Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS 
(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
Translated from the Latin by R. H. M. Elwes



PART III:  ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS


Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem
to be treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural
phenomena following nature's general laws.  They appear to
conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a
kingdom:  for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows
nature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions,
and that he is determined solely by himself.  They attribute
human infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature
in general, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man,
which accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or, as
usually happens, abuse:  he, who succeeds in hitting off
the weakness of the human mind more eloquently or more
acutely than his fellows, is looked upon as a seer.  Still there
has been no lack of very excellent men (to whose toil and
industry I confess myself much indebted), who have written
many noteworthy things concerning the right way of life,
and have given much sage advice to mankind.  But no one,
so far as I know, has defined the nature and strength of the
emotions, and the power of the mind against them for their
restraint.

I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he
believed, that the mind has absolute power over its actions,
strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes,
and, at the same time, to point out a way, by which the mind
might attain to absolute dominion over them.  However,
in my opinion, he accomplishes nothing beyond a display
of the acuteness of his own great intellect, as I will show
in the proper place.  For the present I wish to revert to
those, who would rather abuse or deride human emotions
than understand them.  Such persons will, doubtless think
it strange that I should attempt to treat of human vice and
folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth with rigid
reasoning those matters which they cry out against as
repugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful.
However, such is my plan.  Nothing comes to pass in nature,
which can be set down to a flaw therein; for nature is always
the same, and everywhere one and the same in her efficacy
and power of action; that is, nature's laws and ordinances,
whereby all things come to pass and change from one form
to another, are everywhere and always the same; so that
there should be one and the same method of understanding
the nature of all things whatsoever, namely, through nature's
universal laws and rules.  Thus the passions of hatred, anger,
envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow from this
same necessity and efficacy of nature; they answer to certain
definite causes, through which they are understood, and
possess certain properties as worthy of being known as
the properties of anything else, whereof the contemplation
in itself affords us delight.  I shall, therefore, treat of the
nature and strength of the emotions according to the same
method, as I employed heretofore in my investigations
concerning God and the mind.  I shall consider human
actions and desires in exactly the same manner, as though
I were concerned with lines, planes, and solids.


DEFINITIONS

I. By an 'adequate' cause, I mean a cause through which
its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived.  By an
'inadequate' or partial cause, I mean a cause through which,
by itself, its effect cannot be understood.

II. I say that we 'act' when anything takes place, either
within us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate
cause; that is (by the foregoing definition) when through
our nature something takes place within us or externally
to us, which can through our nature alone be clearly and
distinctly understood.  On the other hand, I say that we
are passive as regards something when that something
takes place within us, or follows from our nature externally,
we being only the partial cause.

III. By 'emotion' I mean the modifications of the body,
whereby the active power of the said body is increased
or diminished, aided or constrained, and also the ideas
of such modifications.

N.B. If we can be the adequate cause of any of these
modifications, I then call the emotion an activity,
otherwise I call it a passion, or state wherein the mind
is passive.


POSTULATES

I. The human body can be affected in many ways, whereby
its power of activity is increased or diminished, and also
in other ways which do not render its power of activity
either greater or less.

N.B. This postulate or axiom rests on Postulate i. and
Lemmas v. and vii., which see after II. xiii.

II. The human body can undergo many changes, and,
nevertheless, retain the impressions or traces of objects
(cf. II. Post. v.), and, consequently, the same images
of things (see note II. xvii.).


PROPOSITIONS

I. Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain cases
passive.  In so far as it has adequate ideas it is necessarily
active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it is
necessarily passive.

>>>>>Proof--In every human mind there are some
adequate ideas, and some ideas that are fragmentary
and confused (II. xl. note).  Those ideas which are
adequate in the mind are adequate also in God, inasmuch
as he constitutes the essence of the mind (II. xl. Cor.),
and those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise
(by the same Cor.) adequate in God, not inasmuch as he
contains in himself the essence of the given mind alone,
but as he, at the same time, contains the minds of other
things.  Again, from any given idea some effect must
necessarily follow (I. xxxvi.); of this effect God is the
adequate cause (III. Def. i.), not inasmuch as he is
infinite, but inasmuch as he is conceived as affected by
the given idea (II. ix.).  But of that effect whereof God
is the cause, inasmuch as he is affected by an idea which
is adequate in a given mind, of that effect, I repeat, the
mind in question is the adequate cause (II. xi. Cor.).
Therefore our mind, in so far as it has adequate ideas
(III. Def. ii.), is in certain cases necessarily active;
this was our first point.  Again, whatsoever necessarily
follows from the idea which is adequate in God, not by
virtue of his possessing in himself the mind of one man
only, but by virtue of his containing, together with the
mind of that one man, the minds of other things also,
of such an effect (II. xi. Cor.) the mind of the given man
is not an adequate, but only a partial cause; thus
(III. Def. ii.) the mind, inasmuch as it has inadequate
ideas, is in certain cases necessarily passive; this was
our second point.  Therefore our mind, &c.  Q.E.D.

