XXX. If anyone has done something which he conceives
as affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by
pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in
other words, he will regard himself with pleasure.  On the
other hand, if he has done anything which he conceives as
affecting others painfully, he will regard himself with pain.

>>>>>Proof--He who conceives, that he affects others
with pleasure or pain, will, by that very fact, himself be
affected with pleasure or pain (III. xxvii.), but, as a man (II.
xix. and xxiii.) is conscious of himself through the modifications
whereby he is determined to action, it follows that he who
conceives, that he affects others pleasurably, will be affected
with pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in
other words, he will regard himself with pleasure.  And so
"mutatis mutandis" in the case of pain.  Q.E.D.

*****Note--As love (III. xiii.) is pleasure accompanied by
the idea of an external cause, and hatred is pain accompanied
by the idea of an external cause; the pleasure and pain in
question will be a species of love and hatred.  But, as the terms
love and hatred are used in reference to external objects, we
will employ other names for the emotions now under discussion:
pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause we will
style "Honour," and the emotion contrary thereto we will style
"Shame":  I mean in such cases as where pleasure or pain
arises from a man's belief, that he is being praised or blamed:
otherwise pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external
cause is called "self-complacency," and its contrary pain is
called "repentance."  Again, as it may happen (II. xvii. Cor.)
that the pleasure, wherewith a man conceives that he affects
others, may exist solely in his own imagination, and as (III.
xxv.) everyone endeavours to conceive concerning himself
that which he conceives will affect him with pleasure, it may
easily come to pass that a vain man may be proud and may
imagine that he is pleasing to all, when in reality he may be
an annoyance to all.

XXXI. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates
anything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall
thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast
love, &c.  On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks
from something that we love, we shall undergo vacillations
of soul.

>>>>>Proof--From the mere fact of conceiving that anyone
loves anything we shall ourselves love that thing (III. xxvii.):
but we are assumed to love it already; there is, therefore, a
new cause of love, whereby our former emotion is fostered;
hence we shall thereupon love it more steadfastly.  Again,
from the mere fact of conceiving that anyone shrinks from
anything, we shall ourselves shrink from that thing (III. xxvii.).
If we assume that we at the same time love it, we shall then
simultaneously love it and shrink from it; in other words, we
shall be subject to vacillation (III. xvii. note).  Q.E.D.

<<<<>>>>Proof--From the mere fact of our conceiving that another
person takes delight in a thing (III. xxvii. and Cor.) we shall
ourselves love that thing and desire to take delight therein.  But
we assumed that the pleasure in question would be prevented by
another's delight in its object; we shall, therefore, endeavour to
prevent his possession thereof (III. xxviii.).  Q.E.D.

*****Note--We thus see that man's nature is generally so
constituted, that he takes pity on those who fare ill, and envies
those who fare well with an amount of hatred proportioned to
his own love for the goods in their possession.  Further, we see
that from the same property of human nature, whence it follows
that men are merciful, it follows also that they are envious and
ambitious.  Lastly, if we make appeal to Experience, we shall
find that she entirely confirms what we have said; more especially
if we turn our attention to the first years of our life.  We find that
children, whose body is continually, as it were, in equilibrium,
laugh or cry simply because they see others laughing or crying;
moreover, they desire forthwith to imitate whatever they see
others doing, and to possess themselves of whatever they
conceive as delighting others:  inasmuch as the images of things
are, as we have said, modifications of the human body, or
modes wherein the human body is affected and disposed by
external causes to act in this or that manner.

XXXIII. When we love a thing similar to ourselves we endeavour,
as far as we can, to bring about that it should love us in return.

>>>>>Proof--That which we love we endeavour, as far as we
can, to conceive in preference to anything else (III. xii.).  If the
thing be similar to ourselves, we shall endeavour to affect it
pleasurably in preference to anything else (III. xxix.).  In other
words, we shall endeavour, as far as we can, to bring it about,
that the thing should be affected with pleasure accompanied by
the idea of ourselves, that is (III. xiii. note), that it should love
us in return.  Q.E.D.

XXXIV. The greater the emotion with which we conceive a
loved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be our
complacency.

>>>>>Proof--We endeavour (III. xxxiii.), as far as we can, to
bring about, that what we love should love us in return:  in other
words, that what we love should be affected with pleasure
accompanied by the idea of ourself as cause.  Therefore, in
proportion as the loved object is more pleasurably affected
because of us, our endeavour will be assisted. --that is (III. xi.
and note) the greater will be our pleasure.  But when we take
pleasure in the fact, that we pleasurably affect something similar
to ourselves, we regard ourselves with pleasure (III. xxx);
therefore the greater the emotion with which we conceive a
loved object to be affected, &c.  Q.E.D.

