Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS
(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
Translated by R. H. M. Elwes
PART IV: Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions
PREFACE
Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I name bondage:
for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is not his own master, but
lies at the mercy of fortune: so much so, that he is often compelled,
while seeing that which is better for him, to follow that which is worse.
Why this is so, and what is good or evil in the emotions, I propose to
show in this part of my treatise. But, before I begin, it would be well
to make a few prefatory observations on perfection and imperfection,
good and evil.
When a man has purposed to make a given thing, and has brought it
to perfection, his work will be pronounced perfect, not only by
himself, but by everyone who rightly knows, or thinks that he knows,
the intention and aim of its author. For instance, suppose anyone sees a
work (which I assume to be not yet completed), and knows that the aim
of the author of that work is to build a house, he will call the work
imperfect; he will, on the other hand, call it perfect, as soon as he
sees that it is carried through to the end, which its author had purposed
for it. But if a man sees a work, the like whereof he has never seen
before, and if he knows not the intention of the artificer, he plainly
cannot know, whether that work be perfect or imperfect. Such seems to
be the primary meaning of these terms.
But, after men began to form general ideas, to think out types of
houses, buildings, towers, &c., and to prefer certain types to others,
it came about, that each man called perfect that which he saw agree
with the general idea he had formed of the thing in question, and called
imperfect that which he saw agree less with his own preconceived type,
even though it had evidently been completed in accordance with the idea
of its artificer. This seems to be the only reason for calling natural
phenomena, which, indeed, are not made with human hands, perfect or
imperfect: for men are wont to form general ideas of things natural, no
less than of things artificial, and such ideas they hold as types,
believing that Nature (who they think does nothing without an object)
has them in view, and has set them as types before herself. Therefore,
when they behold something in Nature, which does not wholly conform to
the preconceived type which they have formed of the thing in question,
they say that Nature has fallen short or has blundered, and has left
her work incomplete. Thus we see that men are wont to style natural
phenomena perfect or imperfect rather from their own prejudices, than
from true knowledge of what they pronounce upon.
Now we showed in the Appendix to Part I., that Nature does not work
with an end in view. For the eternal and infinite Being, which we call
God or Nature, acts by the same necessity as that whereby it exists. For
we have shown, that by the same necessity of its nature, whereby it
exists, it likewise works (I:xvi.). The reason or cause why God or Nature
exists, and the reason why he acts, are one and the same. Therefore,
as he does not exist for the sake of an end, so neither does he act for
the sake of an end; of his existence and of his action there is neither
origin nor end. Wherefore, a cause which is called final is nothing else
but human desire, in so far as it is considered as the origin or cause
of anything. For example, when we say that to be inhabited is the final
cause of this or that house, we mean nothing more than that a man,
conceiving the conveniences of household life, had a desire to build a
house. Wherefore, the being inhabited, in so far as it is regarded as
a final cause, is nothing else but this particular desire, which is
really the efficient cause; it is regarded as the primary cause,
because men are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires.
They are, as I have often said already, conscious of their own actions
and appetites, but ignorant of the causes whereby they are determined
to any particular desire. Therefore, the common saying that Nature
sometimes falls short, or blunders, and produces things which are
imperfect, I set down among the glosses treated of in the Appendix to
Part 1. Perfection and imperfection, then, are in reality merely modes
of thinking, or notions which we form from a comparison among one
another of individuals of the same species; hence I said above
(II:Def.vi.), that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing.
For we are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to one
genus, which is called the highest genus, namely, to the category of
Being, whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong. Thus, in
so far as we refer the individuals in nature to this category, and
comparing them one with another, find that some possess more of being or
reality than others, we, to this extent, say that some are more perfect
than others. Again, in so far as we attribute to them anything implying
negation - as term, end, infirmity, etc., we, to this extent, call them
imperfect, because they do not affect our mind so much as the things
which we call perfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency,
or because Nature has blundered. For nothing lies within the scope of a
thing's nature, save that which follows from the necessity of the nature
of its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from the necessity of the
nature of its efficient cause necessarily comes to pass.
As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive quality in
things regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of thinking, or
notions which we form from the comparison of things one with another.
Thus one and the same thing can be at the same time good, bad, and
indifferent. For instance, music is good for him that is melancholy,
bad for him that mourns; for him that is deaf, it is neither good nor
bad.
Nevertheless, though this be so, the terms should still be retained.
For, inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a type of human
nature which we may hold in view, it will be useful for us to retain
the terms in question, in the sense I have indicated.
In what follows, then, I shall mean by, "good" that, which we
certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the type
of human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by "bad," that
which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in approaching the
said type. Again, we shall that men are more perfect, or more imperfect,
in proportion as they approach more or less nearly to the said type.
