroke of the pen
almost the whole of Polish Prussia, the dear-bought conquest
of Gustavus Adolphus.  The treaty of Beerwald was, with certain modifications,
which circumstances rendered necessary, renewed at different times
at Compiegne, and afterwards at Wismar and Hamburg.  France had already come
to a rupture with Spain, in May, 1635, and the vigorous attack which it made
upon that power, deprived the Emperor of his most valuable auxiliaries
from the Netherlands.  By supporting the Landgrave William of Cassel,
and Duke Bernard of Weimar, the Swedes were enabled to act with more vigour
upon the Elbe and the Danube, and a diversion upon the Rhine
compelled the Emperor to divide his force.

The war was now prosecuted with increasing activity.  By the treaty of Prague,
the Emperor had lessened the number of his adversaries within the Empire;
though, at the same time, the zeal and activity of his foreign enemies
had been augmented by it.  In Germany, his influence was almost unlimited,
for, with the exception of a few states, he had rendered himself
absolute master of the German body and its resources,
and was again enabled to act in the character of emperor and sovereign.
The first fruit of his power was the elevation of his son, Ferdinand III.,
to the dignity of King of the Romans, to which he was elected
by a decided majority of votes, notwithstanding the opposition of Treves,
and of the heirs of the Elector Palatine.  But, on the other hand,
he had exasperated the Swedes to desperation, had armed the power of France
against him, and drawn its troops into the heart of the kingdom.
France and Sweden, with their German allies, formed, from this moment,
one firm and compactly united power; the Emperor, with the German states
which adhered to him, were equally firm and united.  The Swedes,
who no longer fought for Germany, but for their own lives,
showed no more indulgence; relieved from the necessity of consulting
their German allies, or accounting to them for the plans which they adopted,
they acted with more precipitation, rapidity, and boldness.
Battles, though less decisive, became more obstinate and bloody;
greater achievements, both in bravery and military skill, were performed;
but they were but insulated efforts; and being neither dictated
by any consistent plan, nor improved by any commanding spirit,
had comparatively little influence upon the course of the war.

Saxony had bound herself, by the treaty of Prague, to expel the Swedes
from Germany.  From this moment, the banners of the Saxons and Imperialists
were united:  the former confederates were converted into implacable enemies.
The archbishopric of Magdeburg which, by the treaty, was ceded to
the prince of Saxony, was still held by the Swedes, and every attempt
to acquire it by negociation had proved ineffectual.  Hostilities commenced,
by the Elector of Saxony recalling all his subjects from the army of Banner,
which was encamped upon the Elbe.  The officers, long irritated
by the accumulation of their arrears, obeyed the summons, and evacuated
one quarter after another.  As the Saxons, at the same time, made a movement
towards Mecklenburg, to take Doemitz, and to drive the Swedes from Pomerania
and the Baltic, Banner suddenly marched thither, relieved Doemitz,
and totally defeated the Saxon General Baudissin, with 7000 men,
of whom 1000 were slain, and about the same number taken prisoners.
Reinforced by the troops and artillery, which had hitherto been employed
in Polish Prussia, but which the treaty of Stummsdorf rendered unnecessary,
this brave and impetuous general made, the following year (1636),
a sudden inroad into the Electorate of Saxony, where he gratified his
inveterate hatred of the Saxons by the most destructive ravages.  Irritated by
the memory of old grievances which, during their common campaigns,
he and the Swedes had suffered from the haughtiness of the Saxons,
and now exasperated to the utmost by the late defection of the Elector,
they wreaked upon the unfortunate inhabitants all their rancour.
Against Austria and Bavaria, the Swedish soldier had fought from a sense,
as it were, of duty; but against the Saxons, they contended
with all the energy of private animosity and personal revenge,
detesting them as deserters and traitors; for the hatred of former friends
is of all the most fierce and irreconcileable.  The powerful diversion
made by the Duke of Weimar, and the Landgrave of Hesse,
upon the Rhine and in Westphalia, prevented the Emperor from affording
the necessary assistance to Saxony, and left the whole Electorate
exposed to the destructive ravages of Banner's army.