XXXV. If anyone conceives, that an object of his love joins
itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he himself
has attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards the
loved object and with envy towards his rival.

>>>>>Proof--In proportion as a man thinks, that a loved
object is well affected towards him, will be the strength of
his self-approval (by the last Prop.), that is (III. xxx. note),
of his pleasure; he will, therefore (III. xxviii.), endeavour,
as far as he can, to imagine the loved object as most closely
bound to him:  this endeavour or desire will be increased, if
he thinks that someone else has a similar desire (III. xxxi.).
But this endeavour or desire is assumed to be checked by
the image of the loved object in conjunction with the image
of him whom the loved object has joined to itself; therefore
(III. xi. note) he will for that reason be affected with pain,
accompanied by the idea of the loved object as a cause in
conjunction with the image of his rival; that is, he will be
(III. xiii.) affected with hatred towards the loved object
and also towards his rival (III. xv. Cor.), which latter he
will envy as enjoying the beloved object.  Q.E.D.

*****Note--This hatred towards an object of love joined
with envy is called "Jealousy," which accordingly is nothing
else but a wavering of the disposition arising from combined
love and hatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival who
is envied.  Further, this hatred towards the object of love will
be greater, in proportion to the pleasure which the jealous
man had been wont to derive from the reciprocated love of
the said object; and also in proportion to the feelings he had
previously entertained towards his rival.  If he had hated him,
he will forthwith hate the object of his love, because he
conceives it is pleasurably affected by one whom he himself
hates:  and also because he is compelled to associate the image
of his loved one with the image of him whom he hates.  This
condition generally comes into play in the case of love for a
woman:  for he who thinks, that a woman whom he loves
prostitutes herself to another, will feel pain, not only because
his own desire is restrained, but also because, being compelled
to associate the image of her he loves with the parts of shame
and the excreta of another, he therefore shrinks from her.

We must add, that a jealous man is not greeted by his beloved
with the same joyful countenance as before, and this also gives
him pain as a lover, as I will now show.

XXXVI. He who remembers a thing, in which he has once taken
delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances as
when he first took delight therein.

>>>>>Proof--Everything, which a man has seen in conjunction
with the object of his love, will be to him accidentally a cause of
pleasure (III. xv.); he will, therefore, desire to possess it, in
conjunction with that wherein he has taken delight; in other words,
he will desire to possess the object of his love under the same
circumstances as when he first took delight therein.  Q.E.D.

<<<<>>>>Proof--For, in so far as he finds some circumstance to
be missing, he conceives something which excludes its existence.
As he is assumed to be desirous for love's sake of that thing or
circumstance (by the last Prop.), he will, in so far as he conceives
it to be missing, feel pain (III. xix.).  Q.E.D.

*****This pain, in so far as it has reference to the absence of
the object of love, is called "Regret."

XXXVII. Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or
love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.

>>>>>Proof--Pain diminishes or constrains a man's power
of activity (III. xi. note), in other words (III. vii.), diminishes or
constrains the effort, wherewith he endeavours to persist in his
own being; therefore (III. v.) it is contrary to the said endeavour:
thus all the endeavours of a man affected by pain are directed
to removing that pain.  But (by the definition of pain), in proportion
as the pain is greater, so also is it necessarily opposed to a greater
part of man's power of activity; therefore the greater the pain,
the greater the power of activity employed to remove it; that is,
the greater will be the desire or appetite in endeavouring to
remove it.  Again, since pleasure (III. xi. note) increases or aids
a man's power of activity, it may easily be shown in like manner,
that a man affected by pleasure has no desire further than to
preserve it, and his desire will be in proportion to the magnitude
of the pleasure.

Lastly, since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain
and pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavour, appetite,
or desire, which arises through hatred or love, will be greater in
proportion to the hatred or love.  Q.E.D.

XXXVIII. If a man has begun to hate an object of his love, so
that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being equal,
regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it, and
his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his former love.

>>>>>Proof--If a man begins to hate that which he had loved,
more of his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never
loved it.  For love is a pleasure (III. xiii. note) which a man
endeavours as far as he can to render permanent (III. xxviii.);
he does so by regarding the object of his love as present, and
by affecting it as far as he can pleasurably; this endeavour is
greater in proportion as the love is greater, and so also is the
endeavour to bring about that the beloved should return his
affection (III. xxxiii.).  Now these endeavours are constrained
by hatred towards the object of love (III. xiii. Cor. and III. xxiii.);
wherefore the love (III. xi. note) will for this cause also be
affected with pain, the more so in proportion as his love has
been greater; that is, in addition to the pain caused by hatred,
there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the object;
wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater pain,
or in other words, will hate it more than if he had never loved
it, and with the more intensity in proportion as his former love
was greater.  Q.E.D.

XXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an
injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue
to himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the
same law, seek to benefit him.

>>>>>Proof--To hate a man is (III. xiii. note) to conceive him
as a cause of pain; therefore he who hates a man will endeavour
to remove or destroy him.  But if anything more painful, or, in
other words, a greater evil, should accrue to the hater thereby
--and if the hater thinks he can avoid such evil by not carrying
out the injury, which he planned against the object of his hatred
--he will desire to abstain from inflicting that injury (III. xxviii.),
and the strength of his endeavour (III. xxxvii.) will be greater
than his former endeavour to do injury, and will therefore prevail
over it, as we asserted.  The second part of this proof proceeds
in the same manner.  Wherefore he who hates another, etc.
Q.E.D.

*****Note--By "good" I here mean every kind of pleasure,
and all that conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies our
longings, whatsoever they may be.  By "evil," I mean every kind
of pain, especially that which frustrates our longings.  For I have
shown (III. ix. note) that we in no case desire a thing because we
deem it good, but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good because
we desire it:  consequently we deem evil that which we shrink
from; everyone, therefore, according to his particular emotions,
judges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better,
what is worse, lastly, what is best, and what is worst.  Thus a
miser thinks that abundance of money is the best, and want of
money the worst; an ambitious man desires nothing so much as
glory, and fears nothing so much as shame.  To an envious man
nothing is more delightful than another's misfortune, and nothing
more painful than another's success.  So every man, according
to his emotions, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful or
useless.  The emotion, which induces a man to turn from that
which he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, is
called "timidity," which may accordingly be defined as "the fear
whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as
future by encountering a lesser evil" (III. xxviii.).  But if the evil
which he fears be shame, timidity becomes "bashfulness."
Lastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the
fear of another evil, so that the man knows not which to choose,
fear becomes "consternation," especially if both the evils feared
be very great.

XL. He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and
believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate
that other in return.

>>>>>Proof--He who conceives another as affected with
hatred, will thereupon be affected himself with hatred (III.
xxvii.), that is, with pain, accompanied by the idea of an
external cause.  But, by the hypothesis, he conceives no
cause for this pain except him who is his enemy; therefore,
from conceiving that he is hated by some one, he will be
affected with pain, accompanied by the idea of his enemy;
in other words, he will hate his enemy in return.  Q.E.D.

*****Note--He who thinks that he has given just cause for
hatred will (III. xxx. and note) be affected with shame; but
this case (III. xxv.) rarely happens.  This reciprocation of hatred
may also arise from the hatred, which follows an endeavour to
injure the object of our hate (III. xxxix.).  He therefore who
conceives that he is hated by another will conceive his enemy
as the cause of some evil or pain; thus he will be affected with
pain or fear, accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause;
in other words, he will be affected with hatred towards his
enemy, as I said above.

<<<<>>>>Proof--He who conceives, that another hates him, will
(by the last proposition) hate his enemy in return, and (III. xxvi.)
will endeavour to recall everything which can affect him painfully;
he will moreover endeavour to do him an injury (III. xxxix.).
Now the first thing of this sort which he conceives is the injury
done to himself; he will, therefore, forthwith endeavour to repay
it in kind.  Q.E.D.

*****Note--The endeavour to injure one whom we hate is
called "Anger;" the endeavour to repay in kind injury done to
ourselves is called "Revenge."

XLI.  If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and
believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love
that other in return.  (Cf. XIII. xv. Cor., and III. xvi.)

>>>>>Proof--This proposition is proved in the same way as
the preceding one.  See also the note appended thereto.

*****Note--If he believes that he has given just cause for the
love, he will take pride therein (III. xxx. and note); this is what
most often happens (III. xxv.), and we said that its contrary
took place whenever a man conceives himself to be hated by
another.  (See note to preceding proposition.)  This reciprocal
love, and consequently the desire of benefiting him who loves
us (III. xxxix.), and who endeavours to benefit us, is called
"gratitude" or "thankfulness."  It thus appears that men are much
more prone to take vengeance than to return benefits.

