Johann Shiller

The History of the Thirty Years' War
Gustavus Adolphus had learned the fall of Magdeburg with deep regret;
and the demand now made by the Elector, George William,
in terms of their agreement, for the restoration of Spandau,
greatly increased this feeling.  The loss of Magdeburg had rather augmented
than lessened the reasons which made the possession of this fortress
so desirable; and the nearer became the necessity of a decisive battle
between himself and Tilly, the more unwilling he felt to abandon
the only place which, in the event of a defeat, could ensure him a refuge.
After a vain endeavour, by entreaties and representations,
to bring over the Elector to his views, whose coldness and lukewarmness
daily increased, he gave orders to his general to evacuate Spandau,
but at the same time declared to the Elector that he would henceforth
regard him as an enemy.

To give weight to this declaration, he appeared with his whole force
before Berlin.  "I will not be worse treated than the imperial generals,"
was his reply to the ambassadors whom the bewildered Elector
despatched to his camp.  "Your master has received them into his territories,
furnished them with all necessary supplies, ceded to them every place
which they required, and yet, by all these concessions, he could not
prevail upon them to treat his subjects with common humanity.
All that I require of him is security, a moderate sum of money,
and provisions for my troops; in return, I promise to protect his country,
and to keep the war at a distance from him.  On these points, however,
I must insist; and my brother, the Elector, must instantly determine
to have me as a friend, or to see his capital plundered."  This decisive tone
produced a due impression; and the cannon pointed against the town put an end
to the doubts of George William.  In a few days, a treaty was signed,
by which the Elector engaged to furnish a monthly subsidy of 30,000 dollars,
to leave Spandau in the king's hands, and to open Custrin at all times
to the Swedish troops.  This now open alliance of the Elector of Brandenburg
with the Swedes, excited no less displeasure at Vienna,
than did formerly the similar procedure of the Duke of Pomerania;
but the changed fortune which now attended his arms,
obliged the Emperor to confine his resentment to words.

The king's satisfaction, on this favourable event, was increased by
the agreeable intelligence that Griefswald, the only fortress
which the Imperialists still held in Pomerania, had surrendered,
and that the whole country was now free of the enemy.
He appeared once more in this duchy, and was gratified at the sight
of the general joy which he had caused to the people.  A year had elapsed
since Gustavus first entered Germany, and this event was now celebrated
by all Pomerania as a national festival.  Shortly before, the Czar of Moscow
had sent ambassadors to congratulate him, to renew his alliance,
and even to offer him troops.  He had great reason to rejoice at
the friendly disposition of Russia, as it was indispensable to his interests
that Sweden itself should remain undisturbed by any dangerous neighbour
during the war in which he himself was engaged.  Soon after, his queen,
Maria Eleonora, landed in Pomerania, with a reinforcement of 8000 Swedes;
and the arrival of 6000 English, under the Marquis of Hamilton,
requires more particular notice because this is all that history mentions
of the English during the Thirty Years' War.

During Tilly's expedition into Thuringia, Pappenheim commanded in Magdeburg;
but was unable to prevent the Swedes from crossing the Elbe at various points,
routing some imperial detachments, and seizing several posts.  He himself,
alarmed at the approach of the King of Sweden, anxiously recalled Tilly,
and prevailed upon him to return by rapid marches to Magdeburg.
Tilly encamped on this side of the river at Wolmerstadt;
Gustavus on the same side, near Werben, not far from the confluence
of the Havel and the Elbe.  His very arrival portended no good to Tilly.
The Swedes routed three of his regiments, which were posted in villages
at some distance from the main body, carried off half their baggage,
and burned the remainder.  Tilly in vain advanced within cannon shot
of the king's camp, and offered him battle.  Gustavus, weaker by one-half
than his adversary, prudently declined it; and his position was too strong
for an attack.  Nothing more ensued but a distant cannonade,
and a few skirmishes, in which the Swedes had invariably the advantage.
In his retreat to Wolmerstadt, Tilly's army was weakened
by numerous desertions.  Fortune seemed to have forsaken him
since the carnage of Magdeburg.

The King of Sweden, on the contrary, was followed by uninterrupted success.
While he himself was encamped in Werben, the whole of Mecklenburg,
with the exception of a few towns, was conquered by his General Tott
and the Duke Adolphus Frederick; and he enjoyed the satisfaction of
reinstating both dukes in their dominions.  He proceeded in person to Gustrow,
where the reinstatement was solemnly to take place, to give additional dignity
to the ceremony by his presence.  The two dukes, with their deliverer
between them, and attended by a splendid train of princes,
made a public entry into the city, which the joy of their subjects
converted into an affecting solemnity.  Soon after his return to Werben,
the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel appeared in his camp, to conclude
an offensive and defensive alliance; the first sovereign prince in Germany,
who voluntarily and openly declared against the Emperor, though not
wholly uninfluenced by strong motives.  The Landgrave bound himself to act
against the king's enemies as his own, to open to him his towns and territory,
and to furnish his army with provisions and necessaries.  The king,
on the other hand, declared himself his ally and protector;
and engaged to conclude no peace with the Emperor without first obtaining
for the Landgrave a full redress of grievances.  Both parties honourably
performed their agreement.  Hesse Cassel adhered to the Swedish alliance
during the whole of this tedious war; and at the peace of Westphalia
had no reason to regret the friendship of Sweden.

Tilly, from whom this bold step on the part of the Landgrave was not
long concealed, despatched Count Fugger with several regiments against him;
and at the same time endeavoured to excite his subjects to rebellion
by inflammatory letters.  But these made as little impression as his troops,
which subsequently failed him so decidedly at the battle of Breitenfield.
The Estates of Hesse could not for a moment hesitate between their oppressor
and their protector.

