XXV. The idea of each modification of the human body does not
involve an adequate knowledge of the external body.
>>>>>Proof--We have shown that the idea of a modification of the
human body involves the nature of an external body, in so far as
that external body conditions the human body in a given manner.
But, in so far as the external body is an individual, which has
no reference to the human body, the knowledge or idea thereof is
in God (II. ix.), in so far as God is regarded as affected by
the idea of a further thing, which (II. vii.) is naturally prior
to the said external body. Wherefore an adequate knowledge of
the external body is not in God, in so far as he has the idea of
the modification of the human body; in other words, the idea of
the modification of the human body does not involve an adequate
knowledge of the external body. Q.E.D.
XXVI. The human mind does not perceive any external body as
actually existing, except through the ideas of the modifications
of its own body.
>>>>>Proof--If the human body is in no way affected by a given
external body, then (II. vii.) neither is the idea of the human
body, in other words, the human mind, affected in any way by the
idea of the existence of the said external body, nor does it in
any manner perceive its existence. But, in so far as the human
body is affected in any way by a given external body, thus far
(II. xvi. and Cor.) it perceives that external body. Q.E.D.
<<<<>>>>Proof--When the human mind regards external bodies through
the ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say that it
imagines (see II. xvii. note); now the mind can only imagine
external bodies as actually existing. Therefore (by II. xxv.),
in so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has not an
adequate knowledge of them. Q.E.D.
XXVII. The idea of each modification of the human body does not
involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.
>>>>>Proof--Every idea of a modification of the human body
involves the nature of the human body, in so far as the human
body is regarded as affected in a given manner (II. xvi.). But
inasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected
in many other ways, the idea of the said modification, &c.
Q.E.D.
XXVIII. The ideas of the modifications of the human body, in so
far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not clear
and distinct, but confused.
>>>>>Proof--The ideas of the modifications of the human body
involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies
(II. xvi.); they must involve the nature not only of the human
body but also of its parts; for the modifications are modes
(Post. iii.), whereby the parts of the human body, and,
consequently, the human body as a whole are affected. But (by
II. xxiv., xxv.) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, as
also of the parts composing the human body, is not in God, in
so far as he is regarded as affected by the human mind, but in
so far as he is regarded as affected by other ideas. These ideas
of modifications, in so far as they are referred to the human
mind alone, are as consequences without premisses, in other
words, confused ideas. Q.E.D.
*****Note--The idea which constitutes the nature of the human
mind is, in the same manner, proved not to be, when considered
in itself and alone, clear and distinct; as also is the case
with the idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of
the modifications of the human body, in so far as they are
referred to the mind only, as everyone may easily see.
XXIX. The idea of the idea of each modification of the human
body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human mind.
>>>>>Proof--The idea of a modification of the human body (II.
xxvii.) does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body,
in other words, does not adequately express its nature; that is
(II. xiii.) it does not agree with the nature of the mind
adequately; therefore (I. Ax. vi.) the idea of this idea does
not adequately express the nature of the human mind, or does not
involve an adequate knowledge thereof.
<<<<>>>>Proof--The duration of our body does not depend on its
essence (II. Ax. i.), nor on the absolute nature of God (I.
xxi.). But (I. xxviii.) it is conditioned to exist and operate
by causes, which in their turn are conditioned to exist and
operate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes, these
last again being conditioned by others, and so on to infinity.
The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of
nature, or the constitution of things. Now, however a thing may
be constituted, the adequate knowledge of that thing is in God,
in so far as he has the ideas of all things, and not in so far as
he has the idea of the human body only (II. ix. Cor.).
Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in God
very inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as constituting
the nature of the human mind; that is (II. xi. Cor.), this
knowledge is very inadequate to our mind. Q.E.D.
XXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the
duration of particular things external to ourselves.
>>>>>Proof--Every particular thing, like the human body, must be
conditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in
a fixed and definite relation; this other particular thing must
likewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity (I.
xxviii.). As we have shown in the foregoing proposition, from
this common property of particular things, we have only a very
inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body; we must draw a
similar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular
things, namely, that we can only have a very inadequate
knowledge of the duration thereof. Q.E.D.