<<<<>>>>Proof--All modes of thinking have for their cause
God, by virtue of his being a thinking thing, and not by
virtue of his being displayed under any other attribute (II.
vi.).  That, therefore, which determines the mind to thought
is a mode of thought, and not a mode of extension; that
is (II. Def. i.), it is not body.  This was our first point.
Again, the motion and rest of a body must arise from
another body, which has also been determined to a state
of motion or rest by a third body, and absolutely
everything which takes place in a body must spring from
God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by some
mode of extension, and not by some mode of thought
(II. vi.); that is, it cannot spring from the mind, which
is a mode of thought.  This was our second point.
Therefore body cannot determine mind, &c.  Q.E.D.

*****Note--This is made more clear by what was said
in the note to II. vii., namely, that mind and body are one
and the same thing, conceived first under the attribute of
thought, secondly, under the attribute of extension.  Thus
it follows that the order or concatenation of things is identical,
whether nature be conceived under the one attribute or the
other; consequently the order of states of activity and
passivity in our body is simultaneous in nature with the
order of states of activity and passivity in the mind.
The same conclusion is evident from the manner in which
we proved II. xii.

Nevertheless, though such is the case, and though there
be no further room for doubt, I can scarcely believe,
until the fact is proved by experience, that men can be
induced to consider the question calmly and fairly, so firmly
are they convinced that it is merely at the bidding of the
mind, that the body is set in motion or at rest, or performs
a variety of actions depending solely on the mind's will
or the exercise of thought.  However, no one has hitherto
laid down the limits to the powers of the body, that is, no
one has as yet been taught by experience what the body
can accomplish solely by the laws of nature, in so far as
she is regarded as extension.  No one hitherto has gained
such an accurate knowledge of the bodily mechanism, that
he can explain all its functions; nor need I call attention
to the fact that many actions are observed in the lower
animals, which far transcend human sagacity, and
that somnambulists do many things in their sleep, which
they would not venture to do when awake:  these instances
are enough to show, that the body can by the sole laws
of its nature do many things which the mind wonders at.

Again, no one knows how or by what means the mind
moves the body, nor how many various degrees of motion
it can impart to the body, nor how quickly it can move it.
Thus, when men say that this or that physical action has
its origin in the mind, which latter has dominion over the
body, they are using words without meaning, or are
confessing in specious phraseology that they are ignorant
of the cause of the said action, and do not wonder at it.

But, they will say, whether we know or do not know the
means whereby the mind acts on the body, we have, at
any rate, experience of the fact that unless the human mind
is in a fit state to think, the body remains inert.  Moreover,
we have experience, that the mind alone can determine
whether we speak or are silent, and a variety of similar
states which, accordingly, we say depend on the mind's
decree.  But, as to the first point, I ask such objectors,
whether experience does not also teach, that if the body
be inactive the mind is simultaneously unfitted for
thinking?  For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mind
simultaneously is in a state of torpor also, and has no
power of thinking, such as it possesses when the body
is awake.  Again, I think everyone's experience will
confirm the statement, that the mind is not at all times
equally fit for thinking on a given subject, but according
as the body is more or less fitted for being stimulated by
the image of this or that object, so also is the mind more
or less fitted for contemplating the said object.

