Prop. LXV. Under the guidance of reason we 
should pursue the greater of two goods and 
the lesser of two evils.

Proof.- A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good is in 
reality an evil; for we apply the terms good and bad to things, in so 
far as we compare them one with another (see preface to this Part); 
therefore, evil is in reality a lesser good; hence under the guidance of 
reason we seek or pursue only the greater good and the lesser evil. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- We may, under the guidance of reason, pursue the lesser evil 
as though it were the greater good, and we may shun the lesser good, 
which would be the cause of the greater evil. For the evil, which is 
here called the lesser, is really good, and the lesser good is really 
evil, wherefore we may seek the former and shun the latter. Q.E.D.



Prop. LXVI. We may, under the guidance of 
reason, seek a greater good in the future 
in preference to a lesser good in the 
present, and we may seek a lesser evil in 
the present in preference to a greater evil 
in the future. 
"Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro." (Van Vloten).  Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod
causa est faturi alicujus mali." The last word of the latter is an obvious misprint, and is
corrected by the Dutch translator into "majoris boni." (Pollock, p. 268, note.)

Proof.- If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things future, 
it would be affected towards what is future in the same way as towards 
what is present (IV:lxii.); wherefore, looking merely to reason, as in 
this proposition we are assumed to do, there is no difference, whether 
the greater good or evil be assumed as present, or assumed as future; 
hence (IV:lxv.) we may seek a greater good in the future in preference 
to a lesser good in the present, &c. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a lesser evil in 
the present, because it is the cause of a greater good in the future, 
and we may shun a lesser good in the present, because it is the cause 
of a greater evil in the future. This Corollary is related to the 
foregoing Proposition as the Corollary to IV:lxv. is related to the 
said IV:lxv.

Note.- If these statements be compared with what we have pointed out 
concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part up to Prop. xviii., 
we shall readily see the difference between a man, who is led solely by 
emotion or opinion, and a man, who is led by reason. The former, whether  
will or no, performs actions whereof he is utterly ignorant; the latter is 
his own master and only performs such actions, as he knows are of primary 
importance in life, and therefore chiefly, desires; wherefore I call the 
former a slave, and the latter a free man, concerning whose disposition 
and manner of life it will be well to make a few observations.



Prop. LXVII. A free man thinks of death 
least of all things; and his wisdom is 
a meditation not of death but of life.

Proof.- A free man is one who lives under the guidance of reason, who is 
not led by fear (IV:lxiii.), but who directly desires that which is good 
(IV:lxiii.Coroll.), in other words (IV:xxiv.), who strives to act, to live, 
and to preserve his being on the basis of seeking his own true advantage; 
wherefore such an one thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom 
is a meditation of life. Q.E.D



Prop. LXVIII. If men were born free, 
they would, so long as they remained free, 
form no conception of good and evil.

Proof.- I call free him who is led solely by reason; he, therefore, who 
is born free, and who remains free, has only adequate ideas; therefore 
(IV:lxiv.Coroll.) he has no conception of evil, or consequently (good 
and evil being correlative) of good. Q.E.D.

Note.- It is evident, from IV:iv., that the hypothesis of this Proposition 
is false and inconceivable, except in so far as we look solely to the 
nature of man, or rather to God; not in so far as the latter is infinite, 
but only in so far as he is the cause of man's existence.

This, and other matters which we have already proved, seem to have 
been signifieded by Moses in the history of the first man. For in that 
narrative no other power of God is conceived, save that whereby he 
created man, that is the power wherewith he provided solely for man's 
advantage; it is stated that God forbade man, being free, to eat of the 
tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and that, as soon as man should 
have eaten of it, he would straightway fear death rather than desire to 
live. Further, it is written that when man had found a wife, who was in 
entire harmony with his nature, he knew that there could be nothing in 
nature which could be more useful to him; but that after he believed the 
beasts to be like himself, he straightway began to imitate their emotions 
(III:xxvii.), and to lose his freedom; this freedom was afterwards 
recovered by the patriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the 
idea of God, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desire for 
others the good which he desires for himself, as we have shown above 
(IV:xxxii.).



Prop. LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen 
to be as great, when it declines dangers, 
as when it overcomes them.