At length, the Elector, having formed a junction with
the Imperial General Hatzfeld, advanced against Magdeburg,
which Banner in vain hastened to relieve.  The united army
of the Imperialists and the Saxons now spread itself over Brandenburg,
wrested several places from the Swedes, and almost drove them to the Baltic.
But, contrary to all expectation, Banner, who had been given up as lost,
attacked the allies, on the 24th of September, 1636, at Wittstock,
where a bloody battle took place.  The onset was terrific;
and the whole force of the enemy was directed against the right wing
of the Swedes, which was led by Banner in person.  The contest
was long maintained with equal animosity and obstinacy on both sides.
There was not a squadron among the Swedes, which did not return ten times
to the charge, to be as often repulsed; when at last, Banner was obliged
to retire before the superior numbers of the enemy.  His left wing
sustained the combat until night, and the second line of the Swedes,
which had not as yet been engaged, was prepared to renew it the next morning.
But the Elector did not wait for a second attack.  His army was exhausted
by the efforts of the preceding day; and, as the drivers had fled
with the horses, his artillery was unserviceable.  He accordingly retreated
in the night, with Count Hatzfeld, and relinquished the ground to the Swedes.
About 5000 of the allies fell upon the field, exclusive of those
who were killed in the pursuit, or who fell into the hands
of the exasperated peasantry.  One hundred and fifty standards and colours,
twenty-three pieces of cannon, the whole baggage and silver plate
of the Elector, were captured, and more than 2000 men taken prisoners.
This brilliant victory, achieved over an enemy far superior in numbers,
and in a very advantageous position, restored the Swedes at once
to their former reputation; their enemies were discouraged,
and their friends inspired with new hopes.  Banner instantly followed up
this decisive success, and hastily crossing the Elbe, drove the Imperialists
before him, through Thuringia and Hesse, into Westphalia.  He then returned,
and took up his winter quarters in Saxony.

But, without the material aid furnished by the diversion upon the Rhine,
and the activity there of Duke Bernard and the French,
these important successes would have been unattainable.  Duke Bernard,
after the defeat of Nordlingen, reorganized his broken army at Wetterau;
but, abandoned by the confederates of the League of Heilbronn,
which had been dissolved by the peace of Prague, and receiving little support
from the Swedes, he found himself unable to maintain an army, or to perform
any enterprise of importance.  The defeat at Nordlingen had terminated
all his hopes on the Duchy of Franconia, while the weakness of the Swedes,
destroyed the chance of retrieving his fortunes through their assistance.
Tired, too, of the constraint imposed upon him by the imperious chancellor,
he turned his attention to France, who could easily supply him with money,
the only aid which he required, and France readily acceded to his proposals.
Richelieu desired nothing so much as to diminish the influence of the Swedes
in the German war, and to obtain the direction of it for himself.  To secure
this end, nothing appeared more effectual than to detach from the Swedes
their bravest general, to win him to the interests of France,
and to secure for the execution of its projects the services of his arm.
From a prince like Bernard, who could not maintain himself
without foreign support, France had nothing to fear, since no success,
however brilliant, could render him independent of that crown.
Bernard himself came into France, and in October, 1635, concluded a treaty
at St. Germaine en Laye, not as a Swedish general, but in his own name,
by which it was stipulated that he should receive for himself
a yearly pension of one million five hundred thousand livres,
and four millions for the support of his army, which he was to command
under the orders of the French king.  To inflame his zeal, and to accelerate
the conquest of Alsace, France did not hesitate, by a secret article,
to promise him that province for his services; a promise which Richelieu
had little intention of performing, and which the duke also estimated
at its real worth.  But Bernard confided in his good fortune, and in his arms,
and met artifice with dissimulation.  If he could once succeed
in wresting Alsace from the enemy, he did not despair of being able,
in case of need, to maintain it also against a friend.  He now raised an army
at the expense of France, which he commanded nominally under the orders
of that power, but in reality without any limitation whatever,
and without having wholly abandoned his engagements with Sweden.
He began his operations upon the Rhine, where another French army,
under Cardinal Lavalette, had already, in 1635, commenced hostilities
against the Emperor.