<<<<>>>>Proof--All ideas which are in God agree in every respect
with their objects (II. ii. Cor.), therefore (I. Ax. vi.) they
are all true. Q.E.D.
XXXII. There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them to
be called false.
>>>>>Proof--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positive
mode of thinking, which should constitute the distinctive
quality of falsehood. Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God
(II. xxxii.); external to God it cannot be or be conceived (I.
xv.). Therefore there is nothing positive in ideas which causes
them to be called false. Q.E.D.
XXXIV. Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and
perfect, is true.
>>>>>Proof--When we say that an idea in us is adequate and
perfect, we say, in other words (II. xi. Cor.), that the idea is
adequate and perfect in God, in so far as he constitutes the
essence of our mind; consequently (II. xxxii.), we say that such
an idea is true. Q.E.D.
XXXV. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge, which
inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve.
>>>>>Proof--There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them
to be called false (II. xxxiii.); but falsity cannot consist in
simple privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err and to
be mistaken), neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, for
ignorance and error are not identical; wherefore it consists in
the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or
confused ideas involve. Q.E.D.
*****Note--In the note to II. xvii. I explained how error
consists in the privation of knowledge, but in order to throw
more light on the subject I will give an example. For instance,
men are mistaken in thinking themselves free; their opinion is
made up of consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of
the causes by which they are conditioned. Their idea of
freedom, therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for
their actions. As for their saying that human actions depend on
the will, this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond
thereto. What the will is, and how it moves the body, they none
of them know; those who boast of such knowledge, and feign
dwellings and habitations for the soul, are wont to provoke
either laughter or disgust. So, again, when we look at the sun,
we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet;
this error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the fact
that, while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun's true
distance or the cause of the fancy. For although we afterwards
learn, that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of
the earth's diameters, we none the less shall fancy it to be
near; for we do not imagine the sun as near us, because we are
ignorant of its true distance, but because the modification of
our body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as our said
body is affected thereby.
XXXVI. Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same
necessity, as adequate or clear and distinct ideas.
>>>>>Proof--All ideas are in God (I. xv.), and in so far as they
are referred to God are true (II. xxxii.) and (II. vii. Cor.)
adequate; therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate,
except in respect to a particular mind (cf. II. xxiv. and
xxviii.); therefore all ideas, whether adequate or inadequate,
follow by the same necessity (II. vi.). Q.E.D.
XXXVII. That which is common to all (cf. Lemma II, above), and
which is equally in a part and in the whole, does not constitute
the essence of any particular thing.
>>>>>Proof--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that it
constitutes the essence of some particular thing; for instance,
the essence of B. Then (II. Def. ii.) it cannot without B
either exist or be conceived; but this is against our hypothesis.
Therefore it does not appertain to B's essence, nor does it
constitute the essence of any particular thing. Q.E.D.
XXXVIII. Those things, which are common to all, and which are
equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived except
adequately.
>>>>>Proof--Let A be something, which is common to all bodies,
and which is equally present in the part of any given body and
in the whole. I say A cannot be conceived except adequately.
For the idea thereof in God will necessarily be adequate (II.
vii. Cor.), both in so far as God has the idea of the human
body, and also in so far as he has the idea of the modifications
of the human body, which (II. xvi., xxv., xxvii.) involve in part
the nature of the human body and the nature of external bodies;
that is (II. xii., xiii.), the idea in God will necessarily be
adequate, both in so far as he constitutes the human mind, and in
so far as he has the ideas, which are in the human mind.
Therefore the mind (II. xi. Cor.) necessarily perceives A
adequately, and has this adequate perception, both in so far as
it perceives itself, and in so far as it perceives its own or
any external body, nor can A be conceived in any other manner.
Q.E.D.