But, it will be urged, it is impossible that solely from
the laws of nature considered as extended substance,
we should be able to deduce the causes of buildings,
pictures, and things of that kind, which are produced
only by human art; nor would the human body, unless
it were determined and led by the mind, be capable of
building a single temple.  However, I have just pointed
out that the objectors cannot fix the limits of the body's
power, or say what can be concluded from a consideration
of its sole nature, whereas they have experience of many
things being accomplished solely by the laws of nature,
which they would never have believed possible except
under the direction of mind:  such are the actions performed
by somnambulists while asleep, and wondered at by their
performers when awake.  I would further call attention
to the mechanism of the human body, which far surpasses
in complexity all that has been put together by human art,
not to repeat what I have already shown, namely, that
from nature, under whatever attribute she be considered,
infinite results follow.  As for the second objection, I
submit that the world would be much happier, if men were
as fully able to keep silence as they are to speak.
Experience abundantly shows that men can govern anything
more easily than their tongues, and restrain anything more
easily than their appetites; when it comes about that many
 believe, that we are only free in respect to objects which
we moderately desire, because our desire for such can
easily be controlled by the thought of something else
frequently remembered, but that we are by no means free
in respect to what we seek with violent emotion, for our
desire cannot then be allayed with the remembrance of
anything else.  However, unless such persons had proved
by experience that we do many things which we afterwards
repent of, and again that we often, when assailed by contrary
emotions, see the better and follow the worse, there would
be nothing to prevent their believing that we are free in all
things.  Thus an infant believes that of its own free will it
desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely desires
to run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters
from the free decision of his mind words which, when he
is sober, he would willingly have withheld:  thus, too, a
delirious man, a garrulous woman, a child, and others
of like complexion, believe that they speak from the free
decision of their mind, when they are in reality unable to
restrain their impulse to talk.  Experience teaches us no
less clearly than reason, that men believe themselves to be
free, simply because they are conscious of their actions,
and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are
determined; and, further, it is plain that the dictates of the
mind are but another name for the appetites, and therefore
vary according to the varying state of the body.  Everyone
shapes his actions according to his emotion, those who are
assailed by conflicting emotions know not what they wish;
those who are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayed
this way or that.  All these considerations clearly show that
a mental decision and a bodily appetite, or determined state,
are simultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing, which
we call decision, when it is regarded under and explained
through the attribute of thought, and a conditioned state, when
it is regarded under the attribute of extension, and deduced
from the laws of motion and rest.  This will appear yet more
plainly in the sequel.  For the present I wish to call attention
to another point, namely, that we cannot act by the decision
of the mind, unless we have a remembrance of having done
so.  For instance, we cannot say a word without remembering
that we have done so.  Again, it is not within the free power
of the mind to remember or forget a thing at will.  Therefore
the freedom of the mind must in any case be limited to the
power of uttering or not uttering something which it remembers.
But when we dream that we speak, we believe that we speak
from a free decision of the mind, yet we do not speak, or, if we
do, it is by a spontaneous motion of the body.  Again, we
dream that we are concealing something, and we seem to act
from the same decision of the mind as that, whereby we keep
silence when awake concerning something we know.  Lastly,
we dream that from the free decision of our mind we do
something, which we should not dare to do when awake.

Now I should like to know whether there be in the mind two
sorts of decisions, one sort illusive, and the other sort free?
If our folly does not carry us so far as this, we must necessarily
admit, that the decision of the mind, which is believed to be
free, is not distinguishable from the imagination or memory,
and is nothing more than the affirmation, which an idea, by
virtue of being an idea, necessarily involves (II. xlix.).
Wherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind by
the same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing.
Therefore those who believe, that they speak or keep silence
or act in any way from the free decision of their mind, do
but dream with their eyes open.

III. The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate
ideas; the passive states of the mind depend solely
on inadequate ideas.

>>>>>Proof--The first element, which constitutes the essence
of the mind, is nothing else but the idea of the actually existent
body (II. xi. and xiii.), which (II. xv.) is compounded of many
other ideas, whereof some are adequate and some inadequate
(II. xxix. Cor., II. xxxviii. Cor.).  Whatsoever therefore follows
from the nature of mind, and has mind for its proximate cause,
through which it must be understood, must necessarily follow
either from an adequate or from an inadequate idea.  But in
so far as the mind (III. i.) has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily
passive:  wherefore the activities of the mind follow solely from
adequate ideas, and accordingly the mind is only passive in so
far as it has inadequate ideas.  Q.E.D.

*****Note--Thus we see, that passive states are not
attributed to the mind, except in so far as it contains something
involving negation, or in so far as it is regarded as a part of
nature, which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived
through itself without other parts:  I could thus show, that
passive states are attributed to individual things in the same
way that they are attributed to the mind, and that they cannot
otherwise be perceived, but my purpose is solely to treat
of the human mind.

IV. Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external to
itself.

>>>>>Proof--This proposition is self-evident, for the
definition of anything affirms the essence of that thing, but
does not negative it; in other words, it postulates the essence
of the thing, but does not take it away.  So long therefore as
we regard only the thing itself, without taking into account
external causes, we shall not be able to find in it anything
which could destroy it.  Q.E.D.

V. Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in the same
object, in so far as one is capable of destroying the other.

>>>>>Proof--If they could agree together or co-exist in the same
object, there would then be in the said object something which
could destroy it; but this, by the foregoing proposition, is absurd,
therefore things, &c.  Q.E.D.

