Prop. XXXV. In so far only as men live 
in obedience to reason, do they always 
necessarily agree in nature.

Proof.- In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are passions, they 
can be different in nature (IV:xxxiii.), and at variance one with another. 
But men are only said to be active, in so far as they act in obedience to 
reason (III:iii.); therefore, what so ever follows from human nature in so 
far as it is defined by reason must (III:Def.ii.) be understood solely 
through human nature as its proximate cause. But, since every man by the 
laws of his nature desires that which he deems good, and endeavours to 
remove that which he deems bad (IV:xix.); and further, since that which we, 
in accordance with reason, deem good or bad, necessarily is good 
or bad (II:xli.); it follows that men, in so far as they live in obedience 
to reason, necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for 
human nature, and consequently for each individual man (IV:xxxi.Coroll.); 
in other words, such things as are in harmony with each man's nature. 
Therefore, men in so far as they live in obedience to reason, necessarily 
live always in harmony one with another. Q.E.D.

Corollary I - There is no individual thing in nature, which is 
more useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason. For that 
thing is to man most useful, which is most in harmony with his nature 
(IV:xxxi.Coroll.); that is, obviously, man. But man acts absolutely 
according to the laws of his nature, when he lives in obedience to reason 
(III:Def.ii.), and to this extent only is always necessarily in harmony 
with the nature of another man (by the last Prop.); wherefore among 
individual things nothing is more useful to man, than a man who lives in 
obedience to reason. Q.E.D.

Corollary II.- As every man seeks most that which is useful to him, so are 
men most useful one to another. For the more a man seeks what is useful to 
him and endeavours to preserve himself, the more is he endowed with virtue 
(IV:xx.), or, what is the same thing (IV:Def.viii.), the more is he endowed 
with power to act according to the laws of his own nature, that is to live 
in obedience to reason. But men are most in natural harmony, when they live 
in obedience to reason (by the last Prop.); therefore (by the foregoing 
Coroll.) men will be most useful one to another, when each seeks most that 
which is useful to him. Q.E.D.

Note.- What we have just shown is attested by experience so conspicuously, 
that it is in the mouth of nearly everyone: "Man is to man a God." Yet it 
rarely happens that men live in obedience to reason, for things are so 
ordered among them, that they are generally envious and troublesome one to 
another. Nevertheless they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life, 
so that the definition of man as a social animal has met with general 
assent; in fact, men do derive from social life much more convenience than 
injury. Let satirists then laugh their fill at human affairs, let 
theologians rail, and let misanthropes praise to their utmost the life of 
untutored rusticity, let them heap contempt on men and praises on beasts; 
when all is said, they will find that men can provide for their wants much 
more easily by mutual help, and that only by uniting their forces can they 
escape from the dangers that on every side beset them: not to say how much 
more excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is, to study the actions of 
men than the actions of beasts. But I will treat of this more at 
length elsewhere.



Prop. XXXVI. The highest good of those 
who follow virtue is common to all, 
and therefore all can equally rejoice 
therein.

Proof.- To act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason (IV:xxiv.), 
and whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience to reason is to understand 
(IV:xxvi.); therefore (IV:xxviii.) the highest good for those who follow 
after virtue is to know God; that is (II:xlvii.&Note) a good which is 
common to all and can be possessed. by all men equally, in so far as they 
are of the same nature. Q.E.D.

Note.- Someone may ask how it would be, if the highest good of those who 
follow after virtue were not common to all? Would it not then follow, as 
above (IV:xxxiv.), that men living in obedience to reason, that is 
(IV:xxxv.), men in so far as they agree in nature, would be at variance 
one with another? To such an inquiry, I make answer, that it follows not 
accidentally but from the very nature of reason, that main's highest good 
is common to all, inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence of man, 
in so far as defined by reason; and that a man could neither be, nor be 
conceived without the power of taking pleasure in this highest good. For 
it belongs to the essence of the human mind (II:xlvii.), to have an 
adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.



Prop. XXXVII. The good which every man, 
who follows after virtue, desires for 
himself he will also desire for other 
men, and so much the more, in proportion 
as he has a greater knowledge of God.

Proof.- Men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason, are most 
useful to their fellow men (IV:xxxv;Coroll.i.); therefore (IV:xix.), 
we shall in obedience to reason necessarily endeavour to bring about that 
men should live in obedience to reason. But the good which every man, in 
so far as he is guided by reason, or, in other words, follows after virtue, 
desires for himself, is to understand (IV:xxvi.); wherefore the good, which 
each follower of virtue seeks for himself, he will desire also for others. 
Again, desire, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is the very 
essence of the mind (Def. of the Emotions, i.); now the essence of the 
mind consists in knowledge (III:xi.), which involves the knowledge of God 
(II:xlvii.), and without it (I:xv.), can neither be, nor be conceived; 
therefore, in proportion as the mind's essence involves a greater knowledge 
of God, so also will be greater the desire of the follower of virtue, that 
other men should possess that which he seeks as good for himself. Q.E.D.