But the imperial general was far more disturbed by the equivocal conduct
of the Elector of Saxony, who, in defiance of the imperial prohibition,
continued his preparations, and adhered to the confederation of Leipzig.
At this conjuncture, when the proximity of the King of Sweden
made a decisive battle ere long inevitable, it appeared extremely dangerous
to leave Saxony in arms, and ready in a moment to declare for the enemy.
Tilly had just received a reinforcement of 25,000 veteran troops
under Furstenberg, and, confident in his strength, he hoped either to disarm
the Elector by the mere terror of his arrival, or at least to conquer him
with little difficulty.  Before quitting his camp at Wolmerstadt,
he commanded the Elector, by a special messenger, to open his territories
to the imperial troops; either to disband his own, or to join them
to the imperial army; and to assist, in conjunction with himself,
in driving the King of Sweden out of Germany.  While he reminded him that,
of all the German states, Saxony had hitherto been most respected,
he threatened it, in case of refusal, with the most destructive ravages.

But Tilly had chosen an unfavourable moment for so imperious a requisition.
The ill-treatment of his religious and political confederates,
the destruction of Magdeburg, the excesses of the Imperialists in Lusatia,
all combined to incense the Elector against the Emperor.  The approach, too,
of Gustavus Adolphus, (however slender his claims were to the protection
of that prince,) tended to fortify his resolution.  He accordingly
forbade the quartering of the imperial soldiers in his territories,
and announced his firm determination to persist in his warlike preparations.
However surprised he should be, he added, "to see an imperial army
on its march against his territories, when that army had enough to do in
watching the operations of the King of Sweden, nevertheless he did not expect,
instead of the promised and well merited rewards, to be repaid
with ingratitude and the ruin of his country."  To Tilly's deputies,
who were entertained in a princely style, he gave a still plainer answer
on the occasion.  "Gentlemen," said he, "I perceive that
the Saxon confectionery, which has been so long kept back,
is at length to be set upon the table.  But as it is usual to mix with it
nuts and garnish of all kinds, take care of your teeth."

Tilly instantly broke up his camp, and, with the most frightful devastation,
advanced upon Halle; from this place he renewed his demands on the Elector,
in a tone still more urgent and threatening.  The previous policy
of this prince, both from his own inclination, and the persuasions
of his corrupt ministers had been to promote the interests of the Emperor,
even at the expense of his own sacred obligations, and but very little tact
had hitherto kept him inactive.  All this but renders more astonishing
the infatuation of the Emperor or his ministers in abandoning,
at so critical a moment, the policy they had hitherto adopted,
and by extreme measures, incensing a prince so easily led.  Was this
the very object which Tilly had in view?  Was it his purpose to convert
an equivocal friend into an open enemy, and thus to relieve himself
from the necessity of that indulgence in the treatment of this prince,
which the secret instructions of the Emperor had hitherto imposed upon him?
Or was it the Emperor's wish, by driving the Elector to open hostilities,
to get quit of his obligations to him, and so cleverly to break off at once
the difficulty of a reckoning?  In either case, we must be equally surprised
at the daring presumption of Tilly, who hesitated not, in presence of
one formidable enemy, to provoke another; and at his negligence in permitting,
without opposition, the union of the two.

The Saxon Elector, rendered desperate by the entrance of Tilly
into his territories, threw himself, though not without a violent struggle,
under the protection of Sweden.

Immediately after dismissing Tilly's first embassy, he had despatched
his field-marshal Arnheim in all haste to the camp of Gustavus, to solicit
the prompt assistance of that monarch whom he had so long neglected.  The king
concealed the inward satisfaction he felt at this long wished for result.
"I am sorry for the Elector," said he, with dissembled coldness,
to the ambassador; "had he heeded my repeated remonstrances,
his country would never have seen the face of an enemy, and Magdeburg
would not have fallen.  Now, when necessity leaves him no alternative,
he has recourse to my assistance.  But tell him, that I cannot,
for the sake of the Elector of Saxony, ruin my own cause,
and that of my confederates.  What pledge have I for the sincerity of a prince
whose minister is in the pay of Austria, and who will abandon me
as soon as the Emperor flatters him, and withdraws his troops
from his frontiers?  Tilly, it is true, has received a strong reinforcement;
but this shall not prevent me from meeting him with confidence,
as soon as I have covered my rear."

The Saxon minister could make no other reply to these reproaches,
than that it was best to bury the past in oblivion.

He pressed the king to name the conditions, on which he would
afford assistance to Saxony, and offered to guarantee their acceptance.
"I require," said Gustavus, "that the Elector shall cede to me
the fortress of Wittenberg, deliver to me his eldest sons as hostages,
furnish my troops with three months' pay, and deliver up to me
the traitors among his ministry."

"Not Wittenberg alone," said the Elector, when he received this answer,
and hurried back his minister to the Swedish camp, "not Wittenberg alone,
but Torgau, and all Saxony, shall be open to him; my whole family
shall be his hostages, and if that is insufficient, I will place myself
in his hands.  Return and inform him I am ready to deliver to him
any traitors he shall name, to furnish his army with the money he requires,
and to venture my life and fortune in the good cause.

The king had only desired to test the sincerity of the Elector's
new sentiments.  Convinced of it, he now retracted these harsh demands.
"The distrust," said he, "which was shown to myself when advancing
to the relief of Magdeburg, had naturally excited mine;
the Elector's present confidence demands a return.  I am satisfied,
provided he grants my army one month's pay, and even for this advance
I hope to indemnify him."