<<<<>>>>Proof--When a man loves something similar to himself,
he endeavours, as far as he can, to bring it about that he should
be loved thereby in return (III. xxxiii.).  Therefore he who has
conferred a benefit confers it in obedience to the desire, which
he feels of being loved in return; that is (III. xxxiv.) from the hope
of honour or (III. xxx. note) pleasure; hence he will endeavour,
as far as he can, to conceive this cause of honour, or to regard
it as actually existing.  But, by the hypothesis, he conceives
something else, which excludes the existence of the said cause
of honour:  wherefore he will thereat feel pain (III. xix.).  Q.E.D.

XLIII. Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can on
the other hand be destroyed by love.

>>>>>Proof--He who conceives, that an object of his hatred
hates him in return, will thereupon feel a new hatred, while the
former hatred (by hypothesis) still remains (III. xl.).  But if, on
the other hand, he conceives that the object of hate loves him,
he will to this extent (III. xxxviii.) regard himself with pleasure,
and (III. xxix.) will endeavour to please the cause of his emotion.
In other words, he will endeavour not to hate him (III. xli.), and
not to affect him painfully; this endeavour (III. xxxvii.) will be
greater or less in proportion to the emotion from which it arises.
Therefore, if it be greater than that which arises from hatred,
and through which the man endeavours to affect painfully the
thing which he hates, it will get the better of it and banish the
hatred from his mind.  Q.E.D.

XLIV. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes
into love:  and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not
preceded it.

>>>>>Proof--The proof proceeds in the same way as Prop.
xxxviii. of this Part:  for he who begins to love a thing, which he
was wont to hate or regard with pain, from the very fact of
loving feels pleasure.  To this pleasure involved in love is added
the pleasure arising from aid given to the endeavour to remove
the pain involved in hatred (III. xxxvii.), accompanied by the
idea of the former object of hatred as cause.

*****Note--Though this be so, no one will endeavour to hate
anything, or to be affected with pain, for the sake of enjoying
this greater pleasure; that is, no one will desire that he should
be injured, in the hope of recovering from the injury, nor long
to be ill for the sake of getting well.  For everyone will always
endeavour to persist in his being, and to ward off pain as far as
he can.  If the contrary is conceivable, namely, that a man should
desire to hate someone, in order that he might love him the more
thereafter, he will always desire to hate him.  For the strength of
love is in proportion to the strength of the hatred, wherefore the
man would desire, that the hatred be continually increased more
and more, and, for a similar reason, he would desire to become
more and more ill, in order that he might take a greater pleasure
in being restored to health:  in such a case he would always
endeavour to be ill, which (III. vi.) is absurd.

XLV.  If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself hates
anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will hate that
person.

>>>>>Proof--The beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards
him who hates it (III. xl.); therefore the lover, in conceiving that
anyone hates the beloved object, conceives the beloved thing as
affected by hatred, in other words (III. xiii.), by pain; consequently
he is himself affected by pain accompanied by the idea of the
hater of the beloved thing as cause; that is, he will hate him who
hates anything which he himself loves (III. xiii. note). Q.E.D.

XLVI. If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by
anyone, of a class or nation different from his own, and if the
pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said
stranger as cause, under the general category of the class or
nation:  the man will feel love or hatred, not only to the individual
stranger, but also to the whole class or nation whereto he belongs.

>>>>>Proof--This is evident from III. xvi.

XLVII. Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate is
destroyed, or suffers other injury, is never unaccompanied by
a certain pain in us.

>>>>>Proof--This is evident from III. xxvii.  For in so far as
we conceive a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain,
we ourselves feel pain.

*****Note--This proposition can also be proved from the
Corollary to II. xvii.  Whenever we remember anything, even
if it does not actually exist, we regard it only as present, and
the body is affected in the same manner; wherefore, in so far
as the remembrance of the thing is strong, a man is determined
to regard it with pain; this determination, while the image of the
thing in question lasts, is indeed checked by the remembrance
of other things excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing,
but is not destroyed:  hence, a man only feels pleasure in so
far as the said determination is checked:  for this reason the
joy arising from the injury done to what we hate is repeated,
every time we remember that object of hatred.  For, as we
have said, when the image of the thing in question, is aroused,
inasmuch as it involves the thing's existence, it determines the
man to regard the thing with the same pain as he was wont to
do, when it actually did exist.  However, since he has joined
to the image of the thing other images, which exclude its
existence, this determination to pain is forthwith checked, and
the man rejoices afresh as often as the repetition takes place.
This is the cause of men's pleasure in recalling past evils, and
delight in narrating dangers from which they have escaped.
For when men conceive a danger, they conceive it as still future,
and are determined to fear it; this determination is checked
afresh by the idea of freedom, which became associated with
the idea of the danger when they escaped therefrom:
this renders them secure afresh:  therefore they rejoice afresh.

