(33) If we would know whether Moses believed God to be a fire or not, we
must on no account decide the question on grounds of the reasonableness or
the reverse of such an opinion, but must judge solely by the other opinions
of Moses which are on record.

(34) In the present instance, as Moses says in several other passages that
God has no likeness to any visible thing, whether in heaven or in earth, or
in the water, either all such passages must be taken metaphorically, or else
the one before us must be so explained. (35) However, as we should depart as
little as possible from the literal sense, we must first ask whether this
text, God is a fire, admits of any but the literal meaning - that is,
whether the word fire ever means anything besides ordinary natural fire.
(36) If no such second meaning can be found, the text must be taken
literally, however repugnant to reason it may be: and all the other
passages, though in complete accordance with reason, must be brought into
harmony with it. (37) If the verbal expressions would not admit of being
thus harmonized, we should have to set them down as irreconcilable, and
suspend our judgment concerning them. (38) However, as we find the name fire
applied to anger and jealousy (see Job xxxi:12) we can thus easily reconcile
the words of Moses, and legitimately conclude that the two propositions God
is a fire, and God is jealous, are in meaning identical.

(39) Further, as Moses clearly teaches that God is jealous, and nowhere
states that God is without passions or emotions, we must evidently infer
that Moses held this doctrine himself, or at any rate, that he wished to
teach it, nor must we refrain because such a belief seems contrary to
reason: for as we have shown, we cannot wrest the meaning of texts to suit
the dictates of our reason, or our preconceived opinions. (40) The whole
knowledge of the Bible must be sought solely from itself.

(41) III. Lastly, such a history should relate the environment of all the
prophetic books extant; that is, the life, the conduct, and the studies of
the author of each book, who he was, what was the occasion, and the epoch of
his writing, whom did he write for, and in what language. (42) Further,
it should inquire into the fate of each book: how it was first received,
into whose hands it fell, how many different versions there were of it, by
whose advice was it received into the Bible, and, lastly, how all the books
now universally accepted as sacred, were united into a single whole.

(43) All such information should, as I have said, be contained in the
"history" of Scripture. (44) For, in order to know what statements are set
forth as laws, and what as moral precepts, it is important to be acquainted
with the life, the conduct, and the pursuits of their author: moreover,
it becomes easier to explain a man's writings in proportion as we have more
intimate knowledge of his genius and temperament.

(45) Further, that we may not confound precepts which are eternal with those
which served only a temporary purpose, or were only meant for a few, we
should know what was the occasion, the time, the age, in which each book was
written, and to what nation it was addressed.(46) Lastly, we should have
knowledge on the other points I have mentioned, in order to be sure,
in addition to the authenticity of the work, that it has not been tampered
with by sacrilegious hands, or whether errors can have crept in, and, if so,
whether they have been corrected by men sufficiently skilled and worthy of
credence. (47) All these things should be known, that we may not be led away
by blind impulse to accept whatever is thrust on our notice, instead of only
that which is sure and indisputable.

(48) Now when we are in possession of this history of Scripture, and have
finally decided that we assert nothing as prophetic doctrine which does not
directly follow from such history, or which is not clearly deducible from
it, then, I say, it will be time to gird ourselves for the task of
investigating the mind of the prophets and of the Holy Spirit. (49) But in
this further arguing, also, we shall require a method very like that
employed in interpreting nature from her history. (50) As in the examination
of natural phenomena we try first to investigate what is most universal
and common to all nature - such, for instance, as motion and rest, and their
laws and rules, which nature always observes, and through which she
continually works - and then we proceed to what is less universal; so, too,
in the history of Scripture, we seek first for that which is most universal,
and serves for the basis and foundation of all Scripture, a doctrine, in
fact, that is commended by all the prophets as eternal and most profitable
to all men. (51) For example, that God is one, and that He is omnipotent,
that He alone should be worshipped, that He has a care for all men, and that
He especially loves those who adore Him and love their neighbour as
themselves, &c. (52) These and similar doctrines, I repeat, Scripture
everywhere so clearly and expressly teaches, that no one was ever in doubt
of its meaning concerning them.

(53) The nature of God, His manner of regarding and providing for things,
and similar doctrines, Scripture nowhere teaches professedly, and as eternal
doctrine; on the contrary, we have shown that the prophets themselves did
not agree on the subject; therefore, we must not lay down any doctrine as
Scriptural on such subjects, though it may appear perfectly clear on
rational grounds.

(54) From a proper knowledge of this universal doctrine of Scripture, we
must then proceed to other doctrines less universal, but which,
nevertheless, have regard to the general conduct of life, and flow from the
universal doctrine like rivulets from a source; such are all particular
external manifestations of true virtue, which need a given occasion for
their exercise; whatever is obscure or ambiguous on such points in Scripture
must be explained and defined by its universal doctrine; with regard to
contradictory instances, we must observe the occasion and the time in which
they were written. (55) For instance, when Christ says, "Blessed are they
that mourn, for they shall be comforted" we do not know, from the actual
passage, what sort of mourners are meant; as, however, Christ afterwards
teaches that we should have care for nothing, save only for the kingdom of
God and His righteousness, which is commended as the highest good (see
Matt. vi;33), it follows that by mourners He only meant those who mourn for
the kingdom of God and righteousness neglected by man: for this would be the
only cause of mourning to those who love nothing but the Divine kingdom and
justice, and who evidently despise the gifts of fortune. (56) So, too, when
Christ says: "But if a man strike you on the right cheek, turn to him the
left also," and the words which follow.

