DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS

I. "Desire" is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived,
as determined to a particular activity by some given modification
of itself.

^^^^^Explanation--We have said above, in the note to
Prop. ix. of this part, that desire is appetite, with consciousness
thereof; further, that appetite is the essence of man, in so far
as it is determined to act in a way tending to promote its own
persistence.  But, in the same note, I also remarked that,
strictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetite
and desire.  For whether a man be conscious of his appetite
or not, it remains one and the same appetite.  Thus, in order
to avoid the appearance of tautology, I have refrained from
explaining desire by appetite; but I have take care to define
it in such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head, all
those endeavours of human nature, which we distinguish by
the terms appetite, will, desire, or impulse.  I might, indeed,
have said, that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is
conceived as determined to a particular activity; but from
such a definition (cf. II. xxiii.) it would not follow that the
mind can be conscious of its desire or appetite.  Therefore,
in order to imply the cause of such consciousness, it was
necessary to add, "in so far as it is determined by some given
modification," &c.  For, by a modification of man's essence,
we understand every disposition of the said essence, whether
such disposition be innate, or whether it be conceived solely
under the attribute of thought, or solely under the attribute
of extension, or whether, lastly, it be referred simultaneously
to both these attributes.  By the term desire, then, I here
mean all man's endeavours, impulses, appetites, and volitions,
which vary according to each man's disposition, and are,
therefore, not seldom opposed one to another, according
as a man is drawn in different directions, and knows not
where to turn.

II. "Pleasure" is the transition of a man from a less to a greater
perfection.

III. "Pain" is the transition of a man from a greater to a less
perfection.

^^^^^Explanation--I say transition:  for pleasure is not
perfection itself.  For, if man were born with the perfection
to which he passes, he would possess the same, without the
emotion of pleasure.  This appears more clearly from the
consideration of the contrary emotion, pain.  No one can
deny, that pain consists in the transition to a less perfection,
and not in the less perfection itself:  for a man cannot be
pained, in so far as he partakes of perfection of any degree.
Neither can we say, that pain consists in the absence of a
greater perfection.  For absence is nothing, whereas the
emotion of pain is an activity; wherefore this activity can
only be the activity of transition from a greater to a less
perfection--in other words, it is an activity whereby a man's
power of action is lessened or constrained (cf. III. xi. note).
I pass over the definitions of merriment, stimulation, melancholy,
and grief, because these terms are generally used in reference
to the body, and are merely kinds of pleasure or pain.

IV. "Wonder" is the conception (imaginatio) of anything,
wherein the mind comes to a stand, because the particular
concept in question has no connection with other concepts
(cf. III. lii. and note).

^^^^^Explanation--In the note to II. xviii. we showed the
reason, why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing,
straightway falls to the contemplation of another thing, namely,
because the images of the two things are so associated and
arranged, that one follows the other.  This state of association
is impossible, if the image of the thing be new; the mind will
then be at a stand in the contemplation thereof, until it is
determined by other causes to think of something else.

Thus the conception of a new object, considered in itself,
is of the same nature as other conceptions; hence, I do not
include wonder among the emotions, nor do I see why I
should so include it, inasmuch as this distraction of the mind
arises from no positive cause drawing away the mind from
other objects, but merely from the absence of a cause,
which should determine the mind to pass from the
contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another.

I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary emotions
(as I said in the note to III. xi.), namely, pleasure, pain, and
desire.  I have spoken of wonder simply because it is customary
to speak of certain emotions springing from the three primitive
ones by different names, when they are referred to the objects
of our wonder.  I am led by the same motive to add a definition
of contempt.

V. "Contempt" is the conception of anything which touches
the mind so little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine
those qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it
(cf. III. lii. note).

The definitions of veneration and scorn I here pass over, for
I am not aware that any emotions are named after them.

VI. "Love" is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external
cause.

^^^^^Explanation--This definition explains sufficiently clearly
the essence of love; the definition given by those authors who
say that love is "the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved
object" expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and,
as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence,
they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its
properties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted
to be very obscure.  It must, however, be noted, that when I
say that it is a property of love, that the lover should wish to
unite himself to the beloved object, I do not here mean by
"wish" consent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind
(for I have shown such, in II. xlviii., to be fictitious); neither
do I mean a desire of being united to the loved object when
it is absent, or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand;
for love can be conceived without either of these desires; but
by "wish" I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on
account of the presence of the beloved object, whereby the
pleasure of the lover is strengthened, or at least maintained.