Against this force, the main body of the Imperialists, after the great victory
of Nordlingen, and the reduction of Swabia and Franconia had advanced
under the command of Gallas, had driven them as far as Metz,
cleared the Rhine, and took from the Swedes the towns of Metz and Frankenthal,
of which they were in possession.  But frustrated by the vigorous resistance
of the French, in his main object, of taking up his winter quarters in France,
he led back his exhausted troops into Alsace and Swabia.
At the opening of the next campaign, he passed the Rhine at Breysach,
and prepared to carry the war into the interior of France.
He actually entered Burgundy, while the Spaniards from the Netherlands
made progress in Picardy; and John De Werth, a formidable general
of the League, and a celebrated partisan, pushed his march into Champagne,
and spread consternation even to the gates of Paris.
But an insignificant fortress in Franche Comte completely checked
the Imperialists, and they were obliged, a second time,
to abandon their enterprise.

The activity of Duke Bernard had hitherto been impeded
by his dependence on a French general, more suited to the priestly robe,
than to the baton of command; and although, in conjunction with him,
he conquered Alsace Saverne, he found himself unable, in the years
1636 and 1637, to maintain his position upon the Rhine.  The ill success
of the French arms in the Netherlands had cheated the activity of operations
in Alsace and Breisgau; but in 1638, the war in that quarter
took a more brilliant turn.  Relieved from his former restraint,
and with unlimited command of his troops, Duke Bernard,
in the beginning of February, left his winter quarters
in the bishopric of Basle, and unexpectedly appeared upon the Rhine,
where, at this rude season of the year, an attack was little anticipated.
The forest towns of Laufenburg, Waldshut, and Seckingen, were surprised,
and Rhinefeldt besieged.  The Duke of Savelli, the Imperial general
who commanded in that quarter, hastened by forced marches
to the relief of this important place, succeeded in raising the siege,
and compelled the Duke of Weimar, with great loss to retire.
But, contrary to all human expectation, he appeared on the third day after,
(21st February, 1638,) before the Imperialists, in order of battle,
and defeated them in a bloody engagement, in which the four Imperial generals,
Savelli, John De Werth, Enkeford, and Sperreuter, with 2000 men,
were taken prisoners.  Two of these, De Werth and Enkeford,
were afterwards sent by Richelieu's orders into France,
in order to flatter the vanity of the French by the sight
of such distinguished prisoners, and by the pomp of military trophies,
to withdraw the attention of the populace from the public distress.
The captured standards and colours were, with the same view,
carried in solemn procession to the church of Notre Dame,
thrice exhibited before the altar, and committed to sacred custody.

