Tilly, however, was not the sole enemy whom Gustavus Adolphus met
in Franconia, and drove before him.  Charles, Duke of Lorraine,
celebrated in the annals of the time for his unsteadiness of character,
his vain projects, and his misfortunes, ventured to raise a weak arm
against the Swedish hero, in the hope of obtaining from the Emperor
the electoral dignity.  Deaf to the suggestions of a rational policy,
he listened only to the dictates of heated ambition;
by supporting the Emperor, he exasperated France, his formidable neighbour;
and in the pursuit of a visionary phantom in another country,
left undefended his own dominions, which were instantly overrun
by a French army.  Austria willingly conceded to him, as well as to
the other princes of the League, the honour of being ruined in her cause.
Intoxicated with vain hopes, this prince collected a force of 17,000 men,
which he proposed to lead in person against the Swedes.  If these troops
were deficient in discipline and courage, they were at least attractive
by the splendour of their accoutrements; and however sparing they were
of their prowess against the foe, they were liberal enough with it
against the defenceless citizens and peasantry, whom they were summoned
to defend.  Against the bravery, and the formidable discipline of the Swedes
this splendidly attired army, however, made no long stand.
On the first advance of the Swedish cavalry a panic seized them,
and they were driven without difficulty from their cantonments in Wurtzburg;
the defeat of a few regiments occasioned a general rout,
and the scattered remnant sought a covert from the Swedish valour
in the towns beyond the Rhine.  Loaded with shame and ridicule,
the duke hurried home by Strasburg, too fortunate in escaping,
by a submissive written apology, the indignation of his conqueror,
who had first beaten him out of the field, and then called upon him
to account for his hostilities.  It is related upon this occasion that,
in a village on the Rhine a peasant struck the horse of the duke
as he rode past, exclaiming, "Haste, Sir, you must go quicker
to escape the great King of Sweden!"

The example of his neighbours' misfortunes had taught
the Bishop of Bamberg prudence.  To avert the plundering of his territories,
he made offers of peace, though these were intended only to delay
the king's course till the arrival of assistance.  Gustavus Adolphus,
too honourable himself to suspect dishonesty in another, readily accepted
the bishop's proposals, and named the conditions on which he was willing
to save his territories from hostile treatment.  He was the more inclined
to peace, as he had no time to lose in the conquest of Bamberg,
and his other designs called him to the Rhine.  The rapidity with which
he followed up these plans, cost him the loss of those pecuniary supplies
which, by a longer residence in Franconia, he might easily have extorted
from the weak and terrified bishop.  This artful prelate
broke off the negotiation the instant the storm of war passed away
from his own territories.  No sooner had Gustavus marched onwards
than he threw himself under the protection of Tilly, and received the troops
of the Emperor into the very towns and fortresses, which shortly before
he had shown himself ready to open to the Swedes.  By this stratagem,
however, he only delayed for a brief interval the ruin of his bishopric.
A Swedish general who had been left in Franconia, undertook to punish
the perfidy of the bishop; and the ecclesiastical territory became
the seat of war, and was ravaged alike by friends and foes.

The formidable presence of the Imperialists had hitherto been a check
upon the Franconian States; but their retreat, and the humane conduct
of the Swedish king, emboldened the nobility and other inhabitants
of this circle to declare in his favour.  Nuremberg joyfully committed itself
to his protection; and the Franconian nobles were won to his cause
by flattering proclamations, in which he condescended to apologize
for his hostile appearance in the dominions.  The fertility of Franconia,
and the rigorous honesty of the Swedish soldiers in their dealings
with the inhabitants, brought abundance to the camp of the king.
The high esteem which the nobility of the circle felt for Gustavus,
the respect and admiration with which they regarded his brilliant exploits,
the promises of rich booty which the service of this monarch held out,
greatly facilitated the recruiting of his troops; a step which was
made necessary by detaching so many garrisons from the main body.
At the sound of his drums, recruits flocked to his standard from all quarters.

The king had scarcely spent more time in conquering Franconia,
than he would have required to cross it.  He now left behind him
Gustavus Horn, one of his best generals, with a force of 8,000 men,
to complete and retain his conquest.  He himself with his main army,
reinforced by the late recruits, hastened towards the Rhine
in order to secure this frontier of the empire from the Spaniards;
to disarm the ecclesiastical electors, and to obtain
from their fertile territories new resources for the prosecution of the war.
Following the course of the Maine, he subjected, in the course of his march,
Seligenstadt, Aschaffenburg, Steinheim, the whole territory on both sides
of the river.  The imperial garrisons seldom awaited his approach,
and never attempted resistance.  In the meanwhile one of his colonels
had been fortunate enough to take by surprise the town and citadel of Hanau,
for whose preservation Tilly had shown such anxiety.  Eager to be free
of the oppressive burden of the Imperialists, the Count of Hanau
gladly placed himself under the milder yoke of the King of Sweden.