Another Proof.- The good, which a man desires for himself and loves, he 
will love more constantly, if he sees that others love it also (III:xxxi.); 
he will therefore endeavour that others should love it also; and as the 
good in question is common to all, and therefore all can rejoice therein, 
he will endeavour, for the same reason, to bring about that all should 
rejoice therein, and this he will do the more (III:xxxvii.), in proportion 
as his own enjoyment of the good is greater.

Note 1- He who, guided by emotion only, endeavours to cause others to love 
what he loves himself, and to make the rest of the world live according to 
his own fancy, acts solely by impulse, and is, therefore, hateful, 
especially, to those who take delight in something different, and 
accordingly study and, by similar impulse, endeavour, to make men live in 
accordance with what pleases themselves. Again, as the highest good sought 
by men under the guidance of emotion is often such, that it can only be 
possessed by a single individual, it follows that those who love it are not 
consistent in their intentions, but, while they delight to sing its praises, 
fear to be believed. But he, who endeavours to lead men by reason, does not 
act by impulse but courteously and kindly, and his intention is always 
consistent. Again, whatsoever we desire and do, whereof we are the cause 
in so far as we possess the idea of God, or know God, I set down to 
Religion. The desire of well-doing, which is engendered by a life 
according to reason, I call piety. Further, the desire, whereby a 
man living according to reason is bound to associate others with 
himself in friendship, I call honour (Honestas); by honourable I mean 
that which is praised by men living according to reason, and by base 
I mean that which is repugnant to the gaining of friendship. I have also 
shown in addition what are the foundations of a state; and the difference 
between true ,virtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what I 
have said; namely, that true virtue is nothing else but living in 
accordance with reason; while infirmity is nothing else but man's 
allowing himself to be led by things which are external to himself, 
and to be by them determined to act in a manner demanded by the general 
disposition of things rather than by his own nature considered solely 
in itself.

Such are the matters which I engaged to prove in IV:xviii., whereby it 
is plain that the law against the slaughtering of animals is founded rather 
on vain superstition and womanish pity than on sound reason. The rational 
quest of what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of 
associating ourselves with our fellow men, but - not with beasts, or things, 
whose nature is different from our own; we have the same rights in respect 
to them as they have in respect to us. Nay, as everyone's right is defined 
by his virtue, or power, men have far greater rights over beasts than 
beasts have over men. Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, 
that we may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please, 
treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature is not like 
ours, and their emotions are naturally different from human emotions 
(III:Ivii.Note). It remains for me to explain what I mean by, just and 
unjust, sin and merit. On these points see the following note.

Note II.- In the Appendix to Part I. I undertook to explain praise and 
blame, merit and sin, justice and injustice.

Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in III:xxix.Note: the time 
has now come to treat of the remaining terms. But I must first say a few 
words concerning man in the state of nature and in society.

Every man exists by sovereign natural right, and, consequently, by 
sovereign natural right performs those actions which follow from the 
necessity of his own nature; therefore by sovereign natural right every man 
judges what is good and what is bad, takes care of his own advantage 
according to his own disposition (IV:xix. and IV:xx.), avenges the wrongs 
done to him (III:xl.Coroll. ii.), and endeavours to preserve that which he 
loves and to destroy - that which he hates (III:xxviii.). Now, if men lived 
under the guidance of reason, everyone would remain in possession of this 
his right, without any injury being done to his neighbour V:xxxv.Coroll.i.). 
But seeing that they are a prey to their emotions, which far surpass human 
power or virtue (IV:vi.), they are often drawn in different directions, and 
being at variance one with another (IV:xxxiii., xxxiv.), stand in need of 
mutual help (IV:xxxv.Note). Wherefore, in order that men may live together 
in harmony, and may aid one another, it is necessary that they should 
forego their natural right, and, for the sake of security, refrain from 
all actions which can injure their fellow-men. The way in which this end 
can be obtained, so that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions 
(IV:iv.Coroll.), inconstant, and diverse, should be able to render each 
other mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is evident from IV:vii. and 
III:xxxix. It is there shown, that an emotion can only be restrained by an 
emotion stronger than, and contrary to itself, and that men avoid inflicting 
injury through fear of incurring a greater injury themselves.

On this law society can be established, so long as it keeps in its own 
hand the right, possessed by everyone, of avenging injury, and pronouncing 
on good and evil; and provided it also possesses the power to lay down a 
general rule of conduct, and to pass laws sanctioned, not by reason, which 
is powerless in restraining emotion, but by threats (IV:xvii.Note). Such a 
society established with laws and the power of preserving itself is called 
a State, while those who live under its protection are called citizens. We 
may readily understand that there is in the state of nature nothing, which 
by universal consent is pronounced good or bad; for in the state of nature 
everyone thinks solely of his own advantage, and according to his 
disposition, with reference only to his individual advantage, decides 
what is good or bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself.

In the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable; it can only 
exist in a state, where good and evil are pronounced on by common consent, 
and where everyone is bound to obey the State authority. Sin, then, 
is nothing else but disobedience, which is therefore punished by the right 
of the State only. Obedience, on the other hand, is set down as merit, 
inasmuch as a man is thought worthy of merit, if he takes delight in the 
advantages which a State provides.