Proof.- Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion contrary to 
itself, and possessing more power in restraining emotion (IV:vii.). But 
blind daring and fear are emotions, which can be conceived as equally 
great (IV:v. and IV:iii.): hence, no less virtue or firmness is required 
in checking daring than in checking fear (III:lix.Note); in other words 
(Def. of the Emotions:xl. and xli.), the free man shows as much virtue, 
when he declines dangers, as when he strives to overcome them. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as in combat; 
or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of mind, whether he elect 
to give battle or to retreat.

 Note.- What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby, I explained 
in III:lix.Note. By danger I mean everything, which can give rise to any 
evil, such as pain, hatred, discord, &c.



Prop. LXX. The free man, who lives among the 
ignorant, strives, as far as he can, to avoid 
receiving favours from them.

Proof.- Everyone judges what is good according to his disposition 
(III:xxxix.Note); wherefore an ignorant man, who has conferred a benefit 
on another, puts his own estimate upon it, and, if it appears to be 
estimated less highly by the receiver, will feel pain (III:xlii.). But 
the free man only desires to join other men to him in friendship 
(IV:xxxvii.), not repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like 
value, but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason, 
and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary importance.  
Therefore the free man, lest be should become hateful to the ignorant, or 
follow their desires rather than reason, will endeavour, as far as he can, 
to avoid receiving their favours.

Note.- I say, as far as he can. For though men be ignorant, yet are they 
men, and in cases of necessity could afford us human aid, the most 
excellent of all things: therefore it is often necessary to accept favours 
from them, and consequently to repay such favours in kind; we must, 
therefore, exercise caution in declining favours, lest we should have the 
appearance of despising those who bestow them, or of being, from 
avaricious motives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground for 
offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it. Thus, in declining 
favours, we must look to the requirements of utility and courtesy.




Prop. LXXI. Only free men are thoroughly 
grateful one to another.

Proof.- Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another, and 
associated among themselves by the closest necessity of friendship 
(IV:xxxv.,&Coroll.i.), only such men endeavour, with mutual zeal of 
love, to confer benefits on each other (IV:xxxvii.), and, therefore, 
only they are thoroughly grateful one to another. Q.E.D.

Note.- The goodwill, which men who are led by blind desire have for one 
another, is generally a bargaining or enticement, rather than pure goodwill. 
Moreover, ingratitude is not an emotion. Yet it is base, inasmuch as 
it generally shows, that a man is affected by excessive hatred, anger, 
pride, avarice, &c. He who, by reason of his folly, knows not how to 
return benefits, is not ungrateful, much less he who is not gained over
by the gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by a thief to conceal 
his thefts, or by any similar persons. Contrariwise, such an one shows 
a constant mind, inasmuch as he cannot by an gifts be corrupted, to his 
own or the general hurt.



Prop. LXXII. The free man never acts fraudulently, 
but always in good faith.

Proof.- If it be asked: What should a man's conduct be in a case where 
he could by breaking faith free himself from the danger of present death? 
Would not his plan of self-preservation completely persuade him to deceive? 
This may be answered by pointing out that, if reason persuaded him to act 
thus, it would persuade all men to act in a similar manner, in which case 
reason would persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their forces, 
or to have laws in common, that is, not to. have any general laws, which is 
absurd.



Prop. LXXIII. The man, who is guided by reason, 
is more free in a State, where he lives under 
a general system of law, than in 
solitude, where he is independent.

Proof.- The man, who is guided by reason, does not obey through fear 
(IV:Ixiii.): but, in so far as he endeavours to preserve his being 
according to the dictates of reason, that is (IV:lxvi.Note), in so far 
as he endeavours to live in freedom, he desires to order his life 
according to the general good (IV:xxxvii.), and, consequently (as we 
showed in IV:xxxvii.Note.ii.), to live according to the laws of his 
country. Therefore the free man, in order to enjoy greater freedom, 
desires to possess the general rights of citizenship. Q.E.D.