For it must be specially remarked that, when I say that a man passes
from a lesser to a greater perfection, or vice versa, I do not mean
that he is changed from one essence or reality to another; for instance,
a horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a man,
as by being changed into an insect. What I mean is, that we conceive the
thing's power of action, in so far as this is understood by its nature,
to be increased or diminished. Lastly, by perfection in general I shall,
as I have said, mean reality in other words, each thing's essence, in so
far as it exists, and operates in a particular manner, and without paying
any regard to its duration. For no given thing can be said to be more
perfect, because it has passed a longer time in existence. The duration
of things cannot be determined by their essence, for the essence of
things involves no fixed and definite period of existence; but everything,
whether it be more perfect or less perfect, will always be able to persist
in existence with the same force wherewith it began to exist; wherefore, in
this respect, all things are equal.
DEFINITIONS.
I. By good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to us.
II. By evil I mean that which we certainly know to be a hindrance
to us in the attainment of any good. (Concerning these terms see the
foregoing preface towards the end.)
III. Particular things I call contingent in so far as, while regarding
their essence only, we find nothing therein, which necessarily asserts
their existence or excludes it.
IV. Particular things I call possible in so far as, while regarding the
causes whereby they must be produced, we know not, whether such causes
be determined for producing them.
(In I:xxxiii.note.i., I drew no distinction between possible and
contingent, because there was in that place no need to distinguish
them accurately.)
V. By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man in different
directions, though they are of the same kind, such as luxury and
avarice, which are both species of love, and are contraries, not
by nature, but by accident.
VI. What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing, future, present, and
past, I explained in III:xviii.,notes.i.,&ii., which see.
(But I should here also remark, that we can only distinctly conceive
distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit; that is, all
objects distant from us more than two hundred feet, or whose distance
from the place where we are exceeds that which we can distinctly conceive,
seem to be an equal distance from us, and all in the same plane; so also
objects, whose time of existing is conceived as removed from the present
by a longer interval than we can distinctly conceive, seem to be all
equally distant from the present, and are set down, as it were, to the
same moment of time.)
VII. By an end, for the sake of which we do something, I mean a desire.
VIII. By virtue (virtus) and power I mean the same thing; that is
(III:vii.), virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is a man's
nature or essence, in so far as it has the power of effecting what
can only be understood by the laws of that nature.
AXIOM.
There is no individual thing in nature, than which there is not
another more powerful and strong. Whatsoever thing be given, there is
something stronger whereby it can be destroyed.
PROPOSITIONS.
Prop. I. No positive quality possessed by a
false idea is removed by the presence of
what is true, in virtue of its being true.
Proof.- Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge which
inadequate ideas involve (II:xxxv.), nor have they any positive
quality on account of which they are called false (II:xxxiii.); contrariwise, in so far as they
are referred to God, they are true
(II:xxxii.). Wherefore, if the positive quality possessed by a false
idea were removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its
being true, a true idea would then be removed by itself, which
(IV:iii.) is absurd. Therefore, no positive quality possessed by a
false idea, &c. Q.E.D.
Note.- This proposition is more clearly understood from II:xvi.Coroll.ii.
For imagination is an idea, which indicates rather the present disposition
of the human body than the nature of the external body; not indeed
distinctly, but confusedly; whence it comes to pass, that the mind is
said to err. For instance, when we look at the sun, we conceive that it
is distant from us about two hundred feet; in this judgment we err, so
long as we are in ignorance of its true distance; when its true distance
is known, the error is removed, but not the imagination; or, in other
words, the idea of the sun, which only explains tho nature of that
luminary, in so far as the body is affected thereby: wherefore, though
we know the real distance, we shall still nevertheless imagine the sun
to be near us. For, as we said in III:xxxv.note, we do not imagine the sun
to be so near us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because
the mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the body is
affected thereby. Thus, when the rays of the sun falling on the surface of
water are reflected into our eyes, we imagine the sun as if it were in the
water, though we are aware of its real position; and similarly other
imaginations, wherein the mind is deceived whether they indicate the
natural disposition of the body, or that its power of activity is
increased or diminished, are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish
at its presence. It happens indeed that, when we mistakenly fear an evil,
the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings; but the contrary also
happens, namely, that we fear an evil which will certainly come, and our
fear vanishes when we hear false tidings; thus imaginations do not vanish
at the presence of the truth, in virtue of its being true, but because
other imaginations, stronger than the first, supervene and exclude the
present existence of that which we imagined, as I have shown in II:.xvii.
Prop. II. We are only passive, in so far as
we are apart of Nature, which cannot be
conceived by itself without other parts.
Proof.- We are said to be passive, when something arises in us, whereof
we are only a partial cause (III:Def.ii.), that is (III:Def.i.), something
which cannot be deduced solely from the laws of our nature. We are passive
therefore in so far as we are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived
by itself without other parts. Q.E.D.
Prop. III. The force whereby a man persists
in existing is limited, and is infinitely
surpassed by the power of external causes.