Again, in the state of nature, no one is by common consent master of 
anything, nor is there anything in nature, which can be said to belong to 
one man rather than another: all things are common to all. Hence, in the 
state of nature, we can conceive no wish to render to every man his own, 
or to deprive a man of that which belongs to him; in other words, there is 
nothing in the state of nature answering to justice and injustice. Such 
ideas are only possible in a social state, when it is decreed by common 
consent what belongs to one man and what to another.

From all these considerations it is evident, that justice and 
injustice, sin and merit, are extrinsic ideas, and not attributes which 
display the nature of the mind. But I have said enough.



Prop. XXXVIII. Whatsoever disposes the human 
body, so as to render it capable of being 
affected in an increased number of ways, or 
of affecting external bodies in an increased 
number of ways, is useful to man ; and is so, 
in proportion as the body is thereby rendered 
more capable of being affected or affecting 
other bodies in an increased number of ways; 
contrariwise, whatsoever renders the body less 
capable in this respect is hurtful to man.

Proof.- Whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the body increases 
also the mind's capability of perception (II:xiv.); therefore, whatsoever 
thus disposes the body and thus renders it capable, is necessarily good or 
useful (IV:xxvi., IV:xxvii.); and is so in proportion to the extent to 
which it can render the body capable; contrariwise (II:xiv., IV:xxvi., 
IV:xxvii.), it is hurtful, if it renders the body in this respect less 
capable. Q.E.D.



Prop. XXXIX. Whatsoever brings about 
the preservation of the proportion of 
motion and rest, which the parts of 
the human body mutually possess, is 
good; contrariwise, whatsoever causes 
a change in such proportion is bad.

Proof.- The human body needs many other bodies for its preservation 
(II:Post.iv.). But that which constitutes the specific reality (forma) 
of a human body is, that its parts communicate their several motions 
one to another in a certain fixed proportion (Def. before Lemma iv. after 
II:xiii.). Therefore, whatsoever brings about the preservation of the 
proportion between motion and rest, which the parts of the human body 
mutually possess, preserves the specific reality of the human body, and 
consequently renders the human body capable of being affected in many ways 
and of affecting external bodies in many ways; consequently it is good 
(by the last Prop.). Again, whatsoever brings about a change in the 
aforesaid proportion causes the human body to assume another specific 
character, in other words (see Preface to this Part towards the end, 
though the point is indeed self-evident), to be destroyed, and 
consequently totally incapable of being affected in an increased 
numbers of ways; therefore it is bad. Q.E.D.

Note.- The extent to which such causes can injure or be of service to the 
mind will be explained in the Fifth Part. But I would here remark that I 
consider that a body undergoes death, when the proportion of motion and 
rest which obtained mutually among its several parts is changed. For I do 
not venture to deny that a human body, while keeping the circulation of 
the blood and other properties, wherein the life of a body is thought to 
consist, may none the less be changed into another nature totally different 
from its own. There is no reason, which compels me to maintain that a body 
does not die, unless it becomes a corpse; nay, experience would seem to 
point to the opposite conclusion. It sometimes happens, that a man 
undergoes such changes, that I should hardly call him the same. As I have 
heard tell of a certain Spanish poet, who had been seized with sickness, 
and though he recovered therefrom yet remained so oblivious of his past 
life, that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he had 
written to be his own: indeed, he might have been taken for a grown-up 
child, if he had also forgotten his native tongue. If this instance seems 
incredible, what shall we say of infants? A man of ripe age deems their 
nature so unlike his own, that he can only be persuaded that he too has 
been an infant by the analogy of other men. However, I prefer to leave such 
questions undiscussed, lest I should give ground to the superstitious for 
raising new issues.



Prop. XL. Whatsoever conduces to man's 
social life, or causes men to live 
together in harmony, is useful, whereas 
whatsoever brings discord into a State is bad.

Proof.- For whatsoever causes men to live together in harmony also causes 
them to live according to reason (IV:xxxv.), and is therefore (IV:xxvi. 
and IV:xxvii.) good, and (for the same reason) whatsoever brings about 
discord is bad. Q.E.D.



Prop. XLI. Pleasure in itself is not 
bad but good: contrariwise, pain in 
itself is bad.

Proof.- Pleasure (III:xi.&Note) is emotion, whereby the body's power of 
activity is increased or helped; pain is emotion, whereby the body's power 
of activity is diminished or checked; therefore (IV:xxxviii.) pleasure in 
itself is good, &c. Q.E.D.



Prop. XLII. Mirth cannot be excessive, 
but is always good; contrariwise, 
Melancholy is always bad.

Proof.- Mirth (see its Def. in III:xi.Note) is pleasure. which, in so 
far as it is referred to the body, consists in all parts of the body being 
affected equally: that is (III:xi.), the body's power of activity is 
increased or aided in such a manner, that the several parts maintain their 
former proportion of motion and rest; therefore Mirth is always good 
(IV. xxxix.), and cannot be excessive. But Melancholy (see its Def. in 
the same note to III:xi.Note) is pain, which, in so far as it is referred 
to the body, consists in the absolute decrease or hindrance of the body's 
power of activity; therefore (IV:xxxviii.) it is always bad. Q.E.D.



Prop. XLIII. Stimulation may be excessive 
and bad; on the other hand, grief may be 
good, in so far as stimulation or pleasure 
is bad.