VII.  "Hatred" is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external
cause.

^^^^^Explanation--These observations are easily grasped
after what has been said in the explanation of the preceding
definition (cf. also III. xiii. note).

VIII. "Inclination" is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of
something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure.

IX. "Aversion" is pain, accompanied by the idea of something
which is accidentally the cause of pain (cf. III. xv. note).

X. "Devotion" is love towards one whom we admire.

^^^^^Explanation--Wonder (admiratio) arises (as we have
shown, III. lii.) from the novelty of a thing.  If, therefore, it
happens that the object of our wonder is often conceived
by us, we shall cease to wonder at it; thus we see, that the
emotion of devotion readily degenerates into simple love.

XI. "Derision" is pleasure arising from our conceiving the
presence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which
we hate.

^^^^^Explanation--In so far as we despise a thing which we
hate, we deny existence thereof (III. lii. note), and to that
extent rejoice (III. xx.).  But since we assume that man hates
that which he derides, it follows that the pleasure in question
is not without alloy (cf. III. xlvii. note).

XII. "Hope" is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea
of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent
doubt the issue.

XIII. "Fear" is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of
something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent
doubt the issue (cf. III. xviii. note).

^^^^^Explanation--From these definitions it follows, that
there is no hope unmingled with fear, and no fear unmingled
with hope.  For he, who depends on hope and doubts
concerning the issue of anything, is assumed to conceive
something, which excludes the existence of the said thing
in the future; therefore he, to this extent, feels pain (cf. III.
xix.); consequently, while dependent on hope, he fears
for the issue.  Contrariwise he, who fears, in other words
doubts, concerning the issue of something which he hates,
also conceives something which excludes the existence of
the thing in question; to this extent he feels pleasure, and
consequently to this extent he hopes that it will turn out as
he desires (III. xx.).

XIV.  "Confidence" is pleasure arising from the idea of
something past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has
been removed.

XV. "Despair" is pain arising from the idea of something past
or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.

^^^^^Explanation--Thus confidence springs from hope, and
despair from fear, when all cause for doubt as to the issue
of an event has been removed:  this comes to pass, because
man conceives something past or future as present and
regards it as such, or else because he conceives other things,
which exclude the existence of the causes of his doubt.  For,
although we can never be absolutely certain of the issue
of any particular event (II. xxxi. Cor.), it may nevertheless
happen that we feel no doubt concerning it.  For we have
shown, that to feel no doubt concerning a thing is not the
same as to be quite certain of it (II. xlix. note).  Thus it
may happen that we are affected by the same emotion
of pleasure or pain concerning a thing past or future, as
concerning the conception of a thing present; this I have
already shown in III. xviii., to which, with its note, I refer
the reader.

XVI. "Joy" is pleasure accompanied by the idea of
something past, which has had an issue beyond our hope.

XVII. "Disappointment" is pain accompanied by the idea
of something past, which has had an issue contrary to our
hope.

XVIII. "Pity" is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which
has befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like
ourselves (cf. III. xxii. note, and III. xxvii. note).

^^^^^Explanation--Between pity and sympathy (misericordia)
there seems to be no difference, unless perhaps that the former
term is used in reference to a particular action, and the latter
in reference to a disposition.

XIX. "Approval" is love towards one who has done good to
another.

XX. "Indignation" is hatred towards one who has done evil to
another.

^^^^^Explanation--I am aware that these terms are employed
in senses somewhat different from those usually assigned.  But
my purpose is to explain, not the meaning of words, but the
nature of things.  I therefore make use of such terms, as may
convey my meaning without any violent departure from their
ordinary signification.  One statement of my method will suffice.
As for the cause of the above-named emotions see III. xxvii.
Cor. i., and III. xxii. note.

XXI. "Partiality" is thinking too highly of anyone because of
the love we bear him.

^^^^^Explanation--Thus partiality is an effect of love, and
disparagement an effect of hatred:  so that "partiality" may
also be defined as "love, in so far as it induces a man to
think too highly of a beloved object."  Contrariwise,
"disparagement" may be defined as "hatred, in so far as
it induces a man to think too meanly of a hated object."
Cf. III. xxvi. note.

XXIII. "Envy" is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be
pained by another's good fortune, and to rejoice in another's
evil fortune.

^^^^^Explanation--Envy is generally opposed to sympathy,
which, by doing some violence to the meaning of the word,
may therefore be thus defined:

XXIV. "Sympathy" (misericordia) is love, in so far as it
induces a man to feel pleasure at another's good fortune,
and pain at another's evil fortune.