Immediately upon the conclusion of the treaty, the king crossed the Elbe,
and next day joined the Saxons.  Instead of preventing this junction,
Tilly had advanced against Leipzig, which he summoned to receive
an imperial garrison.  In hopes of speedy relief, Hans Von der Pforta,
the commandant, made preparations for his defence, and laid the suburb
towards Halle in ashes.  But the ill condition of the fortifications
made resistance vain, and on the second day the gates were opened.
Tilly had fixed his head quarters in the house of a grave-digger,
the only one still standing in the suburb of Halle:  here he signed
the capitulation, and here, too, he arranged his attack on the King of Sweden.
Tilly grew pale at the representation of the death's head and cross bones,
with which the proprietor had decorated his house; and, contrary to
all expectation, Leipzig experienced moderate treatment.

Meanwhile, a council of war was held at Torgau, between the King of Sweden
and the Elector of Saxony, at which the Elector of Brandenburg
was also present.  The resolution which should now be adopted,
was to decide irrevocably the fate of Germany and the Protestant religion,
the happiness of nations and the destiny of their princes.
The anxiety of suspense which, before every decisive resolve,
oppresses even the hearts of heroes, appeared now for a moment to overshadow
the great mind of Gustavus Adolphus.  "If we decide upon battle," said he,
"the stake will be nothing less than a crown and two electorates.
Fortune is changeable, and the inscrutable decrees of Heaven may,
for our sins, give the victory to our enemies.  My kingdom, it is true,
even after the loss of my life and my army, would still have a hope left.
Far removed from the scene of action, defended by a powerful fleet,
a well-guarded frontier, and a warlike population, it would at least be safe
from the worst consequences of a defeat.  But what chances of escape
are there for you, with an enemy so close at hand?"  Gustavus Adolphus
displayed the modest diffidence of a hero, whom an overweening belief
of his own strength did not blind to the greatness of his danger;
John George, the confidence of a weak man, who knows that he has a hero
by his side.  Impatient to rid his territories as soon as possible
of the oppressive presence of two armies, he burned for a battle,
in which he had no former laurels to lose.  He was ready
to march with his Saxons alone against Leipzig, and attack Tilly.
At last Gustavus acceded to his opinion; and it was resolved that the attack
should be made without delay, before the arrival of the reinforcements,
which were on their way, under Altringer and Tiefenbach.
The united Swedish and Saxon armies now crossed the Mulda,
while the Elector returned homeward.

Early on the morning of the 7th September, 1631, the hostile armies
came in sight of each other.  Tilly, who, since he had neglected
the opportunity of overpowering the Saxons before their union with the Swedes,
was disposed to await the arrival of the reinforcements, had taken up
a strong and advantageous position not far from Leipzig, where he expected
he should be able to avoid the battle.  But the impetuosity of Pappenheim
obliged him, as soon as the enemy were in motion, to alter his plans,
and to move to the left, in the direction of the hills which run
from the village of Wahren towards Lindenthal.  At the foot of these heights,
his army was drawn up in a single line, and his artillery placed
upon the heights behind, from which it could sweep the whole extensive plain
of Breitenfeld.  The Swedish and Saxon army advanced in two columns,
having to pass the Lober near Podelwitz, in Tilly's front.

To defend the passage of this rivulet, Pappenheim advanced at the head
of 2000 cuirassiers, though after great reluctance on the part of Tilly,
and with express orders not to commence a battle.  But, in disobedience
to this command, Pappenheim attacked the vanguard of the Swedes,
and after a brief struggle was driven to retreat.  To check the progress
of the enemy, he set fire to Podelwitz, which, however, did not prevent
the two columns from advancing and forming in order of battle.

On the right, the Swedes drew up in a double line, the infantry in the centre,
divided into such small battalions as could be easily and rapidly manoeuvred
without breaking their order; the cavalry upon their wings, divided in
the same manner into small squadrons, interspersed with bodies of musqueteers,
so as both to give an appearance of greater numerical force,
and to annoy the enemy's horse.  Colonel Teufel commanded the centre,
Gustavus Horn the left, while the right was led by the king in person,
opposed to Count Pappenheim.

On the left, the Saxons formed at a considerable distance from the Swedes, --
by the advice of Gustavus, which was justified by the event.
The order of battle had been arranged between the Elector
and his field-marshal, and the king was content with merely signifying
his approval.  He was anxious apparently to separate the Swedish prowess
from that of the Saxons, and fortune did not confound them.

The enemy was drawn up under the heights towards the west,
in one immense line, long enough to outflank the Swedish army, --
the infantry being divided in large battalions, the cavalry
in equally unwieldy squadrons.  The artillery being on the heights behind,
the range of its fire was over the heads of his men.  From this position
of his artillery, it was evident that Tilly's purpose was to await
rather than to attack the enemy; since this arrangement rendered it impossible
for him to do so without exposing his men to the fire of his own cannons.
Tilly himself commanded the centre, Count Furstenberg the right wing,
and Pappenheim the left.  The united troops of the Emperor and the League
on this day did not amount to 34,000 or 35,000 men; the Swedes and Saxons
were about the same number.  But had a million been confronted with a million
it could only have rendered the action more bloody, certainly not
more important and decisive.  For this day Gustavus had crossed the Baltic,
to court danger in a distant country, and expose his crown and life
to the caprice of fortune.  The two greatest generals of the time,
both hitherto invincible, were now to be matched against each other
in a contest which both had long avoided; and on this field of battle
the hitherto untarnished laurels of one leader must droop for ever.
The two parties in Germany had beheld the approach of this day with
fear and trembling; and the whole age awaited with deep anxiety its issue,
and posterity was either to bless or deplore it for ever.