Proof.- Localized pleasure or stimulation (titillatio) is pleasure, which, 
in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in one or some of its 
parts being affected more than the rest (see its Definition, III:xi.Note); 
the power of this emotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of 
the body (IV:vi.), and may remain obstinately fixed therein, thus rendering 
it incapable of being affected in a variety of other ways: therefore 
(IV:xxxviii.) it may be bad. Again, grief, which is pain, cannot as such 
be good (IV:xli.). But, as its force and increase is defined by the power 
of an external cause compared with our own (IV:v.), we can conceive  
infinite degrees and modes of strength in this emotion (IV:iii.); 
we can, therefore, conceive it as capable of restraining stimulation, 
and preventing its becoming excessive, and hindering the body's 
capabilities; thus, to this extent, it will be good. Q.E.D.



Prop. XLIV. Love and desire may be excessive.

Proof.- Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause 
(Def_of_Emotions:vi.); therefore stimulation, accompanied by the idea of 
an external cause is love (III:xi.Note); hence love maybe excessive.  
Again, the strength of desire varies in proportion to the emotion from 
which it arises (III:xxxvii.). Now emotion may overcome all the rest of 
men's actions (IV:vi.); so, therefore, can desire, which arises from the 
same emotion, overcome all other desires, and become excessive, as we 
showed in the last proposition concerning stimulation.

Note.- Mirth, which I have stated to be good, can be conceived more easily 
than it can be observed. For the emotions, whereby we are daily assailed, 
are generally referred to some part of the body which is affected more than 
the rest; hence the emotions are generally excessive, and so fix the mind 
in the contemplation of one object, that it is unable to think of others; 
and although men, as a rule, are a prey to many emotions - and very few 
are found who are always assailed by one and the same - yet there are 
cases, where one and the same emotion remains obstinately fixed. We 
sometimes see men so absorbed in one object, that, although it be not 
present, they think they have it before them; when this is the case with a 
man who is not asleep, we say he is delirious or mad; nor are those persons 
who are inflamed with love, and who dream all night and all day about 
nothing but their mistress, or some woman, considered as less mad, for 
they are made objects of ridicule. But when a miser thinks of nothing but 
gain or money, or when an ambitious man thinks of nothing but glory, they 
are not reckoned to be mad, because they are generally harmful, and are 
thought worthy of being hated. But, in reality, Avarice, Ambition, Lust, 
&c., are species of madness, though they may not be reckoned among diseases.



Prop. XLV. Hatred can never be good.

Proof.- When we hate a man, we endeavour to destroy him (III.xxxix.), 
that is (IV:xxxvii.), we endeavour to do something that is bad. 
Therefore, &c. Q.E.D.

N.B. Here, and in what follows, I mean by hatred only hatred towards men.

Corollary I.- Envy, derision, contempt, anger, revenge, and other emotions 
attributable to hatred, or arising therefrom, are bad; this is evident from 
III:xxxix. and IV:xxxvii.

Corollary II.- Whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred is base, and in 
a State unjust. This also is evident from III:xxxix., and from the 
definitions of baseness and injustice in IV:xxxvii.Note.

Note.- Between derision (which I have in Coroll. I. stated to be bad) and 
laughter I recognize a great difference. For laughter, as also jocularity, 
is merely pleasure; therefore, so long as it be not excessive, it is in 
itself good (IV:xli.). Assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself, 
save grim and gloomy superstition. For why is it more lawful to satiate 
one's hunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy? I reason, and 
have convinced myself as follows: No deity, nor anyone else, save the 
envious, takes pleasure in my infirmity and discomfort, nor sets down to my 
virtue the tears, sobs, fear, and the like, which axe signs of infirmity of 
spirit; on the contrary, the greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected, 
the greater the perfection whereto we pass; in other words, the more must 
we necessarily partake of the divine nature. Therefore, to make use of what 
comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as possible (not to the point of 
satiety, for that would not be enjoyment) is the part of a wise man. I say 
it is the part of a wise man to refresh and recreate himself with moderate 
and pleasant food and drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty 
of growing plants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres, 
and the like, such as every man may make use of without injury to his 
neighbour. For the human body is composed of very numerous parts, of 
diverse nature, which continually stand in need of fresh and varied 
nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of performing 
all the actions, which follow from the necessity of its own nature; and, 
consequently, so that the mind may also be equally capable of - 
understanding many things simultaneously. This way of life, then, agrees 
best with our principles, and also with general practice; therefore, if 
there be any question of another plan, the plan we have mentioned is the 
best, and in every way to be commended. There is no need for me to set 
forth the matter more clearly or in more detail.



Prop. XLVI. He, who lives under the 
guidance of reason, endeavours, as 
far as possible, to render back love, 
or kindness, for other men's hatred, 
anger, contempt, &c., towards him.

Proof.- All emotions of hatred are bad (IV:xlv.Coroll.i.); therefore he who 
lives under the guidance of reason will endeavour, as far as possible, to 
avoid being assailed by, such emotions (IV:xix.); consequently, he will 
also endeavour to prevent others being so aspect (IV:xxxvii.). But hatred 
is increased by being reciprocated, and can be quenched by love III:xliii.), 
so that hatred may pass into love (III:xliv.); therefore he who lives under 
the guidance of reason will endeavour to repay hatred with love, that is, 
with kindness. Q.E.D.