^^^^^Explanation--Concerning envy see the notes to II.
xxiv. and xxxii.  These emotions also arise from pleasure
or pain accompanied by the idea of something external, as
cause either in itself or accidentally.  I now pass on to other
emotions, which are accompanied by the idea of something
within as a cause.

XXV. "Self-approval" is pleasure arising from a man's
contemplation of himself and his own power of action.

XXVI. "Humility" is pain arising from a man's contemplation
of his own weakness of body or mind.

^^^^^Explanation--Self-complacency is opposed to
humility, in so far as we thereby mean pleasure arising from
a contemplation of our own power of action; but, in so far
as we mean thereby pleasure accompanied by the idea of
any action which we believe we have performed by the free
decision of our mind, it is opposed to repentance, which we
may thus define:

XXVII. "Repentance" is pain accompanied by the idea of
some action, which we believe we have performed by the
free decision of our mind.

^^^^^Explanation--The causes of these emotions we have
set forth in III. li. note, and in III. liii., liv., lv. and note.
Concerning the free decision of the mind see II. xxxv. note.
This is perhaps the place to call attention to the fact, that it is
nothing wonderful that all those actions, which are commonly
called "wrong," are followed by pain, and all those, which are
called "right," are followed by pleasure.  We can easily gather
from what has been said, that this depends in great measure
on education.  Parents, by reprobating the former class of
actions, and by frequently chiding their children because of
them, and also by persuading to and praising the latter class,
have brought it about, that the former should be associated
with pain and the latter with pleasure.  This is confirmed by
experience.  For custom and religion are not the same
among all men, but that which some consider sacred others
consider profane, and what some consider honourable others
consider disgraceful.  According as each man has been
educated, he feels repentance for a given action or glories
therein.

XXVIII. "Pride" is thinking too highly of one's self from
self-love.

^^^^^Explanation--Thus pride is different from partiality,
for the latter term is used in reference to an external object,
but pride is used of a man thinking too highly of himself.
However, as partiality is the effect of love, so is pride the
effect or property of "self-love," which may therefore be
thus defined, "love of self or self-approval, in so far as it
leads a man to think too highly of himself."  To this emotion
there is no contrary.  For no one thinks too meanly of
himself because of self-hatred; I say that no one thinks too
meanly of himself, in so far as he conceives that he is
incapable of doing this or that.  For whatsoever a man
imagines that he is incapable of doing, he imagines this of
necessity, and by that notion he is so disposed, that he
really cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot do.
For, so long as he conceives that he cannot do it, so long
is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long is
it impossible for him to do it.  However, if we consider
such matters as only depend on opinion, we shall find it
conceivable that a man may think too meanly of himself;
for it may happen, that a man, sorrowfully regarding his
own weakness, should imagine that he is despised by all
men, while the rest of the world are thinking of nothing less
than of despising him.  Again, a man may think too meanly
of himself, if he deny of himself in the present something
in relation to a future time of which he is uncertain.  As,
for instance, if he should say that he is unable to form any
clear conceptions, or that he can desire and do nothing but
what is wicked and base, &c.  We may also say, that a man
thinks too meanly of himself, when we see him from excessive
fear of shame refusing to do things which others, his equals,
venture.  We can, therefore, set down as a contrary to pride
an emotion which I will call self-abasement, for as from
self-complacency springs pride, so from humility springs
self-abasement, which I will accordingly thus define:

XXIX. "Self-abasement" is thinking too meanly of one's
self by reason of pain.

^^^^^Explanation--We are nevertheless generally
accustomed to oppose pride to humility, but in that case
we pay more attention to the effect of either emotion than
to its nature.  We are wont to call "proud" the man who
boasts too much (III. xxx. note), who talks of nothing but
his own virtues and other people's faults, who wishes to
be first; and lastly who goes through life with a style and
pomp suitable to those far above him in station.  On the
other hand, we call "humble" the man who too often blushes,
who confesses his faults, who sets forth other men's virtues,
and who, lastly, walks with bent head and is negligent of
his attire.  However, these emotions, humility and
self-abasement, are extremely rare.  For human nature,
considered in itself, strives against them as much as it can
(see III. xiii., liv.); hence those, who are believed to be
most self-abased and humble, are generally in reality the
most ambitious and envious.

XXX. "Honour" (gloria) is pleasure accompanied by the
idea of some action of our own, which we believe to be
praised by others.