Proof.-This is evident from the axiom of this part. For, when man is
given, there is something else - say A - more powerful; when A is given,
there is something else - say B - more powerful than A, and so on to
infinity; thus the power of man is limited by the power of some other
thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. Q.E.D.
Prop. IV. It is impossible, that man should
not be a part of Nature, or that he should
be capable of undergoing no changes, save
such as can be understood through his nature
only as their adequate cause.
Proof.- The power, whereby each particular thing, and consequently man,
preserves his being, is the power of God or of Nature (I:xxiv.Coroll.);
not in so far as it is infinite, but in so far as it can be explained by
the actual human essence (III:vii.). Thus the power of man, in so far
as it is explained through his own actual essence, is a part of the
infinite power of God or Nature, in other words, of the essence thereof
(I:xxxiv.). This was our first point. Again, if it were possible, that man
should undergo no changes save such as can be understood solely through
the nature of man, it would follow that he would not be able to die, but
would always necessarily exist; this would be the necessary consequence
of a cause whose power was either finite or infinite; namely, either of
man's power only, inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself
all changes which could spring from external causes; or of the infinite
power of Nature, whereby all individual things would be so ordered, that
man should be incapable of undergoing any changes save such as tended
towards his own preservation. But the first alternative is absurd (by the
last Prop., the proof of which is universal, and can be applied to all
individual things). Therefore, if it be possible, that man should not be
capable of undergoing any changes, save such as can be explained solely
through his own nature, and consequently that he must always (as we have
shown) necessarily exist; such a result must follow from the infinite
power of God, and consequently (I:xvi.) from the necessity of the divine
nature, in so far as it is regarded as affected by the idea of any given
man, the whole order of nature as conceived under the attributes of
extension and thought must be deducible. It would therefore follow (I:xxi.)
that man is infinite, which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd.
It is, therefore, impossible, that man should not undergo any changes save
those whereof he is the adequate cause. Q.E.D.
Corollary.- Hence it follows, that man is necessarily always a prey to
his passions, that he follows and obeys the general order of nature, and
that he accommodates himself thereto, as much as the nature of things
demands.
Prop. V. The power and increase of every
passion, and its persistence in existing
are not defined by the power, whereby we
ourselves endeavour to persist in existing,
but by the power of an external cause
compared with our own.
Proof.- The essence of a passion cannot be explained through our
essence alone (III:Def.i.&.ii.), that is (III:vii.), the power of
a passion cannot be defined by the power, whereby we ourselves
endeavour to persist in existing, but (as is shown in II:xvi.) must
necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared
with our own. Q.E.D.
Prop. VI. The force of any passion or emotion
can overcome the rest of a man's activities or
power, so that the emotion becomes obstinately
fixed to him.
Proof.- The force and increase of any passion and its persistence in
existing are defined by the power of an external cause compared with
our own (by the foregoing Prop.); therefore (IV:iii.) it can overcome a
man's power, &e. Q.E.D.
Prop. VII. An emotion can only be controlled
or destroyed by another emotion contrary
thereto, and with more power for controlling
emotion.
Proof.- Emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is an idea,
whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less force of existence
than before (cf. the general Definition of the Emotions at the end of
Part III.) When, therefore, the mind is assailed by any emotion, the
body is at the same time affected with a modification whereby its power
of activity is increased or diminished. Now this modification of the body
(IV:v.) receives from its cause the force for persistence in its being;
which force can only be checked or destroyed by a bodily cause (II:vi.),
in virtue of the body being affected with a modification contrary to
(III:v.) and stronger than itself (IV.Ax.); wherefore (II:xii.) the mind
is affected by the idea of a modification contrary to, and stronger than
the former modification, in other words, (by the general definition
of the emotions) the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to and
stronger than the former emotion, which will exclude or destroy the
existence of the former emotion; thus an emotion cannot be destroyed nor
controlled except by a contrary and stronger emotion. Q.E.D.
Corollary.- An emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, can
only be controlled or destroyed through an idea of a modification of
the body contrary to, and stronger than, that which we are undergoing.
For the emotion which we undergo can only be checked or destroyed by an
emotion contrary to, and stronger than, itself, in other words, (by the
general Definition of the Emotions) only by an idea of a modification
of the body contrary to, and stronger than, the modification which we
undergo.
Prop. VIII. The knowledge of good and evil
is nothing else but the emotions of pleasure
or pain, in so far as we are conscious
thereof.
Proof.- We call a thing good or evil, when it is of service or the
reverse in preserving our being (IV:Def.i.&.ii.), that is (III:vii.),
when it increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our power of activity.