<<<<>>>>Proof--If A be that, which is common to and a property of
the human body and external bodies, and equally present in the
human body and in the said external bodies, in each part of each
external body and in the whole, there will be an adequate idea of
A in God (II. vii. Cor.), both in so far as he has the idea of
the human body, and in so far as he has the ideas of the given
external bodies. Let it now be granted, that the human body is
affected by an external body through that, which it has in common
therewith, namely, A; the idea of this modification will involve
the property A (II. xvi.), and therefore (II. vii. Cor.) the
idea of this modification, in so far as it involves the property
A, will be adequate in God, in so far as God is affected by the
idea of the human body; that is (II. xiii.), in so far as he
constitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore (II. xi.
Cor.) this idea is also adequate in the human mind. Q.E.D.
<<<<>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident. For when we say
that an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are
therein adequate, we say, in other words (II. xi. Cor.), that an
idea is in the divine intellect, whereof God is the cause, not in
so far as he is infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by the
ideas of very many particular things, but only in so far as he
constitutes the essence of the human mind.
*****Note I--I have thus set forth the cause of those notions,
which are common to all men, and which form the basis of our
ratiocinations. But there are other causes of certain axioms or
notions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this
method of ours; for it would thus appear what notions are more
useful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use at
all. Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all
men, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who
are unshackled by prejudice, and we should detect those which
are ill-founded. Again we should discern whence the notions
called "secondary" derived their origin, and consequently the
axioms on which they are founded, and other points of interest
connected with these questions. But I have decided to pass over
the subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another
treatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader by
too great prolixity. Nevertheless, in order not to omit
anything necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the
causes, whence are derived the terms styled "transcendental,"
such as Being, Thing, Something. These terms arose from the
fact, that the human body, being limited, is only capable of
distinctly forming a certain number of images (what an image is
I explained in the II. xvii. note) within itself at the same
time; if this number be exceeded, the images will begin to be
confused; if this number of images, of which the body is capable
of forming distinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all
will become entirely confused one with another. This being so,
it is evident (from II. Prop. xvii. Cor., and xviii.) that the
human mind can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously,
as its body can form images simultaneously. When the images
become quite confused in the body, the mind also imagines all
bodies confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend
them, as it were, under one attribute, namely, under the
attribute of Being, Thing, &c. The same conclusion can be drawn
from the fact that images are not always equally vivid, and from
other analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here;
for the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to
consider one only. All may be reduced to this, that these terms
represent ideas in the highest degree confused. From similar
causes arise those notions, which we call "general," such as
man, horse, dog, &c. They arise, to wit, from the fact that so
many images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in
the human mind, that the powers of imagination break down, not
indeed utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of
small differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, &c.)
and their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in
which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by
them, agree; for that is the point, in which each of the said
individuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses by
the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of
particular individuals. For, as we have said, it is unable to
imagine the definite number of individuals. We must, however,
bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all
men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as
the point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected
and which the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For
instance, those who have most often regarded with admiration the
stature of man, will by the name of man understand an animal of
erect stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some
other attribute, will form a different general image of man, for
instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two-footed animal
without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases,
everyone will form general images of things according to the
habit of his body.
It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers, who
seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed of
them, so many controversies should have arisen.
*****Note II--From all that has been said above it is clear, that
we, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions:--(1.)
From particular things represented to our intellect
fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses
(II. xxix. Cor.); I have settled to call such perceptions by the
name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience. (2.)
From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard
certain words we remember things and form certain ideas
concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine
things (II. xviii. Note). I shall call both these ways of
regarding things "knowledge of the first kind," "opinion," or
"imagination." (3.) From the fact that we have notions common
to all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of things (II.
xxxviii. Cor., xxxix. and Cor., and xl.); this I call "reason"
and "knowledge of the second kind." Besides these two kinds of
knowledge, there is, as I will hereafter show, a third kind of
knowledge, which we will call intuition. This kind of knowledge
proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of
certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the
essence of things. I will illustrate all three kinds of
knowledge by a single example. Three numbers are given for
finding a fourth, which shall be to the third as the second is
to the first. Tradesmen without hesitation multiply the second
by the third, and divide the product by the first; either
because they have not forgotten the rule which they received
from a master without any proof, or because they have often made
trial of it with simple numbers, or by virtue of the proof of
the nineteenth proposition of the seventh book of Euclid,
namely, in virtue of the general property of proportionals.