Gustavus Adolphus now turned his whole attention to Frankfort,
for it was his constant maxim to cover his rear by the friendship
and possession of the more important towns.  Frankfort was among
the free cities which, even from Saxony, he had endeavoured to prepare
for his reception; and he now called upon it, by a summons from Offenbach,
to allow him a free passage, and to admit a Swedish garrison.
Willingly would this city have dispensed with the necessity of choosing
between the King of Sweden and the Emperor; for, whatever party
they might embrace, the inhabitants had a like reason to fear
for their privileges and trade.  The Emperor's vengeance
would certainly fall heavily upon them, if they were in a hurry
to submit to the King of Sweden, and afterwards he should prove unable
to protect his adherents in Germany.  But still more ruinous for them
would be the displeasure of an irresistible conqueror, who,
with a formidable army, was already before their gates, and who might
punish their opposition by the ruin of their commerce and prosperity.
In vain did their deputies plead the danger which menaced their fairs,
their privileges, perhaps their constitution itself, if, by espousing
the party of the Swedes, they were to incur the Emperor's displeasure.
Gustavus Adolphus expressed to them his astonishment that,
when the liberties of Germany and the Protestant religion were at stake,
the citizens of Frankfort should talk of their annual fairs,
and postpone for temporal interests the great cause of their country
and their conscience.  He had, he continued, in a menacing tone,
found the keys of every town and fortress, from the Isle of Rugen
to the Maine, and knew also where to find a key to Frankfort;
the safety of Germany, and the freedom of the Protestant Church,
were, he assured them, the sole objects of his invasion;
conscious of the justice of his cause, he was determined not to allow
any obstacle to impede his progress.  "The inhabitants of Frankfort,
he was well aware, wished to stretch out only a finger to him,
but he must have the whole hand in order to have something to grasp."
At the head of the army, he closely followed the deputies
as they carried back his answer, and in order of battle awaited,
near Saxenhausen, the decision of the council.

If Frankfort hesitated to submit to the Swedes, it was solely from fear
of the Emperor; their own inclinations did not allow them a moment to doubt
between the oppressor of Germany and its protector.  The menacing preparations
amidst which Gustavus Adolphus now compelled them to decide,
would lessen the guilt of their revolt in the eyes of the Emperor,
and by an appearance of compulsion justify the step which they willingly took.
The gates were therefore opened to the King of Sweden, who marched his army
through this imperial town in magnificent procession, and in admirable order.
A garrison of 600 men was left in Saxenhausen; while the king himself
advanced the same evening, with the rest of his army, against the town
of Hoechst in Mentz, which surrendered to him before night.

While Gustavus was thus extending his conquests along the Maine,
fortune crowned also the efforts of his generals and allies
in the north of Germany.  Rostock, Wismar, and Doemitz, the only strong places
in the Duchy of Mecklenburg which still sighed under the yoke
of the Imperialists, were recovered by their legitimate sovereign,
the Duke John Albert, under the Swedish general, Achatius Tott.
In vain did the imperial general, Wolf Count von Mansfeld,
endeavour to recover from the Swedes the territories of Halberstadt,
of which they had taken possession immediately upon the victory of Leipzig;
he was even compelled to leave Magdeburg itself in their hands.
The Swedish general, Banner, who with 8,000 men remained upon the Elbe,
closely blockaded that city, and had defeated several imperial regiments
which had been sent to its relief.  Count Mansfeld defended it in person
with great resolution; but his garrison being too weak to oppose
for any length of time the numerous force of the besiegers,
he was already about to surrender on conditions, when Pappenheim advanced
to his assistance, and gave employment elsewhere to the Swedish arms.
Magdeburg, however, or rather the wretched huts that peeped out miserably
from among the ruins of that once great town, was afterwards
voluntarily abandoned by the Imperialists, and immediately taken possession of
by the Swedes.

Even Lower Saxony, encouraged by the progress of the king,
ventured to raise its head from the disasters of the unfortunate Danish war.
They held a congress at Hamburg, and resolved upon raising three regiments,
which they hoped would be sufficient to free them from
the oppressive garrisons of the Imperialists.  The Bishop of Bremen,
a relation of Gustavus Adolphus, was not content even with this;
but assembled troops of his own, and terrified the unfortunate
monks and priests of the neighbourhood, but was quickly compelled
by the imperial general, Count Gronsfeld, to lay down his arms.
Even George, Duke of Lunenburg, formerly a colonel in the Emperor's service,
embraced the party of Gustavus, for whom he raised several regiments,
and by occupying the attention of the Imperialists in Lower Saxony,
materially assisted him.

But more important service was rendered to the king by the Landgrave William
of Hesse Cassel, whose victorious arms struck with terror
the greater part of Westphalia and Lower Saxony, the bishopric of Fulda,
and even the Electorate of Cologne.  It has been already stated
that immediately after the conclusion of the alliance between the Landgrave
and Gustavus Adolphus at Werben, two imperial generals, Fugger and Altringer,
were ordered by Tilly to march into Hesse, to punish the Landgrave
for his revolt from the Emperor.  But this prince had as firmly withstood
the arms of his enemies, as his subjects had the proclamations of Tilly
inciting them to rebellion, and the battle of Leipzig presently relieved him
of their presence.  He availed himself of their absence
with courage and resolution; in a short time, Vach, Muenden and Hoexter
surrendered to him, while his rapid advance alarmed the bishoprics of Fulda,
Paderborn, and the ecclesiastical territories which bordered on Hesse.
The terrified states hastened by a speedy submission to set limits to
his progress, and by considerable contributions to purchase exemption
from plunder.  After these successful enterprises, the Landgrave united
his victorious army with that of Gustavus Adolphus, and concerted with him
at Frankfort their future plan of operations.