Thus, in so far as we perceive that a thing affects us with pleasure or
pain, we call it good or evil; wherefore the knowledge of good and evil
is nothing else but the idea of the pleasure or pain, which necessarily
follows from that pleasurable or painful emotion (II:xxii.). But this idea
is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is united to body
(II:xxi.); that is, there is no real distinction between this idea and
the emotion or idea of the modification of the body, save in conception
only. Therefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the
emotion, in so far as we are conscious thereof. Q.E.D.
Prop. IX. An emotion, whereof we conceive
the cause to be with us at the present time,
is stronger than if we did not conceive the
cause to be with us.
Proof.- Imagination or conception is the idea, by which the mind regards
a thing as present (II:xvii.note), but which indicates the disposition of
the mind rather than the nature of the external thing (II:xvi.Coroll.ii).
An emotion is therefore a conception, in so far as it indicates the
disposition of the body. But a conception (by II:xvii.) is stronger,
so long as we conceive nothing which excludes the present existence
of the external object; wherefore an emotion is also stronger or more
intense, when we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time,
than when we do not conceive the cause to be with us. Q.E.D.
Note.- When I said above in III:xviii. that we are affected by the image
of what is past or future with the same emotion as if the thing conceived
were present, I expressly stated, that this is only true in so far as we
look solely to the image of the thing in question itself ; for the thing's
nature is unchanged, whether we have conceived it or not; I did not deny
that the image becomes weaker, when we regard as present to us other
things which exclude the present existence of the future object: I did
not expressly call attention to the fact, because I purposed to treat
of the strength of the emotions in this part of my work.
Corollary.- The image of something past or future, that is, of a thing
which we regard as in relation to time past or time future, to the
exclusion of time present, is, when other conditions are equal, weaker
than the image of something present; consequently an emotion felt towards
what is past or future is less intense, other conditions being equal,
than an emotion felt towards something present.
Prop. X. Towards something future, which we
conceive as close at hand, we are affected
more intensely, than if we conceive that
its time for existence is separated from
the present by a longer interval; so too
by the remembrance of what we conceive to
have not long passed away we are affected
more intensely, than if we conceive that
it has long passed away.
Proof.- In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand, or not long
passed away, we conceive that which excludes the presence of the object
less, than if its period of future existence were more distant from the
present, or if it had long passed away (this is obvious) therefore (by the
foregoing Prop.) we are, so far, more intensely affected towards it. Q.E.D.
Corollary.- From the remarks made in IV:Def.vi. of this part it follows
that, if objects are separated from the present by a longer period than
we can define in conception, though their dates of occurrence be widely
separated one from the other, they all affect us equally faintly.
Prop. XI. An emotion towards that which
we conceive as necessary is, when other
conditions are equal, more intense than
an emotion towards that which impossible,
or contingent, or non-necessary.
Proof.- In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary, we, to that
extent, affirm its existence; on the other hand we deny a thing's
existence, in so far as we conceive it not to be necessary :xxxiii.note.i.);
wherefore (IV.ix.) an emotion towards that which is necessary is, other
conditions being equal, more intense than an emotion that which is
non-necessary. Q.E.D.
Prop. XII. An emotion towards a thing,
which we know not to exist at the present
time, and which we conceive as possible,
is more intense, other conditions being
equal, than an emotion towards a thing
contingent.
Proof.- In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are affected
by the conception of some further thing, which would assert the existence
of the former (IV:Def.iii.); but, on the other hand, we (by hypothesis)
conceive certain things, which exclude its present existence. But, in
so far as we conceive a thing to be possible in the future, we there by
conceive things which assert its existence (IV:iv.), that is (III:xviii.),
things which promote hope or fear: wherefore an emotion towards something
possible is more vehement. Q.E.D.
Corollary.- An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to exist in the
present, and which we conceive as contingent, is far fainter, than if we
conceive the thing to be present with us.
Proof.- Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to exist, is more
intense than it would be, if we conceived the thing as future V:ix.Coroll.),
and is much more vehement, than if the future time be conceived as far
distant from the present (IV:x.). Therefore an emotion towards a thing,
whose period of existence we conceive to be far distant from the present,
is far fainter, than if we conceive the thing as present; it is,
nevertheless, more intense, than if we conceived the thing as contingent,
wherefore an emotion towards a thing, which we regard as contingent,
will be far fainter, than if we conceived the thing to be present with us.
Q.E.D.
Prop. XIII. Emotion towards a thing contingent,
which we know not to exist in the present, is,
other conditions being equal, fainter than an
emotion towards a thing past.
Proof.- In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are not
affected by the image of any other thing, which asserts the existence
of the said thing (IV:Def.iii.), but, on the other hand (by hypothesis),
we conceive certain things excluding its present existence. But, in so
far as we conceive it in relation to time past, we are assumed to
conceive something, which recalls the thing to memory, or excites the
image thereof (II:xviii.&Note), which is so far the same as regarding
it as present (II:xvii.Coroll.). Therefore (IV:ix.) an emotion towards a
thing contingent, which we know does not exist in the present, is fainter,
other conditions being equal, than an emotion towards a thing past. Q.E.D.