But with very simple numbers there is no need of this. For
instance, one, two, three being given, everyone can see that the
fourth proportional is six; and this is much clearer, because
we infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the
ratio, which the first bears to the second.
XLI. Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of falsity,
knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true.
>>>>>Proof--To knowledge of the first kind we have (in the
foregoing note) assigned all those ideas, which are inadequate
and confused; therefore this kind of knowledge is the only
source of falsity (II. xxxv.). Furthermore, we assigned to the
second and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are
adequate; therefore these kinds are necessarily true (II.
xxxiv.). Q.E.D.
XLII. Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not knowledge of
the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true from the
false.
>>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident. He, who knows how
to distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate
idea of true and false. That is (II. xl., note ii.), he must
know the true and the false by the second or third kind of
knowledge.
XLIII. He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that he has
a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing
perceived.
>>>>>Proof--A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in
God, in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the
human mind (II. xi. Cor.). Let us suppose that there is in God,
in so far as he is displayed through the human mind, an adequate
idea, A. The idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God,
and be referred to him in the same way as the idea A (by II.
xx., whereof the proof is of universal application). But the
idea A is supposed to be referred to God, in so far as he is
displayed through the human mind; therefore, the idea of the
idea A must be referred to God in the same manner; that is (by
II. xi. Cor.), the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the
mind, which has the adequate idea A; therefore he, who has an
adequate idea or knows a thing truly (II. xxxiv.), must at the
same time have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his
knowledge; that is, obviously, he must be assured. Q.E.D.
*****Note--I explained in the note to II. xxi. what is meant by
the idea of an idea; but we may remark that the foregoing
proposition is in itself sufficiently plain. No one, who has a
true idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest
certainty. For to have a true idea is only another expression
for knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible. No one,
indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is
something lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of
thinking--namely, the very act of understanding. And who, I
ask, can know that he understands anything, unless he do first
understand it? In other words, who can know that he is sure of
a thing, unless he be first sure of that thing? Further, what
can there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a
standard of truth? Even as light displays both itself and
darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity.
I think I have thus sufficiently answered these
questions--namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a false
idea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, a
true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea
(since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark);
consequently, neither will a man who has a true idea have any
advantage over him who has only false ideas. Further, how comes
it that men have false ideas? Lastly, how can anyone be sure,
that he has ideas which agree with their objects? These
questions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently
answered. The difference between a true idea and a false idea
is plain: from what was said in II. xxxv., the former is
related to the latter as being is to not-being. The causes of
falsity I have set forth very clearly in II. xix. and II. xxxv.
with the note. From what is there stated, the difference
between a man who has true ideas, and a man who has only false
ideas, is made apparent. As for the last question--as to how a
man can be sure that he has ideas that agree with their objects,
I have just pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his
knowledge arises from the simple fact, that he has an idea which
corresponds with its object--in other words, that truth is its
own standard. We may add that our mind, in so far as it
perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God
(II. xi. Cor.); therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the
mind are as necessarily true as the ideas of God.
XLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as
contingent, but as necessary.
>>>>>Proof--It is in the nature of reason to perceive things
truly (II. xli.), namely (I. Ax. vi.), as they are in
themselves--that is (I. xxix.), not as contingent, but as
necessary. Q.E.D.
<<<<>>>>Proof--It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not
as contingent, but as necessary (II. xliv.). Reason perceives
this necessity of things (II. xli.) truly--that is (I. Ax. vi.),
as it is in itself. But (I. xvi.) this necessity of things is
the very necessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, it
is in the nature of reason to regard things under this form of
eternity. We may add that the bases of reason are the notions
(II. xxxviii.), which answer to things common to all, and which
(II. xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence of any particular
thing: which must therefore be conceived without any relation to
time, under a certain form of eternity.