The taking of Rhinefeldt, Roeteln, and Fribourg, was the immediate consequence
of the duke's victory.  His army now increased by considerable recruits,
and his projects expanded in proportion as fortune favoured him.
The fortress of Breysach upon the Rhine was looked upon as holding the command
of that river, and as the key of Alsace.  No place in this quarter was
of more importance to the Emperor, and upon none had more care been bestowed.
To protect Breysach, was the principal destination of the Italian army,
under the Duke of Feria; the strength of its works, and its natural defences,
bade defiance to assault, while the Imperial generals who commanded
in that quarter had orders to retain it at any cost.  But the duke,
trusting to his good fortune, resolved to attempt the siege.
Its strength rendered it impregnable; it could, therefore,
only be starved into a surrender; and this was facilitated by the carelessness
of the commandant, who, expecting no attack, had been selling off his stores.
As under these circumstances the town could not long hold out,
it must be immediately relieved or victualled.  Accordingly,
the Imperial General Goetz rapidly advanced at the head of 12,000 men,
accompanied by 3000 waggons loaded with provisions, which he intended
to throw into the place.  But he was attacked with such vigour by Duke Bernard
at Witteweyer, that he lost his whole force, except 3000 men,
together with the entire transport.  A similar fate at Ochsenfeld, near Thann,
overtook the Duke of Lorraine, who, with 5000 or 6000 men,
advanced to relieve the fortress.  After a third attempt of general Goetz
for the relief of Breysach had proved ineffectual, the fortress,
reduced to the greatest extremity by famine, surrendered,
after a blockade of four months, on the 17th December 1638,
to its equally persevering and humane conqueror.

The capture of Breysach opened a boundless field to the ambition
of the Duke of Weimar, and the romance of his hopes was fast approaching
to reality.  Far from intending to surrender his conquests to France,
he destined Breysach for himself, and revealed this intention,
by exacting allegiance from the vanquished, in his own name,
and not in that of any other power.  Intoxicated by his past success,
and excited by the boldest hopes, he believed that he should be able
to maintain his conquests, even against France herself.
At a time when everything depended upon bravery, when even personal strength
was of importance, when troops and generals were of more value
than territories, it was natural for a hero like Bernard to place confidence
in his own powers, and, at the head of an excellent army,
who under his command had proved invincible, to believe himself capable
of accomplishing the boldest and largest designs.  In order to secure himself
one friend among the crowd of enemies whom he was about to provoke,
he turned his eyes upon the Landgravine Amelia of Hesse,
the widow of the lately deceased Landgrave William, a princess whose talents
were equal to her courage, and who, along with her hand, would bestow
valuable conquests, an extensive principality, and a well disciplined army.
By the union of the conquests of Hesse, with his own upon the Rhine,
and the junction of their forces, a power of some importance,
and perhaps a third party, might be formed in Germany,
which might decide the fate of the war.  But a premature death
put a period to these extensive schemes.

"Courage, Father Joseph, Breysach is ours!" whispered Richelieu
in the ear of the Capuchin, who had long held himself in readiness
to be despatched into that quarter; so delighted was he
with this joyful intelligence.  Already in imagination he held Alsace,
Breisgau, and all the frontiers of Austria in that quarter,
without regard to his promise to Duke Bernard.  But the firm determination
which the latter had unequivocally shown, to keep Breysach for himself,
greatly embarrassed the cardinal, and no efforts were spared
to retain the victorious Bernard in the interests of France.
He was invited to court, to witness the honours by which his triumph
was to be commemorated; but he perceived and shunned the seductive snare.
The cardinal even went so far as to offer him the hand of his niece
in marriage; but the proud German prince declined the offer,
and refused to sully the blood of Saxony by a misalliance.
He was now considered as a dangerous enemy, and treated as such.
His subsidies were withdrawn; and the Governor of Breysach
and his principal officers were bribed, at least upon the event
of the duke's death, to take possession of his conquests,
and to secure his troops.  These intrigues were no secret to the duke,
and the precautions he took in the conquered places, clearly bespoke
the distrust of France.  But this misunderstanding with the French court
had the most prejudicial influence upon his future operations.
The preparations he was obliged to make, in order to secure his conquests
against an attack on the side of France, compelled him to divide
his military strength, while the stoppage of his subsidies delayed
his appearance in the field.  It had been his intention to cross the Rhine,
to support the Swedes, and to act against the Emperor and Bavaria
on the banks of the Danube.  He had already communicated
his plan of operations to Banner, who was about to carry the war
into the Austrian territories, and had promised to relieve him so,
when a sudden death cut short his heroic career, in the 36th year of his age,
at Neuburgh upon the Rhine (in July, 1639).