XLVIII. Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is destroyed,
if the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain involved in the
latter emotion, be associated with the idea of another cause:  and
will be diminished in proportion as we conceive Peter not to have
been the sole cause of either emotion.

>>>>>Proof--This Prop. is evident from the mere definition
of love and hatred (III. xiii. note).  For pleasure is called love
towards Peter, and pain is called hatred towards Peter, simply
in so far as Peter is regarded as the cause of one emotion or the
other.  When this condition of causality is either wholly or partly
removed, the emotion towards Peter also wholly or in part
vanishes.  Q.E.D.

XLIX.  Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive
to be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than
if it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity.

>>>>>Proof--A thing which we conceive as free must (I. Def.
vii.) be perceived through itself without anything else.  If, therefore,
we conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain, we shall therefore
(III. xiii. note) love it or hate it, and shall do so with the utmost
love or hatred that can arise from the given emotion.  But if the
thing which causes the emotion be conceived as acting by
necessity, we shall then (by the same Def. vii. Part I.) conceive
it not as the sole cause, but as one of the causes of the emotion,
and therefore our love or hatred towards it will be less.  Q.E.D.

*****Note--Hence it follows, that men, thinking themselves
to be free, feel more love or hatred towards one another than
towards anything else:  to this consideration we must add the
imitation of emotions treated of in III. xxvii., xxxiv., xl. and xliii.

L. Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope or
fear.

>>>>>Proof--This proposition is proved in the same way as
III. xv., which see, together with the note to III. xviii.

*****Note--Things which are accidentally the causes of hope
or fear are called good or evil omens.  Now, in so far as such
omens are the cause of hope or fear, they are (by the definitions
of hope and fear given in III. xviii. note) the causes also of
pleasure and pain; consequently we, to this extent, regard them
with love or hatred, and endeavour either to invoke them as
means towards that which we hope for, or to remove them as
obstacles, or causes of that which we fear.  It follows, further,
from III. xxv., that we are naturally so constituted as to believe
readily in that which we hope for, and with difficulty in that which
we fear; moreover, we are apt to estimate such objects above
or below their true value.  Hence there have arisen superstitions,
whereby men are everywhere assailed.  However, I do not
think it worth while to point out here the vacillations springing
from hope and fear; it follows from the definition of these
emotions, that there can be no hope without fear, and no fear
without hope, as I will duly explain in the proper place.  Further,
in so far as we hope for or fear anything, we regard it with love
or hatred; thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear
what we have said concerning love and hatred.

LI. Different men may be differently affected by the same object,
and the same man may be differently affected at different times
by the same object.

>>>>>Proof--The human body is affected by external bodies
in a variety of ways (II. Post. iii.).  Two men may therefore be
differently affected at the same time, and therefore (by Ax. i.
after Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) may be differently affected by one
and the same object.  Further (by the same Post.) the human
body can be affected sometimes in one way, sometimes in another;
consequently (by the same Axiom) it may be differently affected
at different times by one and the same object.  Q.E.D.

*****Note--We thus see that it is possible, that what one man
loves another may hate, and that what one man fears another may
not fear; or, again, that one and the same man may love what he
once hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on.
Again, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good,
what bad, what better, and what worse (III. xxxix. note), it follows
that men's judgments may vary no less than their emotions*, hence
when we compare some with others, we distinguish them solely
by the diversity of their emotions, and style some intrepid, others
timid, others by some other epithet.  For instance, I shall call a
man "intrepid," if he despises an evil which I am accustomed to
fear; if I further take into consideration, that, in his desire to injure
his enemies and to benefit those whom he loves, he is not
restrained by the fear of an evil which is sufficient to restrain me,
I shall call him "daring."  Again, a man will appear "timid" to me,
if he fears an evil which I am accustomed to despise; and if I
further take into consideration that his desire is restrained by the
fear of an evil, which is not sufficient to restrain me, I shall say
that he is "cowardly;" and in like manner will everyone pass
judgment.
[*This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine
intellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.]

Lastly, from this inconstancy in the nature of human judgment,
inasmuch as a man often judges things solely by his emotions,
and inasmuch as the things which he believes cause pleasure or
pain, and therefore endeavours to promote or prevent, are often
purely imaginary, not to speak of the uncertainty of things alluded
to in III. xxviii.; we may readily conceive that a man may be at
one time affected with pleasure, and at another with pain,
accompanied by the idea of himself as cause.  Thus we can easily
understand what are "Repentance" and "Self-complacency."
"Repentance" is "pain, accompanied by the idea of one's self as
cause;" "Self-complacency" is "pleasure, accompanied by the
idea of one's self as cause," and these emotions are most intense
because men believe themselves to be free (III. xlix.).