Tilly's usual intrepidity and resolution seemed to forsake him
on this eventful day.  He had formed no regular plan for giving battle
to the King, and he displayed as little firmness in avoiding it.
Contrary to his own judgment, Pappenheim had forced him to action.
Doubts which he had never before felt, struggled in his bosom;
gloomy forebodings clouded his ever-open brow; the shade of Magdeburg
seemed to hover over him.

A cannonade of two hours commenced the battle; the wind,
which was from the west, blew thick clouds of smoke
and dust from the newly-ploughed and parched fields
into the faces of the Swedes.  This compelled the king
insensibly to wheel northwards, and the rapidity with which
this movement was executed left no time to the enemy to prevent it.

Tilly at last left his heights, and began the first attack upon the Swedes;
but to avoid their hot fire, he filed off towards the right,
and fell upon the Saxons with such impetuosity that their line was broken,
and the whole army thrown into confusion.  The Elector himself
retired to Eilenburg, though a few regiments still maintained their ground
upon the field, and by a bold stand saved the honour of Saxony.
Scarcely had the confusion began ere the Croats commenced plundering,
and messengers were despatched to Munich and Vienna
with the news of the victory.

Pappenheim had thrown himself with the whole force of his cavalry
upon the right wing of the Swedes, but without being able to make it waver.
The king commanded here in person, and under him General Banner.
Seven times did Pappenheim renew the attack, and seven times was he repulsed.
He fled at last with great loss, and abandoned the field to his conqueror.

In the mean time, Tilly, having routed the remainder of the Saxons,
attacked with his victorious troops the left wing of the Swedes.
To this wing the king, as soon as he perceived that the Saxons
were thrown into disorder, had, with a ready foresight,
detached a reinforcement of three regiments to cover its flank,
which the flight of the Saxons had left exposed.  Gustavus Horn,
who commanded here, showed the enemy's cuirassiers a spirited resistance,
which the infantry, interspersed among the squadrons of horse,
materially assisted.  The enemy were already beginning to relax the vigour
of their attack, when Gustavus Adolphus appeared to terminate the contest.
The left wing of the Imperialists had been routed; and the king's division,
having no longer any enemy to oppose, could now turn their arms
wherever it would be to the most advantage.  Wheeling, therefore,
with his right wing and main body to the left, he attacked the heights
on which the enemy's artillery was planted.  Gaining possession of them
in a short time, he turned upon the enemy the full fire of their own cannon.

The play of artillery upon their flank, and the terrible onslaught
of the Swedes in front, threw this hitherto invincible army into confusion.
A sudden retreat was the only course left to Tilly, but even this was
to be made through the midst of the enemy.  The whole army was in disorder,
with the exception of four regiments of veteran soldiers,
who never as yet had fled from the field, and were resolved not to do so now.
Closing their ranks, they broke through the thickest of the victorious army,
and gained a small thicket, where they opposed a new front to the Swedes,
and maintained their resistance till night, when their number was reduced
to six hundred men.  With them fled the wreck of Tilly's army,
and the battle was decided.

Amid the dead and the wounded, Gustavus Adolphus threw himself on his knees;
and the first joy of his victory gushed forth in fervent prayer.  He ordered
his cavalry to pursue the enemy as long as the darkness of the night
would permit.  The pealing of the alarm-bells set the inhabitants
of all the neighbouring villages in motion, and utterly lost
was the unhappy fugitive who fell into their hands.  The king encamped
with the rest of his army between the field of battle and Leipzig,
as it was impossible to attack the town the same night.
Seven thousand of the enemy were killed in the field, and more than 5,000
either wounded or taken prisoners.  Their whole artillery and camp fell
into the hands of the Swedes, and more than a hundred standards and colours
were taken.  Of the Saxons about 2,000 had fallen, while the loss
of the Swedes did not exceed 700.  The rout of the Imperialists
was so complete, that Tilly, on his retreat to Halle and Halberstadt,
could not rally above 600 men, or Pappenheim more than 1,400 --
so rapidly was this formidable army dispersed, which so lately
was the terror of Italy and Germany.

Tilly himself owed his escape merely to chance.  Exhausted by his wounds,
he still refused to surrender to a Swedish captain of horse, who summoned him
to yield; but who, when he was on the point of putting him to death,
was himself stretched on the ground by a timely pistol-shot.
But more grievous than danger or wounds was the pain of surviving
his reputation, and of losing in a single day the fruits of a long life.
All former victories were as nothing, since he had failed in gaining
the one that should have crowned them all.  Nothing remained
of all his past exploits, but the general execration which had followed them.
From this period, he never recovered his cheerfulness or his good fortune.
Even his last consolation, the hope of revenge, was denied to him,
by the express command of the Emperor not to risk a decisive battle.

The disgrace of this day is to be ascribed principally to three mistakes;
his planting the cannon on the hills behind him, his afterwards
abandoning these heights, and his allowing the enemy, without opposition,
to form in order of battle.  But how easily might those mistakes
have been rectified, had it not been for the cool presence of mind
and superior genius of his adversary!

Tilly fled from Halle to Halberstadt, where he scarcely allowed time
for the cure of his wounds, before he hurried towards the Weser
to recruit his force by the imperial garrisons in Lower Saxony.