VI. Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in
its own being.

>>>>>Proof--Individual things are modes whereby the
attributes of God are expressed in a given determinate manner
(I. xxv.Cor.); that is, (I. xxxiv.), they are things which express
in a given determinate manner the power of God, whereby
God is and acts; now no thing contains in itself anything
whereby it can be destroyed, or which can take away its
existence (III. iv.); but contrariwise it is opposed to all that
could take away its existence (III. v.).  Therefore, in so far as
it can, and in so far as it is in itself, it endeavours to persist
in its own being.  Q.E.D.

VII. The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to
persist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essence
of the thing in question.

>>>>>Proof--From the given essence of any thing certain
consequences necessarily follow (I. xxxvi.), nor have things any
power save such as necessarily follows from their nature as
determined (I. xxix.); wherefore the power of any given thing,
or the endeavour whereby, either alone or with other things,
it acts, or endeavours to act, that is (III. vi.), the power or
endeavour, wherewith it endeavours to persist in its own being,
is nothing else but the given or actual essence of the thing in
question.  Q.E.D.

VIII. The endeavour, whereby a thing endeavours to persist
in its own being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite time.

>>>>>Proof--If it involved a limited time, which should determine
the duration of the thing, it would then follow solely from that
power whereby the thing exists, that the thing could not exist
beyond the limits of that time, but that it must be destroyed; but
this (III. iv.) is absurd.  Wherefore the endeavour wherewith a
thing exists involves no definite time; but, contrariwise, since
(III. iv.) it will by the same power whereby it already exists
always continue to exist, unless it be destroyed by some external
cause, this endeavour involves an indefinite time.

IX. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas, and
also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to persist in its
being for an indefinite period, and of this endeavour it is conscious.

>>>>>Proof--The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate
and inadequate ideas (III. iii.), therefore (III. vii.), both in so far
as it possesses the former, and in so far as it possesses the latter,
it endeavours to persist in its own being, and that for an indefinite
time (III. viii.).  Now as the mind (II. xxiii.) is necessarily conscious
of itself through the ideas of the modifications of the body, the mind
is therefore (III. vii.) conscious of its own endeavour.

*****Note--This endeavour, when referred solely to the mind, is
called "will," when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it
is called "appetite"; it is, in fact, nothing else but man's essence,
from the nature of which necessarily follow all those results which
tend to its preservation; and which man has thus been determined
to perform.

Further, between appetite and desire there is no difference, except
that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so far as they
are conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly be thus defined:
"Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof."  It is thus plain from
what has been said, that in no case do we strive for, wish for, long
for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but on the
other hand we deem a thing to be good, because we strive for it,
wish for it, long for it, or desire it.

X. An idea, which excludes the existence of our body, cannot be
postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto.

>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever can destroy our body, cannot be
postulated therein (III. v.).  Therefore neither can the idea of such
a thing occur in God, in so far as he has the idea of our body (II. ix.
Cor.); that is (II. xi., xiii.), the idea of that thing cannot be postulated
as in our mind, but contrariwise, since (II. xi., xiii.) the first element,
that constitutes the essence of the mind, is the idea of the human
body as actually existing, it follows that the first and chief endeavour
of our mind is the endeavour to affirm the existence of our body:
thus, an idea, which negatives the existence of our body, is contrary
to our mind, &c.  Q.E.D.

XI. Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power
of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes, helps
or hinders the power of thought in our mind.

>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from II. vii. or from II. xiv.

*****Note--Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes,
and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection, sometimes
to a state of lesser perfection.  These passive states of transition
explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain.  By "pleasure"
therefore in the following propositions I shall signify "a passive state
wherein the mind passes to a greater perfection."  By "pain" I shall
signify "a passive state wherein the mind passes to a lesser perfection."
Further, the emotion of pleasure in reference to the body and mind
together I shall call "stimulation" (titillatio) or "merriment" (hilaritas),
the emotion of pain in the same relation I shall call "suffering" or
"melancholy."  But we must bear in mind, that stimulation and
suffering are attributed to man, when one part of his nature is more
affected than the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all parts
are alike affected.  What I mean by desire I have explained in the
note to Prop. ix. of this part; beyond these three I recognize no
other primary emotion; I will show as I proceed, that all other
emotions arise from these three.  But, before I go further, I should
like here to explain at greater length Prop. x. of this part, in order
that we may clearly understand how one idea is contrary to another.
In the note to II. xvii. we showed that the idea, which constitutes
the essence of mind, involves the existence of body, so long as
the body itself exists.  Again, it follows from what we pointed out
in the Corollary to II. viii., that the present existence of our mind
depends solely on the fact, that the mind involves the actual
existence of the body.  Lastly, we showed (II. xvii., xviii. and
Note) that the power of the mind, whereby it imagines and
remembers things, also depends on the fact, that it involves the
actual existence of the body.  Whence it follows, that the present
existence of the mind and its power of imagining are removed,
as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the
body.  Now the cause, why the mind ceases to affirm this
existence of the body, cannot be the mind itself (III. iv.), nor
again the fact that the body ceases to exist.  For (by II. vi.)
the cause, why the mind affirms the existence of the body,
is not that the body began to exist; therefore, for the same
reason, it does not cease to affirm the existence of the body,
because the body ceases to exist; but (II. xvii.) this result
follows from another idea, which excludes the present
existence of our body and, consequently, of our mind, and
which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the essence
of our mind.