Note.- These and similar observations, which we have made on man's true 
freedom, may be referred to strength, that is, to courage and nobility 
of character (III:lix.Note). I do not think it worth while to prove 
separately all the properties of strength; much less need I show, that he 
that is strong hates no man, is angry with no man, envies no man, is 
indignant with no man, despises no man, and least of all things is proud. 
These propositions, and all that relate to the true way of life and 
religion, are easily proved from IV:xxxvii. and IV:xlvi.; namely, that 
hatred should be overcome with love, and that every man should desire for 
others the good which he seeks for himself. We may also repeat what 
we drew attention to in the note to IV:I., and in other places; namely, 
that the strong man has ever first in his thoughts, that all things 
follow from the necessity of the divine nature; so that whatsoever he 
deems to be hurtful and evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him 
impious, horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to his 
own disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe. Wherefore 
he strives before all things to conceive things as they really are, and 
to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such as are hatred, anger, 
envy, derision, pride, and similar emotions, which I have mentioned above. 
Thus he endeavours, as we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, 
and to go on his way rejoicing. How far human virtue is capable of 
attaining to such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove 
in the following Part.



APPENDIX.
What have said in this Part concerning the right way of life has not been 
arranged, so as to admit of being seen at one view, but has been set forth 
piece-meal, according as I thought each Proposition could most readily be 
deduced from what preceded it. I propose, therefore, to rearrange my 
remarks and to bring them under leading heads.

I. All our endeavours or desires so follow from the necessity of our 
nature, that they can be understood either through it alone, as their 
proximate cause, or by virtue of our being a part of nature, which cannot 
be adequately conceived through itself without other individuals.

II. Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner, that they can 
be understood through it alone, are those which are referred to the mind, 
in so far as the latter is conceived to consist of adequate ideas: the 
remaining desires are only referred to the mind, in so far as it conceives 
things inadequately, and their force and increase are generally defined 
not by the power of man, but by the power of things external to us: 
wherefore the former are rightly called actions, the latter passions, for 
the former always indicate our power, the latter, on the other hand, show 
our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge.

III. Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined by man's power 
or reason, are always good. The rest maybe either good or bad.

IV. Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect the 
understanding or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone man's 
highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed blessedness is nothing 
else but the contentment of spirit, which arises from the intuitive 
knowledge of God: now, to perfect the understanding is nothing else 
but to understand God, God's attributes, and the actions which follow 
from the necessity of his nature. Wherefore of a man, who is led by reason, 
the ultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to govern all his 
fellows, is that whereby he is brought to the adequate conception of 
himself and of all things within the scope of his intelligence.

V. Therefore, without intelligence there is not rational life: and things 
are only good, in so far as they aid man in his enjoyment of the 
intellectual life, which is defined by intelligence. Contrariwise, 
whatsoever things hinder man's perfecting of his reason, and capability 
to enjoy the rational life, are alone called evil.

VI. As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are necessarily good, 
no evil can befall man except through external causes; namely, by virtue
of man being a part of universal nature, whose laws human nature is 
compelled to, obey, and to conform to in almost infinite ways.

VII. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of nature, or that 
he should not follow her general order; but if he be thrown among 
individuals whose nature is in harmony with his own, his power of action 
will thereby be aided and fostered, whereas, if he be thrown among such as 
are but very little in harmony with his nature, he will hardly be able to 
accommodate himself to them without undergoing a great change himself.

VIII. Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to be capable of 
injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the rational life, we may 
endeavour to remove in whatever way seems safest to us; on the other hand, 
whatsoever we deem to be good or useful for preserving our being, and 
enabling us to enjoy the rational life, we may appropriate to our use and 
employ as we think best. Everyone without exception may, by sovereign 
right of nature, do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest.

IX. Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any given thing 
than other individuals of the same species; therefore (cf. vii.) for man 
in the preservation of his being and the enjoyment of the rational life 
there is nothing more useful than his fellow-man who is led by reason. 
Further, as we know not anything among individual things which is more 
excellent than a man led by reason, no man can better display the power of 
his skill and disposition, than in so training men, that they come at last 
to live under the dominion of their own reason.

X. In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of hatred, one 
towards another, they are at variance, and are therefore to be feared in 
proportion, as they are more powerful than their fellows.

XI. Yet minds are not conquered by force, but by love and high-mindedness.

XII. It is before all things useful to men to associate their ways of life, 
to bind themselves together with such bonds as they think most fitted to 
gather them all into unity, and generally to do whatsoever serves to 
strengthen friendship.