Prop. XIV. A true knowledge of good and evil
cannot check any emotion by virtue of being true,
but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion.
Proof.- An emotion is an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its body a
greater or less force of existing than before (by the general Definition
of the Emotions); therefore it has no positive quality, which can be
destroyed by the presence of what is true; consequently the knowledge
of good and evil cannot, by virtue oi being true, restrain any emotion.
But, in so far as such knowledge is an emotion (IV:viii.) if it have
more strength for restraining emotion, it will to that extent be able
to restrain the given emotion. Q.E.D.
Prop. XV. Desire arising from the
knowledge of good and bad can be
quenched or checked by many of the
other desires arising from the
emotions whereby we are assailed.
Proof.- From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it is an
emotion, necessarily arises desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the strength
of which is proportioned to the strength of the emotion wherefrom it arises
(III:xxxvii.). But, inasmuch as this desire arises (by hypothesis) from the
fact of our truly understanding anything, it follows that it is also
present with us, in so far as we are active (III:i.), and must therefore
be understood through our essence only (III:Def.ii.); consequently
(III:vii.) its force and increase can be defined solely by human power.
Again, the desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed are
stronger, in proportion as the said emotions are more vehement; wherefore
their force and increase must be defined solely by the power of external
causes, which, when compared with our own power, indefinitely surpass it
(IV:iii.); hence the desires arising from like emotions may be more
vehement, than the desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and
evil, and may, consequently, control or quench it. Q.E.D.
Prop. XVI. Desire arising from the knowledge
of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge
regards what is future, may be more easily
controlled or quenched, than the desire for
what is agreeable at the present moment.
Proof.- Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive as future, is fainter
than emotion towards a thing that is present (IV:ix.Coroll.). But desire,
which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil, though it be
concerned with things which are good at the moment, can be quenched
or controlled by any headstrong desire (by the last Prop., the proof
whereof is of universal application). Wherefore desire arising from
such knowledge, when concerned with the future, can be more easily
controlled or quenched, &c. Q.E.D.
Prop. XVII. Desire arising from the true
knowledge of good and evil, in so far as
such knowledge is concerned with what is
contingent, can be controlled far more
easily still, than desire for things
that are present.
Proof.- This Prop. is proved in the same way as the last Prop. from
IV:xii.Coroll.
Note.- I think I have now shown the reason, why men are moved by opinion
more readily than by true reason, why it is that the true knowledge of good
and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul, and often yields to every kind of
passion. This state of things gave rise to the exclamation of the poet:
(Ov. Met. vii.20, "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.")
The better path I gaze at and approve,
The worse - I follow."
Ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind, when he says,
"He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow." I have not written the
above with the object of drawing the conclusion, that ignorance is more
excellent than knowledge, or that a wise man is on a par with a fool in
controlling his emotions, but because it is necessary to know the power
and the infirmity of our nature, before we can determine what reason can
do in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her power. I have said,
that in the present part I shall merely treat of human infirmity. The
power of reason over the emotions I have settled to treat separately.
Prop. XVIII. Desire arising from pleasure is,
other conditions being equal, stronger than
desire arising from pain.
Proof.- Desire is the essence of a man (Def. of the Emotions, i.),
that is, the endeavour whereby a man endeavours to persist in his own
being. Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is, by the fact of
pleasure being felt, increased or helped; on the contrary, desire
arising from pain is, by the fact of pain being felt, diminished or
hindered; hence the force of desire arising from pleasure must be
defined by human power together with the power of an external cause,
whereas desire arising from pain must be defined by human power only.
Thus the former is the stronger of the two. Q.E.D.
Note.- In these few remarks I have explained the causes of human infirmity
and inconstancy, and shown why men do not abide by the precepts of reason.
It now remains for me to show what course is marked out for us by reason,
which of the emotions are in harmony with the rules of human reason, and
which of them are contrary thereto.
But, before I begin to prove my Propositions in detailed geometrical
fashion, it is advisable to sketch them briefly in advance, so that
everyone may more readily grasp my meaning.
As reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands, that every
man should love himself, should seek that which is useful to him - I mean,
that which is really useful to him, should desire everything which really
brings man to greater perfection, and should, each for himself, endeavour
as far as he can to preserve his own being. This is as necessarily true,
as that a whole is greater than its part. (Cf. III:iv.)
Again, as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance with the
laws of one's own nature (IV:Def.viii.), and as no one endeavours to
preserve his own being, except in accordance with the laws of his own
nature, it follows, first, that the foundation of virtue is the endeavour
to preserve one's own being, and that happiness consists in man's power
of preserving, his own being; secondly, that virtue is to be desired for
its own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful to
us, for the sake of which we should desire it; thirdly and lastly that
suicides are weak-minded, and are overcome by external causes repugnant to
their nature. Further, it follows from Postulate iv. Part.II., that we can
never arrive at doing without all external things for the preservation of
our being or living, so as to have no relations with things
which are outside ourselves. Again, if we consider our mind, we see that
our intellect would be more imperfect, if mind were alone, and could
understand nothing besides itself. There are, then, many things outside
ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, therefore, to be desired.