XII. The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive those
things, which increase or help the power of activity in the body.

>>>>>Proof--So long as the human body is affected in a mode,
which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind
will regard that external body as present (II. xvii.), and consequently
(II. vii.), so long as the human mind regards an external body as
present, that is (II. xvii. Note), conceives it, the human body is
affected in a mode, which involves the nature of the said external
body; thus so long as the mind conceives things, which increase
or help the power of activity in our body, the body is affected in
modes which increase or help its power of activity (III. Post. i.);
consequently (III. xi.) the mind's power of thinking is for that
period increased or helped.  Thus (III. vi., ix.) the mind, as far
as it can, endeavours to imagine such things.  Q.E.D.

XIII. When the mind conceives things which diminish or hinder the
body's power of activity, it endeavours, as far as possible, to
remember things which exclude the existence of the first-named
things.

>>>>>Proof--So long as the mind conceives anything of the kind
alluded to, the power of the mind and body is diminished or
constrained (cf. III. xii. Proof); nevertheless it will continue to
conceive it, until the mind conceives something else, which excludes
the present existence thereof (II. xvii.); that is (as I have just shown),
the power of the mind and of the body is diminished, or constrained,
until the mind conceives something else, which excludes the
existence of the former thing conceived:  therefore the mind (III. ix.),
as far as it can, will endeavour to conceive or remember the latter.
Q.E.D.

<<<<>>>>Proof--If the human body has once been affected by two
bodies at once, whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of
them, it will straightway remember the other also (II. xviii.).  But
the mind's conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body
than the nature of external bodies (II. xvi. Cor. ii.); therefore, if
the body, and consequently the mind (III. Def. iii.) has been once
affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is
afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by the
other.

XV. Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure, pain,
or desire.

>>>>>Proof--Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously
affected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor
diminishes its power of activity, and the other does either increase
or diminish the said power (III. Post. i.).  From the foregoing
proposition it is evident that, whenever the mind is afterwards
affected by the former, through its true cause, which (by hypothesis)
neither increases nor diminishes its power of action, it will be at
the same time affected by the latter, which does increase or
diminish its power of activity, that is (III. xi. note) it will be affected
with pleasure or pain.  Thus the former of the two emotions will,
not through itself, but accidentally, be the cause of pleasure or
pain.  In the same way also it can be easily shown, that a thing
may be accidentally the cause of desire.  Q.E.D.

<<<<>>>>Proof--For from this fact alone it arises (III. xiv.), that
the mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with the
emotion of pleasure or pain, that is (III. xi. note), according as
the power of the mind and body may be increased or diminished,
&c.; and consequently (III. xii.), according as the mind may
desire or shrink from the conception of it (III. xiii. Cor.), in other
words (III. xiii. note), according as it may love or hate the same.
Q.E.D.

*****Note--Hence we understand how it may happen, that we
love or hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known
to us; merely, as a phrase is, from "sympathy" or "antipathy."  We
should refer to the same category those objects, which affect us
pleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble other
objects which affect us in the same way.  This I will show in the
next Prop.  I am aware that certain authors, who were the first to
introduce these terms "sympathy" and "antipathy," wished to signify
thereby some occult qualities in things; nevertheless I think we may
be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known or manifest
qualities.

XVI. Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a given object
has some point of resemblance with another object which is wont
to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although the point of
resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said emotions, we
shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate.

>>>>>Proof--The point of resemblance was in the object (by
hypothesis), when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus
(III. xiv.), when the mind is affected by the image thereof, it will
straightway be affected by one or the other emotion, and
consequently the thing, which we perceive to have the same point
of resemblance, will be accidentally (III. xv.) a cause of pleasure
or pain.  Thus (by the foregoing Corollary), although the point
in which the two objects resemble one another be not the
efficient cause of the emotion, we shall still regard the first-named
object with love or hate.  Q.E.D.