XIII. But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness. For men are 
diverse (seeing that those who live under the guidance of reason are few), 
yet are they generally envious and more prone to revenge than to sympathy. 
No small force of character is therefore required to take everyone as he 
is, and to restrain one's self from imitating the emotions of others. But 
those who carp at mankind, and are more skilled in railing at vice than 
in instilling virtue, and who break rather than strengthen men's 
dispositions, are hurtful both to themselves and others. Thus many from 
too great impatience of spirit, or from misguided religious zeal, have 
preferred to live among brutes rather than among men; as boys or youths, 
who cannot peaceably endure the chidings of their parents, will enlist as 
soldiers and choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in 
preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their father: 
suffering any burden to be put upon them, so long as they may spite 
their parents.

XIV. Therefore, although men are generally governed in everything by their 
own lusts, yet their association in common brings many more advantages 
than drawbacks. Wherefore it is better to bear patiently the wrongs they 
may do us, and to strive to promote whatsoever serves to bring about 
harmony and friendship.

XV. Those things, which beget harmony, are such as are attributable to 
justice, equity, and honourable living. For men brook ill not only what is 
unjust or iniquitous, but also what is reckoned disgraceful, or that a man 
should slight the received customs of their society. For winning love those 
qualities are especially necessary which have regard to religion and piety 
(cf. IV:xxxvii.Notes.i., &.ii.; IV:xlvi.Note; and IV:lxxiii.Note).

XVI. Further, harmony is often the result of fear: but such harmony is 
insecure. Further, fear arises from infirmity of spirit and moreover 
belongs not to the exercise of reason: the same is true of compassion, 
though this latter seems to bear a certain resemblance to piety.

XVII. Men are also gained over by liberality, especially such as have 
not the means to buy what is necessary to sustain life. However, to give 
aid to every poor man is far beyond the power and the advantage of any 
private person. For the riches of any private person are wholly inadequate 
to meet such a call. Again, an individual man's resources of character 
are too limited for him to be able to make all men his friends. Hence 
providing for the poor is a duty, which falls on the State as a whole, 
and has regard only to the general advantage.

XVIII. In accepting favours, and in returning gratitude our duty must be 
wholly different (cf. IV:lxx.Note; IV:lxxi. Note). 

XIX. Again, meretricious love, that is, the lust of generation arising 
from bodily beauty, and generally every sort of love, which owns anything 
save freedom of soul as its cause, readily passes into hate; unless indeed, 
what is worse, it is a species of madness; and then it promotes discord 
rather than harmony (cf. III:xxxi.Coroll.).

XX. As concerning marriage, it is certain that this is in harmony with 
reason, if the desire for physical union be not engendered solely by 
bodily beauty, but also by the desire to beget children and to train them 
up wisely; and moreover, if the love of both, to wit, of the man and of 
the woman, is not caused by bodily beauty only, but also by freedom of soul.

XXI. Furthermore, flattery begets harmony; but only by means of the vile 
offence of slavishness or treachery. None are more readily taken with 
flattery than the proud, who wish to be first, but are not.

XXII. There is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety and 
religion. Although abasement is the opposite to pride, yet is he that 
abases himself most akin to the proud (IV:lvii.Note).

XXIII. Shame also brings about harmony, but only in such matters as cannot 
be hid. Further, as shame is a species of pain, it does not concern the 
exercise of reason. 

XXIV. The remaining emotions of pain towards men are directly opposed
to justice, equity, honour, piety, and religion; and, although 
indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance to equity, yet is life 
but lawless, where every man may pass judgment on another's deeds, and 
vindicate his own or other men's rights. 

XXV. Correctness of conduct (modestia), that is, the desire of pleasing 
men which is determined by reason, is attributable to piety (as we said 
in IV:xxxvii.Note.i.). But, if it spring from emotion, it is ambition, 
or the desire whereby, men, under the false cloak of piety, generally 
stir up discords and seditions. For he who desires to aid his fellows. 
either in word or in deed, so that they may together enjoy the highest 
good, he, I say, will before all things strive to, win them over with 
love: not to draw them into admiration, so that a system may be called 
after his name, nor to give any cause for envy. Further, in his 
conversation he will shrink from talking of men's faults, and will be 
careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity: but he will dwell at 
length on human virtue or power, and the way whereby it may be perfected. 
Thus will men be stirred not by fear, nor by aversion, but only by the 
emotion of joy, to endeavour, so far as in them lies, to live in 
obedience to reason.