In this city, a number of princes and ambassadors were assembled
to congratulate Gustavus on his success, and either to conciliate his favour
or to appease his indignation.  Among them was the fugitive King of Bohemia,
the Palatine Frederick V., who had hastened from Holland to throw himself
into the arms of his avenger and protector.  Gustavus gave him
the unprofitable honour of greeting him as a crowned head, and endeavoured,
by a respectful sympathy, to soften his sense of his misfortunes.
But great as the advantages were, which Frederick had promised himself
from the power and good fortune of his protector; and high as were
the expectations he had built on his justice and magnanimity,
the chance of this unfortunate prince's reinstatement in his kingdom
was as distant as ever.  The inactivity and contradictory politics
of the English court had abated the zeal of Gustavus Adolphus,
and an irritability which he could not always repress,
made him on this occasion forget the glorious vocation of protector
of the oppressed, in which, on his invasion of Germany, he had so loudly
announced himself.

The terrors of the king's irresistible strength, and the near prospect
of his vengeance, had also compelled George, Landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt,
to a timely submission.  His connection with the Emperor,
and his indifference to the Protestant cause, were no secret to the king,
but he was satisfied with laughing at so impotent an enemy.
As the Landgrave knew his own strength and the political situation of Germany
so little, as to offer himself as mediator between the contending parties,
Gustavus used jestingly to call him the peacemaker.  He was frequently
heard to say, when at play he was winning from the Landgrave,
"that the money afforded double satisfaction, as it was Imperial coin."
To his affinity with the Elector of Saxony, whom Gustavus had cause
to treat with forbearance, the Landgrave was indebted for the favourable terms
he obtained from the king, who contented himself with the surrender of
his fortress of Russelheim, and his promise of observing a strict neutrality
during the war.  The Counts of Westerwald and Wetteran also visited the King
in Frankfort, to offer him their assistance against the Spaniards,
and to conclude an alliance, which was afterwards of great service to him.
The town of Frankfort itself had reason to rejoice at the presence
of this monarch, who took their commerce under his protection,
and by the most effectual measures restored the fairs, which had been
greatly interrupted by the war.

The Swedish army was now reinforced by ten thousand Hessians,
which the Landgrave of Casse commanded.  Gustavus Adolphus had
already invested Koenigstein; Kostheim and Floersheim surrendered
after a short siege; he was in command of the Maine; and transports
were preparing with all speed at Hoechst to carry his troops across the Rhine.
These preparations filled the Elector of Mentz, Anselm Casimir,
with consternation; and he no longer doubted but that the storm of war
would next fall upon him.  As a partisan of the Emperor, and one of
the most active members of the League, he could expect no better treatment
than his confederates, the Bishops of Wurtzburg and Bamberg,
had already experienced.  The situation of his territories upon the Rhine
made it necessary for the enemy to secure them, while the fertility
afforded an irresistible temptation to a necessitous army.
Miscalculating his own strength and that of his adversaries,
the Elector flattered himself that he was able to repel force by force,
and weary out the valour of the Swedes by the strength of his fortresses.
He ordered the fortifications of his capital to be repaired with
all diligence, provided it with every necessary for sustaining a long siege,
and received into the town a garrison of 2,000 Spaniards,
under Don Philip de Sylva.  To prevent the approach of the Swedish transports,
he endeavoured to close the mouth of the Maine by driving piles,
and sinking large heaps of stones and vessels.  He himself, however,
accompanied by the Bishop of Worms, and carrying with him
his most precious effects, took refuge in Cologne, and abandoned
his capital and territories to the rapacity of a tyrannical garrison.
But these preparations, which bespoke less of true courage
than of weak and overweening confidence, did not prevent the Swedes
from marching against Mentz, and making serious preparations for an attack
upon the city.  While one body of their troops poured into the Rheingau,
routed the Spaniards who remained there, and levied contributions
on the inhabitants, another laid the Roman Catholic towns
in Westerwald and Wetterau under similar contributions.  The main army
had encamped at Cassel, opposite Mentz; and Bernhard, Duke of Weimar,
made himself master of the Maeusethurm and the Castle of Ehrenfels,
on the other side of the Rhine.  Gustavus was now actively preparing
to cross the river, and to blockade the town on the land side,
when the movements of Tilly in Franconia suddenly called him from the siege,
and obtained for the Elector a short repose.

The danger of Nuremberg, which, during the absence of Gustavus Adolphus
on the Rhine, Tilly had made a show of besieging, and, in the event
of resistance, threatened with the cruel fate of Magdeburg,
occasioned the king suddenly to retire from before Mentz.
Lest he should expose himself a second time to the reproaches of Germany,
and the disgrace of abandoning a confederate city to a ferocious enemy,
he hastened to its relief by forced marches.  On his arrival at Frankfort,
however, he heard of its spirited resistance, and of the retreat of Tilly,
and lost not a moment in prosecuting his designs against Mentz.
Failing in an attempt to cross the Rhine at Cassel, under the cannon
of the besieged, he directed his march towards the Bergstrasse,
with a view of approaching the town from an opposite quarter.
Here he quickly made himself master of all the places of importance,
and at Stockstadt, between Gernsheim and Oppenheim, appeared a second time
upon the banks of the Rhine.  The whole of the Bergstrasse was abandoned
by the Spaniards, who endeavoured obstinately to defend the other bank
of the river.  For this purpose, they had burned or sunk all the vessels
in the neighbourhood, and arranged a formidable force on the banks,
in case the king should attempt the passage at that place.