Note.- He who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is assuredly, wretched.  
But he, who strives to conquer hatred with love, fights his battle in joy 
and confidence; he withstands many as easily as one, and has very little 
need of fortune's aid. Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through 
failure, but through increase in their powers; all these consequences 
follow so plainly from the mere definitions of love and understanding, 
that I have no need to prove them in detail.



Prop. XLVII. Emotions of hope and fear 
cannot be in themselves good.

Proof.- Emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without pain. For fear is 
pain (Def. of the  Emotions:xiii.), and hope (Def. of the Emotions, 
Explanation xii. and xiii.) cannot exist without fear; therefore (IV. xli.) 
these emotions cannot be good in themselves, but only in so far as they 
can restrain excessive pleasure (IV:xliii.). Q.E.D.

Note.- We may add, that these emotions show defective knowledge and an 
absence of power in the mind; for the same reason confidence, despair, joy, 
and disappointment are signs of a want of mental power. For although 
confidence and joy are pleasurable emotions, they, nevertheless imply a 
preceding, pain, namely, hope and fear. Wherefore the more we endeavour to 
be guided by reason, the less do we depend on hope; we endeavour to free 
ourselves from fear, and, as far as we can, to dominate fortune, directing 
our actions by the sure counsels of wisdom.



Prop. XLVIII. The emotions of over-esteem 
and disparagement are always bad.

Proof.- These emotions (see Def. of the Emotions, xxi., xxii.) are 
repugnant to reason; and are therefore (IV. xxvi., IV:xxvii.) bad. Q.E.D.



Prop. XLIX. Over-esteem is apt to 
render its object proud.

Proof.- If we see that any one rates us too highly, for love's sake, 
we are apt to become elated (III:xli.), or to be pleasurably affected 
Def. of the Emotions:xxx.); the good which we hear of ourselves we readily 
believe (III:xxv.); and therefore, for love's sake, rate ourselves too 
highly; in other words, we are apt to become proud. Q.E.D.



Prop. L. Pity, in a man who lives 
under the guidance of reason, is in 
itself bad and useless.

Proof.- Pity (Def. of the Emotions:xviii.) is a pain, and therefore 
(IV:xli.) is in itself bad. The good effect which follows, namely, our 
endeavour to free the object of our pity from misery, is an action which 
we desire to do solely at the dictation of reason (IV:xxxvii.); only at 
the dictation of reason are we able to perform any action, which we know 
for certain to be good (IV:xxvii.); thus, in a man who lives under the 
guidance of reason, pity in itself is useless and bad. Q.E.D.

Note.- He who rightly realizes, that all things follow from the necessity 
of the divine nature, and come to pass in accordance with the eternal laws 
and rules of nature, will not find anything worthy of hatred, derision, or 
contempt, nor will he bestow pity on anything, but to the utmost extent of 
human virtue he will endeavour to do well, as the saying is, and to rejoice. 
We may add, that he, who is easily touched with compassion, and is moved by 
another's sorrow or tears, often does something which he afterwards regrets; 
partly because we can never be sure that an action caused by emotion is 
good, partly because we are easily deceived by false tears. I am in this 
place expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of reason. He 
who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by compassion, is 
rightly styled inhuman, for (III: xxvii.) he seems unlike a man.



Prop. LI. Approval is not repugnant 
to reason, but can agree therewith 
and arise therefrom.

Proof.- Approval is love towards one who has done good to another (Def. of 
the Emotions:xix.); therefore it may be referred to the mind, in so far as 
the latter is active (III:lix.), that is (III:iii.), in so far as it - 
understands; therefore, it is in agreement with reason, &c. Q.E.D.

Another Proof.- He, who lives under the guidance of reason, desires for 
others the good which he seeks for himself (IV:xxxvii.); wherefore from 
seeing someone doing good to his fellow his own endeavour to do good is 
aided; in other words, he will feel pleasure (III:xi.Note) accompanied by 
the idea of the benefactor. Therefore he approves of him. Q.E.D.

Note.- Indignation as we defined it (Def. of the Emotions:xx.) is 
necessarily evil (IV:xlv.); we may, however, remark that, when the 
sovereign power for the sake of preserving peace punishes a citizen 
who has injured another, it should not be said to be indignant with the 
criminal, for it is not incited by hatred to ruin him, it is led by a sense 
of duty to punish him.



Prop. LII. Self-approval may arise 
from reason, and that which arises 
from reason is the highest possible.

Proof.- Self-approval is pleasure arising from a man's contemplation of 
himself and his own power of action (Def. of the Emotions:xxv.). But a 
man's true power of action - or virtue is reason herself (III:iii.), as 
the said man clearly and distinctly contemplates her (II:xl., II:xliii.); 
therefore self-approval arises from reason. Again, when a man is 
contemplating himself, he only perceived clearly and distinctly or 
adequately, such things as follow from his power of action (III:Def.ii.), 
that is (III:iii.), from his power of understanding; therefore in such 
contemplation alone does the highest possible self-approval arise. Q.E.D.