(57) If He had given such a command, as a lawgiver, to judges, He would
thereby have abrogated the law of Moses, but this He expressly says He did
not do (Matt. v:17). (58) Wherefore we must consider who was the speaker,
what was the occasion, and to whom were the words addressed. (59) Now Christ
said that He did not ordain laws as a legislator, but inculcated precepts as
a teacher: inasmuch as He did not aim at correcting outward actions so
much as the frame of mind. (60) Further, these words were spoken to men who
were oppressed, who lived in a corrupt commonwealth on the brink of ruin,
where justice was utterly neglected. (61) The very doctrine inculcated here
by Christ just before the destruction of the city was also taught by
Jeremiah before the first destruction of Jerusalem, that is, in similar
circumstances, as we see from Lamentations iii:25-30.

(62) Now as such teaching was only set forth by the prophets in times of
oppression, and was even then never laid down as a law; and as, on the other
hand, Moses (who did not write in times of oppression, but - mark this -
strove to found a well-ordered commonwealth), while condemning envy and
hatred of one's neighbour, yet ordained that an eye should be given for
an eye, it follows most clearly from these purely Scriptural grounds that
this precept of Christ and Jeremiah concerning submission to injuries was
only valid in places where justice is neglected, and in a time of
oppression, but does not hold good in a well-ordered state.

(63) In a well-ordered state where justice is administered every one is
bound, if he would be accounted just, to demand penalties before the judge
(see Lev:1), not for the sake of vengeance (Lev. xix:17, 18), but in order
to defend justice and his country's laws, and to prevent the wicked
rejoicing in their wickedness. (64) All this is plainly in accordance with
reason. (65) I might cite many other examples in the same manner, but I
think the foregoing are sufficient to explain my meaning and the utility of
this method, and this is all my present purpose. (66) Hitherto we have only
shown how to investigate those passages of Scripture which treat of
practical conduct, and which, therefore, are more easily examined, for on
such subjects there was never really any controversy among the writers of
the Bible.

(67) The purely speculative passages cannot be so easily, traced to their
real meaning: the way becomes narrower, for as the prophets differed in
matters speculative among themselves, and the narratives are in great
measure adapted to the prejudices of each age, we must not, on any, account
infer the intention of one prophet from clearer passages in the writings of
another; nor must we so explain his meaning, unless it is perfectly plain
that the two prophets were at one in the matter.

(68) How we are to arrive at the intention of the prophets in such cases I
will briefly explain. (69) Here, too, we must begin from the most universal
proposition, inquiring first from the most clear Scriptural statements what
is the nature of prophecy or revelation, and wherein does it consist; then
we must proceed to miracles, and so on to whatever is most general till we
come to the opinions of a particular prophet, and, at last, to the meaning
of a particular revelation, prophecy, history, or miracle. (70) We have
already pointed out that great caution is necessary not to confound the mind
of a prophet or historian with the mind of the Holy Spirit and the truth
of the matter; therefore I need not dwell further on the subject. (71) I
would, however, here remark concerning the meaning of revelation, that the
present method only teaches us what the prophets really saw or heard, not
what they desired to signify or represent by symbols. (72) The latter may be
guessed at but cannot be inferred with certainty from Scriptural premises.

(73) We have thus shown the plan for interpreting Scripture, and have, at
the same time, demonstrated that it is the one and surest way of
investigating its true meaning. (74) I am willing indeed to admit that those
persons (if any such there be) would be more absolutely certainly right, who
have received either a trustworthy tradition or an assurance from the
prophets themselves, such as is claimed by the Pharisees; or who have a
pontiff gifted with infallibility in the interpretation of Scripture, such
as the Roman Catholics boast. (75) But as we can never be perfectly sure,
either of such a tradition or of the authority of the pontiff, we cannot
found any certain conclusion on either: the one is denied by the oldest sect
of Christians, the other by the oldest sect of Jews. (76) Indeed, if we
consider the series of years (to mention no other point) accepted by the
Pharisees from their Rabbis, during which time they say they have handed
down the tradition from Moses, we shall find that it is not correct, as I
show elsewhere. (77) Therefore such a tradition should be received with
extreme suspicion; and although, according to our method, we are bound to
consider as uncorrupted the tradition of the Jews, namely, the meaning of
the Hebrew words which we received from them, we may accept the latter while
retaining our doubts about the former.

(78) No one has ever been able to change the meaning of a word in ordinary
use, though many have changed the meaning of a particular sentence. (79)
Such a proceeding would be most difficult; for whoever attempted to change
the meaning of a word, would be compelled, at the same time, to explain all
the authors who employed it, each according to his temperament and
intention, or else, with consummate cunning, to falsify them.