On this occasion, the king's impetuosity exposed him to great danger
of falling into the hands of the enemy.  In order to reconnoitre
the opposite bank, he crossed the river in a small boat;
he had scarcely landed when he was attacked by a party of Spanish horse,
from whose hands he only saved himself by a precipitate retreat.
Having at last, with the assistance of the neighbouring fishermen,
succeeded in procuring a few transports, he despatched two of them
across the river, bearing Count Brahe and 300 Swedes.
Scarcely had this officer time to entrench himself on the opposite bank,
when he was attacked by 14 squadrons of Spanish dragoons and cuirassiers.
Superior as the enemy was in number, Count Brahe, with his small force,
bravely defended himself, and gained time for the king to support him
with fresh troops.  The Spaniards at last retired with the loss of 600 men,
some taking refuge in Oppenheim, and others in Mentz.  A lion of marble
on a high pillar, holding a naked sword in his paw, and a helmet on his head,
was erected seventy years after the event, to point out to the traveller
the spot where the immortal monarch crossed the great river of Germany.

Gustavus Adolphus now conveyed his artillery and the greater part
of his troops over the river, and laid siege to Oppenheim, which,
after a brave resistance, was, on the 8th December, 1631, carried by storm.
Five hundred Spaniards, who had so courageously defended the place,
fell indiscriminately a sacrifice to the fury of the Swedes.  The crossing
of the Rhine by Gustavus struck terror into the Spaniards and Lorrainers,
who had thought themselves protected by the river from the vengeance
of the Swedes.  Rapid flight was now their only security;
every place incapable of an effectual defence was immediately abandoned.
After a long train of outrages on the defenceless citizens,
the troops of Lorraine evacuated Worms, which, before their departure,
they treated with wanton cruelty.  The Spaniards hastened
to shut themselves up in Frankenthal, where they hoped to defy
the victorious arms of Gustavus Adolphus.

The king lost no time in prosecuting his designs against Mentz,
into which the flower of the Spanish troops had thrown themselves.
While he advanced on the left bank of the Rhine, the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel
moved forward on the other, reducing several strong places on his march.
The besieged Spaniards, though hemmed in on both sides, displayed at first
a bold determination, and threw, for several days, a shower of bombs
into the Swedish camp, which cost the king many of his bravest soldiers.
But notwithstanding, the Swedes continually gained ground,
and had at last advanced so close to the ditch that they prepared seriously
for storming the place.  The courage of the besieged now began to droop.
They trembled before the furious impetuosity of the Swedish soldiers,
of which Marienberg, in Wurtzburg, had afforded so fearful an example.
The same dreadful fate awaited Mentz, if taken by storm;
and the enemy might even be easily tempted to revenge the carnage of Magdeburg
on this rich and magnificent residence of a Roman Catholic prince.
To save the town, rather than their own lives, the Spanish garrison
capitulated on the fourth day, and obtained from the magnanimity of Gustavus
a safe conduct to Luxembourg; the greater part of them, however,
following the example of many others, enlisted in the service of Sweden.

On the 13th December, 1631, the king made his entry into the conquered town,
and fixed his quarters in the palace of the Elector.  Eighty pieces of cannon
fell into his hands, and the citizens were obliged to redeem their property
from pillage, by a payment of 80,000 florins.  The benefits of this redemption
did not extend to the Jews and the clergy, who were obliged to make
large and separate contributions for themselves.  The library of the Elector
was seized by the king as his share, and presented by him to his chancellor,
Oxenstiern, who intended it for the Academy of Westerrah, but the vessel
in which it was shipped to Sweden foundered at sea.

After the loss of Mentz, misfortune still pursued the Spaniards on the Rhine.
Shortly before the capture of that city, the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel
had taken Falkenstein and Reifenberg, and the fortress of Koningstein
surrendered to the Hessians.  The Rhinegrave, Otto Louis,
one of the king's generals, defeated nine Spanish squadrons
who were on their march for Frankenthal, and made himself master
of the most important towns upon the Rhine, from Boppart to Bacharach.
After the capture of the fortress of Braunfels, which was effected
by the Count of Wetterau, with the co-operation of the Swedes,
the Spaniards quickly lost every place in Wetterau, while in the Palatinate
they retained few places besides Frankenthal.  Landau and Kronweisenberg
openly declared for the Swedes; Spires offered troops for the king's service;
Manheim was gained through the prudence of the Duke Bernard of Weimar,
and the negligence of its governor, who, for this misconduct,
was tried before the council of war, at Heidelberg, and beheaded.

The king had protracted the campaign into the depth of winter,
and the severity of the season was perhaps one cause of the advantage
his soldiers gained over those of the enemy.  But the exhausted troops
now stood in need of the repose of winter quarters, which,
after the surrender of Mentz, Gustavus assigned to them, in its neighbourhood.
He himself employed the interval of inactivity in the field,
which the season of the year enjoined, in arranging, with his chancellor,
the affairs of his cabinet, in treating for a neutrality
with some of his enemies, and adjusting some political disputes
which had sprung up with a neighbouring ally.  He chose the city of Mentz
for his winter quarters, and the settlement of these state affairs,
and showed a greater partiality for this town, than seemed consistent
with the interests of the German princes, or the shortness of his visit
to the Empire.  Not content with strongly fortifying it,
he erected at the opposite angle which the Maine forms with the Rhine,
a new citadel, which was named Gustavusburg from its founder,
but which is better known under the title of Pfaffenraub or Pfaffenzwang*.