He died of a pestilential disorder, which, in the course of two days,
had carried off nearly 400 men in his camp.  The black spots which appeared
upon his body, his own dying expressions, and the advantages which France
was likely to reap from his sudden decease, gave rise to a suspicion
that he had been removed by poison -- a suspicion sufficiently refuted
by the symptoms of his disorder.  In him, the allies lost
their greatest general after Gustavus Adolphus, France a formidable competitor
for Alsace, and the Emperor his most dangerous enemy.  Trained to
the duties of a soldier and a general in the school of Gustavus Adolphus,
he successfully imitated his eminent model, and wanted only a longer life
to equal, if not to surpass it.  With the bravery of the soldier,
he united the calm and cool penetration of the general
and the persevering fortitude of the man, with the daring resolution of youth;
with the wild ardour of the warrior, the sober dignity of the prince,
the moderation of the sage, and the conscientiousness of the man of honour.
Discouraged by no misfortune, he quickly rose again in full vigour
from the severest defeats; no obstacles could check his enterprise,
no disappointments conquer his indomitable perseverance.  His genius, perhaps,
soared after unattainable objects; but the prudence of such men,
is to be measured by a different standard from that of ordinary people.
Capable of accomplishing more, he might venture to form more daring plans.
Bernard affords, in modern history, a splendid example of those
days of chivalry, when personal greatness had its full weight and influence,
when individual bravery could conquer provinces, and the heroic exploits
of a German knight raised him even to the Imperial throne.

The best part of the duke's possessions were his army, which,
together with Alsace, he bequeathed to his brother William.  But to this army,
both France and Sweden thought that they had well-grounded claims; the latter,
because it had been raised in name of that crown, and had done homage to it;
the former, because it had been supported by its subsidies.
The Electoral Prince of the Palatinate also negociated for its services,
and attempted, first by his agents, and latterly in his own person,
to win it over to his interests, with the view of employing it
in the reconquest of his territories.  Even the Emperor endeavoured
to secure it, a circumstance the less surprising, when we reflect
that at this time the justice of the cause was comparatively unimportant,
and the extent of the recompense the main object to which the soldier looked;
and when bravery, like every other commodity, was disposed of
to the highest bidder.  But France, richer and more determined,
outbade all competitors:  it bought over General Erlach,
the commander of Breysach, and the other officers, who soon placed
that fortress, with the whole army, in their hands.

The young Palatine, Prince Charles Louis, who had already made
an unsuccessful campaign against the Emperor, saw his hopes again deceived.
Although intending to do France so ill a service, as to compete with her
for Bernard's army, he had the imprudence to travel through that kingdom.
The cardinal, who dreaded the justice of the Palatine's cause,
was glad to seize any opportunity to frustrate his views.  He accordingly
caused him to be seized at Moulin, in violation of the law of nations,
and did not set him at liberty, until he learned that the army
of the Duke of Weimar had been secured.  France was now in possession
of a numerous and well disciplined army in Germany, and from this moment
began to make open war upon the Emperor.

But it was no longer against Ferdinand II. that its hostilities
were to be conducted; for that prince had died in February, 1637,
in the 59th year of his age.  The war which his ambition had kindled,
however, survived him.  During a reign of eighteen years
he had never once laid aside the sword, nor tasted the blessings of peace
as long as his hand swayed the imperial sceptre.  Endowed with the qualities
of a good sovereign, adorned with many of those virtues which ensure
the happiness of a people, and by nature gentle and humane,
we see him, from erroneous ideas of the monarch's duty,
become at once the instrument and the victim of the evil passions of others;
his benevolent intentions frustrated, and the friend of justice
converted into the oppressor of mankind, the enemy of peace,
and the scourge of his people.  Amiable in domestic life,
and respectable as a sovereign, but in his policy ill advised,
while he gained the love of his Roman Catholic subjects, he incurred
the execration of the Protestants.  History exhibits many and greater despots
than Ferdinand II., yet he alone has had the unfortunate celebrity of kindling
a thirty years' war; but to produce its lamentable consequences,
his ambition must have been seconded by a kindred spirit of the age,
a congenial state of previous circumstances, and existing seeds of discord.
At a less turbulent period, the spark would have found no fuel; and the
peacefulness of the age would have choked the voice of individual ambition;
but now the flash fell upon a pile of accumulated combustibles,
and Europe was in flames.