(80) Further, the masses and the learned alike preserve language, but it is
only the learned who preserve the meaning of particular sentences and books:
thus, we may easily imagine that the learned having a very rare book in
their power, might change or corrupt the meaning of a sentence in it, but
they could not alter the signification of the words; moreover, if anyone
wanted to change the meaning of a common word he would not be able to keep
up the change among posterity, or in common parlance or writing.

(81) For these and such-like reasons we may readily conclude that it would
never enter into the mind of anyone to corrupt a language, though the
intention of a writer may often have been falsified by changing his phrases
or interpreting them amiss. (82) As then our method (based on the principle
that the knowledge of Scripture must be sought from itself alone) is the
sole true one, we must evidently renounce any knowledge which it cannot
furnish for the complete understanding of Scripture. (83) I will now point
out its difficulties and shortcomings, which prevent our gaining a complete
and assured knowledge of the Sacred Text.

(84) Its first great difficulty consists in its requiring a thorough
knowledge of the Hebrew language. (85) Where is such knowledge to be
obtained? (86) The men of old who employed the Hebrew tongue have left none
of the principles and bases of their language to posterity; we have from
them absolutely nothing in the way of dictionary, grammar, or rhetoric.

(87) Now the Hebrew nation has lost all its grace and beauty (as one would
expect after the defeats and persecutions it has gone through), and has only
retained certain fragments of its language and of a few books. (88) Nearly
all the names of fruits, birds, and fishes, and many other words have
perished in the wear and tear of time. (89) Further, the meaning of many
nouns and verbs which occur in the Bible are either utterly lost, or are
subjects of dispute. (90) And not only are these gone, but we are lacking in
a knowledge of Hebrew phraseology. (91) The devouring tooth of time has
destroyed turns of expression peculiar to the Hebrews, so that we know them
no more.

(92) Therefore we cannot investigate as we would all the meanings of a
sentence by the uses of the language; and there are many phrases of which
the meaning is most obscure or altogether inexplicable, though the component
words are perfectly plain.

(93) To this impossibility of tracing the history of the Hebrew language
must be added its particular nature and composition: these give rise to so
many ambiguities that it is impossible to find a method which would
enable us to gain a certain knowledge of all the statements in Scripture,
[Endnote 7]. (94) In addition to the sources of ambiguities common to all
languages, there are many peculiar to Hebrew. (95) These, I think, it worth
while to mention.

(96) Firstly, an ambiguity often arises in the Bible from our mistaking one
letter for another similar one. (97) The Hebrews divide the letters of the
alphabet into five classes, according to the five organs of the month
employed in pronouncing them, namely, the lips, the tongue, the teeth, the
palate, and the throat. (98) For instance, Alpha, Ghet, Hgain, He, are
called gutturals, and are barely distinguishable, by any sign that we know,
one from the other. (99) El, which signifies to, is often taken for hgal,
which signifies above, and vice versa. (100) Hence sentences are often
rendered rather ambiguous or meaningless.

(101) A second difficulty arises from the multiplied meaning of conjunctions
and adverbs. (102) For instance, vau serves promiscuously for a particle of
union or of separation, meaning, and, but, because, however, then: ki, has
seven or eight meanings, namely, wherefore, although, if, when, inasmuch as,
because, a burning, &c., and so on with almost all particles.

(103) The third very fertile source of doubt is the fact that Hebrew verbs
in the indicative mood lack the present, the past imperfect, the pluperfect,
the future perfect, and other tenses most frequently employed in other
languages; in the imperative and infinitive moods they are wanting in all
except the present, and a subjunctive mood does not exist. (104) Now,
although all these defects in moods and tenses may be supplied by certain
fundamental rules of the language with ease and even elegance, the ancient
writers evidently neglected such rules altogether, and employed
indifferently future for present and past, and vice versa past for future,
and also indicative for imperative and subjunctive, with the result of
considerable confusion.

(105) Besides these sources of ambiguity there are two others, one very
important. (106) Firstly, there are in Hebrew no vowels; secondly, the
sentences are not separated by any marks elucidating the meaning or
separating the clauses. (107) Though the want of these two has generally
been supplied by points and accents, such substitutes cannot be accepted by
us, inasmuch as they were invented and designed by men of an after age whose
authority should carry no weight. (108) The ancients wrote without points
(that is, without vowels and accents), as is abundantly testified; their
descendants added what was lacking, according to their own ideas of
Scriptural interpretation; wherefore the existing accents and points are
simply current interpretations, and are no more authoritative than any other
commentaries.