Note.- Self-approval is in reality the highest object for which we can hope.  
For (as we showed in IV:xxv.) no one endeavours to preserve his being for 
the sake of any ulterior object, and, as this approval is more and more 
fostered and strengthened by praise (III:liii.Coroll.), and on the 
contrary (III:lv.Coroll.) is more and more disturbed by blame, fame 
becomes the most powerful of incitements to action, and life under 
disgrace is almost unendurable.



Prop. LIII. Humility is not a virtue, 
or does not arise from reason.

Proof.- Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his own 
infirmities (Def. of the Emotions:xxvi.). But, in so far as a man knows 
himself by true reason, he is assumed to understand his essence, that is, 
his power (III:vii.). Wherefore, if a man in self-contemplation perceives 
any infirmity in himself, it is not by virtue of his understanding himself, 
but (III:lv.) by virtue of his power of activity being checked. But, if we 
assume that a man perceives his own infirmity by virtue of understanding 
something stronger than himself, by the knowledge of which he determines 
his own power of activity, this is the same as saying that we conceive 
that a man understands himself distinctly (IV:xxvi.), because (Land reads: 
"Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur"- which I have translated above. He - 
suggests as alternative readings to `quod', 'quo' (= whereby) and 'quodque' 
(= and that).) his power of activity is aided. Wherefore humility, or the 
pain which arises from a man's contemplation of his own infirmity, does 
not arise from the contemplation or reason, and is not a virtue but a 
passion. Q.E.D.



Prop. LIV. Repentance is not a virtue, 
or does not arise from reason ; but he 
who repents of an action is doubly 
wretched or infirm.

Proof.- The first part of this proposition is proved like the foregoing 
one. The second part is proved from the mere definition of the emotion in 
question (Def. of the Emotions:xxvii.). For the man allows himself to be 
overcome, first, by evil desires; secondly, by pain.

Note.- As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these two emotions, 
namely, Humility and Repentance, as also Hope and Fear, bring more good 
than harm; hence, as we must sin, we had better sin in that direction. 
For, if all men who are a prey to emotion were all equally proud, they 
would shrink from nothing, and would fear nothing; how then could they be 
joined and linked together in bonds of union?  The crowd plays the tyrant, 
when it is not in fear; hence we need not wonder that the prophets, who 
consulted the good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously commended 
Humility, Repentance, and Reverence. Indeed those who are a prey to these 
emotions may be led much more easily than others to live under the 
guidance of reason, that is, to become free and to enjoy the life of the 
blessed.



Prop. LV. Extreme pride or dejection 
indicates extreme ignorance of self.

Proof.- This is evident from Def. of the Emotions:xxviii. and xxix.



Prop. LVI. Extreme pride or dejection 
indicates extreme infirmity of spirit.

Proof.- The first foundation of virtue is self-preservation 
(IV:xxii.Coroll.) under the guidance of reason (IV:xxiv.). He, therefore, 
who is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the foundation of all virtues, 
and consequently of all virtues. Again, to act virtuously is merely to 
act under the guidance of reason (IV:xxiv.): now he, that acts under the 
guidance of reason, must necessarily know that he so acts (III:xliii.).  
Therefore he who is in extreme ignorance of himself, and consequently of 
all virtues, acts least in obedience to virtue; in other words 
(IV:Def.viii.), is most infirm of spirit. Thus extreme pride or dejection 
indicates extreme infirmity of spirit. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and the 
dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions.

Note.- Yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride; for the 
latter being a pleasurable emotion, and the former a painful emotion, the 
pleasurable is stronger than the painful (IV:xviii.).



Prop. LVII. The proud man delights in the 
company of flatterers and parasites, 
but hates the company of the high-minded.

Proof.- Pride is pleasure arising from a man's over estimation of himself 
(Def. of the Emotions:xxviii. and vi.); this estimation the proud man will 
endeavour to foster by all the means in his power (III:xiii.Note); he will 
therefore delight in the company of flatterers and parasites (whose 
character is too well known to need definition here), and will avoid the 
company of high-minded men, who value him according to his deserts. Q.E.D.

Note.- It would be too long a task to enumerate here all the evil results 
of pride, inasmuch as the proud are a, prey to all the emotions, though to 
none of them less than to love and pity. I cannot, however, pass over in 
silence the fact, that a man may be called proud from his underestimation 
of other people; and, therefore, pride in this sense may be defined as 
pleasure arising from the false opinion, whereby a man may consider 
himself superior to his fellows. The dejection, which is the opposite 
quality to this sort of pride, may be defined as pain arising from the 
false opinion, whereby a man may think himself inferior to his fellows. 
Such being the ease, we can easily see that a proud man is necessarily 
envious (III:xli.Note), and only takes pleasure in the company, who fool 
his weak mind to the top of his bent, and make him insane instead of 
merely foolish.