XLV. Every idea of every body, or of every particular thing
actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite
essence of God.
>>>>>Proof--The idea of a particular thing actually existing
necessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the
said thing (II. viii.). Now particular things cannot be
conceived without God (I. xv.); but, inasmuch as (II. vi.) they
have God for their cause, in so far as he is regarded under the
attribute of which the things in question are modes, their ideas
must necessarily involve (I. Ax. iv.) the conception of the
attributes of those ideas--that is (I. vi.), the eternal and
infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.
*****Note--By existence I do not here mean duration--that is,
existence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly, and as a
certain form of quantity. I am speaking of the very nature of
existence, which is assigned to particular things, because they
follow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal
necessity of God's nature (I. xvi.). I am speaking, I repeat,
of the very existence of particular things, in so far as they are
in God. For although each particular thing be conditioned by
another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force
whereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from
the eternal necessity of God's nature (cf. I. xxiv. Cor.).
XLVI. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God
which every idea involves is adequate and perfect.
>>>>>Proof--The proof of the last proposition is universal; and
whether a thing be considered as a part or a whole, the idea
thereof, whether of the whole or of a part (by the last Prop.),
will involve God's eternal and infinite essence. Wherefore,
that, which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence
of God, is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the
whole; therefore (II. xxxviii.) this knowledge will be adequate.
Q.E.D.
XLVII. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal
and infinite essence of God.
>>>>>Proof--The human mind has ideas (II. xxii.), from which (II.
xxiii.) it perceives itself and its own body (II. xix.) and
external bodies (II. xvi. Cor. i. and II. xvii.) as actually
existing; therefore (II. xlv. and xlvi.) it has an adequate
knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.
*****Note--Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the
eternity of God are known to all. Now as all things are in God,
and are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer
many things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that
third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II.
xl., and of the excellence and use of which we shall have
occasion to speak in Part V. Men have not so clear a knowledge
of God as they have of general notions, because they are unable
to imagine God as they do bodies, and also because they have
associated the name God with images of things that they are in
the habit of seeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing,
being, as they are, men, and continually affected by external
bodies. Many errors, in truth, can be traced to this head,
namely, that we do not apply names to things rightly. For
instance, when a man says that the lines drawn from the centre
of a circle to its circumference are not equal, he then, at all
events, assuredly attaches a meaning to the word circle different
from that assigned by mathematicians. So again, when men make
mistakes in calculation, they have one set of figures in their
mind, and another on the paper. If we could see into their
minds, they do not make a mistake; they seem to do so, because
we think, that they have the same numbers in their mind as they
have on the paper. If this were not so, we should not believe
them to be in error, any more than I thought that a man was in
error, whom I lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had
flown into a neighbour's hen, for his meaning seemed to me
sufficiently clear. Very many controversies have arisen from the
fact, that men do not rightly explain their meaning, or do not
rightly interpret the meaning of others. For, as a matter of
fact, as they flatly contradict themselves, they assume now one
side, now another, of the argument, so as to oppose the
opinions, which they consider mistaken and absurd in their
opponents.
XLVIII. In the mind there is no absolute or free will; but the
mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which has
also been determined by another cause, and this last by another
cause, and so on to infinity.
>>>>>Proof--The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought (II.
xi.), therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions (I.
xvii. Cor. ii.); in other words, it cannot have an absolute
faculty of positive or negative volition; but (by I. xxviii.) it
must be determined by a cause, which has also been determined by
another cause, and this last by another, &c. Q.E.D.
*****Note--In the same way it is proved, that there is in the
mind no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, &c.