(109) Those who are ignorant of this fact cannot justify the author of the
Epistle to the Hebrews for interpreting (chap. xi;21) Genesis (xlvii:31)
very differently from the version given in our Hebrew text as at present
pointed, as though the Apostle had been obliged to learn the meaning of
Scripture from those who added the points. (110) In my opinion the latter
are clearly wrong. (111) In order that everyone may judge for himself, and
also see how the discrepancy arose simply from the want of vowels, I will
give both interpretations. (112)Those who pointed our version read, "And
Israel bent himself over, or (changing Hqain into Aleph, a similar letter)
towards, the head of the bed." (113) The author of the Epistle reads, "And
Israel bent himself over the head of his staff," substituting mate for mita,
from which it only differs in respect of vowels. (114) Now as in this
narrative it is Jacob's age only that is in question, and not his illness,
which is not touched on till the next chapter, it seems more likely that the
historian intended to say that Jacob bent over the head of his staff (a
thing commonly used by men of advanced age for their support) than that he
bowed himself at the head of his bed, especially as for the former reading
no substitution of letters is required. (115) In this example I have desired
not only to reconcile the passage in the Epistle with the passage in
Genesis, but also and chiefly to illustrate how little trust should be
placed in the points and accents which are found in our present Bible, and
so to prove that he who would be without bias in interpreting Scripture
should hesitate about accepting them, and inquire afresh for himself. (116)
Such being the nature and structure of the Hebrew language, one may easily
understand that many difficulties are likely to arise, and that no possible
method could solve all of them. (117) It is useless to hope for a way out of
our difficulties in the comparison of various parallel passages (we have
shown that the only method of discovering the true sense of a passage out of
many alternative ones is to see what are the usages of the language), for
this comparison of parallel passages can only accidentally throw light on a
difficult point, seeing that the prophets never wrote with the express
object of explaining their own phrases or those of other people, and also
because we cannot infer the meaning of one prophet or apostle by the meaning
of another, unless on a purely practical question, not when the matter is
speculative, or if a miracle, or history is being narrated. (118) I might
illustrate my point with instances, for there are many inexplicable phrases
in Scripture, but I would rather pass on to consider the difficulties and
imperfections of the method under discussion.

(119) A further difficulty attends the method, from the fact that it
requires the history of all that has happened to every book in the Bible;
such a history we are often quite unable to furnish. (120) Of the authors,
or (if the expression be preferred), the writers of many of the books, we
are either in complete ignorance, or at any rate in doubt, as I will point
out at length. (121) Further, we do not know either the occasions or the
epochs when these books of unknown authorship were written; we cannot say
into what hands they fell, nor how the numerous varying versions
originated; nor, lastly, whether there were not other versions, now lost.
(122) I have briefly shown that such knowledge is necessary, but I passed
over certain considerations which I will now draw attention to.

(123) If we read a book which contains incredible or impossible narratives,
or is written in a very obscure style, and if we know nothing of its author,
nor of the time or occasion of its being written, we shall vainly endeavour
to gain any certain knowledge of its true meaning. (124) For being in
ignorance on these points we cannot possibly know the aim or intended aim of
the author; if we are fully informed, we so order our thoughts as not to be
in any way prejudiced either in ascribing to the author or him for whom the
author wrote either more or less than his meaning, and we only take into
consideration what the author may have had in his mind, or what the time and
occasion demanded. (125) I think this must be tolerably evident to all.

(126) It often happens that in different books we read histories in
themselves similar, but which we judge very differently, according to the
opinions we have formed of the authors. (127) I remember once to have read
in some book that a man named Orlando Furioso used to drive a kind of winged
monster through the air, fly over any countries he liked, kill unaided vast
numbers of men and giants, and such like fancies, which from the point of
view of reason are obviously absurd. (128) A very similar story I read in
Ovid of Perseus, and also in the books of Judges and Kings of Samson, who
alone and unarmed killed thousands of men, and of Elijah, who flew through
the air, said at last went up to heaven in a chariot of fire, with horses of
fire. (129) All these stories are obviously alike, but we judge them very
differently. (130) The first only sought to amuse, the second had a
political object, the third a religious object.(131) We gather this simply
from the opinions we had previously formed of the authors. (132) Thus it
is evidently necessary to know something of the authors of writings which
are obscure or unintelligible, if we would interpret their meaning; and for
the same reason, in order to choose the proper reading from among a great
variety, we ought to have information as to the versions in which the
differences are found, and as to the possibility of other readings having
been discovered by persons of greater authority.

(133) A further difficulty attends this method in the case of some of the
books of Scripture, namely, that they are no longer extant in their original
language. (133) The Gospel according to Matthew, and certainly the Epistle
to the Hebrews, were written, it is thought, in Hebrew, though they no
longer exist in that form. (134) Aben Ezra affirms in his commentaries that
the book of Job was translated into Hebrew out of another language, and that
its obscurity arises from this fact. (135) I say nothing of the apocryphal
books, for their authority stands on very inferior ground.

(136) The foregoing difficulties in this method of interpreting Scripture
from its own history, I conceive to be so great that I do not hesitate to
say that the true meaning of Scripture is in many places inexplicable, or at
best mere subject for guesswork; but I must again point out, on the other
hand, that such difficulties only arise when we endeavour to follow the
meaning of a prophet in matters which cannot be perceived, but only
imagined, not in things, whereof the understanding can give a clear idea,
and which are conceivable through themselves:, [Endnote 8], matters which by
their nature are easily perceived cannot be expressed so obscurely as to be
unintelligible; as the proverb says, "a word is enough to the wise." (137)
Euclid, who only wrote of matters very simple and easily understood, can
easily be comprehended by anyone in any language; we can follow his
intention perfectly, and be certain of his true meaning, without having a
thorough knowledge of the language in which he wrote; in fact, a quite
rudimentary acquaintance is sufficient. (138) We need make no researches
concerning the life, the pursuits, or the habits of the author; nor need we
inquire in what language, nor when he wrote, nor the vicissitudes of his
book, nor its various readings, nor how, nor by whose advice it has been
received.