His son, Ferdinand III., who, a few months before his father's death,
had been raised to the dignity of King of the Romans, inherited his throne,
his principles, and the war which he had caused.  But Ferdinand III.
had been a closer witness of the sufferings of the people,
and the devastation of the country, and felt more keenly and ardently
the necessity of peace.  Less influenced by the Jesuits and the Spaniards,
and more moderate towards the religious views of others,
he was more likely than his father to listen to the voice of reason.
He did so, and ultimately restored to Europe the blessing of peace,
but not till after a contest of eleven years waged with sword and pen;
not till after he had experienced the impossibility of resistance,
and necessity had laid upon him its stern laws.

Fortune favoured him at the commencement of his reign, and his arms
were victorious against the Swedes.  The latter, under the command
of the victorious Banner, had, after their success at Wittstock,
taken up their winter quarters in Saxony; and the campaign of 1637 opened
with the siege of Leipzig.  The vigorous resistance of the garrison,
and the approach of the Electoral and Imperial armies, saved the town,
and Banner, to prevent his communication with the Elbe being cut off,
was compelled to retreat into Torgau.  But the superior number
of the Imperialists drove him even from that quarter;
and, surrounded by the enemy, hemmed in by rivers, and suffering from famine,
he had no course open to him but to attempt a highly dangerous retreat
into Pomerania, of which, the boldness and successful issue
border upon romance.  The whole army crossed the Oder,
at a ford near Furstenberg; and the soldiers, wading up to the neck in water,
dragged the artillery across, when the horses refused to draw.
Banner had expected to be joined by General Wrangel,
on the farther side of the Oder in Pomerania; and, in conjunction with him,
to be able to make head against the enemy.  But Wrangel did not appear;
and in his stead, he found an Imperial army posted at Landsberg, with a view
to cut off the retreat of the Swedes.  Banner now saw that he had fallen into
a dangerous snare, from which escape appeared impossible.  In his rear
lay an exhausted country, the Imperialists, and the Oder on his left;
the Oder, too, guarded by the Imperial General Bucheim, offered no retreat;
in front, Landsberg, Custrin, the Warta, and a hostile army;
and on the right, Poland, in which, notwithstanding the truce,
little confidence could be placed.  In these circumstances,
his position seemed hopeless, and the Imperialists were already triumphing
in the certainty of his fall.  Banner, with just indignation,
accused the French as the authors of this misfortune.
They had neglected to make, according to their promise,
a diversion upon the Rhine; and, by their inaction, allowed the Emperor
to combine his whole force upon the Swedes.  "When the day comes,"
cried the incensed General to the French Commissioner, who followed the camp,
"that the Swedes and Germans join their arms against France,
we shall cross the Rhine with less ceremony."  But reproaches
were now useless; what the emergency demanded was energy and resolution.
In the hope of drawing the enemy by stratagem from the Oder, Banner pretended
to march towards Poland, and despatched the greater part of his baggage
in this direction, with his own wife, and those of the other officers.
The Imperialists immediately broke up their camp, and hurried towards
the Polish frontier to block up the route; Bucheim left his station,
and the Oder was stripped of its defenders.  On a sudden,
and under cloud of night, Banner turned towards that river, and crossed it
about a mile above Custrin, with his troops, baggage, and artillery,
without bridges or vessels, as he had done before at Furstenberg.
He reached Pomerania without loss, and prepared to share with Wrangel
the defence of that province.