Whence it follows, that these and similar faculties are either
entirely fictitious, or are merely abstract and general terms,
such as we are accustomed to put together from particular
things. Thus the intellect and the will stand in the same
relation to this or that idea, or this or that volition, as
"lapidity" to this or that stone, or as "man" to Peter and
Paul. The cause which leads men to consider themselves free has
been set forth in the Appendix to Part I. But, before I proceed
further, I would here remark that, by the will to affirm and
decide, I mean the faculty, not the desire. I mean, I repeat,
the faculty, whereby the mind affirms or denies what is true or
false, not the desire, wherewith the mind wishes for or turns
away from any given thing. After we have proved, that these
faculties of ours are general notions, which cannot be
distinguished from the particular instances on which they are
based, we must inquire whether volitions themselves are anything
besides the ideas of things. We must inquire, I say, whether
there is in the mind any affirmation or negation beyond that,
which the idea, in so far as it is an idea, involves. On which
subject see the following proposition, and II. Def. iii., lest
the idea of pictures should suggest itself. For by ideas I do
not mean images such as are formed at the back of the eye, or in
the midst of the brain, but the conceptions of thought.
XLIX. There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and
negation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea,
involves.
>>>>>Proof--There is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive
or negative volition, but only particular volitions, namely,
this or that affirmation, and this or that negation. Now let us
conceive a particular volition, namely, the mode of thinking
whereby the mind affirms, that the three interior angles of a
triangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmation
involves the conception or idea of a triangle, that is, without
the idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived. It is the same
thing to say, that the concept A must involve the concept B, as
it is to say, that A cannot be conceived without B. Further,
this affirmation cannot be made (II. Ax. iii.) without the idea
of a triangle. Therefore, this affirmation can neither be nor
be conceived, without the idea of a triangle. Again, this idea
of a triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely, that
its three interior angles are equal to two right angles.
Wherefore, and vice versa, this idea of a triangle can neither be
nor be conceived without this affirmation, therefore, this
affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle,
and is nothing besides. What we have said of this volition
(inasmuch as we have selected it at random) may be said of any
other volition, namely, that it is nothing but an idea. Q.E.D.
<<<<>>>>Proof--Will and understanding are nothing beyond the
individual volitions and ideas (II. xlviii. and note). But a
particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same
(by the foregoing Prop.); therefore, will and understanding are
one and the same. Q.E.D.
*****Note--We have thus removed the cause which is commonly
assigned for error. For we have shown above, that falsity
consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas
which are fragmentary and confused. Wherefore, a false idea,
inasmuch as it is false, does not involve certainty. When we
say, then, that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that he
has no doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain,
but only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what
is false, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which should cause
his imagination to waver (see II. xliv. note). Thus, although
the man be assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall never
say that he is certain. For by certainty we mean something
positive (II. xliii. and note), not merely the absence of doubt.
However, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully
explained, I will draw attention to a few additional points, and
I will furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced
against our doctrine. Lastly, in order to remove every scruple,
I have thought it worth while to point out some of the
advantages, which follow therefrom. I say "some," for they will
be better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth
part.
I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to make
an accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of the
mind, and the images of things which we imagine. It is further
necessary that they should distinguish between idea and words,
whereby we signify things. These three--namely, images, words,
and ideas--are by many persons either entirely confused
together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care,
and hence people are generally in ignorance, how absolutely
necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will, both for
philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life. Those
who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by
contact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas
of those things, whereof we can form no mental picture, are not
ideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree of
our will; they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate
pictures on a panel, and, filled with this misconception, do not
see that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an
affirmation or negation. Again, those who confuse words with
ideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves, think
that they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm,
or deny. This misconception will easily be laid aside by one,
who reflects on the nature of knowledge, and seeing that it in
no wise involves the conception of extension, will therefore
clearly understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does
not consist in the image of anything, nor in words. The essence
of words and images is put together by bodily motions, which in
no wise involve the conception of thought.
These few words on this subject will suffice: I will therefore
pass on to consider the objections, which may be raised against
our doctrine. Of these, the first is advanced by those, who
think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding, and
that therefore it is different therefrom. The reason for their
holding the belief, that the will has wider scope than the
understanding, is that they assert, that they have no need of an
increase in their faculty of assent, that is of affirmation or
negation, in order to assent to an infinity of things which we
do not perceive, but that they have need of an increase in their
faculty of understanding. The will is thus distinguished from
the intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite.
Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us
especially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment
before assenting to things which we perceive; this is confirmed
by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as he
perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or
dissents.
For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not therefore
admit that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not deceived,
unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does exist.
Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by experience,
than that the will or faculty of assent is free and different
from the faculty of understanding. Thirdly, it may be objected
that one affirmation does not apparently contain more reality
than another; in other words, that we do not seem to need for
affirming, that what is true is true, any greater power than for
affirming, that what is false is true. We have, however, seen
that one idea has more reality or perfection than another, for
as objects are some more excellent than others, so also are the
ideas of them some more excellent than others; this also seems
to point to a difference between the understanding and the will.
Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from free
will, what will happen if the incentives to action are equally
balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass? Will he perish of
hunger and thirst? If I say that he would not, he would then
determine his own action, and would consequently possess the
faculty of going and doing whatever he liked. Other objections
might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence
everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the
task of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as
possible.
To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will has a
wider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding be
meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will
has a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of
forming conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volition
should be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling:
for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an
infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot
affirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by
the same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an
infinite number of bodies. If it be said that there is an
infinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer,
that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor,
consequently, by any faculty of volition. But, it may still be
urged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive
them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of
perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have
already. This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bring
it about that we should understand an infinite number of other
entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater
understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that
which we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities.
We have shown that will is a universal entity or idea, whereby
we explain all particular volitions--in other words, that which
is common to all such volitions.
As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or
universal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to be
wondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself
into the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding: for
what is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an
infinite number of individuals.
To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a free
power of suspending our judgment: for, when we say that anyone
suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that he does
not perceive the matter in question adequately. Suspension of
judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a perception, and not
free will. In order to illustrate the point, let us suppose a
boy imagining a horse, and perceive nothing else. Inasmuch as
this imagination involves the existence of the horse (II. xvii.
Cor.), and the boy does not perceive anything which would
exclude the existence of the horse, he will necessarily regard
the horse as present: he will not be able to doubt of its
existence, although he be not certain thereof. We have daily
experience of such a state of things in dreams; and I do not
suppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that, while he
is dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his judgment
concerning the things in his dream, and bringing it about that
he should not dream those things, which he dreams that he sees;
yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we suspend
our judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming.
Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as actual
perception extends--that is, I grant that the mind's
imaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error (II.
xvii. note); but I deny, that a man does not, in the act of
perception, make any affirmation. For what is the perception of
a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings? If the
mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would
regard the same as present to itself: it would have no reasons
for doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unless
the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which
precludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the mind
perceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse is
inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the
existence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on
the subject.
I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third objection,
namely, that the will is something universal which is predicated
of all ideas, and that it only signifies that which is common to
all ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequate essence must,
therefore, in so far as it is thus conceived in the abstract, be
in every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the same in all,
not in so far as it is considered as constituting the idea's
essence: for, in this respect, particular affirmations differ
one from the other, as much as do ideas. For instance, the
affirmation which involves the idea of a circle, differs from
that which involves the idea of a triangle, as much as the idea
of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle.
Further, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal power
of thinking, to affirm that that which is true is true, and to
affirm that that which is false is true. These two
affirmations, if we regard the mind, are in the same relation to
one another as being and not-being; for there is nothing
positive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality of
falsehood (II. xxxv. note, and xlvii. note).
We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when we
confuse universals with singulars, and the entities of reason
and abstractions with realities. As for the fourth objection, I
am quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium
described (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst,
a certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant from
him) would die of hunger and thirst. If I am asked, whether such
an one should not rather be considered an ass than a man; I
answer, that I do not know, neither do I know how a man should
be considered, who hangs himself, or how we should consider
children, fools, madmen, &c.
It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this
doctrine as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gathered
from what has been said. The doctrine is good,
1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the
decree of God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and so
much the more, as we perform more perfect actions and more and
more understand God. Such a doctrine not only completely
tranquilizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highest
happiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge of
God, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid
us. We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true
estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God
with high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as
for having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and the
service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.