XXVI. Besides men, we know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind 
we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or 
any sort of fellowship; therefore, whatsoever there be in nature besides 
man, a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to 
preserve or destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt 
to our use as best we may.

XXVII. The advantage which we derive from things external to us, besides 
the experience and knowledge which we acquire from observing them, and 
from recombining their elements in different forms, is principally the 
preservation of the body; from this point of view, those things are most 
useful which can so feed and nourish the body, that all its parts may 
rightly fulfil their functions. For, in proportion as the body is capable 
of being affected in a greater variety of ways, and of affecting external 
bodies in a great number of ways, so much the more is the mind capable of 
thinking (IV:xxxviii., IV:xxxix.). But there seem to be very few things 
of this kind in nature; wherefore for the due nourishment of the body we 
must use many foods of diverse nature. For the human body is composed of 
very many parts of different nature, which stand in continual need of 
varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of 
doing everything that can follow from its own nature, and consequently 
that the mind also may be equally capable of forming many perceptions.

XXVIII. Now for providing these nourishments the strength of each 
individual would hardly suffice, if men did not lend one another mutual 
aid. But money has furnished us with a token for everything: hence it is 
with the notion of money, that the mind of the multitude is chiefly 
engrossed: nay, it can hardly conceive any kind of pleasure, which is not 
accompanied with the idea of money as cause.

XXIX. This result is the fault only of those, who seek money, not from 
poverty or to supply their necessary, wants, but because they, have 
learned the arts of gain, wherewith they bring themselves to great 
splendour. Certainly they nourish their bodies, according to custom, but 
scantily, believing that they lose as much of their wealth as they spend on 
the preservation of their body. But they who know the true use of money, 
and who fix the measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs, 
live content with little.

XXX. As, therefore, those things are good which assist the various parts 
of the body, and enable them to perform their functions; and as pleasure 
consists in an increase of, or aid to, man's power, in so far as he is 
composed of mind and body; it follows that all those things which bring 
pleasure are good. But seeing that things do not work with the object of 
giving us pleasure, and that their power of action is not tempered to suit 
our advantage, and, lastly, that pleasure is generally referred to one 
part of the body more than to the other parts; therefore most emotions of 
pleasure (unless reason and watchfulness be at hand), and consequently the 
desires arising therefrom, may become excessive. Moreover we may add that 
emotion leads us to pay most regard to what is agreeable in the present, 
nor can we estimate what is future with emotions equally vivid. 
(IV:xliv.Note, and IV:lx.Note.)

XXXI. Superstition, on the other hand, seems to account as good all that 
brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure. However, as we said 
above (IV:xlv.Note), none but the envious take delight in my infirmity 
and trouble. For the greater the pleasure whereby we are affected, the 
greater is the perfection whereto we pass, and consequently the more do 
we partake of the divine nature: no pleasure can ever be evil, which is 
regulated by a true regard for our advantage. But contrariwise he, who is 
led by fear and does good only to avoid evil, is not guided by reason.

Ap.XXXII. (1) But human power is extremely limited, and is infinitely 
surpassed by the power of external causes; we have not, therefore, an 
absolute power of shaping to our use those things which are without us.  
Nevertheless, we shall bear with an equal mind all that happens to us 
in contravention to the claims of our own advantage, so long as we are 
conscious, that we have done our duty, and that the power which we possess 
is not sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely; 
remembering that we are a part of universal nature, and that we 
follow her order. If we have a clear and distinct understanding of 
this, that part of our nature which is defined by intelligence, in other 
words the better part of ourselves, will assuredly acquiesce in what 
befalls us, and in such acquiescence will endeavour to persist. For, 
in so far as we are intelligent beings, we cannot desire anything save 
that which is necessary, nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything, 
save to that which is true: wherefore, in so far as we have a right 
understanding of these things, the endeavour of the better part of 
ourselves is in harmony with the order of nature as a whole.





End of Part IV