(139) What we here say of Euclid might equally be said of any book which
treats of things by their nature perceptible: thus we conclude that we can
easily follow the intention of Scripture in moral questions, from the
history we possess of it, and we can be sure of its true meaning.

(140) The precepts of true piety are expressed in very ordinary language,
and are equally simple and easily understood. (141) Further, as true
salvation and blessedness consist in a true assent of the soul - and we
truly assent only to what we clearly understand - it is most plain that we
can follow with certainty the intention of Scripture in matters relating to
salvation and necessary to blessedness; therefore, we need not be much
troubled about what remains: such matters, inasmuch as we generally cannot
grasp them with our reason and understanding, are more curious than
profitable.

(142) I think I have now set forth the true method of Scriptural
interpretation, and have sufficiently explained my own opinion thereon.
(143) Besides, I do not doubt that everyone will see that such a method only
requires the aid of natural reason. (144) The nature and efficacy of the
natural reason consists in deducing and proving the unknown from the known,
or in carrying premises to their legitimate conclusions; and these are the
very processes which our method desiderates. (145) Though we must admit that
it does not suffice to explain everything in the Bible, such imperfection
does not spring from its own nature, but from the fact that the path
which it teaches us, as the true one, has never been tended or trodden by
men, and has thus, by the lapse of time, become very difficult, and almost
impassable, as, indeed, I have shown in the difficulties I draw attention
to.

(146) There only remains to examine the opinions of those who differ from
me. (147) The first which comes under our notice is, that the light of
nature has no power to interpret Scripture, but that a supernatural faculty
is required for the task. (148) What is meant by this supernatural faculty I
will leave to its propounders to explain. (149) Personally, I can only
suppose that they have adopted a very obscure way of stating their complete
uncertainty about the true meaning of Scripture. (150) If we look at their
interpretations, they contain nothing supernatural, at least nothing but the
merest conjectures.

(151) Let them be placed side by side with the interpretations of those who
frankly confess that they have no faculty beyond their natural ones; we
shall see that the two are just alike - both human, both long pondered over,
both laboriously invented. (152) To say that the natural reason is
insufficient for such results is plainly untrue, firstly, for the reasons
above stated, namely, that the difficulty of interpreting Scripture arises
from no defect in human reason, but simply from the carelessness (not to say
malice) of men who neglected the history of the Bible while there were still
materials for inquiry; secondly, from the fact (admitted, I think, by all)
that the supernatural faculty is a Divine gift granted only to the faithful.
(153) But the prophets and apostles did not preach to the faithful only, but
chiefly to the unfaithful and wicked. (154) Such persons, therefore, were
able to understand the intention of the prophets and apostles, otherwise the
prophets and apostles would have seemed to be preaching to little boys and
infants, not to men endowed with reason. (155) Moses, too, would have given
his laws in vain, if they could only be comprehended by the faithful, who
need no law. (156) Indeed, those who demand supernatural faculties for
comprehending the meaning of the prophets and apostles seem truly lacking in
natural faculties, so that we should hardly suppose such persons the
possessors of a Divine supernatural gift.

(157) The opinion of Maimonides was widely different. (158) He asserted
that each passage in Scripture admits of various, nay, contrary,
meanings; but that we could never be certain of any particular one till we
knew that the passage, as we interpreted it, contained nothing contrary or
repugnant to reason. (159) If the literal meaning clashes with reason,
though the passage seems in itself perfectly clear, it must be interpreted
in some metaphorical sense. (160) This doctrine he lays down very plainly in
chap. xxv. part ii. of his book, "More Nebuchim," for he says: "Know that we
shrink not from affirming that the world hath existed from eternity,
because of what Scripture saith concerning the world's creation. (161) For
the texts which teach that the world was created are not more in number than
those which teach that God hath a body; neither are the approaches in this
matter of the world's creation closed, or even made hard to us: so that we
should not be able to explain what is written, as we did when we showed
that God hath no body, nay, peradventure, we could explain and make fast the
doctrine of the world's eternity more easily than we did away with the
doctrines that God hath a beatified body. (162) Yet two things hinder me
from doing as I have said, and believing that the world is eternal.
(163) As it hath been clearly shown that God hath not a body, we must
perforce explain all those passages whereof the literal sense agreeth not
with the demonstration, for sure it is that they can be so explained. (164)
But the eternity of the world hath not been so demonstrated, therefore
it is not necessary to do violence to Scripture in support of some common
opinion, whereof we might, at the bidding of reason, embrace the contrary."