Of such none can be discerned more excellent, than those which are in
entire agreement with our nature. For if, for example, two individuals
of entirely the same nature are united, they form a combination twice
as powerful as either of them singly.
Therefore, to man there is nothing more useful than man - nothing,
I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being can be wished for
by men, than that all should so in all points agree, that the minds and
bodies of all should form, as it were, one single mind and one single
body, and that all should, with one consent, as far as they are able,
endeavour to preserve their being, and all with one consent seek what is
useful to them all. Hence, men who are governed by reason - that is, who
seek what is useful to them in accordance with reason, desire for
themselves nothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind,
and, consequently, are just, faithful, and honourable in their conduct.
Such are the dictates of reason, which I purposed thus briefly to
indicate, before beginning to prove them in greater detail. I have taken
this course, in order, if possible, to gain the attention of those who
believe, that the principle that every man is bound to seek what is useful
for himself is the foundation of impiety, rather than of piety and virtue.
Therefore, after briefly showing that the contrary is the case, I go
on to prove it by, the same method, as that whereby I have hitherto
proceeded.
Prop. XIX. Every man, by the laws of his
nature, necessarily desires or shrinks
from that which he deems to be good or bad.
Proof.- The knowledge of good and evil is (IV:viii.) the emotion of
pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof; therefore,
every man necessarily desires what he thinks good, and shrinks from
what he thinks bad. Now this appetite is nothing else but man's nature
or essence (Cf. the Definition of Appetite, III.ix.note, and Def. of
the Emotions, i.). Therefore, every man, solely by the laws of his
nature, desires the one, and shrinks from the other, &c. Q.E.D.
Prop. XX. The more every man endeavours,
and is able to seek what is useful to him -
in other words, to preserve his own being -
the more is he endowed with virtue; on the
contrary, in proportion as a man neglects
to seek what is useful to him, that is, to
preserve his own being, he is wanting in power.
Proof.- Virtue is human power, which is defined solely by man's essence
(IV:Def.viii.), that is, which is defined solely by the endeavour made by
man to persist in his own being. Wherefore, the more a man endeavours,
and is able to preserve his own being, the more is he endowed with virtue,
and, consequently (III:iv.&,vi.), in so far as a man neglects to
preserve his own being, he is wanting in power. Q.E.D.
Note.- No one, therefore, neglects seeking his own good, or preserving his
own being, unless he be overcome by causes external and foreign to his
nature. No one, I say, from the necessity of his own nature, or otherwise
than under compulsion from external causes, shrinks from food, or kills
himself: which latter may be done in a variety of ways. A man, for
instance, kills himself under the compulsion of another man, who twists
round his right hand, wherewith he happened to have taken up a sword, and
forces him to turn the blade against his own heart; or, again, he may be
compelled, like Seneca, by a tyrant's command, to open his own veins -
that is, to escape a greater evil by incurring, a lesser; or, lastly,
latent external causes may so disorder his imagination, and so affect his
body, that it may assume a nature contrary to its former one, and whereof
the idea cannot exist in the mind (III:x.) But that a man, from the
necessity of his own nature, should endeavour to become non-existent, is
as impossible as that something should be made out of nothing, as everyone
will see for himself, after a little reflection.
Prop. XXI. No one can desire to be blessed,
to act rightly, and to live rightly, without
at the same time wishing to be, act, and to
live - in other words, to actually exist.
Proof.- The proof of this proposition, or rather the proposition itself,
is self-evident, and is also plain from the definition of desire. For the
desire of living, acting, &C., blessedly or rightly, is (Def. of the
Emotions, i.) the essence of man - that is (III:vii.), the endeavour
made by everyone to preserve his own being. Therefore, no one can
desire, &c. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXII. No virtue can be conceived
as prior to this endeavour to preserve
one's own being.
Proof.- The effort for self-preservation is the essence of a thing
(III:vii.); therefore, if any virtue could be conceived as prior
thereto, the essence of a thing would have to be conceived as
prior to itself, which is obviously absurd. Therefore no virtue, &c.
Q.E.D.
Corollary.- The effort for self-preservation is the first and only
foundation of virtue. For prior to this principle nothing can be
conceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived.
Prop. XXIII. Man, in so far as he is
determined to a particular action
because he has inadequate ideas,
cannot be absolutely said to act in
obedience to virtue; he can only be
so described, in so far as he is
determined for the action because
he understands.