Though dejection is the emotion contrary to pride, yet is the dejected 
man very near akin to the proud man. For, inasmuch as his pain arises 
from a comparison between his own infirmity and other men's power or 
virtue, it will be removed, or, in other words, he will feel pleasure, if 
his imagination be occupied in contemplating other men's faults; whence 
arises the proverb, "The unhappy are comforted by finding fellow-sufferers." 
Contrariwise, he will be the more pained in proportion as he thinks 
himself inferior to others; hence none are so prone to envy as the 
dejected, they are specially keen in observing men's actions, with a 
view to fault-finding rather than correction, in order to reserve their 
praises for dejection, and to glory therein, though all the time with a 
dejected air. These effects follow as necessarily from the said emotion, 
as it follows from the nature of a triangle, that the three angles are 
equal to two right angles. I have already said that I call these and 
similar emotions bad, solely in respect to what is useful to man. The 
laws of nature have regard to nature's general order, whereof man is but 
a part. I mention this, in passing, lest any should think that I have 
wished to set forth the faults and irrational deeds of men rather than 
the nature and properties of things. For, as I said in the preface to the 
third Part, I regard human emotions and their properties as on the same 
footing with other natural phenomena. Assuredly human emotions indicate 
the power and ingenuity, of nature, if not of human nature, quite as fully, 
as other things which we admire, and which we delight to contemplate. 
But I pass on to note those qualities in the emotions, which bring 
advantage to man, or inflict injury upon him.



Prop. LVIII. Honour (gloria) is not repugnant 
to reason, but may arise therefrom.

Proof.-This is evident from Def. of the Emotions:xxx., and also from the 
definition of an honourable man (IV:xxxvii.Note.i.).

Note.- Empty honour, as it is styled, is self- approval, fostered only by 
the good opinion of the populace; when this good opinion ceases there 
ceases also the self-approval, in other words, the highest object of each 
man's love (IV:lii.Note); consequently, he whose honour is rooted in 
popular approval must, day by day, anxiously strive, act, and scheme in 
order to retain his reputation. For the populace is variable and 
inconstant, so that, if a reputation be not kept up, it quickly withers 
away. Everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself, and readily 
represses the fame of others. The object of the strife being estimated as 
the greatest of all goods, each combatant is seized with a fierce desire 
to put down his rivals in every possible way, till he who at last comes 
out victorious is more proud of having done harm to others than of having 
done good to himself. This sort of honour, then, is really empty, being 
nothing.

The points to note concerning shame (pudor) may easily be inferred 
from what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance. I will only 
add that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue, is yet good, in so 
far as it shows, that the feeler of shame is really imbued with the 
desire to live honourably; in the same way as suffering is good, as 
showing that the injured part is not mortified. Therefore, though a man 
who feels shame is sorrowful, he is yet more perfect than he, who is 
shameless, and has no desire to live honourably.

Such are the points which I undertook to remark upon concerning the 
emotions of pleasure and pain; as for the desires, they are good or bad 
according as they spring from good or evil emotions. But all, in so far 
as they are engendered in us by, emotions wherein the mind is passive, 
are blind (as is evident from what was said in IV:xliv.Note), and would 
be useless, if men could easily, be induced to live by the guidance of 
reason only, as I will now briefly, show.



Prop. LIX. To all the actions, whereto we 
are determined by emotion wherein the mind 
is passive; we can be determined without 
emotion by reason.

Proof.- To act rationally, is nothing else (III:iii. and III:Def.ii.) 
but to perform those actions, which follow from the necessity, of our 
nature {to persist} considered in itself alone. But pain is bad, in so 
far as it diminishes or checks the power of action (IV:xli.); wherefore 
we cannot by pain be determined to any action, which we should be unable 
to perform under the guidance of reason. Again, pleasure is bad only 
in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action (IV:xli., IV:xliii.); 
therefore to this extent we could not be determined by, it to any action, 
which we could not perform under the guidance of reason. Lastly, pleasure, 
in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for it consists in the 
fact that a man's capability for action is increased or aided); nor is the 
mind passive therein, except in so far as a man's power of action is not 
increased to the extent of affording him an adequate conception of 
himself and his actions (III:iii., &Note).

Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to such a 
state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception of himself and 
his own actions, he will be equally, nay more, capable of those actions, 
to which he is determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive. But all 
emotions are attributable to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the 
Emotions:iv. explanation); and desire (Def. of the Emotions:i.) is nothing 
else but the attempt to act; therefore, to all actions, &c. Q.E.D.

Another Proof.- A given action is called bad, in so far as it arises 
from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion. But no action, 
considered in itself alone, is either good or bad (as we pointed out in 
the preface to Pt. IV.), one and the same action being sometimes good, 
sometimes bad; wherefore to the action which is sometimes bad, or arises 
from some evil emotion, we may be led by reason (IV:xix.). Q.E.D. 

Note.- An example will put this point in a clearer light. The action of 
striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and in so far as we 
merely look to the fact that a man raises his arm, clenches his fist, and 
moves his whole arm violently downwards, is a virtue or excellence which 
is conceived as proper to the structure of the human body. If, then, a man, 
moved by anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm, 
this result takes place (as we showed in Pt.II.), because one and the 
same action can be associated with various mental images of things; 
therefore we may be determined to the performance of one and the same 
action by confused ideas, or by clear and distinct ideas. Hence it is 
evident that every desire which springs from emotion, wherein the mind is 
passive, would become useless, if men could be guided by reason. Let us 
now see why desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, 
is called by us blind.



Prop. LX. Desire arising from a pleasure 
or pain, that is not attributable, to 
the whole body, but only to one or certain 
parts thereof, is without utility in 
respect to a man as a whole.