(165) Such are the words of Maimonides, and they are evidently sufficient to
establish our point: for if he had been convinced by reason that the world
is eternal, he would not have hesitated to twist and explain away the words
of Scripture till he made them appear to teach this doctrine. (166) He would
have felt quite sure that Scripture, though everywhere plainly denying the
eternity of the world, really intends to teach it. (167) So that, however
clear the meaning of Scripture may be, he would not feel certain of having
grasped it, so long as he remained doubtful of the truth of what, was
written. (168) For we are in doubt whether a thing is in conformity with
reason, or contrary thereto, so long as we are uncertain of its truth,
and, consequently, we cannot be sure whether the literal meaning of a
passage be true or false.

(169) If such a theory as this were sound, I would certainly grant that some
faculty beyond the natural reason is required for interpreting Scripture.
(170) For nearly all things that we find in Scripture cannot be inferred
from known principles of the natural reason, and, therefore, we should be
unable to come to any conclusion about their truth, or about the real
meaning and intention of Scripture, but should stand in need of some
further assistance.

(171) Further, the truth of this theory would involve that the masses,
having generally no comprehension of, nor leisure for, detailed proofs,
would be reduced to receiving all their knowledge of Scripture on the
authority and testimony of philosophers, and, consequently, would be
compelled to suppose that the interpretations given by philosophers were
infallible.

(172) Truly this would be a new form of ecclesiastical authority, and a new
sort of priests or pontiffs, more likely to excite men's ridicule than their
veneration. (173) Certainly our method demands a knowledge of Hebrew for
which the masses have no leisure; but no such objection as the foregoing can
be brought against us. (174) For the ordinary Jews or Gentiles, to whom the
prophets and apostles preached and wrote, understood the language, and,
consequently, the intention of the prophet or apostle addressing them; but
they did not grasp the intrinsic reason of what was preached, which,
according to Maimonides, would be necessary for an understanding of it.

(175) There is nothing, then, in our method which renders it necessary that
the masses should follow the testimony of commentators, for I point to a set
of unlearned people who understood the language of the prophets and
apostles; whereas Maimonides could not point to any such who could arrive at
the prophetic or apostolic meaning through their knowledge of the causes
of things.

(176) As to the multitude of our own time, we have shown that whatsoever is
necessary to salvation, though its reasons may be unknown, can easily be
understood in any language, because it is thoroughly ordinary and usual; it
is in such understanding as this that the masses acquiesce, not in the
testimony of commentators; with regard to other questions, the ignorant and
the learned fare alike.

(177) But let us return to the opinion of Maimonides, and examine it more
closely. In the first place, he supposes that the prophets were in entire
agreement one with another, and that they were consummate philosophers and
theologians; for he would have them to have based their conclusions on the
absolute truth. (178) Further, he supposes that the sense of Scripture
cannot be made plain from Scripture itself, for the truth of things is not
made plain therein (in that it does not prove any thing, nor teach the
matters of which it speaks through their definitions and first causes),
therefore, according to Maimonides, the true sense of Scripture cannot be
made plain from itself, and must not be there sought.

(179) The falsity of such a doctrine is shown in this very chapter, for we
have shown both by reason and examples that the meaning of Scripture is only
made plain through Scripture itself, and even in questions deducible from
ordinary knowledge should be looked for from no other source.

(180) Lastly, such a theory supposes that we may explain the words of
Scripture according to our preconceived opinions, twisting them about, and
reversing or completely changing the literal sense, however plain it may be.
(181) Such licence is utterly opposed to the teaching of this and the
preceding chapters, and, moreover, will be evident to everyone as rash and
excessive.

(182) But if we grant all this licence, what can it effect after all?
Absolutely nothing. (183) Those things which cannot be demonstrated, and
which make up the greater part of Scripture, cannot be examined by reason,
and cannot therefore be explained or interpreted by this rule; whereas,
on the contrary, by following our own method, we can explain many questions
of this nature, and discuss them on a sure basis, as we have already shown,
by reason and example. (184) Those matters which are by their nature
comprehensible we can easily explain, as has been pointed out, simply by
means of the context.

(185) Therefore, the method of Maimonides is clearly useless: to which we
may add, that it does away with all the certainty which the masses acquire
by candid reading, or which is gained by any other persons in any other way.
(186) In conclusion, then, we dismiss Maimonides' theory as harmful,
useless, and absurd.

(187) As to the tradition of the Pharisees, we have already shown that it is
not consistent, while the authority of the popes of Rome stands in need of
more credible evidence; the latter, indeed, I reject simply on this ground,
for if the popes could point out to us the meaning of Scripture as surely as
did the high priests of the Jews, I should not be deterred by the fact that
there have been heretic and impious Roman pontiffs; for among the Hebrew
high-priests of old there were also heretics and impious men who gained the
high- priesthood by improper means, but who, nevertheless, had Scriptural
sanction for their supreme power of interpreting the law. (See
Deut. xvii:11, 12, and xxxiii:10, also Malachi ii:8.)

(188) However, as the popes can show no such sanction, their authority
remains open to very grave doubt, nor should anyone be deceived by the
example of the Jewish high-priests and think that the Catholic religion also
stands in need of a pontiff; he should bear in mind that the laws of Moses
being also the ordinary laws of the country, necessarily required some
public authority to insure their observance; for, if everyone were free to
interpret the laws of his country as he pleased, no state could stand, but
would for that very reason be dissolved at once, and public rights would
become private rights.