LII. An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction with
others, and which we do not conceive to have any property that
is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so long,
as an object which we conceive to have some property peculiar
to itself.

>>>>>Proof--As soon as we conceive an object which we have
seen in conjunction with others, we at once remember those
others (II. xviii. and note), and thus we pass forthwith from the
contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another
object.  And this is the case with the object, which we conceive
to have no property that is not common to many.  For we
thereupon assume that we are regarding therein nothing, which
we have not before seen in conjunction with other objects.
But when we suppose that we conceive an object something
special, which we have never seen before, we must needs say
that the mind, while regarding that object, has in itself nothing
which it can fall to regarding instead thereof; therefore it is
determined to the contemplation of that object only.  Therefore
an object, &c.  Q.E.D.

*****Note--This mental modification, or imagination of a
particular thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is called
"Wonder;" but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is called
"Consternation," because wonder at an evil keeps a man so
engrossed in the simple contemplation thereof, that he has no
power to think of anything else whereby he might avoid the
evil.  If, however, the object of wonder be a man's prudence,
industry, or anything of that sort, inasmuch as the said man,
is thereby regarded as far surpassing ourselves, wonder is
called "Veneration;" otherwise, if a man's anger, envy, &c.,
be what we wonder at, the emotion is called "Horror."  Again,
if it be the prudence, industry, or what not, of a man we love,
that we wonder at, our love will on this account be the greater
(III. xii.), and when joined to wonder or veneration is called
"Devotion."  We may in like manner conceive hatred, hope,
confidence, and the other emotions, as associated with wonder;
and we should thus be able to deduce more emotions than
those which have obtained names in ordinary speech.  Whence
it is evident, that the names of the emotions have been applied
in accordance rather with their ordinary manifestations than with
an accurate knowledge of their nature.

To wonder is opposed "Contempt," which generally arises
 from the fact that, because we see someone wondering at,
loving, or fearing something, or because something, at first sight,
appears to be like things, which we ourselves wonder at, love,
fear, &c., we are, in consequence (III. xv. Cor. and III. xxvii.),
determined to wonder at, love, or fear that thing.  But if from the
presence, or more accurate contemplation of the said thing, we
are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause of
wonder, love, fear, &c., the mind then, by the presence of the
thing, remains determined to think rather of those qualities which
are not in it, than of those which are in it; whereas, on the other
hand, the presence of the object would cause it more particularly
to regard that which is therein.  As devotion springs from wonder
at a thing which we love, so does "Derision" spring from contempt
of a thing which we hate or fear, and "Scorn" from contempt of
folly, as veneration from wonder at prudence.  Lastly, we can
conceive the emotions of love, hope, honour, &c., in association
with contempt, and can thence deduce other emotions, which are
not distinguished one from another by any recognized name.

LIII. When the mind regards itself and its own power of activity,
it feels pleasure:  and that pleasure is greater in proportion to the
distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and its own power of
activity.

>>>>>Proof--A man does not know himself except through the
modifications of his body, and the ideas thereof (II. xix. and xxiii.).
When, therefore, the mind is able to contemplate itself, it is thereby
assumed to pass to a greater perfection, or (III. xi. note) to feel
pleasure; and the pleasure will be greater in proportion to the
distinctness, wherewith it is able to conceive itself and its own
power of activity.  Q.E.D.

<<<<>>>>Proof--The endeavour or power of the mind is the actual
essence thereof (III. vii.); but the essence of the mind obviously
only affirms that which the mind is and can do; not that which it
neither is nor can do; therefore the mind endeavours to conceive
only such things as assert or affirm its power of activity.  Q.E.D.

LV. When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels pain
thereat.

>>>>>Proof--The essence of the mind only affirms that which
the mind is, or can do; in other words, it is the mind's nature to
conceive only such things as assert its power of activity (last
Prop.).  Thus, when we say that the mind contemplates its own
weakness, we are merely saying that while the mind is attempting
to conceive something which asserts its power of activity, it is
checked in its endeavour -- in other words (III. xi. note), it feels
pain.  Q.E.D.

<<<<>>>>Proof--Envy is a species of hatred (III. xxiv. note) or
(III. xiii. note) pain, that is (III. xi. note), a modification whereby
a man's power of activity, or endeavour towards activity, is
checked.  But a man does not endeavour or desire to do anything,
which cannot follow from his nature as it is given; therefore a man
will not desire any power of activity or virtue (which is the same
thing) to be attributed to him, that is appropriate to another's
nature and foreign to his own; hence his desire cannot be checked,
nor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtue in some one
unlike himself, consequently he cannot envy such an one.  But
he can envy his equal, who is assumed to have the same nature
as himself.  Q.E.D.