Proof.- In so far as a man is determined to an action through having
inadequate ideas, he is passive (III:i.), that is (III:Def.i., &iii.),
he does something, which cannot be perceived solely through his essence,
that is (by IV:Def.viii.), which does not follow from his virtue. But,
in so far as he is determined for an action because he understands, he
is active; that is, he does something, which is perceived through his
essence alone, or which adequately follows from his virtue. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXIV. To act absolutely in obedience
to virtue is in us the same thing as to act,
to live, or to preserve one's being (these
three terms are identical in meaning) in
accordance with the dictates of reason on the
basis of seeking what is useful to one's self.
Proof.- To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing else but
to act according to the laws of one's own nature. But we only act, in
so far as we understand (III:iii.) : therefore to act in obedience to
virtue is in us nothing else but to act, to live, or to preserve one's
being in obedience to reason, and that on the basis of seeking what is
useful for us (IV:xxii.Coroll.). Q.E.D.
Prop. XXV. No one wishes to preserve his
being for the sake of anything else.
Proof.- The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its
being, is defined solely by the essence of the thing itself (III:vii.);
from this alone, and not from the essence of anything else, it necessarily
follows (III:vi.) that everyone endeavours to preserve his being.
Moreover, this proposition is plain from IV:xxii.Coroll., for if a man
should endeavour to preserve his being for the sake of anything else, the
last-named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue, which, by the
foregoing corollary, is absurd. Therefore no one, &c. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXVI. Whatsoever we endeavour in
obedience to reason is nothing further
than to understand; neither does the mind,
in so far as it makes use of reason, judge
anything to be useful to it, save such
things as are conducive to understanding.
Proof.- The effort for self-preservation is nothing else but the essence
of the thing in question (III:vii.), which, in so far as it exists such
as it is, is conceived to have force for continuing in existence (III:vi.)
and doing such things as necessarily follow from its given nature (see the
Def. of Appetite, II:ix.Note). But the essence of reason is nought else but
our mind, in so far as it clearly and distinctly understands (see the
definition in II:xl.Note:ii.) ; therefore (III:xl.) whatsoever we endeavour
in obedience to reason is nothing else but to understand. Again, since this
effort of the mind wherewith the mind endeavours, in so far as it reasons,
to preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding; this effort
at understanding is (IV:xxii.Coroll.) the first and single basis of virtue,
nor shall we endeavour to understand things for the sake of any ulterior
object (IV:xxv.); on the other hand, the mind, in so far as it reasons,
will not be able to conceive any good for itself, save such things as are
conducive to understanding.
Prop. XXVII. We know nothing to be certainly
good or evil, save such things as really
conduce to understanding, or such as are
able to hinder us from understanding.
Proof.- The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing beyond
understanding, and judges nothing to be useful to itself, save such
things as conduce to understanding (by the foregoing Prop.). But the
mind (II:xli.&Note) cannot possess certainty concerning anything,
except in so far as it has adequate ideas, or (what by II:xl.Note,
is the same thing) in so far as it reasons. Therefore we know nothing
to be good or evil save such things as really conduce, &c. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXVIII. The mind's highest good is
the knowledge of God, and the mind's
highest virtue is to know God.
Proof.- The mind is not capable of understanding anything higher than God,
that is (I:Def.vi.), than a Being absolutely infinite, and without which
(I:xv.) nothing can either be or be conceived; therefore (IV:xxvi.,
&xxvii.), the mind's highest utility or (IV:Def.i.) good is the knowledge
of God. Again, the mind is active, only in so far as it understands, and
only to the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously. The
mind's absolute virtue is therefore to understand. Now, as we have already
shown, the highest that the mind can understand is God; therefore the
highest virtue of the mind is to understand or to know God. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXIX. No individual thing, which is
entirely different from our own nature,
can help or check our power of activity, and
absolutely nothing can do us good or harm,
unless it has something in common with our nature.
Proof.- The power of every individual thing, and consequently the power of
man, whereby he exists and operates, can only be determined by an
individual thing (I:xxviii.), whose nature (II:vi.) must be understood
through the same nature as that, through which human nature is conceived.
Therefore our power of activity, however it be conceived, can be determined
and consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other individual
thing, which has something in common with us, but not by the power of
anything, of which the nature is entirely different from our own; and
since we call good or evil that which is the cause of pleasure or pain
(IV:viii.), that is (III:xi.Note), which increases or diminishes, helps
or hinders, our power of activity; therefore, that which is entirely,
different from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXX. A thing cannot be bad for us
through the quality which it has in common
with our nature, but it is bad for us in so
far as it is contrary to our nature.
Proof.- We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV:viii.), that
is (by the Def., which see in III:xi.Note), when it diminishes or checks
our power of action. Therefore, if anything were bad for us through that
quality which it has in common with our nature, it would be able
itself to diminish or check that which it has in common with our nature,
which (III:iv.) is absurd. Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through
that quality which it has in common with us, but, on the other hand, in
so far as it is bad for us, that is (as we have just shown), in so far as
it can diminish or check our power of action, it is contrary to our nature.