The Elector of Saxony had not failed, after the danger was over, to appear
in Gustavus's camp.  The king thanked him for having advised a battle;
and the Elector, charmed at his friendly reception, promised him,
in the first transports of joy, the Roman crown.  Gustavus set out next day
for Merseburg, leaving the Elector to recover Leipzig.
Five thousand Imperialists, who had collected together after the defeat,
and whom he met on his march, were either cut in pieces or taken prisoners,
of whom again the greater part entered into his service.
Merseburg quickly surrendered; Halle was soon after taken,
whither the Elector of Saxony, after making himself master of Leipzig,
repaired to meet the king, and to concert their future plan of operations.

The victory was gained, but only a prudent use of it could render it decisive.
The imperial armies were totally routed, Saxony free from the enemy,
and Tilly had retired into Brunswick.  To have followed him thither
would have been to renew the war in Lower Saxony, which had scarcely recovered
from the ravages of the last.  It was therefore determined to carry the war
into the enemy's country, which, open and defenceless as far as Vienna,
invited attack.  On their right, they might fall upon the territories
of the Roman Catholic princes, or penetrate, on the left,
into the hereditary dominions of Austria, and make the Emperor tremble
in his palace.  Both plans were resolved on; and the question
that now remained was to assign its respective parts.  Gustavus Adolphus,
at the head of a victorious army, had little resistance to apprehend
in his progress from Leipzig to Prague, Vienna, and Presburg.
As to Bohemia, Moravia, Austria, and Hungary, they had been stripped
of their defenders, while the oppressed Protestants in these countries
were ripe for a revolt.  Ferdinand was no longer secure in his capital:
Vienna, on the first terror of surprise, would at once open its gates.
The loss of his territories would deprive the enemy of the resources
by which alone the war could be maintained; and Ferdinand would,
in all probability, gladly accede, on the hardest conditions,
to a peace which would remove a formidable enemy from the heart
of his dominions.  This bold plan of operations was flattering to a conqueror,
and success perhaps might have justified it.  But Gustavus Adolphus,
as prudent as he was brave, and more a statesman than a conqueror,
rejected it, because he had a higher end in view, and would not
trust the issue either to bravery or good fortune alone.

By marching towards Bohemia, Franconia and the Upper Rhine would be left
to the Elector of Saxony.  But Tilly had already begun to recruit
his shattered army from the garrisons in Lower Saxony, and was likely to be
at the head of a formidable force upon the Weser, and to lose no time
in marching against the enemy.  To so experienced a general,
it would not do to oppose an Arnheim, of whose military skill
the battle of Leipzig had afforded but equivocal proof;
and of what avail would be the rapid and brilliant career of the king
in Bohemia and Austria, if Tilly should recover his superiority in the Empire,
animating the courage of the Roman Catholics, and disarming,
by a new series of victories, the allies and confederates of the king?
What would he gain by expelling the Emperor from his hereditary dominions,
if Tilly succeeded in conquering for that Emperor the rest of Germany?
Could he hope to reduce the Emperor more than had been done,
twelve years before, by the insurrection of Bohemia, which had failed
to shake the firmness or exhaust the resources of that prince,
and from which he had risen more formidable than ever?

Less brilliant, but more solid, were the advantages which he had to expect
from an incursion into the territories of the League.  In this quarter,
his appearance in arms would be decisive.  At this very conjuncture,
the princes were assembled in a Diet at Frankfort, to deliberate upon
the Edict of Restitution, where Ferdinand employed all his artful policy
to persuade the intimidated Protestants to accede to a speedy
and disadvantageous arrangement.  The advance of their protector could alone
encourage them to a bold resistance, and disappoint the Emperor's designs.
Gustavus Adolphus hoped, by his presence, to unite the discontented princes,
or by the terror of his arms to detach them from the Emperor's party.  Here,
in the centre of Germany, he could paralyse the nerves of the imperial power,
which, without the aid of the League, must soon fall -- here,
in the neighbourhood of France, he could watch the movements
of a suspicious ally; and however important to his secret views it was
to cultivate the friendship of the Roman Catholic electors,
he saw the necessity of making himself first of all master of their fate,
in order to establish, by his magnanimous forbearance,
a claim to their gratitude.

He accordingly chose the route to Franconia and the Rhine;
and left the conquest of Bohemia to the Elector of Saxony.






Book III.




The glorious battle of Leipzig effected a great change in the conduct
of Gustavus Adolphus, as well as in the opinion which both friends and foes
entertained of him.  Successfully had he confronted the greatest general
of the age, and had matched the strength of his tactics
and the courage of his Swedes against the elite of the imperial army,
the most experienced troops in Europe.  From this moment he felt
a firm confidence in his own powers -- self-confidence has always been
the parent of great actions.  In all his subsequent operations
more boldness and decision are observable; greater determination,
even amidst the most unfavourable circumstances, a more lofty tone
towards his adversaries, a more dignified bearing towards his allies,
and even in his clemency, something of the forbearance of a conqueror.
His natural courage was farther heightened by the pious ardour
of his imagination.  He saw in his own cause that of heaven,
and in the defeat of Tilly beheld the decisive interference of Providence
against his enemies, and in himself the instrument of divine vengeance.
Leaving his crown and his country far behind, he advanced
on the wings of victory into the heart of Germany, which for centuries
had seen no foreign conqueror within its bosom.  The warlike spirit
of its inhabitants, the vigilance of its numerous princes,
the artful confederation of its states, the number of its strong castles,
its many and broad rivers, had long restrained the ambition of its neighbours;
and frequently as its extensive frontier had been attacked, its interior
had been free from hostile invasion.  The Empire had hitherto enjoyed
the equivocal privilege of being its own enemy, though invincible
from without.  Even now, it was merely the disunion of its members,
and the intolerance of religious zeal, that paved the way
for the Swedish invader.  The bond of union between the states,
which alone had rendered the Empire invincible, was now dissolved;
and Gustavus derived from Germany itself the power by which he subdued it.
With as much courage as prudence, he availed himself of all
that the favourable moment afforded; and equally at home in the cabinet
and the field, he tore asunder the web of the artful policy,
with as much ease, as he shattered walls with the thunder of his cannon.
Uninterruptedly he pursued his conquests from one end of Germany to the other,
without breaking the line of posts which commanded a secure retreat
at any moment; and whether on the banks of the Rhine,
or at the mouth of the Lech, alike maintaining his communication
with his hereditary dominions.