--
*  Priests' plunder; alluding to the means by which
the expense of its erection had been defrayed.
--

While Gustavus Adolphus made himself master of the Rhine,
and threatened the three neighbouring electorates with his victorious arms,
his vigilant enemies in Paris and St. Germain's made use of every artifice
to deprive him of the support of France, and, if possible,
to involve him in a war with that power.  By his sudden and equivocal march
to the Rhine, he had surprised his friends, and furnished his enemies
with the means of exciting a distrust of his intentions.
After the conquest of Wurtzburg, and of the greater part of Franconia,
the road into Bavaria and Austria lay open to him through Bamberg
and the Upper Palatinate; and the expectation was as general,
as it was natural, that he would not delay to attack the Emperor
and the Duke of Bavaria in the very centre of their power,
and, by the reduction of his two principal enemies, bring the war
immediately to an end.  But to the surprise of both parties,
Gustavus left the path which general expectation had thus marked out for him;
and instead of advancing to the right, turned to the left,
to make the less important and more innocent princes of the Rhine
feel his power, while he gave time to his more formidable opponents
to recruit their strength.  Nothing but the paramount design
of reinstating the unfortunate Palatine, Frederick V., in the possession
of his territories, by the expulsion of the Spaniards, could seem to account
for this strange step; and the belief that Gustavus was about to effect
that restoration, silenced for a while the suspicions of his friends
and the calumnies of his enemies.  But the Lower Palatinate was now
almost entirely cleared of the enemy; and yet Gustavus continued to form
new schemes of conquest on the Rhine, and to withhold the reconquered country
from the Palatine, its rightful owner.  In vain did the English ambassador
remind him of what justice demanded, and what his own solemn engagement
made a duty of honour; Gustavus replied to these demands
with bitter complaints of the inactivity of the English court,
and prepared to carry his victorious standard into Alsace,
and even into Lorraine.

A distrust of the Swedish monarch was now loud and open,
while the malice of his enemies busily circulated the most injurious reports
as to his intentions.  Richelieu, the minister of Louis XIII.,
had long witnessed with anxiety the king's progress towards
the French frontier, and the suspicious temper of Louis rendered him
but too accessible to the evil surmises which the occasion gave rise to.
France was at this time involved in a civil war with her Protestant subjects,
and the fear was not altogether groundless, that the approach
of a victorious monarch of their party might revive their drooping spirit,
and encourage them to a more desperate resistance.  This might be the case,
even if Gustavus Adolphus was far from showing a disposition
to encourage them, or to act unfaithfully towards his ally,
the King of France.  But the vindictive Bishop of Wurtzburg,
who was anxious to avenge the loss of his dominions, the envenomed rhetoric
of the Jesuits and the active zeal of the Bavarian minister,
represented this dreaded alliance between the Huguenots and the Swedes
as an undoubted fact, and filled the timid mind of Louis
with the most alarming fears.  Not merely chimerical politicians,
but many of the best informed Roman Catholics, fully believed that the king
was on the point of breaking into the heart of France, to make common cause
with the Huguenots, and to overturn the Catholic religion within the kingdom.
Fanatical zealots already saw him, with his army, crossing the Alps,
and dethroning the Viceregent of Christ in Italy.  Such reports
no doubt soon refute themselves; yet it cannot be denied that Gustavus,
by his manoeuvres on the Rhine, gave a dangerous handle
to the malice of his enemies, and in some measure justified the suspicion
that he directed his arms, not so much against the Emperor
and the Duke of Bavaria, as against the Roman Catholic religion itself.

The general clamour of discontent which the Jesuits raised
in all the Catholic courts, against the alliance between France
and the enemy of the church, at last compelled Cardinal Richelieu
to take a decisive step for the security of his religion,
and at once to convince the Roman Catholic world of the zeal of France,
and of the selfish policy of the ecclesiastical states of Germany.
Convinced that the views of the King of Sweden, like his own,
aimed solely at the humiliation of the power of Austria,
he hesitated not to promise to the princes of the League,
on the part of Sweden, a complete neutrality, immediately they abandoned
their alliance with the Emperor and withdrew their troops.
Whatever the resolution these princes should adopt, Richelieu would
equally attain his object.  By their separation from the Austrian interest,
Ferdinand would be exposed to the combined attack of France and Sweden;
and Gustavus Adolphus, freed from his other enemies in Germany, would be able
to direct his undivided force against the hereditary dominions of Austria.
In that event, the fall of Austria was inevitable, and this great object
of Richelieu's policy would be gained without injury to the church.
If, on the other hand, the princes of the League persisted
in their opposition, and adhered to the Austrian alliance,
the result would indeed be more doubtful, but still France would have
sufficiently proved to all Europe the sincerity of her attachment to
the Catholic cause, and performed her duty as a member of the Roman Church.
The princes of the League would then appear the sole authors of those evils,
which the continuance of the war would unavoidably bring upon
the Roman Catholics of Germany; they alone, by their wilful and obstinate
adherence to the Emperor, would frustrate the measures employed
for their protection, involve the church in danger, and themselves in ruin.