XXXI. "Shame" is pain accompanied by the idea of
some action of our own, which we believe to be blamed
by others.

^^^^^Explanation--On this subject see the note to III. xxx.
But we should here remark the difference which exists
between shame and modesty.  Shame is the pain following
the deed whereof we are ashamed.  Modesty is the fear or
dread of shame, which restrains a man from committing a
base action.  Modesty is usually opposed to shamelessness,
but the latter is not an emotion, as I will duly show; however,
the names of the emotions (as I have remarked already)
have regard rather to their exercise than to their nature.

I have now fulfilled the task of explaining the emotions
arising from pleasure and pain.  I therefore proceed to
treat of those which I refer to desire.

XXXII. "Regret" is the desire or appetite to possess
something, kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing,
and at the same time constrained by the remembrance
of other things which exclude the existence of it.

^^^^^Explanation--When we remember a thing, we are
by that very fact, as I have already said more than once,
disposed to contemplate it with the same emotion as if it
were something present; but this disposition or endeavour,
while we are awake, is generally checked by the images
of things which exclude the existence of that which we
remember.  Thus when we remember something which
affected us with a certain pleasure, we by that very fact
endeavour to regard it with the same emotion of pleasure
as though it were present, but this endeavour is at once
checked by the remembrance of things which exclude the
existence of the thing in question.  Wherefore regret is,
strictly speaking, a pain opposed to that of pleasure,
which arises from the absence of something we hate (cf.
III. xlvii. note).  But, as the name regret seems to refer
to desire, I set this emotion down, among the emotions
springing from desire.

XXXIII. "Emulation" is the desire of something, engendered
in us by our conception that others have the same desire.

^^^^^Explanation--He who runs away, because he sees
others running away, or he who fears, because he sees
others in fear; or again, he who, on seeing that another man
has burnt his hand, draws towards him his own hand, and
moves his body as though his own were burnt; such an one
can be said to imitate another's emotion, but not to emulate
him; not because the causes of emulation and imitation are
different, but because it has become customary to speak
of emulation only in him, who imitates that which we deem
to be honourable, useful, or pleasant.  As to the cause of
emulation, cf. III. xxvii. and note.  The reason why this
emotion is generally coupled with envy may be seen from
III. xxxii. and note.

XXXIV. "Thankfulness" or "Gratitude" is the desire or
zeal springing from love, whereby we endeavour to benefit
him, who with similar feelings of love has conferred a benefit
on us.  Cf. III. xxxix. note and xl.

XXXV. "Benevolence" is the desire of benefiting one whom
we pity.  Cf. III. xxvii. note.

XXXVI. "Anger" is the desire, whereby through hatred we
are induced to injure one whom we hate, III. xxxix.

XXXVII. "Revenge" is the desire whereby we are induced,
through mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar
feelings, has injured us.  (See III. xl. Cor. ii. and note.)

XXXVIII. "Cruelty" or "savageness" is the desire, whereby
a man is impelled to injure one whom we love or pity.

^^^^^Explanation--To cruelty is opposed clemency, which
is not a passive state of the mind, but a power whereby man
restrains his anger and revenge.

XXXIX. "Timidity" is the desire to avoid a greater evil,
which we dread, by undergoing a lesser evil.  Cf. III. xxxix.
note.

XL. "Daring" is the desire, whereby a man is set on to do
something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.

XLI. "Cowardice" is attributed to one, whose desire is
checked by the fear of some danger which his equals dare
to encounter.

^^^^^Explanation--Cowardice is, therefore, nothing else
but the fear of some evil, which most men are wont not to
fear; hence I do not reckon it among the emotions springing
from desire.  Nevertheless, I have chosen to explain it
here, because, in so far as we look to the desire, it is truly
opposed to the emotion of daring.

XLII. "Consternation" is attributed to one, whose desire of
avoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he
fears.

^^^^^Explanation--Consternation is, therefore, a species
of cowardice.  But, inasmuch as consternation arises from
a double fear, it may be more conveniently defined as a
fear which keeps a man so bewildered and wavering, that
he is not able to remove the evil.  I say bewildered, in so
far as we understand his desire of removing the evil to be
constrained by his amazement.  I say wavering, in so far
as we understand the said desire to be constrained by the
fear of another evil, which equally torments him:  whence
it comes to pass that he knows not, which he may avert
of the two.  On this subject, see III. xxxix. note, and III.
lii. note.  Concerning cowardice and daring, see III. li.
note.

XLIII. "Courtesy," or "deference" (Humanitas seu
modestia), is the desire of acting in a way that should
please men, and refraining from that which should
displease them.