Proof.- Let it be assumed, for instance, that A, a part of a body, is so 
strengthened by some external cause, that it prevails over the remaining 
parts (IV:vi.). This part will not endeavour to do away with its own 
powers, in order that the other parts of the body may perform its office; 
for this it would be necessary for it to have a force or power of doing 
away with its own powers, which (III:vi.) is absurd. The said part, and, 
consequently, the mind also, will endeavour to preserve its condition. 
Wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind aforesaid has no 
utility in reference to a man as a whole. If it be assumed, on the other 
hand, that the part, A, be checked so that the remaining parts prevail, 
it may be proved in the same manner that desire arising from pain has no 
utility in respect to a man as a whole. Q.E.D.

Note.- As pleasure is generally (IV:xliv.Note) attributed to one part 
of the body, we generally desire to preserve our being with out taking 
into consideration our health as a whole: to which it may be added, that 
the desires which have most hold over us (IV:ix.) take account of the 
present and not of the future.



Prop. LXI. Desire which springs from 
reason cannot be excessive.

Proof.- Desire (Def. of the Emotions:i.) considered absolutely is the 
actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as in any way 
determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself. 
Hence desire, which arises from reason, that is (III:iii.), which is 
engendered in us in so far as we act, is the actual essence or nature of 
man, in so far as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are 
adequately conceived through man's essence only (III:Def.ii.). Now, if 
such desire could be excessive, human nature considered in itself alone 
would be able to exceed itself, or would be able to do more than it can, 
a manifest contradiction. Therefore, such desire cannot be excessive. Q.E.D.



Prop. LXII. In so far as the mind conceives 
a thing under the dictates of reason, it is 
affected equally, whether the idea be of a 
thing future, past, or present.

Proof.- Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason, it 
conceives under the form of eternity or necessity (II:xliv.Coroll.ii.), 
and is therefore affected with the same certitude (II:xliii.&Note).  
Wherefore, whether the thing be present, past, or future, the mind 
conceives it under the same necessity and is affected with the same 
certitude; and whether the idea be of something present, past, or future, 
it will in all cases be equally true (II:xli.); that is, it will always 
possess the same properties of an adequate idea (II:Def.iv.); therefore, in 
so far as the mind conceives things under the dictates of reason, it is 
affected in the same manner, whether the idea be of a thing future, past, 
or present. Q.E.D.

Note.- If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the duration of things, 
and could determine by reason their periods of existence, we should 
contemplate things future with the same emotion as things present; and 
the mind would desire as though it were present the good which it 
conceived as future; consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser 
good in the present for the sake of a greater good in the future, and 
would in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source of 
evil in the future, as we shall presently show. However, we can have but 
a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things (II:xxxi.) and the 
periods of their existence (II:xliv.Note) we can only determine by 
imagination, which is not so powerfully affected by the future as by the 
present. Hence such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is 
merely abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order 
of things and the connection of causes, with a view to determining what 
is good or bad for us in the, present, is rather imaginary than real.  
Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if the desire arising from such 
knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it looks on into the future, be 
more readily checked than the desire of things which are agreeable at the 
present time. (Cf. IV:xvi.)



Prop. LXIII. He who is led by fear, 
and does good in order to escape evil, 
is not led by reason.

Proof.- All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as active, 
or in other words to reason, are emotions of pleasure and desire (III:lix.); 
therefore, he who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape evil, 
is not led by reason.

Note.- Superstitions persons, who know better how to rail at vice than 
how to teach virtue, and who strive not to guide men by reason, but so 
to restrain them that they would rather escape evil than love virtue, 
have no other aim but to make others as wretched as themselves; wherefore 
it is nothing wonderful, if they be generally troublesome and odious to 
their fellow-men.

Corollary.- Under desire which springs from reason, we seek good directly, 
and shun evil indirectly.

Proof.- Desire which springs from reason can only spring from a pleasurable 
emotion, wherein the mind is not passive (III:lix.), in other words, from 
a pleasure which cannot be excessive (IV:lxi.), and not from pain; 
wherefore this desire springs from the knowledge of good, not of evil 
(IV:viii.); hence under the guidance of reason we seek good directly and 
only by implication shun evil. Q.E.D.

Note.- This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of a sick and a 
healthy man. The sick man through fear of death eats what he naturally 
shrinks from, but the healthy man takes pleasure in his food, and thus 
gets a better enjoyment out of life, than if he were in fear of death, 
and desired directly to avoid it. So a judge, who condemns a criminal 
to death, not from hatred or anger but from love of the public 
well-being, is guided solely by reason.



Prop. LXIV. The knowledge of evil is 
an inadequate knowledge.

Proof.- The knowledge of evil (IV:viii.) is pain, in so far as we are 
conscious thereof. Now pain is the transition to a lesser perfection 
(Def. of the Emotions:iii.) and therefore cannot be understood through 
man's nature (III:vi.,& II:vii.); therefore it is a passive state 
(III.Def.ii.) which (III:iii.) depends on inadequate ideas; consequently 
the knowledge thereof (II:xxix.), namely, the knowledge of evil, is 
inadequate. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- Hence it follows that, if the human mind possessed only 
adequate ideas, it would form no conception of evil.