Q.E.D.
Prop. XXXI. In so far as a thing is in harmony
with our nature, it is necessarily good.
Proof.- In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it cannot be
bad for it. It will therefore necessarily be either good or indifferent.
If it be assumed that it be neither good nor bad, nothing will follow from
its nature (IV:Def.i.), which tends to the preservation of our nature,
that is (by the hypothesis), which tends to the preservation of the thing
itself; but this (III:vi.) is absurd; therefore, in so far as a thing is
in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good. Q.E.D.
Corollary.- Hence it follows, that, in proportion as a thing is in harmony
with our nature, so is it more useful or better for us, and vice versa, in
proportion as a thing is more useful for us, so is it more in harmony with
our nature. For, in so far as it is not in harmony with our nature, it
will necessarily be different therefrom or contrary thereto. If different,
it can neither be good nor bad (IV:xxix.); if contrary, it will be contrary
to that which is in harmony with our nature, that is, contrary to what is
good - in short, bad. Nothing, therefore, can be good, except in so far as
it is in harmony with our nature; and hence a thing is useful, in proportion
as it is in harmony with our nature, and vice versa. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXXII. In so far as men are a prey
to passion, they cannot, in that respect,
be said to be naturally in harmony.
Proof. Things, which are said to be in harmony naturally, are understood to
agree in power (III:vii.), not in want of power or negation, and
consequently not in passion (III:iii.Note); wherefore men, in so far as
they are a prey to their passions, cannot be said to be naturally in
harmony. Q.E.D.
Note.- This is also self-evident; for, if we say that white and black only
agree in the fact that neither is red, we absolutely affirm that the do not
agree in any respect. So, if we say that a man and a stone only agree in the
fact that both are finite - wanting in power, not existing by the necessity
of their own nature, or, lastly, indefinitely surpassed by the power of
external causes - we should certainly affirm that a man and a stone are in
no respect alike; therefore, things which agree only in negation, or in
qualities which neither possess, really agree in no respect.
Prop. XXXIII. Men can differ in nature,
in so far as they are assailed by those
emotions, which are passions, or passive
states; and to this extent one and the
same man is variable and inconstant.
Proof.- The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained solely
through our essence or nature (III:Def.i.&ii.), but it must be defined by
the power, that is (III:vii.), by the nature of external causes in
comparison with our own; hence it follows, that there are as many kinds of
each emotion as there are external objects whereby we are affected
(III:lvi.), and that men may be differently affected by one and the same
object (III:li), and to this extent differ in nature; lastly, that one and
the same man may be differently affected towards the same object, and may
therefore be variable and inconstant. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXXIV. In so far as men are assailed
by emotions which are passions, they can be
contrary one to another.
Proof.- A man, for instance Peter, can be the cause of Paul's feeling pain,
because he (Peter) possesses something similar to that which Paul hates
(III:xvi.), or because Peter has sole possession of a thing which Paul also
loves (III:xxxii.&Note), or for other causes (of which the chief are
enumerated in III:lv.Note) ; it may therefore happen that Paul should hate
Peter (Def. of Emotions: vii.), consequently it may easily happen also, that
Peter should hate Paul in return, and that each should endeavour to do the
other an injury, (III:xxxix.), that is (IV:xxx.), that they should be
contrary one to another. But the emotion of pain is always a passion
or passive state (III:lix.); hence men, in so far as they are assailed by
emotions which are passions, can be contrary one to another. Q.E.D.
Note.- I said that Paul may hate Peter, because he conceives that Peter
possesses something which he (Paul) also loves; from this it seems, at first
sight, to follow, that these two men, through both loving the same thing,
and, consequently, through agreement of their respective natures, stand in
one another's way; if this were so, II:xxx. and II:xxxi. would be untrue.
But if we give the matter our unbiased attention, we shall see that the
discrepancy vanishes. For the two men are not in one another's way in
virtue of the agreement of their natures, that is, through both loving the
same thing, but in virtue of one differing from the other. For, in so far
as each loves the same thing, the love of each is fostered thereby
(III:xxxi.), that is (Def. of the Emotions: vi.) the pleasure of each is
fostered thereby. Wherefore it is far from being the case, that they are
at variance through both loving the same thing, and through the agreement
in their natures. The cause for their opposition lies, as I have said,
solely in the fact that they are assumed to differ. For we assume that
Peter has the idea of the loved object as already in his possession, while
Paul has the idea of the loved object as lost. Hence the one man will be
affected with pleasure, the other will be affected with pain, and thus they
will be at variance one with another. We can easily show in like manner,
that all other causes of hatred depend solely on differences, and not on
the agreement between men's natures.