(189) With religion the case is widely different. Inasmuch as it consists
not so much in outward actions as in simplicity and truth of character, it
stands outside the sphere of law and public authority. (190) Simplicity and
truth of character are not produced by the constraint of laws, nor by
the authority of the state, no one the whole world over can be forced or
legislated into a state of blessedness; the means required for such a
consummation are faithful and brotherly admonition, sound education, and,
above all, free use of the individual judgment.

(191) Therefore, as the supreme right of free thinking, even on religion, is
in every man's power, and as it is inconceivable that such power could be
alienated, it is also in every man's power to wield the supreme right and
authority of free judgment in this behalf, and to explain and interpret
religion for himself. (192) The only reason for vesting the supreme
authority in the interpretation of law, and judgment on public affairs in
the hands of the magistrates, is that it concerns questions of public right.
(193) Similarly the supreme authority in explaining religion, and in passing
judgment thereon, is lodged with the individual because it concerns
questions of individual right. (194) So far, then, from the authority of the
Hebrew high-priests telling in confirmation of the authority of the Roman
pontiffs to interpret religion, it would rather tend to establish individual
freedom of judgment. (195) Thus in this way also, we have shown that our
method of interpreting Scripture is the best. (196) For as the highest power
of Scriptural interpretation belongs to every man, the rule for such
interpretation should be nothing but the natural light of reason which is
common to all - not any supernatural light nor any external authority;
moreover, such a rule ought not to be so difficult that it can only be
applied by very skilful philosophers, but should be adapted to the natural
and ordinary faculties and capacity of mankind. (197) And such I have shown
our method to be, for such difficulties as it has arise from men's
carelessness, and are no part of its nature.





CHAPTER VIII.  -  OF THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE PENTATEUCH AND THE OTHER
HISTORICAL BOOKS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

(1) In the former chapter we treated of the foundations and principles of
Scriptural knowledge, and showed that it consists solely in a trustworthy
history of the sacred writings; such a history, in spite of its
indispensability, the ancients neglected, or at any rate, whatever they may
have written or handed down has perished in the lapse of time, consequently
the groundwork for such an investigation is to a great extent, cut from
under us. (2) This might be put up with if succeeding generations had
confined themselves within the limits of truth, and had handed down
conscientiously what few particulars they had received or discovered without
any additions from their own brains: as it is, the history of the Bible is
not so much imperfect as untrustworthy: the foundations are not only too
scanty for building upon, but are also unsound. (3) It is part of my purpose
to remedy these defects, and to remove common theological prejudices. (4)
But I fear that I am attempting my task too late, for men have arrived at
the pitch of not suffering contradiction, but defending obstinately whatever
they have adopted under the name of religion. (5) So widely have these
prejudices taken possession of men's minds, that very few, comparatively
speaking, will listen to reason. (6) However, I will make the attempt, and
spare no efforts, for there is no positive reason for despairing of success.

(7) In order to treat the subject methodically, I will begin with the
received opinions concerning the true authors of the sacred books, and in
the first place, speak of the author of the Pentateuch, who is almost
universally supposed to have been Moses. (8) The Pharisees are so firmly
convinced of his identity, that they account as a heretic anyone who differs
from them on the subject. (9) Wherefore, Aben Ezra, a man of enlightened
intelligence, and no small learning, who was the first, so far as I know,
to treat of this opinion, dared not express his meaning openly, but confined
himself to dark hints which I shall not scruple to elucidate, thus throwing,
full light on the subject.

(10) The words of Aben Ezra which occur in his commentary on Deuteronomy are
as follows: "Beyond Jordan, &c . . . If so be that thou understandest the
mystery of the twelve . . .  moreover Moses wrote the law . . .  The
Canaanite was then in the land . . . . it shall be revealed on the mount of
God . . . . then also behold his bed, his iron bed, then shalt thou know
the truth." (11) In these few words he hints, and also shows that it was not
Moses who wrote the Pentateuch, but someone who lived long after him, and
further, that the book which Moses wrote was something different from any
now extant.

(12) To prove this, I say, he draws attention to the facts:

(13) 1. That the preface to Deuteronomy could not have been written by
Moses, inasmuch as he ad never crossed the Jordan.

(14) II. That the whole book of Moses was written at full length on the
circumference of a single altar (Deut. xxvii, and Josh. viii:37), which
altar, according to the Rabbis, consisted of only twelve stones: therefore
the book of Moses must have been of far less extent than the Pentateuch.
(15) This is what our author means, I think, by the mystery of the twelve,
unless he is referring to the twelve curses contained in the chapter of
Deuteronomy above cited, which he thought could not have been contained in
the law, because Moses bade the Levites read them after the recital of the
law, and so bind the people to its observance. (16) Or again, he may have
had in his mind the last chapter of Deuteronomy which treats of the death of
Moses, and which contains twelve verses. (17) But there is no need to dwell
further on these and similar conjectures.