*****Note--When, therefore, as we said in the note to III. lii.,
we venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude,
&c., we do so, because we conceive those qualities to be
peculiar to him, and not as common to our nature; we, therefore,
no more envy their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall,
or lions for being courageous.

LVI. There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of desire,
and of every emotion compounded of these, such as vacillations
of spirit, or derived from these, such as love, hatred, hope, fear,
&c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected.

>>>>>Proof--Pleasure and pain, and consequently the emotions
compounded thereof, or derived therefrom, are passions, or
passive states (III. xi. note); now we are necessarily passive
(III. i.), in so far as we have inadequate ideas; and only in so
far as we have such ideas are we passive (III. iii.); that is, we
are only necessarily passive (II. xl. note), in so far as we conceive,
or (II. xvii. and note) in so far as we are affected by an emotion,
which involves the nature of our own body, and the nature of an
external body.  Wherefore the nature of every passive state must
necessarily be so explained, that the nature of the object whereby
we are affected be expressed.  Namely, the pleasure, which
arises from, say, the object A, involves the nature of that object
A, and the pleasure, which arises from the object B, involves
the nature of the object B; different, inasmuch as the causes
whence they arise are by nature different.  So again the emotion
of pain, which arises from one object, is by nature different from
the pain arising from another object, and, similarly, in the case
of love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation, &c.

Thus, there are necessarily as many kinds of pleasure, pain, love,
hatred, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are
affected.  Now desire is each man's essence or nature, in so far
as it is conceived as determined to a particular action by any
given modification of itself (III. ix. note); therefore, according
as a man is affected through external causes by this or that kind
of pleasure, pain, love, hatred, &c., in other words, according
as his nature is disposed in this or that manner, so will his desire
be of one kind or another, and the nature of one desire must
necessarily differ from the nature of another desire, as widely
as the emotions differ, wherefrom each desire arose.  Thus there
are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of pleasure,
pain, love, &c., consequently (by what has been shown) there
are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of objects
whereby we are affected.  Q.E.D.

*****Note--Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the last
proposition, must be very numerous, the chief are "luxury,"
"drunkenness," "lust," "avarice," and "ambition," being merely
species of love or desire, displaying the nature of those emotions
in a manner varying according to the object, with which they are
concerned.  For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition,
&c., we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting, drinking,
venery, riches, and fame.  Furthermore, these emotions, in so
far as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects
wherewith they are concerned, have no contraries.  For
"temperance," "sobriety," and "chastity," which we are wont
to oppose to luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions
or passive states, but indicate a power of the mind which
moderates the last-named emotions.  However, I cannot here
explain the remaining kinds of emotions (seeing that they are
as numerous as the kinds of objects), nor, if I could, would it
be necessary.  It is sufficient for our purpose, namely, to
determine the strength of the emotions, and the mind's power
over them, to have a general definition of each emotion.  It is
sufficient, I repeat, to understand the general properties of the
emotions and the mind, to enable us to determine the quality
and extent of the mind's power in moderating and checking
the emotions.  Thus, though there is a great difference between
various emotions of love, hatred, or desire, for instance
between love felt towards children, and love felt towards a wife,
there is no need for us to take cognizance of such differences,
or to track out further the nature and origin of the emotions.

 LVII. Any emotion of a given individual differs from the emotion
of another individual, only in so far as the essence of the one
individual differs from the essence of the other.

>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Ax. i. (which
see after Lemma iii. Prop. xiii., Part II.).  Nevertheless, we will
prove it from the nature of the three primary emotions.

All emotions are attributable to desire, pleasure, or pain, as
their definitions above given show.  But desire is each man's
nature or essence (III. ix. note); therefore desire in one individual
differs from desire in another individual, only in so far as the
nature or essence of the one differs from the nature or essence
of the other.  Again, pleasure and pain are passive states or
passions, whereby every man's power or endeavour to persist
in his being is increased or diminished, helped or hindered (III.
xi. and note).  But by the endeavour to persist in its being, in
so far as it is attributable to mind and body in conjunction, we
mean appetite and desire (III. ix. note); therefore pleasure and
pain are identical with desire or appetite, in so far as by
external causes they are increased or diminished, helped or
hindered, in other words, they are every man's nature; wherefore
the pleasure and pain felt by one man differ from the pleasure
and pain felt by another man, only in so far as the nature or
essence of the one man differs from the essence of the other;
consequently, any emotion of one individual only differs, &c.
Q.E.D.