Richelieu pursued this plan with greater zeal, the more he was embarrassed
by the repeated demands of the Elector of Bavaria for assistance from France;
for this prince, as already stated, when he first began to entertain
suspicions of the Emperor, entered immediately into a secret alliance
with France, by which, in the event of any change in the Emperor's sentiments,
he hoped to secure the possession of the Palatinate.  But though
the origin of the treaty clearly showed against what enemy it was directed,
Maximilian now thought proper to make use of it against the King of Sweden,
and did not hesitate to demand from France that assistance against her ally,
which she had simply promised against Austria.  Richelieu, embarrassed by
this conflicting alliance with two hostile powers, had no resource left
but to endeavour to put a speedy termination to their hostilities;
and as little inclined to sacrifice Bavaria, as he was disabled,
by his treaty with Sweden, from assisting it, he set himself,
with all diligence, to bring about a neutrality, as the only means
of fulfilling his obligations to both.  For this purpose,
the Marquis of Breze was sent, as his plenipotentiary,
to the King of Sweden at Mentz, to learn his sentiments on this point,
and to procure from him favourable conditions for the allied princes.
But if Louis XIII. had powerful motives for wishing for this neutrality,
Gustavus Adolphus had as grave reasons for desiring the contrary.
Convinced by numerous proofs that the hatred of the princes of the League
to the Protestant religion was invincible, their aversion to
the foreign power of the Swedes inextinguishable, and their attachment to
the House of Austria irrevocable, he apprehended less danger
from their open hostility, than from a neutrality which was so little
in unison with their real inclinations; and, moreover, as he was constrained
to carry on the war in Germany at the expense of the enemy,
he manifestly sustained great loss if he diminished their number
without increasing that of his friends.  It was not surprising, therefore,
if Gustavus evinced little inclination to purchase the neutrality
of the League, by which he was likely to gain so little,
at the expense of the advantages he had already obtained.

The conditions, accordingly, upon which he offered to adopt the neutrality
towards Bavaria were severe, and suited to these views.  He required
of the whole League a full and entire cessation from all hostilities;
the recall of their troops from the imperial army, from the conquered towns,
and from all the Protestant countries; the reduction of their military force;
the exclusion of the imperial armies from their territories,
and from supplies either of men, provisions, or ammunition.
Hard as the conditions were, which the victor thus imposed
upon the vanquished, the French mediator flattered himself
he should be able to induce the Elector of Bavaria to accept them.
In order to give time for an accommodation, Gustavus had agreed
to a cessation of hostilities for a fortnight.  But at the very time
when this monarch was receiving from the French agents repeated assurances
of the favourable progress of the negociation, an intercepted letter
from the Elector to Pappenheim, the imperial general in Westphalia,
revealed the perfidy of that prince, as having no other object in view
by the whole negociation, than to gain time for his measures of defence.
Far from intending to fetter his military operations by a truce with Sweden,
the artful prince hastened his preparations, and employed the leisure
which his enemy afforded him, in making the most active dispositions
for resistance.  The negociation accordingly failed, and served only
to increase the animosity of the Bavarians and the Swedes.

Tilly's augmented force, with which he threatened to overrun Franconia,
urgently required the king's presence in that circle; but it was necessary
to expel previously the Spaniards from the Rhine, and to cut off their means
of invading Germany from the Netherlands.  With this view, Gustavus Adolphus
had made an offer of neutrality to the Elector of Treves, Philip von Zeltern,
on condition that the fortress of Hermanstein should be delivered up to him,
and a free passage granted to his troops through Coblentz.  But unwillingly
as the Elector had beheld the Spaniards within his territories,
he was still less disposed to commit his estates to the suspicious protection
of a heretic, and to make the Swedish conqueror master of his destinies.
Too weak to maintain his independence between two such powerful competitors,
he took refuge in the protection of France.  With his usual prudence,
Richelieu profited by the embarrassments of this prince
to augment the power of France, and to gain for her an important ally
on the German frontier.  A numerous French army was despatched
to protect the territory of Treves, and a French garrison was received
into Ehrenbreitstein.  But the object which had moved the Elector
to this bold step was not completely gained, for the offended pride
of Gustavus Adolphus was not appeased till he had obtained a free passage
for his troops through Treves.

Pending these negociations with Treves and France, the king's generals
had entirely cleared the territory of Mentz of the Spanish garrisons,
and Gustavus himself completed the conquest of this district
by the capture of Kreutznach.  To protect these conquests,
the chancellor Oxenstiern was left with a division of the army
upon the Middle Rhine, while the main body, under the king himself,
began its march against the enemy in Franconia.

The possession of this circle had, in the mean time, been disputed
with variable success, between Count Tilly and the Swedish General Horn,
whom Gustavus had left there with 8,000 men; and the Bishopric of Bamberg,
in particular, was at once the prize and the scene of their struggle.
Called away to the Rhine by his other projects, the king had left
to his general the chastisement of the bishop, whose perfidy had excited
his indignation, and the activity of Horn justified the choice.
In a short time, he subdued the greater part of the bishopric;
and the capital itself, abandoned by its imperial garrison,
was carried by storm.  The banished bishop urgently demanded assistance
from the Elector of Bavaria, who was at length persuaded to put an end
to Tilly's inactivity.  Fully empowered by his master's order
to restore the bishop to his possessions, this general collected his troops,
who were scattered over the Upper Palatinate, and with an army of 20,000 men
advanced upon Bamberg.  Firmly resolved to maintain his conquest
even against this overwhelming force, Horn awaited the enemy
within the walls of Bamberg; but was obliged to yield to the vanguard of Tilly
what he had thought to be able to dispute with his whole army.
A panic which suddenly seized his troops, and which no presence of mind
of their general could check, opened the gates to the enemy,
and it was with difficulty that the troops, baggage, and artillery,
were saved.  The reconquest of Bamberg was the fruit of this victory;
but Tilly, with all his activity, was unable to overtake the Swedish general,
who retired in good order behind the Maine.  The king's appearance
in Franconia, and his junction with Gustavus Horn at Kitzingen,
put a stop to Tilly's conquests, and compelled him to provide
for his own safety by a rapid retreat.