(18) III. That in Deut. xxxi:9, the expression occurs, "and Moses wrote the
law:" words that cannot be ascribed to Moses, but must be those of some
other writer narrating the deeds and writings of Moses.

(19) IV. That in Genesis xii:6, the historian, after narrating that Abraham
journeyed through the and of Canaan, adds, "and the Canaanite was then in
the land," thus clearly excluding the time at which he wrote. (20) So that
this passage must have been written after the death of Moses, when the
Canaanites had been driven out, and no longer possessed the land.

(21) Aben Ezra, in his commentary on the passage, alludes to the difficulty
as follows:- "And the Canaanite was then in the land: it appears that
Canaan, the grandson of Noah, took from another the land which bears his
name; if this be not the true meaning, there lurks some mystery in the
passage, and let him who understands it keep silence." (22) That is, if
Canaan invaded those regions, the sense will be, the Canaanite was then in
the land, in contradistinction to the time when it had been held by another:
but if, as follows from Gen. chap. x. Canaan was the first to inhabit the
land, the text must mean to exclude the time present, that is the time at
which it was written; therefore it cannot be the work of Moses, in
whose time the Canaanites still possessed those territories: this is the
mystery concerning which silence is recommended.

(23) V. That in Genesis xxii:14 Mount Moriah is called the mount of God,
[Endnote 9], a name which it did not acquire till after the building of the
Temple; the choice of the mountain was not made in the time of Moses, for
Moses does not point out any spot as chosen by God; on the contrary, he
foretells that God will at some future time choose a spot to which this name
will be given.

(24) VI. Lastly, that in Deut. chap. iii., in the passage relating to Og,
king of Bashan, these words are inserted: "For only Og king of Bashan
remained of the remnant of giants: behold, his bedstead was a bedstead of
iron: is it not in Rabbath of the children of Ammon? nine cubits was the
length thereof, and four cubits the breadth of it, after the cubit of a
man." (25) This parenthesis most plainly shows that its writer lived long
after Moses; for this mode of speaking is only employed by one treating of
things long past, and pointing to relics for the sake of gaining credence:
moreover, this bed was almost certainly first discovered by David, who
conquered the city of Rabbath (2 Sam. xii:30.) (26) Again, the historian a
little further on inserts after the words of Moses, "Jair, the son of
Manasseh, took all the country of Argob unto the coasts of Geshuri and
Maachathi; and called them after his own name, Bashan-havoth-jair, unto this
day." (27) This passage, I say, is inserted to explain the words of Moses
which precede it. (28) "And the rest of Gilead, and all Bashan, being the
kingdom of Og, gave I unto the half tribe of Manasseh; all the region of
Argob, with all Bashan, which is called the land of the giants." (29) The
Hebrews in the time of the writer indisputably knew what territories
belonged to the tribe of Judah, but did not know them under the name of the
jurisdiction of Argob, or the land of the giants. (30) Therefore the writer
is compelled to explain what these places were which were anciently so
styled, and at the same time to point out why they were at the time of his
writing known by the name of Jair, who was of the tribe of Manasseh, not of
Judah. (31) We have thus made clear the meaning of Aben Ezra and also the
passages of the Pentateuch which he cites in proof of his contention. (32)
However, Aben Ezra does not call attention to every instance, or even the
chief ones; there remain many of greater importance, which may be cited.
(33) Namely (I.), that the writer of the books in question not only speaks
of Moses in the third person, but also bears witness to many details
concerning him; for instance, "Moses talked with God;" "The Lord spoke with
Moses face to face; " "Moses was the meekest of men" (Numb. xii:3); "Moses
was wrath with the captains of the host; "Moses, the man of God, "Moses, the
servant of the Lord, died;" "There was never a prophet in Israel like
unto Moses," &c. (34) On the other hand, in Deuteronomy, where the law which
Moses had expounded to the people and written is set forth, Moses speaks and
declares what he has done in the first person: "God spake with me " (Deut.
ii:1, 17, &c.), "I prayed to the Lord," &c. (35) Except at the end of the
book, when the historian, after relating the words of Moses, begins again to
speak in the third person, and to tell how Moses handed over the law which
he had expounded to the people in writing, again admonishing them, and
further, how Moses ended his life. (36) All these details, the manner of
narration, the testimony, and the context of the whole story lead to the
plain conclusion that these books were written by another, and not by Moses
in person.

(37) III. We must also remark that the history relates not only the manner
of Moses' death and burial, and the thirty days' mourning of the Hebrews,
but further compares him with all the prophets who came after him, and
states that he surpassed them all. (38) "There was never a prophet in Israel
like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face." (39) Such testimony
cannot have been given of Moses by, himself, nor by any who immediately
succeeded him, but it must come from someone who lived centuries afterwards,
especially, as the historian speaks of past times. (40) "There was never a
prophet," &c. (41) And of the place of burial, "No one knows it to this
day."

(42) III. We must note that some places are not styled by the names they
bore during Moses' lifetime, but by others which they obtained subsequently.
(43) For instance, Abraham is said to have pursued his enemies even unto
Dan, a name not bestowed on the city till long after the death of Joshua
(Gen. xiv;14, Judges xviii;29).