XVII. If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect us
painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing which
is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure,
we shall hate the first-named thing, and at the same time we shall
love it.

>>>>>Proof--The given thing is (by hypothesis) in itself a cause
of pain, and (III. xiii. note), in so far as we imagine it with this
emotion, we shall hate it:  further, inasmuch as we conceive that
it has some point of resemblance to something else, which is wont
to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall
with an equally strong impulse of pleasure love it (III. xvi.); thus
we shall both hate and love the same thing.  Q.E.D.


*****Note--This disposition of the mind, which arises from two
contrary emotions, is called "vacillation"; it stands to the emotions
in the same relation as doubt does to the imagination (II. xliv. note);
vacillation and doubt do not differ one from the other, except as
greater differs from less.  But we must bear in mind that I have
deduced this vacillation from causes, which give rise through
themselves to one of the emotions, and to the other accidentally.
I have done this, in order that they might be more easily deduced
from what went before; but I do not deny that vacillation of the
disposition generally arises from an object, which is the efficient
cause of both emotions.  The human body is composed
(II. Post. i.) of a variety of individual parts of different nature,
and may therefore (Ax. i. after Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) be
affected in a variety of different ways by one and the same body;
and contrariwise, as one and the same thing can be affected in
many ways, it can also in many different ways affect one and
the same part of the body.  Hence we can easily conceive, that
one and the same object may be the cause of many and
conflicting emotions.

XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully
by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing
present.

>>>>>Proof--So long as a man is affected by the image of
anything, he will regard that thing as present, even though it be
non-existent (II. xvii. and Cor.), he will not conceive it as past
or future, except in so far as its image is joined to the image
of time past or future (II. xliv. note).  Wherefore the image of
a thing, regarded in itself alone, is identical, whether it be referred
to time past, time future, or time present; that is (II. xvi. Cor.), the
disposition or emotion of the body is identical, whether the image
be of a thing past or future.  Q.E.D.

*****Note I.--I call a thing past or future, according as we either
have been or shall be affected thereby.  For instance, according
as we have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it has
recreated us, or will recreate us, according as it has harmed us,
or will harm us.  For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm its
existence; that is, the body is affected by no emotion which
excludes the existence of the thing, and therefore (II. xvii.) the
body is affected by the image of the thing, in the same way as if
the thing were actually present.  However, as it generally happens
that those, who have had many experiences, vacillate, so long as
they regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in doubt about
its issue (II. xliv. note); it follows that the emotions which arise from
similar images of things are not so constant, but are generally
disturbed by the images of other things, until men become assured
of the issue.

*****Note II.--From what has just been said, we understand what
is meant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Joy, and
Disappointment.  "Hope" is nothing else but "an inconstant pleasure,
arising from the image of something future or past, whereof we do
not yet know the issue."  "Fear," on the other hand, is "an inconstant
pain also arising from the image of something concerning which we
are in doubt."  If the element of doubt be removed from these
emotions, hope becomes "Confidence" and fear becomes "Despair."
In other words, "Pleasure or Pain arising from the image of
something concerning which we have hoped or feared."  Again,
"Joy" is "Pleasure arising from the image of something past whereof
we have doubted the issue."  "Disappointment" is "the Pain opposed
to Joy."

XIX. He who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed
will feel pain; if he conceives that it is preserved he will feel pleasure.

>>>>>Proof--The mind, as far as possible, endeavours to
conceive those things which increase or help the body's power
of activity (III. xii.); in other words (III. xii. note), those things
which it loves.  But conception is helped by those things which
postulate the existence of a thing, and contrariwise is hindered
by those which exclude the existence of a thing (II. xvii.);
therefore the images of things, which postulate the existence
of an object of love, help the mind's endeavour to conceive
the object of love, in other words (III. xi. note), affect the mind
pleasurably; contrariwise those things, which exclude the existence
of an object of love, hinder the aforesaid mental endeavour; in
other words, affect the mind painfully.  He, therefore, who
conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain,
&c.  Q.E.D.

XX. He who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will
also feel pleasure.

>>>>>Proof--The mind (III. xiii.) endeavours to conceive those
things, which exclude the existence of things whereby the body's
power of activity is diminished or constrained; that is (III. xiii.
note), it endeavours to conceive such things as exclude the
existence of what it hates; therefore the image of a thing, which
excludes the existence of what the mind hates, helps the aforesaid
mental effort, in other words (III. xi. note), affects the mind
pleasurably.  Thus he who conceives that the object of his hate
is destroyed will feel pleasure.  Q.E.D.