The king made a general review of his troops at Aschaffenburg.
After his junction with Gustavus Horn, Banner, and Duke William of Weimar,
they amounted to nearly 40,000 men.  His progress through Franconia
was uninterrupted; for Tilly, far too weak to encounter an enemy
so superior in numbers, had retreated, by rapid marches, towards the Danube.
Bohemia and Bavaria were now equally near to the king, and,
uncertain whither his victorious course might be directed,
Maximilian could form no immediate resolution.  The choice of the king,
and the fate of both provinces, now depended on the road
that should be left open to Count Tilly.  It was dangerous,
during the approach of so formidable an enemy, to leave Bavaria undefended,
in order to protect Austria; still more dangerous, by receiving Tilly
into Bavaria, to draw thither the enemy also, and to render it the seat
of a destructive war.  The cares of the sovereign finally overcame
the scruples of the statesman, and Tilly received orders, at all hazards,
to cover the frontiers of Bavaria with his army.

Nuremberg received with triumphant joy the protector of
the Protestant religion and German freedom, and the enthusiasm of the citizens
expressed itself on his arrival in loud transports of admiration and joy.
Even Gustavus could not contain his astonishment, to see himself in this city,
which was the very centre of Germany, where he had never expected
to be able to penetrate.  The noble appearance of his person,
completed the impression produced by his glorious exploits,
and the condescension with which he received the congratulations
of this free city won all hearts.  He now confirmed the alliance
he had concluded with it on the shores of the Baltic, and excited the citizens
to zealous activity and fraternal unity against the common enemy.
After a short stay in Nuremberg, he followed his army to the Danube,
and appeared unexpectedly before the frontier town of Donauwerth.
A numerous Bavarian garrison defended the place; and their commander,
Rodolph Maximilian, Duke of Saxe Lauenburg, showed at first
a resolute determination to defend it till the arrival of Tilly.
But the vigour with which Gustavus Adolphus prosecuted the siege,
soon compelled him to take measures for a speedy and secure retreat,
which amidst a tremendous fire from the Swedish artillery
he successfully executed.

The conquest of Donauwerth opened to the king the further side of the Danube,
and now the small river Lech alone separated him from Bavaria.
The immediate danger of his dominions aroused all Maximilian's activity;
and however little he had hitherto disturbed the enemy's progress
to his frontier, he now determined to dispute as resolutely
the remainder of their course.  On the opposite bank of the Lech,
near the small town of Rain, Tilly occupied a strongly fortified camp,
which, surrounded by three rivers, bade defiance to all attack.
All the bridges over the Lech were destroyed; the whole course of the stream
protected by strong garrisons as far as Augsburg; and that town itself,
which had long betrayed its impatience to follow the example
of Nuremberg and Frankfort, secured by a Bavarian garrison,
and the disarming of its inhabitants.  The Elector himself,
with all the troops he could collect, threw himself into Tilly's camp,
as if all his hopes centred on this single point, and here the good fortune
of the Swedes was to suffer shipwreck for ever.

Gustavus Adolphus, after subduing the whole territory of Augsburg,
on his own side of the river, and opening to his troops a rich supply
of necessaries from that quarter, soon appeared on the bank
opposite the Bavarian entrenchments.  It was now the month of March,
when the river, swollen by frequent rains, and the melting of the snow
from the mountains of the Tyrol, flowed full and rapid
between its steep banks.  Its boiling current threatened the rash assailants
with certain destruction, while from the opposite side the enemy's cannon
showed their murderous mouths.  If, in despite of the fury
both of fire and water, they should accomplish this almost impossible passage,
a fresh and vigorous enemy awaited the exhausted troops
in an impregnable camp; and when they needed repose and refreshment
they must prepare for battle.  With exhausted powers they must ascend
the hostile entrenchments, whose strength seemed to bid defiance
to every assault.  A defeat sustained upon this shore would be attended
with inevitable destruction, since the same stream which impeded their advance
would also cut off their retreat, if fortune should abandon them.