The consternation of the Emperor and the League at Tilly's defeat at Leipzig,
was scarcely greater than the surprise and embarrassment of the allies
of the King of Sweden at his unexpected success.  It was beyond
both their expectations and their wishes.  Annihilated in a moment
was that formidable army which, while it checked his progress
and set bounds to his ambition, rendered him in some measure dependent
on themselves.  He now stood in the heart of Germany, alone,
without a rival or without an adversary who was a match for him.
Nothing could stop his progress, or check his pretensions,
if the intoxication of success should tempt him to abuse his victory.
If formerly they had dreaded the Emperor's irresistible power,
there was no less cause now to fear every thing for the Empire,
from the violence of a foreign conqueror, and for the Catholic Church,
from the religious zeal of a Protestant king.  The distrust and jealousy
of some of the combined powers, which a stronger fear of the Emperor had
for a time repressed, now revived; and scarcely had Gustavus Adolphus merited,
by his courage and success, their confidence, when they began covertly
to circumvent all his plans.  Through a continual struggle
with the arts of enemies, and the distrust of his own allies,
must his victories henceforth be won; yet resolution,
penetration, and prudence made their way through all impediments.
But while his success excited the jealousy of his more powerful allies,
France and Saxony, it gave courage to the weaker, and emboldened them
openly to declare their sentiments and join his party.
Those who could neither vie with Gustavus Adolphus in importance,
nor suffer from his ambition, expected the more from the magnanimity
of their powerful ally, who enriched them with the spoils of their enemies,
and protected them against the oppression of their stronger neighbours.
His strength covered their weakness, and, inconsiderable in themselves,
they acquired weight and influence from their union with the Swedish hero.
This was the case with most of the free cities, and particularly with
the weaker Protestant states.  It was these that introduced the king
into the heart of Germany; these covered his rear, supplied his troops
with necessaries, received them into their fortresses, while they exposed
their own lives in his battles.  His prudent regard to their national pride,
his popular deportment, some brilliant acts of justice, and his respect
for the laws, were so many ties by which he bound the German Protestants
to his cause; while the crying atrocities of the Imperialists, the Spaniards,
and the troops of Lorraine, powerfully contributed to set his own conduct
and that of his army in a favourable light.

If Gustavus Adolphus owed his success chiefly to his own genius,
at the same time, it must be owned, he was greatly favoured
by fortune and by circumstances.  Two great advantages gave him
a decided superiority over the enemy.  While he removed the scene of war
into the lands of the League, drew their youth as recruits,
enriched himself with booty, and used the revenues of their fugitive princes
as his own, he at once took from the enemy the means of effectual resistance,
and maintained an expensive war with little cost to himself.  And, moreover,
while his opponents, the princes of the League, divided among themselves,
and governed by different and often conflicting interests,
acted without unanimity, and therefore without energy;
while their generals were deficient in authority, their troops in obedience,
the operations of their scattered armies without concert;
while the general was separated from the lawgiver and the statesman;
these several functions were united in Gustavus Adolphus,
the only source from which authority flowed, the sole object
to which the eye of the warrior turned; the soul of his party,
the inventor as well as the executor of his plans.  In him,
therefore, the Protestants had a centre of unity and harmony,
which was altogether wanting to their opponents.  No wonder, then,
if favoured by such advantages, at the head of such an army,
with such a genius to direct it, and guided by such political prudence,
Gustavus Adolphus was irresistible.

With the sword in one hand, and mercy in the other, he traversed Germany
as a conqueror, a lawgiver, and a judge, in as short a time almost
as the tourist of pleasure.  The keys of towns and fortresses were delivered
to him, as if to the native sovereign.  No fortress was inaccessible;
no river checked his victorious career.  He conquered by the very terror
of his name.  The Swedish standards were planted along the whole stream
of the Maine:  the Lower Palatinate was free, the troops of Spain and Lorraine
had fled across the Rhine and the Moselle.  The Swedes and Hessians
poured like a torrent into the territories of Mentz, of Wurtzburg,
and Bamberg, and three fugitive bishops, at a distance from their sees,
suffered dearly for their unfortunate attachment to the Emperor.
It was now the turn for Maximilian, the leader of the League,
to feel in his own dominions the miseries he had inflicted upon others.
Neither the terrible fate of his allies, nor the peaceful overtures
of Gustavus, who, in the midst of conquest, ever held out
the hand of friendship, could conquer the obstinacy of this prince.
The torrent of war now poured into Bavaria.  Like the banks of the Rhine,
those of the Lecke and the Donau were crowded with Swedish troops.
Creeping into his fortresses, the defeated Elector abandoned to the ravages
of the foe his dominions, hitherto unscathed by war, and on which
the bigoted violence of the Bavarians seemed to invite retaliation.
Munich itself opened its gates to the invincible monarch,
and the fugitive Palatine, Frederick V., in the forsaken residence
of his rival, consoled himself for a time for the loss of his dominions.