XLIV. "Ambition" is the immoderate desire of power.

^^^^^Explanation--Ambition is the desire, whereby all the
emotions (cf. III. xxvii. and xxxi.) are fostered and
strengthened; therefore this emotion can with difficulty be
overcome.  For, so long as a man is bound by any desire,
he is at the same time necessarily bound by this.  "The best
men," says Cicero, "are especially led by honour.  Even
philosophers, when they write a book contemning honour,
sign their names thereto," and so on.

XLV. "Luxury" is excessive desire, or even love of living
sumptuously.

XLVI. "Intemperance" is the excessive desire and love
of drinking.

XLVII. "Avarice" is the excessive desire and love of riches.

XLVIII. "Lust" is desire and love in the matter of sexual
intercourse.

^^^^^Explanation--Whether this desire be excessive or
not, it is still called lust.  These last five emotions (as I have
shown in III. lvi.) have on contraries.  For deference is a
species of ambition.  Cf. III. xxix. note.

Again, I have already pointed out, that temperance, sobriety,
and chastity indicate rather a power than a passivity of the
mind.  It may, nevertheless, happen, that an avaricious, an
ambitious, or a timid man may abstain from excess in eating,
drinking, or sexual indulgence, yet avarice, ambition, and fear
are not contraries to luxury, drunkenness, and debauchery.
For an avaricious man often is glad to gorge himself with
food and drink at another man's expense.  An ambitious
man will restrain himself in nothing, so long as he thinks his
indulgences are secret; and if he lives among drunkards
and debauchees, he will, from the mere fact of being
ambitious, be more prone to those vices.  Lastly, a timid
man does that which he would not.  For though an
avaricious man should, for the sake of avoiding death,
cast his riches into the sea, he will none the less remain
avaricious; so, also, if a lustful man is downcast, because
he cannot follow his bent, he does not, on the ground of
abstention, cease to be lustful.  In fact, these emotions are
not so much concerned with the actual feasting, drinking, &c.,
as with the appetite and love of such.  Nothing, therefore,
can be opposed to these emotions, but high-mindedness
and valour, whereof I will speak presently.

The definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind
I pass over in silence, first, because they arise from the
compounding of the emotions already described; secondly,
because many of them have no distinctive names, which
shows that it is sufficient for practical purposes to have
merely a general knowledge of them.  However, it is
established from the definitions of the emotions, which we
have set forth, that they all spring from desire, pleasure, or
pain, or, rather, that there is nothing besides these three;
wherefore each is wont to be called by a variety of names
in accordance with its various relations and extrinsic tokens.
If we now direct our attention to these primitive emotions,
and to what has been said concerning the nature of the
mind, we shall be able thus to define the emotions, in so
far as they are referred to the mind only.


GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS

Emotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is a
confused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its
body, or any part thereof, a force for existence (existendi
vis) greater or less than before, and by the presence of
which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather
than another.

^^^^^Explanation--I say, first, that emotion or passion
of the soul is "a confused idea."  For we have shown that
the mind is only passive, in so far as it has inadequate or
confused ideas.  (III. iii.)  I say, further, "whereby the mind
affirms concerning its body or any part thereof a force for
existence greater than before."  For all the ideas of bodies,
which we possess, denote rather the actual disposition of
our own body (II. xvi. Cor. ii.) than the nature of an
external body.  But the idea which constitutes the reality
of an emotion must denote or express the disposition of
the body, or of some part thereof, because its power of
action or force for existence is increased or diminished,
helped or hindered.  But it must be noted that, when I
say "a greater or less force for existence than before," I
do not mean that the mind compares the present with
the past disposition of the body, but that the idea which
constitutes the reality of an emotion affirms something of
the body, which, in fact, involves more or less of reality
than before.

And inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact
(II. xi., xiii.), that it affirms the actual existence of its own
body, and inasmuch as we understand by perfection the
very essence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to
greater or less perfection, when it happens to affirm
concerning its own body, or any part thereof, something
involving more or less reality than before.

When, therefore, I said above that the power of the mind
is increased or diminished, I merely meant that the mind
had formed of its own body, or of some part thereof, an
idea involving more or less of reality, than it had already
affirmed concerning its own body.  For the excellence of
ideas, and the actual power of thinking are measured by
the excellence of the object.  Lastly, I have added "by the
presence of which the mind is determined to think of one
thing rather than another," so that, besides the nature of
pleasure and pain, which the first part of the definition
explains, I might also express the nature of desire.






END OF PART III