*****Note--Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animals
which are called irrational (for after learning the origin of mind
we cannot doubt that brutes feel) only differ from man's emotions,
to the extent that brute nature differs from human nature.  Horse
and man are alike carried away by the desire of procreation; but
the desire of the former is equine, the desire of the latter is human.
So also the lusts and appetites of insects, fishes, and birds must
needs very according to the several natures.  Thus, although each
individual lives content and rejoices in that nature belonging to
him wherein he has his being, yet the life, wherein each is content
and rejoices, is nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said
individual, and hence the joy of one only differs in nature from
the joy of another, to the extent that the essence of one differs
from the essence of another.  Lastly, it follows from the foregoing
proposition, that there is no small difference between the joy
which actuates, say, a drunkard, and the joy possessed by a
philosopher, as I just mention here by the way.  Thus far I
have treated of the emotions attributable to man, in so far as
he is passive.  It remains to add a few words on those
attributable to him in so far as he is active.

LVIII. Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities or
passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and
desire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active.

>>>>>Proof--When the mind conceives itself and its power
of activity, it feels pleasure (III. liii.):  now the mind necessarily
contemplates itself, when it conceives a true or adequate idea
(II. xliii).  But the mind does conceive certain adequate ideas
(II. xl. note ii.).  Therefore it feels pleasure in so far as it is active
(III. i.).  Again, the mind, both in so far as it has clear and
distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours
to persist in its own being (III. ix.); but by such an endeavour
we mean desire (by the note to the same Prop.); therefore,
desire is also attributable to us, in so far as we understand,
or (III. i.) in so far as we are active.  Q.E.D.

LIX. Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as active,
there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or desire.

>>>>>Proof--All emotions can be referred to desire, pleasure,
or pain, as their definitions, already given, show.  Now by pain
we mean that the mind's power of thinking is diminished or
checked (III. xi. and note); therefore, in so far as the mind
feels pain, its power of understanding, that is, of activity, is
diminished or checked (III. i.); therefore, no painful emotions
can be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active, but
only emotions of pleasure and desire, which (by the last Prop.)
are attributable to the mind in that condition.  Q.E.D.

*****Note--All actions following from emotion, which are
attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set
down to "strength of character" ("fortitudo"), which I divide
into "courage" ("animositas") and "highmindedness"
("generositas").  By "courage" I mean "the desire whereby
every man strives to preserve his own being in accordance
solely with the dictates of reason."  By "highmindedness" I
mean "the desire whereby every man endeavours, solely
under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to unite
them to himself in friendship."  Those actions, therefore,
which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set
down to courage, those which aim at the good of others I
set down to highmindedness.  Thus temperance, sobriety,
and presence of mind in danger, &c., are varieties of courage;
courtesy, mercy, &c., are varieties of highmindedness.

I think I have thus explained, and displayed through their primary
causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit, which
arise from the combination of the three primary emotions, to wit,
desire, pleasure, and pain.  It is evident from what I have said,
that we are in many ways driven about by external causes, and
that like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds we toss to
and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate.  But I have said,
that I have only set forth the chief conflicting emotions, not all
that might be given.  For, by proceeding in the same way as
above, we can easily show that love is united to repentance,
scorn, shame, &c.  I think everyone will agree from what has
been said, that the emotions may be compounded one with
another in so many ways, and so many variations may arise
therefrom, as to exceed all possibility of computation.  However,
for my purpose, it is enough to have enumerated the most
important; to reckon up the rest which I have omitted would be
more curious than profitable.  It remains to remark concerning
love, that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a
thing which we longed for, the body, from the act of enjoyment,
acquires a new disposition, whereby it is determined in another
way, other images of things are aroused in it, and the mind
begins to conceive and desire something fresh.  For example,
when we conceive something which generally delights us with
its flavour, we desire to enjoy, that is, to eat it.  But whilst we
are thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body is
otherwise disposed.  If, therefore, when the body is thus
otherwise disposed, the image of the food which is present
be stimulated, and consequently the endeavour or desire to
eat it be stimulated also, the new disposition of the body
will feel repugnance to the desire or attempt, and consequently
the presence of the food which we formerly longed for will
become odious.  This revulsion of feeling is called "satiety"
or weariness.  For the rest, I have neglected the outward
modifications of the body observable in emotions, such,
for instance, as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, &c.,
for these are attributable to the body only, without any
reference to the mind.  Lastly, the definitions of the emotions
require to be supplemented in a few points; I will therefore
repeat them, interpolating such observations as I think should
here and there be added.