While Gustavus Adolphus was extending his conquests in the south,
his generals and allies were gaining similar triumphs in the other provinces.
Lower Saxony shook off the yoke of Austria, the enemy abandoned Mecklenburg,
and the imperial garrisons retired from the banks of the Weser and the Elbe.
In Westphalia and the Upper Rhine, William, Landgrave of Hesse,
rendered himself formidable; the Duke of Weimar in Thuringia,
and the French in the Electorate of Treves; while to the eastward
the whole kingdom of Bohemia was conquered by the Saxons.
The Turks were preparing to attack Hungary, and in the heart of Austria
a dangerous insurrection was threatened.  In vain did the Emperor
look around to the courts of Europe for support; in vain did he summon
the Spaniards to his assistance, for the bravery of the Flemings
afforded them ample employment beyond the Rhine; in vain did he call upon
the Roman court and the whole church to come to his rescue.
The offended Pope sported, in pompous processions and idle anathemas,
with the embarrassments of Ferdinand, and instead of the desired subsidy
he was shown the devastation of Mantua.

On all sides of his extensive monarchy hostile arms surrounded him.
With the states of the League, now overrun by the enemy, those ramparts
were thrown down, behind which Austria had so long defended herself,
and the embers of war were now smouldering upon her unguarded frontiers.
His most zealous allies were disarmed; Maximilian of Bavaria,
his firmest support, was scarce able to defend himself.  His armies,
weakened by desertion and repeated defeat, and dispirited by
continued misfortunes had unlearnt, under beaten generals,
that warlike impetuosity which, as it is the consequence,
so it is the guarantee of success.  The danger was extreme,
and extraordinary means alone could raise the imperial power
from the degradation into which it was fallen.

The most urgent want was that of a general; and the only one
from whom he could hope for the revival of his former splendour,
had been removed from his command by an envious cabal.
So low had the Emperor now fallen, that he was forced to make
the most humiliating proposals to his injured subject and servant,
and meanly to press upon the imperious Duke of Friedland the acceptance
of the powers which no less meanly had been taken from him.
A new spirit began from this moment to animate the expiring body of Austria;
and a sudden change in the aspect of affairs bespoke the firm hand
which guided them.  To the absolute King of Sweden,
a general equally absolute was now opposed; and one victorious hero
was confronted with another.  Both armies were again to engage
in the doubtful struggle; and the prize of victory, already almost secured
in the hands of Gustavus Adolphus, was to be the object of another
and a severer trial.  The storm of war gathered around Nuremberg;
before its walls the hostile armies encamped; gazing on each other
with dread and respect, longing for, and yet shrinking from,
the moment that was to close them together in the shock of battle.
The eyes of Europe turned to the scene in curiosity and alarm,
while Nuremberg, in dismay, expected soon to lend its name
to a more decisive battle than that of Leipzig.  Suddenly the clouds broke,
and the storm rolled away from Franconia, to burst upon the plains of Saxony.
Near Lutzen fell the thunder that had menaced Nuremberg;
the victory, half lost, was purchased by the death of the king.
Fortune, which had never forsaken him in his lifetime,
favoured the King of Sweden even in his death, with the rare privilege
of falling in the fulness of his glory and an untarnished fame.
By a timely death, his protecting genius rescued him from the inevitable fate
of man -- that of forgetting moderation in the intoxication of success,
and justice in the plenitude of power.  It may be doubted whether,
had he lived longer, he would still have deserved the tears which Germany shed
over his grave, or maintained his title to the admiration with which
posterity regards him, as the first and only JUST conqueror that the world
has produced.  The untimely fall of their great leader seemed to threaten
the ruin of his party; but to the Power which rules the world,
no loss of a single man is irreparable.  As the helm of war dropped
from the hand of the falling hero, it was seized by two great statesmen,
Oxenstiern and Richelieu.  Destiny still pursued its relentless course,
and for full sixteen years longer the flames of war blazed over the ashes
of the long-forgotten king and soldier.

I may now be permitted to take a cursory retrospect of Gustavus Adolphus
in his victorious career; glance at the scene in which he alone
was the great actor; and then, when Austria becomes reduced to extremity
by the successes of the Swedes, and by a series of disasters
is driven to the most humiliating and desperate expedients,
to return to the history of the Emperor.