XXI. He who conceives, that the object of his love is affected
pleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected pleasurably or
painfully; and the one or the other emotion will be greater or less
in the lover according as it is greater or less in the thing loved.

>>>>>Proof--The images of things (as we showed in III. xix.)
which postulate the existence of the object of love, help the
mind's endeavour to conceive the said object.  But pleasure
postulates the existence of something feeling pleasure, so much
the more in proportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater;
for it is (III. xi. note) a transition to a greater perfection; therefore
the image of pleasure in the object of love helps the mental
endeavour of the lover; that is, it affects the lover pleasurably,
and so much the more, in proportion as this emotion may have
been greater in the object of love.  This was our first point.
Further, in so far as a thing is affected with pain, it is to that
extent destroyed, the extent being in proportion to the amount
of pain (III. xi. note); therefore (III. xix.) he who conceives,
that the object of his love is affected painfully, will himself be
affected painfully, in proportion as the said emotion is greater
or less in the object of love.  Q.E.D.

XXII. If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects some
object of our love, we shall be affected with love towards that
thing.  Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an object of
our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred towards it.

>>>>>Proof--He, who affects pleasurably or painfully the object
of our love, affects us also pleasurably or painfully--that is, if we
conceive the loved object as affected with the said pleasure
or pain (III. xxi.). But this pleasure or pain is postulated to come
to us accompanied by the idea of an external cause; therefore
(III. xiii. note), if we conceive that anyone affects an object of
our love pleasurably or painfully, we shall be affected with love
or hatred towards him.  Q.E.D.

*****Note--Prop. xxi. explains to us the nature of 'Pity,' which
we may define as 'pain arising from another's hurt.'  What term
we can use for pleasure arising from another's gain, I know not.

We will call the 'love towards him who confers a benefit on
another,' 'Approval;' and the 'hatred towards him who injures
another,' we will call 'Indignation.'  We must further remark,
that we not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved (as
shown in III. xxi.), but also for a thing which we have hitherto
regarded without emotion, provided that we deem that it resembles
ourselves (as I will show presently).  Thus, we bestow approval
on one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves, and,
contrariwise, are indignant with him who has done it an injury.

XXIII. He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is painfully
affected, will feel pleasure.  Contrariwise, if he thinks that the said
object is pleasurably affected, he will feel pain.  Each of these
emotions will be greater or less, according as its contrary is greater
or less in the object of hatred.

>>>>>Proof--In so far as an object of hatred is painfully affected,
it is destroyed, to an extent proportioned to the strength of the
pain (III. xi. note).  Therefore, he (III. xx.) who conceives, that
some object of his hatred is painfully affected, will feel pleasure,
to an extent proportioned to the amount of pain he conceives
in the object of his hatred.  This was our first point.  Again,
pleasure postulates the existence of the pleasurably affected
thing (III. xi. note), in proportion as the pleasure is greater or
less.  If anyone imagines that an object of his hatred is pleasurably
affected, this conception (III. xiii.) will hinder his own endeavour
to persist; in other words (III. xi. note), he who hates will be
painfully affected.  Q.E.D.

*****Note--This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed, and
without any mental conflict.  For (as I am about to show in Prop.
xxvii.), in so far as a man conceives that something similar to
himself is affected by pain, he will himself be affected in like
manner; and he will have the contrary emotion in contrary
circumstances.  But here we are regarding hatred only.

XXIV. If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an object
of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also.  If we
conceive that he painfully affects that said object, we shall feel
love towards him.

>>>>>Proof--This proposition is proved in the same way as III.
xxii., which see.

*****Note--These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable
to 'envy,' which, accordingly, is nothing else but 'hatred, in so far
as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's hurt,
and to grieve at another's advantage.'

XXV. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and
concerning what we love, everything that we can conceive
to affect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object.
Contrariwise, we endeavour to negative everything, which
we conceive to affect painfully ourselves or the loved object.

>>>>>Proof--That, which we conceive to affect an object
of our love pleasurably or painfully, affects us also pleasurably
or painfully (III. xxi.).  But the mind (III. xii.) endeavours, as
far as possible, to conceive those things which affect us
pleasurably; in other words (II. xvii. and Cor.), it endeavours
to regard them as present.  And, contrariwise (III. xiii.), it
endeavours to exclude the existence of such things as affect
us painfully; therefore, we endeavour to affirm concerning
ourselves, and concerning the loved object, whatever we
conceive to affect ourselves, or the love object pleasurably.
Q.E.D.