The Swedish council of war, which the king now assembled,
strongly urged upon him all these considerations, in order to deter him
from this dangerous undertaking.  The most intrepid were appalled,
and a troop of honourable warriors, who had grown gray in the field,
did not hesitate to express their alarm.  But the king's resolution was fixed.
"What!" said he to Gustavus Horn, who spoke for the rest,
"have we crossed the Baltic, and so many great rivers of Germany,
and shall we now be checked by a brook like the Lech?"  Gustavus had already,
at great personal risk, reconnoitred the whole country,
and discovered that his own side of the river was higher than the other,
and consequently gave a considerable advantage to the fire
of the Swedish artillery over that of the enemy.  With great presence of mind
he determined to profit by this circumstance.  At the point where
the left bank of the Lech forms an angle with the right, he immediately caused
three batteries to be erected, from which 72 field-pieces
maintained a cross fire upon the enemy.  While this tremendous cannonade
drove the Bavarians from the opposite bank, he caused to be erected
a bridge over the river with all possible rapidity.  A thick smoke,
kept up by burning wood and wet straw, concealed for some time the progress
of the work from the enemy, while the continued thunder of the cannon
overpowered the noise of the axes.  He kept alive by his own example
the courage of his troops, and discharged more than 60 cannon
with his own hand.  The cannonade was returned by the Bavarians
with equal vivacity for two hours, though with less effect,
as the Swedish batteries swept the lower opposite bank, while their height
served as a breast-work to their own troops.  In vain, therefore,
did the Bavarians attempt to destroy these works; the superior fire
of the Swedes threw them into disorder, and the bridge was completed
under their very eyes.  On this dreadful day, Tilly did every thing
in his power to encourage his troops; and no danger could drive him
from the bank.  At length he found the death which he sought,
a cannon ball shattered his leg; and Altringer, his brave companion-in-arms,
was, soon after, dangerously wounded in the head.  Deprived of
the animating presence of their two generals, the Bavarians gave way at last,
and Maximilian, in spite of his own judgment, was driven to adopt
a pusillanimous resolve.  Overcome by the persuasions of the dying Tilly,
whose wonted firmness was overpowered by the near approach of death,
he gave up his impregnable position for lost; and the discovery by the Swedes
of a ford, by which their cavalry were on the point of passing,
accelerated his inglorious retreat.  The same night, before a single soldier
of the enemy had crossed the Lech, he broke up his camp,
and, without giving time for the King to harass him in his march,
retreated in good order to Neuburgh and Ingolstadt.  With astonishment
did Gustavus Adolphus, who completed the passage of the river
on the following day behold the hostile camp abandoned;
and the Elector's flight surprised him still more, when he saw the strength
of the position he had quitted.  "Had I been the Bavarian," said he,
"though a cannon ball had carried away my beard and chin,
never would I have abandoned a position like this, and laid open my territory
to my enemies."

Bavaria now lay exposed to the conqueror; and, for the first time,
the tide of war, which had hitherto only beat against its frontier,
now flowed over its long spared and fertile fields.  Before, however,
the King proceeded to the conquest of these provinces,
he delivered the town of Augsburg from the yoke of Bavaria;
exacted an oath of allegiance from the citizens; and to secure its observance,
left a garrison in the town.  He then advanced, by rapid marches,
against Ingolstadt, in order, by the capture of this important fortress,
which the Elector covered with the greater part of his army,
to secure his conquests in Bavaria, and obtain a firm footing on the Danube.

Shortly after the appearance of the Swedish King before Ingolstadt,
the wounded Tilly, after experiencing the caprice of unstable fortune,
terminated his career within the walls of that town.  Conquered by
the superior generalship of Gustavus Adolphus, he lost,
at the close of his days, all the laurels of his earlier victories,
and appeased, by a series of misfortunes, the demands of justice,
and the avenging manes of Magdeburg.  In his death,
the Imperial army and that of the League sustained an irreparable loss;
the Roman Catholic religion was deprived of its most zealous defender,
and Maximilian of Bavaria of the most faithful of his servants,
who sealed his fidelity by his death, and even in his dying moments
fulfilled the duties of a general.  His last message to the Elector
was an urgent advice to take possession of Ratisbon, in order to maintain
the command of the Danube, and to keep open the communication with Bohemia.

With the confidence which was the natural fruit of so many victories,
Gustavus Adolphus commenced the siege of Ingolstadt, hoping to gain the town
by the fury of his first assault.  But the strength of its fortifications,
and the bravery of its garrison, presented obstacles greater
than any he had had to encounter since the battle of Breitenfeld,
and the walls of Ingolstadt were near putting an end to his career.
While reconnoitring the works, a 24-pounder killed his horse under him,
and he fell to the ground, while almost immediately afterwards
another ball struck his favourite, the young Margrave of Baden,
by his side.  With perfect self-possession the king rose,
and quieted the fears of his troops by immediately mounting another horse.

The occupation of Ratisbon by the Bavarians, who, by the advice of Tilly,
had surprised this town by stratagem, and placed in it a strong garrison,
quickly changed the king's plan of operations.  He had flattered himself
with the hope of gaining this town, which favoured the Protestant cause,
and to find in it an ally as devoted to him as Nuremberg, Augsburg,
and Frankfort.  Its seizure by the Bavarians seemed to postpone
for a long time the fulfilment of his favourite project of making himself
master of the Danube, and cutting off his adversaries' supplies from Bohemia.
He suddenly raised the siege of Ingolstadt, before which he had wasted
both his time and his troops, and penetrated into the interior of Bavaria,
in order to draw the Elector into that quarter for the defence
of his territories, and thus to strip the Danube of its defenders.

The whole country, as far as Munich, now lay open to the conqueror.
Mosburg, Landshut, and the whole territory of Freysingen, submitted;
nothing could resist his arms.  But if he met with no regular force
to oppose his progress, he had to contend against a still more implacable
enemy in the heart of every Bavarian -- religious fanaticism.
Soldiers who did not believe in the Pope were, in this country,
a new and unheard-of phenomenon; the blind zeal of the priests
represented them to the peasantry as monsters, the children of hell,
and their leader as Antichrist.  No wonder, then, if they thought themselves
released from all the ties of nature and humanity towards this brood of Satan,
and justified in committing the most savage atrocities upon them.
Woe to the Swedish soldier who fell into their hands!  All the torments
which inventive malice could devise were exercised upon these unhappy victims;
and the sight of their mangled bodies exasperated the army
to a fearful retaliation.  Gustavus Adolphus, alone, sullied the lustre
of his heroic character by no act of revenge; and the aversion which
the Bavarians felt towards his religion, far from making him depart
from the obligations of humanity towards that unfortunate people,
seemed to impose upon him the stricter duty to honour his religion
by a more constant clemency.