As soon as the plan of operations had been concerted at Halle,
between the King of Sweden and the Elector of Saxony; as soon as the alliance
had been concluded with the neighbouring princes of Weimar and Anhalt,
and preparations made for the recovery of the bishopric of Magdeburg,
the king began his march into the empire.  He had here no despicable foe
to contend with.  Within the empire, the Emperor was still powerful;
throughout Franconia, Swabia, and the Palatinate, imperial garrisons
were posted, with whom the possession of every place of importance
must be disputed sword in hand.  On the Rhine he was opposed by the Spaniards,
who had overrun the territory of the banished Elector Palatine,
seized all its strong places, and would everywhere dispute with him
the passage over that river.  On his rear was Tilly, who was fast recruiting
his force, and would soon be joined by the auxiliaries from Lorraine.
Every Papist presented an inveterate foe, while his connexion with France
did not leave him at liberty to act with freedom against the Roman Catholics.
Gustavus had foreseen all these obstacles, but at the same time the means
by which they were to be overcome.  The strength of the Imperialists
was broken and divided among different garrisons, while he would
bring against them one by one his whole united force.
If he was to be opposed by the fanaticism of the Roman Catholics,
and the awe in which the lesser states regarded the Emperor's power,
he might depend on the active support of the Protestants,
and their hatred to Austrian oppression.  The ravages of the Imperialist
and Spanish troops also powerfully aided him in these quarters;
where the ill-treated husbandman and citizen sighed alike for a deliverer,
and where the mere change of yoke seemed to promise a relief.
Emissaries were despatched to gain over to the Swedish side
the principal free cities, particularly Nuremberg and Frankfort.
The first that lay in the king's march, and which he could not leave
unoccupied in his rear, was Erfurt.  Here the Protestant party
among the citizens opened to him, without a blow, the gates of the town
and the citadel.  From the inhabitants of this, as of every important place
which afterwards submitted, he exacted an oath of allegiance,
while he secured its possession by a sufficient garrison.  To his ally,
Duke William of Weimar, he intrusted the command of an army to be raised
in Thuringia.  He also left his queen in Erfurt, and promised to increase
its privileges.  The Swedish army now crossed the Thuringian forest
in two columns, by Gotha and Arnstadt, and having delivered, in its march,
the county of Henneberg from the Imperialists, formed a junction
on the third day near Koenigshofen, on the frontiers of Franconia.

Francis, Bishop of Wurtzburg, the bitter enemy of the Protestants,
and the most zealous member of the League, was the first to feel
the indignation of Gustavus Adolphus.  A few threats gained for the Swedes
possession of his fortress of Koenigshofen, and with it the key
of the whole province.  At the news of this rapid conquest,
dismay seized all the Roman Catholic towns of the circle.
The Bishops of Wurtzburg and Bamberg trembled in their castles;
they already saw their sees tottering, their churches profaned,
and their religion degraded.  The malice of his enemies had circulated
the most frightful representations of the persecuting spirit
and the mode of warfare pursued by the Swedish king and his soldiers,
which neither the repeated assurances of the king, nor the most
splendid examples of humanity and toleration, ever entirely effaced.
Many feared to suffer at the hands of another what in similar circumstances
they were conscious of inflicting themselves.  Many of the richest
Roman Catholics hastened to secure by flight their property, their religion,
and their persons, from the sanguinary fanaticism of the Swedes.
The bishop himself set the example.  In the midst of the alarm,
which his bigoted zeal had caused, he abandoned his dominions,
and fled to Paris, to excite, if possible, the French ministry
against the common enemy of religion.

The further progress of Gustavus Adolphus in the ecclesiastical territories
agreed with this brilliant commencement.  Schweinfurt,
and soon afterwards Wurtzburg, abandoned by their Imperial garrisons,
surrendered; but Marienberg he was obliged to carry by storm.  In this place,
which was believed to be impregnable, the enemy had collected a large store
of provisions and ammunition, all of which fell into the hands of the Swedes.
The king found a valuable prize in the library of the Jesuits,
which he sent to Upsal, while his soldiers found a still more agreeable one
in the prelate's well-filled cellars; his treasures the bishop had
in good time removed.  The whole bishopric followed the example
of the capital, and submitted to the Swedes.  The king compelled
all the bishop's subjects to swear allegiance to himself;
and, in the absence of the lawful sovereign, appointed a regency,
one half of whose members were Protestants.  In every Roman Catholic town
which Gustavus took, he opened the churches to the Protestant people,
but without retaliating on the Papists the cruelties which they had practised
on the former.  On such only as sword in hand refused to submit,
were the fearful rights of war enforced; and for the occasional
acts of violence committed by a few of the more lawless soldiers,
in the blind rage of the first attack, their humane leader
is not justly responsible.  Those who were peaceably disposed, or defenceless,
were treated with mildness.  It was a sacred principle of Gustavus
to spare the blood of his enemies, as well as that of his own troops.

On the first news of the Swedish irruption, the Bishop of Wurtzburg,
without regarding the treaty which he had entered into
with the King of Sweden, had earnestly pressed the general of the League
to hasten to the assistance of the bishopric.  That defeated commander had,
in the mean time, collected on the Weser the shattered remnant of his army,
reinforced himself from the garrisons of Lower Saxony, and effected
a junction in Hesse with Altringer and Fugger, who commanded under him.
Again at the head of a considerable force, Tilly burned with impatience
to wipe out the stain of his first defeat by a splendid victory.
From his camp at Fulda, whither he had marched with his army,
he earnestly requested permission from the Duke of Bavaria to give battle
to Gustavus Adolphus.  But, in the event of Tilly's defeat,
the League had no second army to fall back upon, and Maximilian
was too cautious to risk again the fate of his party on a single battle.
With tears in his eyes, Tilly read the commands of his superior,
which compelled him to inactivity.  Thus his march to Franconia was delayed,
and Gustavus Adolphus gained time to overrun the whole bishopric.
It was in vain that Tilly, reinforced at Aschaffenburg by a body of 12,000 men
from Lorraine, marched with an overwhelming force to the relief of Wurtzburg.
The town and citadel were already in the hands of the Swedes,
and Maximilian of Bavaria was generally blamed (and not without cause,
perhaps) for having, by his scruples, occasioned the loss of the bishopric.
Commanded to avoid a battle, Tilly contented himself with checking
the farther advance of the enemy; but he could save only a few of the towns
from the impetuosity of the Swedes.  Baffled in an attempt to reinforce
the weak garrison of Hanau, which it was highly important to the Swedes
to gain, he crossed the Maine, near Seligenstadt, and took the direction
of the Bergstrasse, to protect the Palatinate from the conqueror.
                
 
 
Хостинг от uCoz