XXVI. We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we hate,
everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and,
contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything
which we conceive to affect it pleasurably.

>>>>>Proof--This proposition follows from III. xxiii., as the
foregoing proposition followed from III. xxi.

*****Note--Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a
man may easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object,
and, contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object.  This feeling
is called 'pride,' in reference to the man who thinks too highly
of himself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams
with his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things
that fall within the scope of his conception, and thereupon
accounting them real, and exulting in them, so long as he is
unable to conceive anything which excludes their existence,
and determines his own power of action.  'Pride,' therefore,
is 'pleasure springing from a man thinking too highly of himself.'
Again, the 'pleasure which arises from a man thinking too
highly of another' is called 'over-esteem.'  Whereas the
'pleasure which arises from thinking too little of a man' is
called 'disdain.'

XXVII. By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is like
ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion,
to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with
a like emotion (affectus).

>>>>>Proof--The images of things are modifications of the
human body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as
present to us (II. xvii.); in other words (II. x.), whereof the
ideas involve the nature of our body, and, at the same time,
the nature of the external bodies as present.  If, therefore,
the nature of the external body be similar to the nature of our
body, then the idea which we form of the external body will
involve a modification of our own body similar to the
modification of the external body.  Consequently, if we
conceive anyone similar to ourselves as affected by any
emotion, this conception will express a modification of our
body similar to that emotion.  Thus, from the fact of
conceiving a thing like ourselves to be affected with any
emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like emotion.
If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we shall,
to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not similar,
emotion.  Q.E.D.

*****Note I--This imitation of emotions, when it is referred
to pain, is called "compassion" (cf. III. xxii. note); when it is
referred to desire, it is called "emulation," which is nothing
else but "the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact
that we conceive that others have the like desire."

<<<<>>>>Proof--This is proved from the last proposition in the
same manner as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi.

<<<<>>>>Proof--If we could hate it for this reason, we should
rejoice in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.

<<<<>>>>Proof--That, which painfully affects the object of
our pity, affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing
proposition); therefore, we shall endeavour to recall
everything which removes its existence, or which destroys
it (cf. III. xiii.); in other words (III. ix. note), we shall desire
to destroy it, or we shall be determined for its destruction;
thus, we shall endeavour to free from misery a thing which
we pity.  Q.E.D.

*****Note II--This will or appetite for doing good, which
arises from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a
benefit, is called "benevolence," and is nothing else but "desire
arising from compassion."  Concerning love or hate towards
him who has done good or harm to something, which we
conceive to be like ourselves, see III. xxii. note.

XXVIII. We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we
conceive to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavour to
remove or destroy whatsoever we conceive to be truly
repugnant thereto, or to conduce to pain.

>>>>>Proof--We endeavour, as far as possible, to conceive
that which we imagine to conduce to pleasure (III. xii.); in
other words (II. xvii.) we shall endeavour to conceive it as far
as possible as present or actually existing.  But the endeavour
of the mind, or the mind's power of thought, is equal to, and
simultaneous with, the endeavour of the body, or the body's
power of action.  (This is clear from II. vii. Cor. and II. xi.
Cor.).  Therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its
existence, in other words (which by III. ix., note, come to the
same thing) we desire and strive for it; this was our first point.
Again, if we conceive that something, which we believed to
be the cause of pain, that is (III. xiii. note), which we hate,
is destroyed, we shall rejoice (III. xx.).  We shall, therefore
(by the first part of this proof), endeavour to destroy the
same, or (III. xiii.) to remove it from us, so that we may not
regard it as present; this was our second point.  Wherefore
whatsoever conduces to pleasure, &c.  Q.E.D.

XXIX. We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we
conceive men* to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we
shall shrink from doing that which we conceive men to shrink
from.

[*N.B. By "men" in this and the following propositions, I
mean men whom we regard without any particular emotion.]

>>>>>Proof--From the fact of imagining, that men love or
hate anything, we shall love or hate the same thing (III. xxvii.).
That is (III. xiii. note), from this mere fact we shall feel pleasure
or pain at the thing's presence.  And so we shall endeavour to
do whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with pleasure,
etc.  Q.E.D.

*****Note--This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone,
solely in order to please men, we call "ambition," especially
when we so eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we
do or omit certain things to our own or another's hurt:  in other
cases it is generally called "kindliness."  Furthermore I give the
name of "praise" to the "pleasure, with which we conceive the
action of another, whereby he has endeavoured to please us";
but of "blame" to the "pain wherewith we feel aversion to his
action."